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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question: why do ostensibly similar 
ethno-national conflicts within a system of settler-colonial domination see such wide 
variation in their outcomes? How they emerge from conflict through power sharing and 
social integration versus the endurance of separation and systems of domination and 
control? The study identifies causal paths that resulted in the decline of domination 
systems of this type.  
Ethno-national conflicts that feature certain similarities develop in different trajectories 
due to certain conditions that culminate in transforming the structures of these conflicts 
towards integration (the establishment of a single political entity) or separation 
(independence in separate entities). The goal of the dissertation is to examine the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict through a comparative lens in order to specify the conditions 
that led to the persistence of the two-state solution and to examine the prevalence or lack 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of a one civic-democratic state.  
Building on the comparative approach I argue that ethno-national territorial 
underpinnings of the conflict and the “regimes of territorial legitimation” of the dominant 
group are the most crucial explanatory factor in determining the trajectory and outcome 
of the conflict. “Regimes of territorial legitimation” are the practices, procedures, systems 
of meaning, and institutional designs that found the relationship between a nation, people, 
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or ethno-national group and geography/territory. The dissertation features a qualitative 
structured and focused comparison of the conflicts in South Africa, and Palestine. 
Method of difference is applied for a case-oriented interpretive inquiry that focuses on 
the complexity of each of the two cases and aims at capturing the historical diversity of 
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Patterns of ethno-national conflicts: Divergence and convergence 
Ethno-national conflicts show similar characteristics and patterns as protracted, 
violence, and persistent. Examples of these conflicts can be found in Europe, Asia, and 
Africa.  All of which challenge the established nation-states and their political as well as 
geographical boundaries. Research on the phenomenon is ample and diverse. Main 
features and patterns of these conflicts are similar, their trajectories, however, vary. Gurr 
and Harff identify two main kinds of ethno-national groups on the bases of their political 
demands; “collectivities that demand representation within the state they live in, and 
separatists – groups who demand autonomy from the state that rules them (Cited in Ben-
Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010:  3). 
 In general the trends these conflicts have shown, especially in the last two decades, 
towards separation indicates the irreconcilability of some national demands for 
sovereignty and independence. However; in some other cases a reverse trend prevails and 
leads to a variety of shared and integrated polities; South Africa is a cases in 
consideration. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict in its current state of affairs exhibits these 
opposing trends and patterns. The conflict is in a stalemate or more specifically has been 
in an interregnum where the Israeli military occupation is still as valid and vibrant as it 
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has been for decades while a pseudo authority was established apart from accomplishing 
the Palestinian aim of national self-determination and statehood. What accounts for this 
divergence of outcomes of similar conflicts? In other words: why do some ethno-national 
conflicts terminate in unitary political entities (integration) and others in various forms of 
autonomy or power-sharing while other end in separation; what causes this divergence?  
Looking at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from the perspective of ethno-national 
conflicts this research examines the developments of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a 
trajectory that has led until today to the persistent of the two-state approach.  Although 
profound changes in the properties of the conflict have accumulated specific conditions 
ostensibly conducive to a One-State outcome the separation rather than the integration 
agenda gains supremacy. In other words, the conflict is fixated on ethno-national 
territorial underpinnings whereby democratization is excluded from political and 
diplomatic agenda as well as from public debate. In this sense liberation based on ethno-
territorial determinants has excluded democratization. What are the conditions that 
culminated in the persistence of separation and ethno-national territorial aspects of the 
conflict? Although it stands at odds with international and domestic consensus on the 
two-state solution as the acceptable outcome of the conflict, the one-state agenda merits 
systematic examination as to its plausibility and attainability, let alone its normative 
appeal. The contradictions inherited in the two-state solution, namely the discrepancy 
between reality on the ground and the political vision of separation is a key issue in the 
debate over the One versus the Two State solution to the conflict. It reflects the push and 
pull factors that may lead to the implementation of the right of national self-
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determination and independence or, alternatively, to diverse types of self-rule, autonomy 
or unitary states. This is not unique to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; similar conflicts 
show the same contradictions.  
A good starting point to answering this question lies in the very definition of ethno-
national conflicts and ethno-nationality. Ethnic-nationality is defined as “a common 
identity of a group based upon perceptions among members of the group and 
nonmembers”, therefore it has subjective and objective aspects that are ingrained in their 
identity (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010:  3). The fact that ethno-nationalism 
encompasses tangible and intangible elements that establishe the common characteristics 
that homogenize the group and unify it makes the concept hard to discern. Ethno-national 
conflict, therefore are elusive to explain and to resolution: the factors and forces the one 
may consider explaining ethno-national conflicts are enormous. There is no single factor 
that has the capacity to account for the phenomenon. Some studies emphasize the 
foundation and formation of the modern nation state (e.g. Amdife and Warhola 1993 on 
the African context) others focus on the decomposition of the state and civic 
configurations (e.g. Noutcheva and Tocci 2004 on the European cases). Studies also 
examine the prospects of ethno-national conflicts in traditional societies (e.g. Kloit 1989 
on the Mediterranean ethnic conflicts) While some research (e.g. Mychajlyszyn 2001 and 
Sanz 1994) is dedicated to discern ethno-nationalism in Post-Soviet republic. Moreover, 
there are a number of studies that attempt to understand the phenomenon from the 
perspective of political systems especially the Parliamentary system and it role in 
accommodating ethnic plurality (e.g. Tse-min Lin 201). More to do with this research, 
4 
 
some studies focus the attention on the role of territory in the conflict (e.g. Yiftachail 
2002), while others focus on the protractibility of ethno-national conflicts and its 
implications (e.g. Yehuda and Mishali Ram 2006), and the demographic effects 
(Cederman 2009) whereas some research examines the international links and 
protractibility of these conflicts (e.g. Mishali Ram 2006). There exists a wide agreement 
in those studies that ethno-national peoples/groups are those who contend the state with 
political demands; political relevancy of a group or a people is central for its emergence 
as an ethno-nationality (Gurr, cited in Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010:  3). Drawing 
on these previous efforts this dissertation presents the premises of our inquiry to 
demarcate the conceptual terrain of our research that introduces certain factors that have 
not been fully, or at all, examined by previous research.  This research departs from these 
conceptual propositions:  
• In ethno-national conflicts within a settler-colonial setting, territorial and spatial 
underpinnings play the most crucial role in determining the trajectory of the conflict and 
its outcome. The political geography of the conflict and its relationship with identity offer 
a plausible explanation of the divergence of outcome these conflicts exhibit; and     
• Territorial-national nexus and the ‘regimes of territorial legetimation’ it relies on 
determine the conflict’s patterns of domination and exclusion-inclusion. Conditions of 
either integration or separation emerge from the structures of domination and exclusion-
inclusion that shape the main properties of the conflict. Systems of settler-colonial 
domination premised on ethno-territorial exclusion obtain a high degree of sustainability 
and durability due to their integral nature; and  
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• Both ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ and structures of domination that serve 
their persistence are subject to internal dynamics of change and transformation as well as 
external influences. The most important among which are: the characteristics and 
political strategy of the challenging ethno-national group/people, and international 
legetimation or delegitimation of a certain definition of the ethno-territorial 
underpinnings of an accepted outcome.   
The conflicts in South Africa and Palestine offer a rich illustration to these interrelated 
and combined factors. As ethno-national conflicts they are characterized with the 
persistent pursuit of self-determination for the subordinate groups, the Africans and the 
Palestinians peoples.  Ethno-nationalism represents the ties that bound a group of people 
that has “a common origin and ‘tribal’ [kinship ties] affiliation of its members, a shared 
history, culture, language, and, most often, a common dominant religion” (Klein 
2010:10).  The interrelatedness between these factors makes particular ethnic 
peoples/groups politically significant and relevant; they pursue political goals and they 
are politically mobilized and organized to achieve these goals.  Different aspects of these 
conflicts and their multidimensionality and inter-group splits do not make them less 
ethno-national (Connor 1990: 19). Moreover, inter-group splits may be a result of the 
conflicts’ politics and internal rivalries and competitions over the most appropriate means 
to achieve independence or autonomy; they do not necessarily imply different 
interpretations of the underlying stakes of the conflict. For instance, although religious 
beliefs have a clear correlation with national identity especially in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, it is fundamentally a struggle over national identity, territory, and civil rights. In 
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South Africa the complexity of the conflict and the different affiliations of the adversaries 
do not undermine the comparability to the other conflicts in terms of its clear ethno-
national dimension (Conor 1990: 20-21). To be sure, ethno-nationalism was prevalent 
and turned the conflicts into protracted and complicated struggles for the realization of 
national identity and self-determination, which makes forging a single national 
consciousness rather less likely taking into account their ethno-national rigidity.  
The establishment of a unitary state under this condition seems less likely. Indeed, 
when the conflict implies aggressive and violent struggle between two imagined or real 
national identities it becomes rather elusive to attain an integrative outcome of the 
conflict as the protagonists see the existence of one as the negation of the other. The 
struggle in this case is ostensibly a zero-sum game whereby the achievement of one’s 
national goals implies vanquishing the other.  
Ethno-national conflicts of the type discussed in this research are multi-dimensional, 
protracted (and at some point intractable), they reflect endemic asymmetrical power 
relationships and identity struggles; these features result in violence and bitter 
antagonism between opposing groups” (Nic Craith 2002:12) in which subordinate groups’ 
demand for self-determination represents group’s persistent sought for political 
recognition as a collective national.  Thus, national movements in both settings waged 
their struggle against the state for the achievement of self-determination for their peoples. 
More to the purpose of this research, the divergence in outcome of the two cases is 
striking and merits systematic examination of the conditions that created it. Whereas 
Africans’ self-determination in South Africa was uplifted within a democratic liberation 
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struggle namely, the achievement of civic self-determination, the Palestinian struggle 
developed in the sought of national self-determination (theoretical treatment of the 
national versus civic self determination is illustrated in chapter II). A cursory look at the 
current state of the Israeli –Palestinian conflict set the stage for articulating the 
parameters of the research, the logic of comparison, and research methodology that 
follow.     
 
Reshaping ethno-territoriality in Palestine 
 
The two-state solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is in a structural impasse: 
While the existence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is circumscribed and crippled by 
Israel’s military domination, the territorial and spatial domain of the Palestinian state is 
shrinking by Israeli colonial settlement expansion. During 1990s-2000s the Palestinian-
Israeli protracted conflict has entered an era of stalemate under the auspices of Oslo 
agreements
1
. The agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) developed in a protracted “peace process”
2
  in which Israeli occupation has 
rearranged its domination over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), and the PLO 
turned into an authority whereas its declared objectives were not achieved especially 
                                                          
1





 The term refers to the protracted negotiating rounds between the two parties; PLO and Israel since 1993. 
The phrase, as William B. Quandt (2005) correctly indicates, is used to describe the USA approach to the 
Arab and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This approach is characterized by a gradual step-by-step- strategy to 
resolve this conflict. USA diplomacy in this regard focuses more on the process than on the substance of 
the issues at stake; how to resolve these issues rather than what substantively should be done. 
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national self-determination. As Klein (2010) notices the Oslo process has turned the 
conflict into a struggle over borders between two, supposedly distinct political and legal 
entities rather than a struggle over national self-determination.  
However, following the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000; Israel conquered and took 
over the areas under the Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction, which reversed the conflict 
dynamics back to their ethno-national territorial properties as a struggle for national self-
determination. Taking into account Israel’s continued control over most of the OPT and 
the enclavization of the Palestinians within major residential areas (main cities) coupled 
colonial settlement expansion, the realization of a Palestinian independent sovereign state 
has become more elusive.  
Nonetheless, the two-state outcome remains the targeted, and negotiated, outcome of 
the conflict. It represents Palestinians’ political and national aspiration for self-
determination on OPT as declared by the PLO in1974and in 1988 as we discuss in 
Chapter IX. This outcome receives Israeli formal acceptance and international 
community’s endorsement.  Moreover, it seems that the validity of the two-state outcome 
derives strength as it provides both adversaries with what they are seeking: independence 
for the Palestinians and disengagement from the Palestinian population for the Israelis. 
The latter understanding of this outcome complicates a compromise that may lead to the 
achievement of a sovereign Palestinian state: disengagement from the population while 
controlling the territory renders this outcome meaningless. 
International legitimation of the two-state solution reflects international rejection of 
Israel’s military occupation of the OPT since 1967. The legitimacy Israel gained for its 
9 
 
territorial boundaries is enshrined the United Nation Resolution 181 of 1947 that 
partitioned Palestine in two states; Jewish and Arab. Therefore, Israel’s occupation of 
1967 remains illegal and the resolution 181 is still the legal basis for Israel’s existence. 
Thus   Israel “has not been able to induce widespread acceptance of the de facto 
extension of its borders achieved through its victory in the 1967 war” (Farer 2008: 181), 
which maintains the status of the OPT as subject to relevant international covenants on 
self-determination and belligerent occupation.  In reality, though, Israeli authorities 
practice the power of a sovereign authority in large parts of the OPT. Thus, inasmuch as 
the establishment of a Palestinian state is a subject of an apparent consensus and  many 
UN resolutions and other International covenants and laws
3
, it seems today far away from 
reality.   
The establishment of a Palestinian state under Israel’ control of most the area of the 
OPT creates a chasm between territorial integrity essential for the realization of statehood 
and the right of national self-determination; two inextricably linked aspects of modern 
                                                          
3
 For example, when the International Court of Justice conducted its legal proceedings In July 2002 on 
Israel's apartheid wall on the West Bank, the World Court invited the State of Palestine to participate in 
the proceedings. In other words, the International Court of Justice recognized the State of Palestine. The 
ICJ ruled that the Israeli Wall is illegal. The ICJ justified its rule by recognizing that “the construction of the 
wall and its regime create a fait accompli on the ground…it would be tantamount to de facto annexation” 
of large areas of the OPT. This legal foundation of a Palestinian state was created long before the ICJ rule. 
For example the UN security Council, in resolution 465 (1980) stressed that “all measures taken by Israel 
to change [any aspect or feature] of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967…have 
no legal validity…and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting 
peace in the Middle east”(Abunimah 2006: 32-36). 
Palestine has Observer State Status with the United Nations Organization, and basically all the rights of a 
U.N. Member State except the right to vote. Effectively, Palestine has de facto U.N. Membership. These 
manifestations have their roots in the U.N. General Assembly's Partition Resolution 181(II) of 1947 that 
called for the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state in the Mandate Palestine. Furthermore,  it is a 
widely accepted position that Palestinian people has a fundamental right to self-determination as 
recognized by the United Nations Charter and general principles of public international law, and that 
Israeli military occupation of the OPT is subject to the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949. 
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statehood. It is a well-established principle in international law that the nation determines 
the future and the political form of the region/territory not the opposite (Falk 2000: 47).  
Moreover, behind this principle there exists as well a  
“power moral concern, namely the creation of the conditions that enable people to give 
coherent shape to their sense of collective identity…A gathering of people in place to 
which they have been randomly or arbitrarily assigned, cannot accomplish that” (Farer 
2008:182).  
Israeli control over the territory and space of the OPT prevents Palestinians’ ability to 
form, sustain, and develop this collective right without which a state would be a mere 
construct void of meaning and at best a client state (See Khan, Giacaman 2004: 4-6, 50-
53 and 112-115) whereby Palestinians can enjoy the trappings of sovereignty and some 
symbolism of statehood while Israel maintains actual control and sovereignty over the 
territory. The requirements of the establishment of a sovereign nation-state are missing in 
this blueprint. As Aruri (2003: 174) rightfully stresses, a state  
without sovereignty, without geographic continuity, and without control over its 
borders, airspace, and economic and water resources… In fact it would be a 
state within Israel, but not alongside Israel.  
A Palestinian state under these circumstances would be a bi-furcated state that 
enjoys no more real autonomy than has South African Bantustans” (Fare 2008: 188). 
However, while the Bantustan policy in South Africa was defeated in favor of none-racial 
and ethnically neutral democracy, it prevails in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a proxy 
for separation and Palestinian statehood. This research aims at answering this question 




Parameters of the Study 
 
Ethno-national conflicts are classified, in a broader sense in ways that assist interpreting 
their properties. Heraclides, for example, presented a detailed classification of ethno-
national armed conflicts that range from irredentist to secessionist and separatist 
autonomous movements (Cited in Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram 2010: 4). These cases 
represent a larger universe of similar cases of ethno-national conflicts with diverse 
outcomes that range from realizing the principle and right of national self-determination 
and independence to the creation of a unitary democratic state and in between these two 
extremes. This classification of ethno-national conflicts serves as a leading analytical tool 
to explaining their paths.  Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2007: 6,42, 43)detailed study on power-
sharing and power-dividing institutions after the termination of civil wars includes a 
useful resource to learn about the dynamics that may lead to this type or another of 
outcomes of a conflict. Among thirty-eight conflicts they have examined between1945-
1999 they identify but few cases resulted in extensively or highly institutionalized 
integrative political entities; South Africa stands as a leading example. The model, 
inasmuch as it provides us with important insight to the similarities and differences 
between conflicts included in this research, it is limited to power-sharing/power-dividing 
negotiated outcomes whereas the comparison in this study seeks explanations of ethno-
national conflicts, which travels beyond civil wars and power-sharing treatments. It 
examines a broader phenomenon and more varied results.  From the establishment of a 
Federal Constitutional Republic in Nigeria in 1960 to the emergence of a Democratic 
republic in India 1974-1950, and from Kashmiri autonomy crafted in 1947 to Timor 
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Leste’s independence of 1999-2000 and the stalemate status of West Saharan conflict, the 
striking divergence of outcomes merits extensive systematic examination and represents 
the wider context of my research and the universe of cases from which the cases 
evaluated here are selected (See also Nic Craith 2002:136-138 and  Erin Jenne 2006:  7-
9).  
The two cases of South Africa and Palestine differ in many aspects: they are 
characterized by diverse social, economic, geopolitical and other important features, 
which make comparison challenging. However; they share at least one key similarity: 
they are to different degrees coming out of their respective conflicts following different 
approaches to peace and political settlement and different levels of integration-separation. 
Therefore, they are selected on the variation they show in their outcome (the dependent 
variable). Thus they present a laboratory to in-depth interpretation the patterns of ethno-
national conflicts and the conditions that generate their convergent outcomes.  
This research sees the diverse outcomes as different points on a continuum that depicts 
the dynamics of ethno-national conflicts and their demise. The cases selected represent a 
plausible representation of this diversity of outcomes. Had we drawn all cases on a 
continuum with conflict climax is in the center, South Africa would have occupied the 
left extreme and embodies full integration in a unitary state, and Palestine-Israeli case 
lags at the right side of the center with the outcome is still in the making but preoccupied 
with separation. In this the Palestinian case resembles other cases such as Timor Leste 
whereas one finds different degrees of institutional arrangements for power sharing and 
autonomy in between these two extremes such as the Northern Ireland power-sharing. 
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Thus, the main consideration has been taken into account in case selection of this 
research is to find incidents of variance of the outcomes of the conflict across cases. 
However, the embedding the cases of this dissertation in the broader phenomenon of 
ethno-national conflicts does not suffice in order to fully justify some important aspects 
of the comparison, which requires further illustrations.    
 
The question of comparability 
 
This research implements the comparative case study based on structured and focused 
approach of similar cases, South Africa and Palestine in order to explain their divergent 
outcomes. The study treats the two cases as principally types of ethno-national conflicts 
that resulted from the dynamics and excesses of settler-colonial domination systems; each 
of which has developed and concluded in a different outcome.   
In principle, the comparative approach is an important research tool in discussing the 
conditions that prevail in Palestine/Israel as a whole and their relationship to the question 
of the emergence of a democratic outcome of the conflict. As discussed below, 
comparisons are meant to capture similarities and differences between Israeli system of 
domination and the South African regime of segregation and apartheid. In this sense 
peculiarities of each case are as crucial as commonalities. Thus, this study is not aimed at 
labeling. Nor it seeks to introduce normative perspectives or ideological claims. Rather, it 
examines systematically the parallels between two similar cases of unique types of 
domination systems to explain their different outcomes. Nonetheless, comparing South 
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African apartheid with Israeli regime in Palestine stirs contentious debates as to its merits 
and foundations. This research challenges the claim that the two cases are incomparable. 
 The contentious nature of the comparison 
Some prominent Israeli politicians and statesmen use the analogy with apartheid at least 
as a looming threat to the state of Israel: Former Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert 
stresses that the failure of the two-state solution will lead to a situation similar to South 
African apartheid (quoted in Bakan and Abu-Laban 201:1 336). Current Israeli Defense 
Minister Ehud Barak roars warning his fellow Israelis that the failure to achieve peace 
with the Palestinians would end up in a state where Israel has no Jewish majority or an 
apartheid regime (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2011: 338). These statements indicate that a 
system of certain type of apartheid is developing in the OPT. However, drawing 
comparisons between South African apartheid and Israeli domination over the Palestinian 
people, within the state of Israel and in the OPT, is a source of discontent and refusal by 
the Zionist movement and Israeli politicians, and many adherents of Israel in the USA, 
Canada and to a lesser degree in Europe.  
For those who reject the comparison, comparing Israel to apartheid is a deliberate 
attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Jewish state itself. The efforts made by Israel 
and its allies in the western countries to prevent all attempts to comparing Israel and 
apartheid resulted in boycotting some international conferences and forums by the USA, 
Canada, Israel and other states. Two UN sponsored ‘World Conferences Against Racism’ 
in 2011 and 2009, which are global in their focus, were interrupted by calls to boycott 
because they were planned to discuss Israel in relation to international law, racism, and a 
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new kind of apartheid. Perhaps no single book on Israel’s domination as apartheid has 
generated heated debates more that former US President Jimmy Carter’s Palestine: Peace 
not Apartheid (2007). The book is a New York Times Best Seller and has generated a lot 
of criticism and debates as to the degree it represents or depicts reality in Palestine.  
Palestine: Peace not Apartheid aims at presenting facts about the Middle East that are 
largely unknown in the USA. Carter argues that the main two obstacles to peace in the 
M.E are that some Israelis insist on confiscating Palestinian lands and colonizing the 
Palestinian people and the insistent of some Palestinians to respond with violence. In the 
face of growing roars against the book, Carter’s defense is that the book was not about 
Israel; rather it is about “Palestine; the occupied territories; forced segregation in the 
West Bank and terrible oppression of the Palestinians create a situation accurately 
described by the word” apartheid (quoted in Bakan and Abu-Laban 2010: 334). He goes 
on to clarify that he sees Israel as a  
…wonderful democracy where everyone has guaranteed equal rights, and where, 
under the law, Arabs and Jews who are Israelis have the same privileges about 
Israel. That's been most of the controversy because people assume it's about Israel. 
It's not.”   
The core issue in this respect is that comparison with apartheid implies the existence of 
state sponsored racist practices and policies, which utterly rebuffed by Zionism and the 
state of Israel. Zionist’s arguments presented to defy the charge have a common thread of 
reasoning:  the Zionist movement is actually a national liberation movement that emerged 
and established its own national-state while being fundamentally inclusive and 
democratic. Accordingly, the Jewish never claimed superior to any other peoples or races; 
thus Israel was founded as, and is still pluralistic. Jews themselves come from a wide 
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array of racial identifications that Israel absorbed without exception, so the argument 
proceeds (Tilley2005: 137). To these arguments this research presents two responses; the 
first has to do with the broader permissibility of the comparison, and the second with the 
substantive justifications for comparison.  
The comparative approach of this study is meant to contribute to the discussion on the 
hindrances that impede, until today, reaching a political settlement to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. Comparison in this sense is a useful and necessary venue to 
understanding the stakes of the conflict.  It seeks to capture the properties of domination 
structures embedded in Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and its relationship 
with the very nature of Israel as a state. In comparing Israeli domination system to 
Afrikaner nationalist rule and apartheid in South Africa this research is interested in 
deconstructing the asymmetrical relationships and modalities of power and exclusion that 
distinguish settler-colonial societies and their underlying ethno-territorial configurations.  
Thus the comparative perspective is important to providing better understanding to 
ethno-national conflicts and their divergent outcomes. Moreover, this comparison is a 
useful tool for understanding state formation and dynamics of change. Thus it aims at 
exploring systematically the conditions that are conducive to a democratic solution of 
such conflicts. To reject the comparison on ideological or political grounds deprives the 
research on the phenomenon from a rich source of empirical revelations on the nature and 




Terminology and substantive comparison  
Apartheid represents a case of racial contract that underpins racist domination as a 
relationship between unequal groups: racism here defined as any system of differentiation 
and inequality. UN Resolution 2016 of 1965 clearly defines racism in terms that render 
Israeli policies against non-Jews a racist action. Apartheid is a generic policy associated 
with all colonial-settler states and it is a policy framework that is based on racial and/or 
ethnic exclusivity as the resolution eloquently states.  As this study contends, Israel’s 
domination over the Palestinians in the entire Palestine is characterized essentially and 
primarily by its ethno-national differentiation system. From this perspective, the 
comparison with the South African apartheid regime consists with international law. The 
United Nations Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid (or the Apartheid Convention) although was established to deal with the South 
African regime of apartheid it is applied generically regardless of the country or specific 
context. The fact that neither the pre-state Zionist movement nor the state of Israel has 
ever spelled out an official policy of discrimination against the Palestinians, and Israel 
did not institute discriminatory practices in one fell swoop doesn’t conceal the structural 
discriminatory properties that defines the state of Israel as a self-defined Jewish state. 
Discrimination, inequality, and differentiation on ethno-religious bases worked in a 
piecemeal fashion to constrain Palestinian rights and access to resources especially land.  
In other words, separation in the OPT has been a process whose legal contours are 
harder to discern and whose name has yet to circulate abroad while discrimination in 
Israeli proper against Palestinians cannot be denied. Thus apartheid as a generic concept 
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applies to Israeli domination over the Palestinians as much as it pertains to the white 
Afrikaner subordination of the Black Africans although it doesn’t replicate it. Nor the 
absence of a name for Israel’s settler-colonial domination over the Palestinians implies 
that the concept of apartheid does not apply. Israeli/Zionist Jewish domination over non-
Jews in Palestine is primarily a “racial contract between the state of Israel and powerful 
allies [that] has worked to absent Palestinians through extreme repression and 
statelessness” (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2010: 332). Obviously this contract granted the 
Jewish immigrant society a super-ordinate status in political, social, economic, and 
cultural realms. Approaching Israel’s domination system from the point view of apartheid 
categorizes its system in order to explain its properties and the conditions it created that 
pertain to our main task: identifying the conditions that made the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict unique in spite of the fundamental similarities it has with South Africa.       
Israel’s system of domination is based on a fundamentally discriminatory jurisprudence; 
its basic laws differentiate between Jews and non-Jews where nationality and a wide set 
of rights attached to it are granted exclusively to Jews. Whether in the Israeli proper or in 
the OPT rights and obligations are predicated upon individuals’ ethnic affiliation, their 
geographical location, and their ethno-nationality defined in terms of Jewishness. Thus, 
this research approaches the whole Palestine as a single unit of analysis: Israel has 
established its domination by creating dual structures within Israel and within the OPT 
both relate to the same origins and utilize different degrees of discrimination and 




Similarities and dissimilarities  
The cases of South Africa and Israel/Palestine are not identical. Nor the Israeli settler-
colonial domination replicates that of apartheid in South Africa. This dissertation 
recognizes that the prevalence of historical contexts and structures of colonial and ethno-
national domination that establish the initial conditions for comparison, doesn’t obfuscate 
the importance of peculiarities and specificities of the two cases. Thus, although this 
research recognizes Israel’s system as apartheid, it contends that Israel’s represents a type 
of its own.  
The first similarity that makes the comparison warranted is that the two cases sprung 
from colonial-settler settings; in both settings settler societies were transformed into 
ethno-territorial peoples. They represent the product of ethno-nationalist specific claims 
to territory and hegemony over indigenous populations.  Afrikaners and Zionist Israeli 
Jews are settler societies in domination.  However; none of those societies’ 
spokespersons use any of the terminology of colonization and do their best to distant their 
practices from the heritage of colonialism (Oberschall 2007: 158). Each society, on its 
own account, justified its colonization by constructing collective myths and ideologies 
that justify aggressive colonization of their respective terrains. Zionism and Afrikaner 
nationalism were defensive and self-contained and applied different levels of exclusion 
and subordination of Black Africans and Palestinians (Akenson 1992: 120). As settler 
colonial systems, the two regimes were challenged by national liberation movements that 
sought self-determination and developed through various stages over the greater part of 
the 20th century (Pearlman 2011:187).  
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The main feature of these struggles can be assessed in terms of conflicting ethno-
nationalist claims of political control over a specific territory, which endowed these 
conflicts with common particular properties, as presented in the conceptual framework 
(Chapter II) of this study. Both the South African and Palestinian national movements 
fought the state and another ethno-national group that the state preserves. Preserving the 
survival and supremacy of the dominant ethnic group by the state generated the dynamics 
of exclusion/inclusion that shaped the asymmetrical relationships of the adversaries and 
defined the types of power deployed to maintain domination. In this respect, different 
levels and degrees of exclusion and inclusion that characterize the two systems are 
considered one of the most crucial differences that shaped the ethno-political geography 
of the two conflicts.  
Finally, and perhaps the most important, both regimes applied regimes of territorial 
segregation and separation to undermine the ability of their adversary to gain political 
viability. In South Africa territorial separation was instrumental in confining the Black 
African while exploiting their work force. Thus, as Farsakh (2005) puts it, Afrikaner 
nationalists, especially the National Party since 1948 sought to control the land and the 
people together especially in the wake of 1948 by implementing the Bantustan policy. 
Zionist movement in the pre-state phase sought to control the land without the people, 
and in 1947-8 it opted to expulsion and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. Following 
the 1967 war, the complexity of Israeli territorial separation was deepened with the 
establishment of Jewish-only settlements in the OPT. In both cases the Israeli/Zionist 
underpinnings of territorial control and separation, as we discuss in our empirical analysis 
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differs from that of South African apartheid. This point brings us to the dissimilarities 
between the two cases.   
 The dissimilarities between the two cases are important and they hold the key to 
understanding the conditions that prevailed and made the democratic outcome possible in 
South Africa while impeded the same conclusion in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Initially, the most striking difference between the two cases is the extent to which the 
Zionist movement stretched the logic of ethnic-territorial separation much further than 
the South African regime did. The Zionist movement and the state of Israel ethnically 
cleansed the indigenous Palestinians and attached fundamental meanings to territorial 
acquisition and spatial expansion as an imperative; territorial control and total exclusion 
are the main two properties of Israel’s domination system. Although the white ethno-
nationalism in South Africa included land confiscations, segregation and territorial 
separation, these features were sought functionally and exclusion practiced was partial.  
The climax of South African racial-colonial system was reached in the implementation 
of apartheid and the Bantustan policy that “reflected some effort at genuine separation 
and, to few Afrikaner dreamers, the possibility of securing an overwhelmingly white state” 
(Tilley 2005: 136). Therefore total ethnic (racial) cleansing of the indigenous in South 
Africa was never entertained by the white society. Indeed, a certain degree of inclusion 
prevailed in all stages of the development of the regime; economic inclusion and a 
minimum political incorporation (See Younis 2000) of African population created a kind 
of de facto integration of the Blacks although as a subordinate cast. Exploitation, political 
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exclusion, and social and ethnic-racial differentiation were the fundamental organizing 
elements of the white domination system in South Africa. 
The case with the Zionist domination in Palestine differs in terms of the total exclusion 
of the indigenous Palestinians it practiced from the outset. “Hebrew Labor” policy that 
the movement applied in the Yishuvs (Jewish communities in Hebrwe) by which jobs 
were exclusively preserved for the Jews reflected a doctrine of Jewish ethno-nationalism 
not a mere economic mechanism. As a movement that aimed at spiritual, political, and 
cultural fulfillment of Jewish ethno-religious identity, it focused on redemption and 
spatial insulation as the core tenet of Jewish-nationalism. This peculiar property explains 
the expulsion of the vast majority of the indigenous Palestinian population in 1947-8 in 
order to create a Jewish majority.  
Finally, the responses to domination and apartheid by the Palestinian and South African 
national movements show a significant difference. The African National Congress (ANC) 
and most elements of the anti-apartheid movement never accepted regimes classifications 
of the South Africans on the bases of their racial-ethnic affiliation. These forces 
consistently challenged the regime for the establishment of South Africa as a unitary and 
democratic non-racial state. The Palestinian national movement, by contrast, dropped the 
goal of liberation and democratization in favor of national-self determination within the 
OPT. Thus it accepted the ethno-territorial logic of Zionism and the state of Israel as the 
base for a political settlement. The implications of this difference are enormous as this 
research unveils.  
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International position in the two cases is another important difference. The discrepancy 
in international intervention in both cases “illuminates the political and moral inadequacy 
of Western critical reticence” (Tilley 2005: 139) and helps to understand how and why 
racial colonialism and apartheid in South Africa couldn’t escape the logic and image of 
settler-colonial racist regime while Israel could.  These powers never used the discourse 
of “mutual recognition”, “dialogue”, mutual concessions”, “land for peace”…etc in the 
South African conflict that it applies to the Palestinian-Israeli one. Rather international 
pressure was aimed at the very foundation of domination relationships in South Africa. 
Whereas international community supported the South African anti-apartheid movement 
in demanding a full democratic and non-racial regime and national unity, it stands 
strongly behind separation and ethnically-based solution in Palestine, which validates 




This research departs from a methodological commitment that social phenomena do not 
result from or the function of a single ‘most important’ factor. Rather, it is more likely 
that phenomena such as ethno-national conflict that we entertain here stem from, develop, 
and terminate from dynamic and overlapped factors. The decline of a given ethno-
national conflict is not a linear effect of correlated independent and dependent variables 
(IVs and DVs); rather it reflects the effects of overlapping factors. Thus, this research 
problematizes different systems of domination and separation deployed by a dominant 
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ethno-national group against the indigenous group/people. The goal in this sense is to 
uncover the causal path/s and causal chains that enable us to understanding the conflicts 
in South Africa and Palestine and how they developed in a divergent manner in spite of 
their similarities.   
Ultimately, the methods deployed in this dissertation seek answers to the questions: 
What are the characteristics in common between these cases, and where and how they 
diverge to produce different outcomes? How similarities and dissimilarities between them 
enable us to understand the current state of affairs of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
especially the prospects for the emergence of one-civic-democratic state in Palestine? In 
other words, we seek to show how ostensibly similar situations have led to different 
outcomes. To be sure that the research is not comparing ‘calk and cheese’ the comparison 
is conceptually-oriented by concepts that pertain to the two cases, presented in the 
conceptual framework in Chapter II. Concepts of settler-colonial domination systems, 
ethno-national territorial nexus, separation and segregation, and apartheid are introduced 
as the anchors of comparison which embrace the two cases.  
This research is a case-oriented for an in-depth empirical investigation of the two cases 
in hand through comparative strategy - ‘that is, it aims at rich descriptions of a few 
instances of a certain phenomenon…[and] seeks to understand the complex units’ (della 
Porta 2008: 198). As such, this inquiry aims at revealing the processes and explaining the 
causal chains that make a particular outcome of the two conflicts prevalent. Thus, this 
study presents an “interpretive case study” using theoretical frameworks to provide an 
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explanation of particular cases using two strategies: ‘method of difference’ and ‘process 
tracing’.  
There are three major approaches to comparative inquiry that aim at studying social 
change or different historical trajectories of specific social phenomena. Each one of them 
has its own logic and has its strength and weaknesses (Skocpol and Somers 1980).  This 
inquiry  applies the ‘method of difference’ to contrasts ‘positive (affirmative) case’ -
whereby ethno-national struggle ends in integration- to other ‘negative case’ whereby the 
integrative outcome is not existent in spite of important similarities the two cases exhibit. 
The figure below illustrates this strategy. Factors a through d are the similar properties of 
the cases examined and analyzed while factors e through g represent the combination of 
causal variables that explain the difference in outcome that appears in the last row of the 
table. The table below shows the logic of difference this research implements where the 
factors X represent the core conceptual attributes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and 
explain the difference of outcome it exhibits.   
The research also applies the method of “process tracing” for within case comparisons. 
Process tracing is aimed at identifying the processes linking a set of initial conditions 
(colonial-settler domination systems in our research) to particular outcomes (integration 
and separation in our cases). Thus it examines multiple features of each case to assess 
causal and constitutive relations between factors; this requires a close examination of 
causal mechanisms that make the correspondence between these factors and their 
ultimate outcomes more concrete.   
26 
 
The importance of causal mechanisms in this sense is to go beyond correlations and to 
uncover the links between causes and their effects. Causal mechanisms reveal why and 
how these causes produce particular effects, which better captures the complexities of a 
unit (case) and empower the research with a tool that takes analysis beyond descriptive 
treatment toward explanation and understanding (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Moreover, 
causal mechanisms explain why the same factors, in a comparative setting, can produce 
different outcomes. This is the ultimate goal of our research: why the same certain set of 
factors trigger different mechanisms and henceforth why the processes culminate in a 
very different manner. This approach aims at uncovering the ‘cogs and wheels’ that make 
the relationship between explanatory factors and their effects possible in the first place 
(Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998:  8). In this light the research aims at examining the 
following hypotheses: 
 
 The salience of exclusive “regimes of territorial legitimation’ as the defining 
element of settler-colonial ethno-nationality and the mechanisms they triggers 
endow the conflict with an indivisible subjective dimension that stiffens political 
demands and galvanizes identity manifestations. It therefore gives the conflict an 
existential property that reduces significantly, if not terminates integration; 
• A segregation and separation system of domination is institutionalized on territorial 
and spatial imperatives; combining political power with geographical and spatial 
exclusion and control, further prolongs ethno-national conflicts and impedes 
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forging a common national identity necessary for integration. However, it may have 
unintended consequences that under specific conditions leads to integration;  
• The dual international effect of legitimating and de-legitimating the antagonists’ 
demands to an ethno-national conflict plays a key role in integration or separation 






‘Negative (disconfirming) Case’: 
Palestine 
State Foundation and properties State Foundation and properties 
Demographic attributes Demographic attributes 
Key actors’ interests and perceptions Key actors’ interests and perceptions 
Duration of the conflict Duration of the conflict 
National-territorial nexus X 
Organizing elements of the domination 
system 
X 
External factors X 
Outcome: Decomposition of domination 
and integrated political entity 
Outcome: conflict continuation and 
separation 
 
                                                          
4
 ‘Positive’ ‘negative’ and ‘control’ cases in this context do not imply any normative or value-laden 
expressions. They are a mere methodological tool to show the cases that show consistent outcomes of 
the same phenomenon and the others that their outcomes vary (See Skocpol and Somers 1980). 
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Outline of Dissertation Chapters 
 
In addition to this chapter, this dissertation consists of another eight chapters and a 
closing section. Chapter II details the conceptual and theoretical framework of the 
research. First it offers a critical review of the comparative research on the subject matter 
of the dissertation and then   discusses the boundaries of ethno-national conflicts and the 
challenges and aspects of peoples’ struggle for self-determination. Then it proceeds to 
establish the centrality of ethno-national territorial nexus as the core concept that I 
represent the main analytical tool of the study. Finally it presents the concept of “state 
contraction” to examine the plausibility and explanatory power of the theoretical 
approach.  
Chapters III to VI address the South African case within a historical approach: in 
chapter III addresses the foundation and underpinnings of racial-colonial Afrikaner 
ethno-nationalism to show the role of “regimes of territorial legitimation” in shaping the 
structures of the conflict; chapter IV presents an interpretation of apartheid as an ethnic-
national territorial system of domination and separation; and chapter V discusses the 
decline of apartheid and the failure of Afrikaner ethno-nationality to re-establish the 
conflict in terms of ethno-territorial properties. 
      In chapters VI through IX the study engages in empirical examination of the main 
properties of the conflict as an ethno-territorial construct. These chapters are analytically 
formatted to discuss main themes of research conceptual treatement: chapter VI 
underlines the perspective of the study on the one-state solution; it critically presents 
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prevailing discussion on the issue and shows that approaching it as an emergence 
property is more useful to capture its conditions. Then the chapter addresses the origins 
of the conflict as a settler-colonial-indigenous struggle over ethno-territorial existence. 
Chapter VII presents a territorial-spatial interpretation of the Zionist movement’s settler-
colonialism and examines the formation of the state of Israel in terms of its “regimes of 
territorial legitimation”. It emphasizes the ethnocratic nature of the state that makes it a 
peculiar type of apartheid. Chapter VIII addresses the expansion of Israel’s ethno-
territorial domination well over the entire of Palestine in the wake of 1967 war and the 
occupation of the OPT. Finally, chapter IX addresses the rise and development of the 
Palestinian national movement. It emphasizes the dialectical constitution and re-
constitution of the movement in its relationship and responses to Israel’s ethno-
territoriality. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to discuss Israeli exceptionalism 
in terms of international effects on the main properties of the conflict. Chapter X presents 














Conceptualizing the national-territorial nexus of self-determination 
 
Introduction 
This research, from a theoretical perspective bridges on the dichotomy between 
structural and agent-based approaches to ethno-national conflicts. In this sense, the 
research differs from traditional conflict resolution treatment that emphasizes decision-
making and elite politics in explaining the conflicts in South Africa and Palestine (e.g. 
Gidron 2002, Knox and Quirk 2000). This study focuses on major structures and 
processes without undermining the effects of interaction between structures and human 
agency. Thus it complements holistic approaches (e.g. Akenson 1992, Connors 2000, and 
Macdonald 1990) by calling for attention the dialectics of events, actors’ actions, and 
contingency along with major structures in creating causal chains that determine the 
trajectory and outcome of the conflict.  
This research draws on structural-historical analysis to understanding ethno-
nationalism and conflicts related to ethno-national systems of domination and their 
trajectories. Thus it takes the settler-colonial origins of these conflicts as the reference 
point of conceptualization and analysis.   However, structural-historical analysis does not 
tell the whole story of divergent outcomes of similar ethno-national conflicts: historical 
contexts and big structures have to be combined with the specificity and peculiarity of 
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each case to uncover the dissimilarities between cases that show how each case 
developed in a unique trajectory and different outcome. 
Conceptual framework that follows addresses ethno-national conflicts as an 
eclectic approach  through three moves: First it situate the issue of self-determination 
within the question of settler-colonial settings, then it  highlights the main characteristics 
of ethno-national conflicts and their implications for the question of integration versus 
separation. Second, this chapter  turns to examine the origins of ethno-national conflicts 
to show how the initial structures of the conflict determine the trajectory it takes; Third it 
discuss the centrality of territorial-national ideologies or ‘regimes of territorial 
legetimation’ as the most important factors in shaping the trajectories ethno-national 
conflicts take. Finally theory of “state contraction” presented in the way of examining the 
plausibility of the concepts suggested toexplain the divergence of outcome in ethno-
national conflicts.    
 
Self-determination in Settler-colonial domination systems 
 
The importance of the principle and right of self-determination is that it represents 
one of the most powerful sources of legitimacy for the struggle of both peoples against 
their respective adversaries. Indeed, the principle has been the premise upon which many 
national and ethno-national groups gained independence in Africa and Asia. The power 
of the principle and successful struggles in these regions has emboldened Africans and 
Palestinians’ struggle to gain the right of self-determination.  It is remarkable the extent 
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to which this principle “developed into an anti-colonial norm of international law in the 
second half of the twentieth century” (Hannum 2006: 61); it reflected the change of 
international order as a whole in terms of embracing new norms and principles pertaining 
to the shifts in world-politics.  
Although international order and regional configurations of power have changed the 
efficacy and prevalence of the principle of self-determination have not diminished or 
eroded. As far as colonial legacies are concerned, the principle still holds. For example, 
Farer (2008:177) asserts that the term “colonial entities acquired the generic name of 
‘non-self-governing territories’ is applicable to Palestine” under British mandate of 1922. 
Farer argues that although the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, that restricts or 
qualifies the principle of self-determination by the consideration of ‘territorial integrity’ 
of states, the principle still applicable to two precedents of “dividing non-self-governing 
territories where the desire of separation” is plain and evident; these two cases are India 
and Palestine.     
Resulting from partitioning a particular country, or by colonial settlement 
enterprise, or by direct military rule, indigenous people’s right of self-determination is 
indisputable in international law (see Falk 2002: 31-66). However, the two cases of South 
Africa and Palestine show a very unique type of settler-colonialism by which the settler-
colonial society developed an ethno-national identity and the structures of a distinct 
people.  Dynamics of these types of conflicts show a number of patterns as to the ways in 
which the right of self-determination is being sought: from separation to integration and 
in between them different types of autonomy and power-sharing. In South Africa 
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democratization and civic self-determination prevailed while in Palestine liberation and 
national self-determination is still the main character of the conflict. Theoretically 
speaking, this divergent merits an appropriate approach to account for its underpinnings.  
Characteristics and manifestations of ethno-national conflicts 
 
The three most important of characteristics of ethno-national conflicts are: The 
asymmetrical power relationships inherited in them; demographic balance or the 
minority-majority syndrome; and their protracted character. They are embedded in the 
literature on ethnic-conflicts as the explaining factors of the rigidity they show, as 
discussed below. We derive from the discussion of each character the mechanisms and 
dynamics that underlay ethno-national conflict and shape their trajectory. This 
dissertation approaches these characteristics as interactive and overlapping system of 
subordination and domination in which the state plays a central role. The practice is 
aimed at depicting the circular manner in which these characteristics generate each other 
to yield a complex of grieves and grievances that galvanize national identities and 
increase the propensity of violence and hinders democratization.   
 
Asymmetrical Power Relationships and Domination 
Ethno-national conflicts arising from settler-colonial settings embody deeply 
rooted and persistent asymmetrical power relations between the adversaries.  The 
dominating regimes in these settings have ruled the subordinate groups by means of force, 
coercion, exploitation and exclusion. State power in this context is harnessed by the 
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dominant ethno-national group to sustain and preserve its political hegemony and socio-
economic privileges. We draw on Michael Foucault’s conception of power and 
domination as complementary forces deployed to create a sphere of deep influence over 
the subordinate with minimum costs and liabilities for the dominant. Thus the state resort 
to three strands of power: disciplinary (creating conformity in the behavior of individuals 
to norms and laws exerted by the state), bio-power (silencing the group as a collective 
mass by oppressing it political organization and preventing its mobilization) and 
sovereign power (imposing state sovereignty; juridical and legal systems partially or 
totally) to dominate, control, and silence the subordinate ethno-national challenger. The 
state implements a set of institutional and procedural instruments: economic, social, 
political, civic, and statistical in order to atomize the population and bore its national 
identity (Gordon 2008: 11-15). Domination, therefore, is defined as the processes, tools, 
institutions, and procedures that aim at directing the actions of individuals and the 
population in conformity with expected conduct. The role of state power in this sense is 
central in sustaining ethno-national and territorial underpinnings of domination and to 
tame, oppress, and annihilate national aspirations of the challenger.   
One of states’ most prevalent structures of domination is exclusion and separation 
and/or segregation that implemented in different levels at differing capacities. Ultimately 
they aim at preserve the supremacy of the ethno-national dominating settlers’ society. 
Drawing clear lines of differentiation between ethno-national groups (defined racially, or 
on religious or ethnic grounds) assumes a powerful and central state with high degree of 
statism and institutional coherency to sustain such a system. Settler-colonial regimes 
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show a distinct level of statism as Akenson (1992) argues; they are preoccupied with 
asserting sovereignty and self-righteousness vis-à-vis the external world and internal 
challenges posed by the subordinate ethno-national group. State sovereignty and 
legitimacy in these contexts takes a supreme priority over all other considerations 
including democratic imperatives and the secular basis of modern liberal democracy. 
Statism implies the endowment of the state with a moral purpose (a higher purpose of 
preserving the ethics of a single ethnicity) that elicits loyalty to the state by invoking 
ethno-national and/or religiously-based discourse. Therefore liberal democracy can 
hardly provide answers to the questions of inclusion vis-à-vis exclusion that face any 
state with these structural properties (Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan 1996) and adopting 
democratic political systems and ideological justifications of domination invoke to give 
the regime legitimacy.   
Under circumstances of power asymmetries subordinate ethno-national groups - 
that conceive of themselves as distinct and “affiliated to actual or commonly perceived 
ancestry with language markers and national or regional origin” (Nic Craith 2002: 136) 
tend to pursue some degree of independence whether in a sovereign political entity or in 
some form of autonomy or self rule to protect their existence and/or interests from state 
power. Self-determination, under these conditions turns into a mobilizing force deployed 
to challenge the central government or the state once the subordinate group has some 
leverage to squeeze political, economic, and social reforms from the state (Jenne 2006: 7). 
The levels and degree of exclusion and segregation decide the shape and component of 
self-determination whether in a civic or a national/ethno-national manner.  
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The effects of exclusion and domination coupled with oppression turns nationalist 
sentiments into a powerful driving force that imply, in the words of Bauman “exclusive 
sets of assigned rights and duties…moral significance and behavioral principles” (Cited 
in Nic Craith 2002: 139). Clearly this shows that coercion and domination do not turn 
into legitimate governance nor they imply the ability of the state to control the 
subordinate group. Force of ethno-nationalism may manifest and seek fulfillment in terms 
of civic nationalism: through civic strife and civil rights movements and revolutions that 
aim at transforming the polity and social relations into an inclusive democracy. National 
self-determination, in contrast, exceeds the limits of civil rights toward statehood as the 
fulfillment of ethno-national identity in a distinct polity (Nic Craith 2002: 139).    
Uncovering the patterns into which ethno-national conflicts develop and transform in 
either direction of civic or national self-determination is a key to explaining their 
divergent outcomes and types of accommodation of ethno-national demands. Dynamics 
of demographic change play a crucial role in changing the patterns of interaction between 
adversaries whereby the status of each group in the demographic balance is crucial.  
 
Minority-Majority dynamics  
Numbers matter in social and political interaction and “Regardless of the political 
context, there always seems to be power in numbers” (Cederman 2009). In ethno-national 
conflicts numbers account even more especially as they are loaded with identity struggles, 
long standing oppression and exclusion that give the conflict the urgency of existence 
struggle.  Demography drives its efficacy from the ‘resource mobilization’ mechanism 
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(Tilly 1978) whereby substantial increase in subordinate groups’ numbers provides an 
opportunity and affects its members’ willingness to act collectively and to raise the 
ceiling of their demands up to the demand of political independence. Henceforth, the 
efficacy of numbers is primarily politicizing ethno-national groups and endows them with 
legitimacy. By contrast, dominant groups, as Connor (2000) notices, struggle for the 
preservation of a considerable majority status that enables them to sustain supremacy by 
establishing coherent democratic regimes to justify their policies against the minority 
group. The logic is simple; in a world that embraces more democratic rule the domination 
of minority groups is a scandal especially if applied by non-democratic means. In 
addition, the principle of proportionality is widely accepted as a main organizing political 
element of political power.   
However, numbers do not transform into political collective action automatically. 
Demographic superiority needs other factors that turn it into a politically influential force: 
unity, purpose, resources and leadership among those factors. Primarily, these factors 
annul or diminish the effects of demobilization and internal divisions. Dilemmas of 
collective action, and inter-group splits are antithetical to group political efficacy. 
Assuming that the benefits of non participation in collective action are minimal, and 
inter-group splits come second in importance at a specific point, demographic balance 
and numerical increase of the subordinate group triggers powerful dynamics. Gurr 
(1993:123-129) clarifies that ethno-political activism is motivated by peoples deep-seated 
grievances about their collective status as subordinate and excluded which facilitates 
collective protest and revolt. Indeed, the more the state exclude, oppress, and deprive 
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these groups the more they become willing to act in a politically organized fashion. 
Dynamics of demographic change and their political implications do not show the 
direction of political protest; toward what end and objectives?      
When the dominant group is a majority and shows no recognition of the 
minority’s political, cultural and civic rights, violence is expected to rise. Violence 
increases in ‘no-exit’ settings: if the minority is increasing in numbers and seeking relief 
from domination by assimilation that is being denied by the majority (Oberschall 
2007:13-15). The ‘no exit’ impasse leads to coercion and militancy by the challenger and 
accommodation becomes far more elusive. Furthermore, the change in demographic 
balance whether it was real, impending or foreseen as pertained to the dominant majority 
drives it to initiate confrontation under the pretext of which the dominant majority “takes 
the move to curb what it perceives as a threat to its position and style of life” (Oberschall 
2007, and Mishali Ram 2006) and strip it from sources of political leverage: unity, 
political organization and mobilization, territorial contiguity, and economic viability.  
Demographic balance especially when it coincides with specific geographical 
attributes is found to affect significantly the prospects of conflict demise in ethno-
national settings. In a quantitative research that covers the whole world between1951-
2005, Cederman shows “that the conflict probability of marginalized group increases 
with the demographic power balance [of the minority] compared to the group(s) in power” 
shifts in favor of the former and leads to the minority rebellion (Cederman 2009). These 
ethno-political mechanisms hold for all ethnic conflicts, as Cederman’s study shows, and 
is crucial to understanding ethno-national conflicts and their patterns. The demographic 
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factor seems crucial to both protagonists, but a majority in rule would most likely resort 
to specific demographic policies that aim at countering the balance in its favor, which 
exacerbates the conflict and pushes the minority group further towards militancy and 
coercion that characterize protractible conflicts.  
Protractability and intractability  
  Duration of the conflict matters. Protracted conflicts are defined “as hostile 
interactions that occur over prolonged periods of time” (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali Ram 
2006), and therefore, they are processes, not events; they proceed in time and have no 
distinguishable point of termination. Being protracted, ethno-national conflicts gather 
their own life cycle and generate compound nature and magnitude that is affected by the 
time factor, which makes these conflicts seem intractable (paralyzed, intensive, stuck and 
destructive, and irresolvable). In this sense these conflicts “seem irresolvable; even when 
the ‘shape of a solution’ emerges such as in the two state solution of Israel/Palestine case, 
“the parties can’t seem to reach it” (Babbitt 2006: 116). Moreover, protractability of the 
conflict increases the prospects of its intractability by bringing new issues and actors into 
the scene (Oberschall 2007). Protracted conflicts transform into intractable under certain 
conditions as Babbitt (2006) indicates; the most important among which are:  (a) when 
Group Identity (emphasis in origin) is essential which turns conflict into an existential 
struggle; (b) when leaders are not willing or unable to compel to negotiations because of 
political calculations; and (c) when there are external parties support factions to the 
conflict and hence contribute to the divisions’ sustainability. 
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The circular relationship between protractability and intractability suggests that breaking 
this circle is a key in accommodation and political settlement of ethno-national conflicts. 
However, the question is about the effects protractability and intractability has on the 
outcome of the conflict. In this sense protractablity seems an intervening element. The 
compound or multidimensional nature of protracted conflicts hinders resolution. As Ben 
Yehuda and Mishali-Ram’s comparative research shows “a compound nature, or a 
primarily ethnic characterization of a conflict, not only prolongs the confrontation but 
also diminishes the prospects of conflict resolution” (Ben-Yehuda and Mishali Ram 
2006). Indeed, Bar-Tal (Cited in: Gidron 2002:  7) defines intractable conflicts as those 
that are protracted and because of this the parties to the conflict accumulate hatred and 
prejudice that give the conflict a sense of existential struggle; “The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, for example, can be described as an existential conflict between two parties, 
each of which sees its very existence as a national group at stake” (Kelman 1997: 195). 
This spiral worsens as the parties to the conflict have interest in its continuation and 
makes vast investments that impede its resolution. All these features exacerbate the 
conflict by turning it into an all out confrontation that penetrate “the cognitive repertoire 
of individuals [that captures] the public agenda” (Bar-Tal, cited in: Gidron 2002: 7) and 
renders accommodation close to impossible. 
 
Although complex, deeply entrenched, and elusive to resolution, ethno-national 
conflicts are not irresolvable. The evidence from different regions in different periods of 
times shows that these conflicts are not zero-sum games. Attaining a political settlement 
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to these conflicts is not a question of whether or not, but a question of when, how and 
under what conditions. This study contends that whenever, and wherever, the one finds 
asymmetrical power relation and domination, especially in the shape of state power that 
is based on coercion and subordination, ethno-national demands of national self 
determination rise. This is typical to settler-colonial systems of domination in which the 
state acts as an ethnizied entity; a state as-an-ethnic group syndrome that creates a type of 
a buffered colonialism that renders accommodation rather much less likely. There exist a 
number of factors that exacerbate these patterns of relationships amongst which the 
salience of identity, the demographic balance, oppression, and territory are the most 
crucial. Any given combination of these factors determines the trajectory of the conflict 
and its eventual outcome. However, none of the factors (characteristics) discussed here: 
state power and systems of domination, demographic balance, and protractability is 
sufficient to explain accommodation and integration or alternatively separation. They are 
necessary for the realization of the conditions required to reach a political settlement of 
the conflict as vital in shaping groups’ positions and demands contextually.  
The trajectories ethno-national conflicts are determined to a large extent by the role of 
–national-territorial nexus or the ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’. The explanatory 
power of this factor is that it dialectically linked with demographic balance, power 
asymmetries and domination, and systems of segregation/separation. States’ territorial 
imperatives and ideology, and spatial aggrandizement essentialize the factors discussed 
above and give them a dynamic dimension as a single coherent system of exclusion and 
domination that faces not only the ethno-national challenger that lives on the same 
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territory, but also the dominant groups internal transformations as well as International 
intervening factor that legitimize or delegitimize the dominant state system. Considering 
state’s ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ is founded and developed along the very 
properties of settler-colonial ethno-nationality where the dynamics of the conflict are 
shaped and shifts of structural features of the conflict change. We now turn to the 
foundation of these conflicts in order to show the centrality of the territorial-national 
nexus in the trajectory of the conflict, its direct and profound effects on systems of 
domination, and the effects it has on the rise and politics of national liberation 
movements.  
 
The national-territorial nexus 
 
Settler- colonial societies in domination present a more challenging and more 
complex type of ethno-national conflicts; they differ substantially from foreign rule (or 
imperialism and empires) by the process of implantation that transforms settlers’ societies 
into distinct ethno-national collectivity. The tendency settler-colonial regimes show to 
exclusiveness, exploitation, oppression, and racism explains, to a large extent, the nature 
of ethno-national conflicts. Settler-colonial societies as (Wynne 2002) notices dominion 
creates self-sustaining societies that gain life of their own that is combined with the traits 
of foreign rule that is “constituted by the annexation of territory; and by the rule of 
foreign metropolitan center [and] the insertion of military order; the expropriation of 
wealth; and the imposition of an external culture”. This combination, unlike traditional 
43 
 
colonial rule, establishes settler-colonial societies in as socially, economically, politically, 
and psychologically buffered societies vis-à-vis the indigenous peoples. They establish 
entities within a zone that inoculates their settlers’ society from the contamination of the 
indigenous peoples that is necessary for these societies to develop a strong sense of 
ethno-nationality that sustains their political and socio-economic texture. Harnessing state 
power is the precondition for this endeavor to succeed especially to contain the challenge 
of the ‘other’ ethno-national people who occupy the same territory.  
Wynne (2002) remarks, colonial settler societies tend to extend their domination and 
supremacy over political, physical and cultural terrains. The ubiquitous presence of 
domination in territorial and spatial spheres of life creates the structures of a 
multidimensional conflict with the indigenous people over territory, identity, political 
power, and socio-economic resources. Being distinct- a key element to staking group 
integrity vis-à-vis other groups, dominant states tend to emphasize ethno-linguistic or 
ethno-religious aspects of its cultural-historical collective presence in order to consolidate 
an integrated territorial-national identity correspondence. By the same token national and 
ethno-national movements tend strongly to stake national identity they invoke to 
particular territory as a means of legitimation and survival especially if the subordinate 
group is a minority (Cederman 2009: 505). The contradictions and conflictual properties 
of territorial claims of national movements in the face of territorial and spatial control of 
the state represent the scheme within which the conflict takes place. In defiance of state 
exclusion and domination    and to protect their distinct existence ethno-national 
groups/peoples often perceive territory as “a defining attribute of their identity, 
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inseparable from their past and vital to their continued existence as a distinct group” (Toft 
2003: 19) whereas for states-as-ethnic-groups territory represents its demarcated 
boundaries in terms of recognized borders as well as a defining factor of their foundation 
and identity.   
Different configurations and types of state regimes of territorial legitimation and 
the territorial-national nexus produce different types of ethno-national conflicts and 
outcomes. One can propose four types that derived from the discussion above and that 
illustrate the concepts that this research focus on: (1) Integration: The establishment of a 
unitary state and integrated polity non-ethnic political systems. This type shows 
minimum prevalence of exclusive “regimes of territorial legitimation”; (2) Quasi-
integrative: The articulation of a power-sharing institutional design that in effect 
preserves ethno-national distinctions within one political system. Ethno-territoriality in 
this context is contingent on minority-majority balance and the geographical distribution 
of ethnic adversaries; (3) Minority Rights-based: types of autonomy and self rule 
especially among minority population in multi-ethnic states whereby minorities are 
concentrated geographically and have no separatist demands; (4) Separatist: 
Independence in a sovereign national state based on the realization of national self-
determination. This type exhibits high degrees of exclusion and ideologically, 
institutionally, and culturally entrenched “regimes of territorial legitimation.   
45 
 
This typology is certainly not the only way to categorize the phenomenon
5
. Rather, 
it provides a conceptual tool to understanding the range of variance of outcomes these 
conflicts show in reference to the structures of territorial legitimation and ideologies.  
 
‘Regimes of territorial legitimation’ in ethno-national conflicts 
 
The analytical utility of the concept of “regimes of territorial legitimation” is that 
it uncover the dynamics of nation-building and state formation especially in settings 
where the regime in question is ethnocratic
6
, discriminatory, racial-ethnic or plainly 
traditional colonial one. Indeed, it helps to avoid the conflation of states and nations by 
thinking of states as, territorial constructs” (Murphy 2002:208). Thinking of states as 
such pinpoints the importance of territory as a homeland that is rationally perceived by 
the state and the challenging ethno-national group/people as the condition for survival 
and identity preservation. Whereas nation-states focus on the objective meaning of 
territory and space, states-as-ethnic groups or states of settler-colonial origins focus on 
the subjective meaning of territory and its indivisibility.    
                                                          
5
 For example, Cederman (2009: 505) suggests that there are two main types of ethno-national conflicts in 
terms of the goals/ends raised by the challenger: (1) The goal is to seize political power from the ruling 
government (domestic cvic); (2) A territorial-political goal in which the challenger seeks to obtain 
sovereignty over a well defined territory. 
6
 Yiftachel (2002: 220-221)define these regimes as “regimes [that] exploit the international legitimacy and 
autonomy bestowed on the ‘nation-state’, as the sole expression of ‘national’ self-determination, to 
facilitate the expanding political and material resources by the dominant ethnic group, often at the expense 
of minorities and peripheral groups. Ethnocratic regimes, which are chronically unstable, can be found in 
cases such as Serbia, Northern Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Sri Lanka, Cyprus and Malaysia, to name but 




The dialectical relationship between the settler-colonial state and the challenger 
constitute and reconstitute their ethno-territorial limitations; dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion derived from the “regimes of territorial legitimation” draw the political 
geography of the conflict. This dialectic finds its antecedent in   
two geographic circumstances: the political-territorial status of states at the time 
of entry into the modern state system (whether they were pre-existing independent 
units, fragments of a waning empire, colonies, initiated by external powers, etc.) 
and prevailing ideas about the cultural-historical character of state territory 
(Murphy 2002:193, 200). 
 It is also a function of the challenging group’s capabilities and chance to control the 
territory in addition to its believe in the legitimacy of the cause of the group (Toft 2003: 
21).    
Territorial and spatial dimensions of the conflict and the dialectical relationships 
it has with demographic change and systems of segregation and domination has the 
potential to strengthen our understanding of ethno-national conflict as territorially 
anchored struggles for national recognition. Ethno-nationalism, in one main aspect, is 
deeply sentimental and abstract, and thus inter-subjective phenomenon “centering 
normally around a shared place and always on a shared identity” (Farer 2008:182). The 
space becomes inseparable from national identity and manifests all the collective 
meanings, symbols, emblems, narratives, and imagery of the group. As Yiftachel (2002) 
argues, territoriality (the where of the nation as he puts it) of the conflict, especially for 
expansionist colonial-settler societies becomes the “kernel of mobilization” for that 
society. This society generates its political coherency, consensus, its socio-economic 
interests, and political supremacy around territorial perceptions.  
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In settler-colonial settings territorial and spatial control is designed to exclude, deprive 
and alienate a particular ethno-national group/people. This phenomenon is the condition 
for the historical construction of the settler-colonial society as a people that has distinct 
cultural-historical mythologies (narratives) anchored necessarily to territorial ideology as 
two mutually constitutive processes. Understanding ethno-national demands for 
independence is necessarily linked to state 
…forces against which minority and stateless movements are struggling…As 
such, it is imperative that we seek to understand the national territorial ideologies 
of groups that are in power within modern state system” (Murphy 2002:197).  
This takes place within a dialectical and ongoing process of conflict with the challenging 
forces of subordinate ethno-national groups/peoples. Territory, in this sense, is the spatial 
arena of the conflict while the history (the when) turns into a tool to galvanize the 
territorial struggle. Territoriality becomes the most rampant aspect of ethno-national 
identity if not the supreme justification of collective self-defined history. The “where” of 
ethno-nationalism turns into the defining element of the nations, and “when the (when) 
and the (where) of the nation are still intimately intertwined, it is the later that provides 
the core of nation building” (Yiftachel 2002: 216). This attribute is typical to all colonial-
settler societies. To be sure, the linkages between political processes especially nation-
building and state formation on the one hand and territory and geography on the other are 
evident. It includes renaming of geographical sights and locations to conform to a certain 
ideology upon which the state and the nation are articulated. For example, Israeli policy 
of renaming a countless number of locations in Palestine is a “symbolic expression of 
Israeli nationalism in the face of Palestinian Arab opposition” (Cohin and Kliot 1992: 
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654). Giving names to settlements (colonies) that reflect national/religious ideology of 
“God-given” boundaries is paramount in this context. What are the implications of the 
centrality of the territorial-spatial dimension of ethno-national conflicts and how it is 
related to domination systems and segregation regimes? 
 
Territorial exclusion and segregation: Patterns of domination 
The construction of settler-colonial society as an ethnic-national people implies 
the establishment of necessary correspondence between ethno-national identity and 
territorial boundaries. Facing another ethno-national people the dominant group opts to 
alienate them from land and strip them from their own correspondence to territory, space, 
and historical relevancy. Since the nation is  
always constituted through territory (e.g. blood and soil), the attempt to erase the 
nation is also an attempt to undermine the connection between the people and 
their land and the right of the people to self-determination” (Grodon 2008:17).  
The persistent challenge that all articulated ethno-national settlers’ communities 
face is that that they have to confront, at some stage of their own life, the presence of 
other ethno-national group/s on the same territory (Tilley 2005:132). The national-
territorial nexus and the dynamics through which it develops, plays a decisive role in 
determining whether the conflict may or may not transform into a civic-democratic one  
or remains ethno-national and territorially driven. Ethno-national-territorial nexus 
endows the conflict with a normative dimension that stiffens political demands and 
galvanizes identity manifestations. This nexus travels beyond mere geography towards 
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ethno-national fight over the meanings, symbols, and heritage. Therefore, “Territory has 
been, and continues to be, a major issue in [ethno-national] conflicts” (Ben-Yehuda and 
Mishali-Ram 2006: 86). 
The nature and levels of territorial control, exclusion, occupying spatial spheres, 
and alienation determine the nature of the demands made by the challenging ethno-
national group/people. Mechanisms of domination and political manipulation 
implemented by the state intervene the effects and exigencies of the ‘regimes of territorial 
legitimation’ adopted by the state. An ethno-national conflict that remains civic or 
transforms into a civic and communal struggle is the one, as (Tilley 2005:163) notices, 
that entails the re-definition of the state based on universal democratic imperatives that 
render territorial and spatial control irrelevant. By contrast, as the settler-colonial 
imperatives prevail the state turns into chauvinist-ethnic regime (Tilley 2005: 163) for the 
fact that the ‘the national project’ under such conditions does not aspire to merge a nation 
and state attempts to essentialise and segregate group identities” (Yiftachel 2002:216), 
which hinders exit from the conflict for long periods of time especially when the systems 
of segregation/separation and exclusion are deeply entrenched and internalized as state 
systems to which state and polity ascribe deep ideological and political significance for 
the survival of the state and society.  
  Separation and segregation serve the intentions of the dominant group in 
perpetuating the asymmetries in power relations and sustaining domination; they 
institutionalize that practices, laws, and policies that signify one type or another of 
apartheid regimes. Segregation works on different levels: psychological, legal, and 
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physical that may have different combinations in different cases and different periods in 
the same case. Examining variations in segregation types enables us to examine different 
types of state domination and their effects on the development of the conflict. The most 
important aspect of segregation is the dualism it creates through sign-posted areas, 
invisible albeit effective measures, and legal means. Segregation is also perceived as “a 
mechanism for coping with physical threat…for preserving group identity from alien 
influences, and to conserve cultural heritage and life style” (Oberschall 2007:5-6) and 
then serves to boost national-territorial nexus and hinders the development of mixed and 
integrated institutions, polities, let alone a common sense of nation-hood between the 
protagonists.  
The context, shape, and ‘legal’ forms in which ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ 
and domination systems are introduced are crucial for the state to harness international 
acceptance and legitmation. Presnting the regime as a democratic system plays a vital 
role. Strong state apparatuses alleviated by democratic political system serves a twofold 
strategy: sustaining a domestic coherent polity based on consensus over the conflict; and 
harnessing international legitimacy of an otherwise regime of oppression and a pariah 
state. International dual effect of legitimating and de-legitimating a particular process as 
the end of ethno-national conflicts has played a crucial role in sustaining or, alternatively 
eroding regimes of ethnic or ethno-national segregation. The adoption of a Western-like 
democratic political system by the dominating state affects international assumptions on 
the conflict and their legitimation or castigating the regime. International community’s 
acceptance or rejecting ethno-national domination on racial, religious, pr ethnic grounds 
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plays a crucial role in conferring lawfulness or exposing a regime of domination. Along 
with domestic developments of the conflict it determines the direction the conflict would 
take. Identifying with Western values has been a key factor that justified ethnic cleansing 
and mass expulsion of subordinate ethno-national groups. Farer (2008:201) remarks that, 
in the case of Kosovo for example 
 The dominators imagine themselves as part of Western civilization, as the forward 
edge of that civilization in a nasty part of the world, and invoked the West’s 
support in terms of their common values.  
The Westernized discourse of the dominators is a pivotal strategy that shields 
them from international criticism, punishment, and delegitimizing. Regardless of the 
specific name that segregation, submission and expulsion might take, international 
legitimizing and de-legitimizing of regimes of domination is evident.  However, this 
factor has to do with the changes in world-politics environment; the post-Cold-War era 
has witnessed a profound change that affected regional and intra-state conflicts in 
divergent manners. The demise of the Cold-War rendered some conflicts less important 
than others as the game of power-politics has changed. Upholding international law and 
various international Covenants on key norms and principles that pertain to ethno-
national conflicts (self-determination being the most prominent) have become more a 
question of contingency of interests and balances of power. One of the most important 
elements that determine international level and pattern of intervention is that of the 
possible spillover of the conflicts to international conflict and crisis. Ethno-national 
conflicts, in this sense have multidimensional impact upon international conflict (Mishali 
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Ram 2006:584-585) and therefore international intervention has a crucial role in their 
developments and termination.  
 
Theory of “state contraction” 
 
The properties of ethno-national conflicts discussed in this part result in a 
stalemate that is very hard to sustain for it is prone to violence eruptions, exposed to 
internal dynamics of socio-economic, political, and demographic changes as well as 
external effects. Analyzing the exit from stalemate depends on dynamics of the conflict 
how they materialize through certain structures and events at turning points. The ultimate 
answer to ethno-nationalism lies in democratization of nation and state building; however 
this process does not suggest how to forge national heterogeneity within a nation-state as 
Connor (1994) rightly contends.  That is because ethno-nationalist conflicts emerge 
where the state does not “include and integrate the vast majority of the population into 
the imagined community of the nation” (Cederman 2009). Indeed, there is a profound 
distinction between state-building as an institutional project and the inclusiveness of 
nation-building that is a social construct. Colonial settings that represent the climax of 
exclusion and coercion are the least likely to accommodate ethno-nationalism in a non-
coercive and legitimate manner.  
Non-coercive means through which ethno-nationalism  could be accommodated 
depend therefore on the foundation, properties and the composition of the state; the 
interests it represents; its perceived identity; and its institutional frameworks that may be 
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conducive to nation-building efforts and hence generates loyalty to the state that lead to 
integration and ethno-national heterogeneity. The case of foreign domination and settler-
colonialism is the culmination of this state of affairs; settler-colonialism domination gives 
rise to territoriality as the material basis for the actualization of collective national 
identity, which exacerbates the conflict. These societies are dynamic political 
communities and they constitute “arenas of constant struggles over the very geography of 
the polity in question” (Yiftachel 2002: 222). Henceforth, understanding the dominant 
state system in terms of its institutional structures, the socio-economic and political 
configurations and interests it protects is a key task to examine the decline of ethno-
national conflicts. Ian Lustick’s theory of state contraction is a useful analytical tool to 
accounting for the initial dynamics of conflict decline and ultimately the resolution of 
ethno-national conflicts in a colonial setting.  
Lustick presents the state as an institution and examines different aspects of 
‘institutionalization’ and ‘de-institutionalization’ of the state to explain its expansion and 
contraction (Lustick 2002:202). The ‘state as institution’ is a dynamic concept that 
enables us to answer the question of “what endows states’ boundaries with long term 
political significance and how and why they may change?” Boundaries are borders 
between political arenas and institutionalized constraints that set the rules according to 
which groups are included in, and those excluded from, the political game. The dynamics 
that may lead to state deinstitutionalization are depicted in the concept of contraction 
which is, as Lustick (2002: 204) puts it 
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…expected to trigger shifts in the distribution of power within a state by changing 
resource allocation among different groups and, ultimately, by changing 
prevailing norms and legal arrangements to correspond with the interests of newly 
dominant groups. Accordingly, unless the border of the state is accepted as an 
immutable given, different groups within the state will, under some circumstances, 
adjust their perceptions of what the proper border of the state should be based on 
their chances of achieving and /or maintaining political power. 
 
This conception enables us to understand long term changes in state border as a 
contingent dimension of state attributes.  Lustick explains why state contraction takes 
place less often than state expansion. He argues that there are thresholds of 
institutionalization whereby state boundaries expand or contract; the thresholds divide the 
state institutionalization process into three stages each of which entails a different degree 
of difficulty to contraction. This difficulty depends on the degree to which state boundary 
is deeply ingrained in the polity: The more threatening contraction is to the integration of 




                                                          
7
 The three contexts of Britain/Northern Ireland, France/Algeria, and Israel/West Bank-Gaza included in 
Lustick’s study are set to examine this comparative framework; each case represents a case of state 
expansion and contraction (institutionalization and deinstitutionalization). In the Britain/Northern Ireland 
case British deinstitutionalization (contraction) of 1922 by the partition of Irish Islands was the culmination 
of a “long process deinstitutionalization of the territorial shape of The British state as it was 
established…early in the nineteenth century.” Britain had to cross the two institutional thresholds 
(Ideological hegemony and Regime thresholds) to disengage from Ireland which took along incremental 
development from 1845 to the 1920s. The French colonization of Algeria did not culminate in creating a 
hegemonic belief that Algeria was an integral part of France. However, France had established Algeria as 
part of its central institutional buildup beyond the ‘regime threshold’. This threshold implied more 
difficulty to disengage from Algeria than the decolonization of other French colonies overseas. The case of 
Israel/Palestine reveals the same dynamics as the PLO negotiated with Israel on the OPT of 1967. These 
territories have not been institutionalized hegemonically as an integrated part of the state of Israel; however, 
they were institutionalized at the regime threshold and beyond towards expansionism especially starting the 
year 1977 when the right (Likud party) took power in Israel. Crossing regime threshold amounted in more 




This research applies the theory of “state contraction” to assess the extent to 
which the South African regime involved in state contraction as it yielded to 
democratization and the abandonment of apartheid, and the extent to which Israel’s 
involvement in the peace process was an act of contraction. Ultimately this inquiry aims 
at assessing the conditions that may or may not lead to democratization in the latter case 
by examining the effects of the combination of national-territorial nexus, domination 
systems and processes embedded in conflict dynamics. However, this research qualifies 
Lipstick’s model by bringing to attention another crucial conceptualization of the state; 
the state as a political-territorial entity. Introducing the concept of “regimes of territorial 
legitimation”  as the founding construct of the state is a decisive factor in interpreting 
state contraction and expansion in settler-colonial settings. The institutional constructs of 
the dominating state in our understanding is affected profoundly by the determinants of 
state’s territorial ideology. State contraction, furthermore, as a process of 
deinstitutionalization is the embodiment of a dialectical relationship between state forces 
and challenging ethno-national groups/peoples. This dialectical relationship and its 
manifestations in a struggle over identity and territoriality induces dominant colonial 
states to establish regimes of domination and segregation in an attempt to sustain its 
‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ and subordination. The struggle over identity-
territorial boundaries as Lustik remarks is then a struggle over the rules of the political 
game: a struggle over transforming or changing the structures of domination and power 
asymmetries between ethno-national protagonists within a unitary state system. The 







Ethno-national colonialism in South Africa 
 
Introduction 
The dramatic escalation of the conflict in South Africa in 1970s and 1980s 
reflected an advanced stage of regime’s erosion and the downturn of Afrikaner 
nationalism. The rise of African nationalism within a deeply divided society indicated to 
a dynamism that would have led to the total collapse of the state (Horowitz 1991). Indeed, 
the increased levels of violence between the years 1984-1992 and the rise of a African 
nationalist and anti-apartheid civic-democratic movements on the one hand, and regime’s 
oppression on the other made the sustainability of the regime more costly. Moreover, 
regimes regional failures and international increased pressure that turned South Africa 
into a pariah state. R. W. Johnson (1977: 314) remarks that regimes police strategy in 
dealing with anti-apartheid movement, and its regional setbacks that stemmed from 
regimes aggression undercut its ability to endure. The eclipse of apartheid also marked 
the downfall of Afrikaners’ racial ethno-nationality as the basis of political life and socio-
economic privileges. The latter represented the essence of apartheid regime as well as the 
source of Africans’ discontent and resentment that led to the convergence of African 
nationalism and civic democratic organizations on the objective of thwarting apartheid. 
At the point where African nationalism was gaining the higher political and moral ground, 
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the regime of racial-ethnic domination was losing ground. Dan O’Meara (1996: 136) 
maintains that “by the end of 1977, virtually all commentators were agreed that on the 
burning issues of economic, social, and political policy, behind the overt face of hard-line 
control and repression, the government was virtually rudderless” (O’Meara 1996: 136).  
The erosion of Afrikaner domination, however, started long before the 1970s as 
this chapter argues: apartheid collapse was a staged process that accompanied and sprung 
from the very structures of exclusion, territorial separation, and domination systems that 
were based on racial differentiation and premised on Afrikaner ethno-nationalism as the 
defining essence of state system. However, the contradictions and weaknesses of the 
racial-ethnically based regime rendered its sustainability rather precarious. Historical 
developments that led to the collapse of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial 
democratic regime makes the case of South Africa illustrative for the purposes of our 
research: unveiling the conditions under which a racially base ethno-national conflict 
resulted in an integrative outcome. Thus our analysis addresses the conditions; structural 
and contextual that culminated in the collapse of a failing regime of ethno-territorial 
domination. As such the inquiry here is not concerned with the process by which the 
regime and the Africans’ national movement negotiated the provisional democratic 
transition; we emphasize the premises upon which the parties came to negotiate an 
integrative, unitary political entity that would preserve South Africa as one nation
8
. 
                                                          
8
 Research and scholarly contributions on the process are many. To mention few: Lowendberg and 
Kaempfer (1998) and Lipton (1986) emphasize the role of domestic interest groups in the process; Sisk 
(1995), and Friedman and Atkinson (1994) are leading examples of research agenda that focuses on actors’ 
perspectives, opportunity, constitutional and institutional design using  core concepts such as ‘mutually 
hurting stalemate’ and elite politics.  Other studies’ pursue the effects of the combination of internal-
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Initially, the conflict in South Africa was rooted in a settler-colonial enterprise 
that was characteristic of settler-colonial type of domination discussed in our conceptual 
framework. However, Afrikaners’ regime territorial ideology and the ‘regimes of 
territorial legitimation’ it adopted were not conducive to the construction of the whites as 
an ethnic core that is united and coherent to create and sustain a white South Africa. 
Moreover, dynamics of partial exclusion and exploitation contributed significantly to the 
failure of the regime to ethicize the conflict by ethnically homogizing the African people 
and the white society that was divided between Afrikaners and English-speaking 
communities. There are four major explanations for  the rise of Afrikaner nationalism  to 
power, its racial-colonial tenets, and the dynamics that led to its  demise: (1) emphasizing 
ideology as the main driving force of racial-colonialism apartheid in 1948 (e.g. Jan J. 
Loubser 1968, p 379-80, and W.A. de Klerk 1975); (2) Economic explanations that focus 
on economic imperatives and the contradictions (especially exploitation and production 
relations) they created in the establishment and the collapse of apartheid (e.g. Legassick 
1974, legassick and Innes 1977, Lowendberg and Kaempfer 1998 and Lipton 1986); (3) 
racist-colonial analyses that  focus on white domination as a system of institutionalized 
unequal distribution of resources and opportunities based on skin color. Ultimately, this 
system aimed at the construction of white society with the Afrikaners in its core as a 
nation endowed with cultural and ethnic euphemism (Adam 1979: 33) and sometimes 
scientific discourse (see Rich 1994); (4) An eclectic perspective that looks upon 
                                                                                                                                                                             
especially structural and external factors that led to regimes acceptance to negotiate the conditions for its 
own end (e.g. Fredrik van Zyle Slabbert’s 1999). These perspectives explain the dramatic transition from 
apartheid and white domination to what Arend Lijphart (1994: 222), depicts as a consociational democracy 
and “optimal power sharing” political system based on constitutional arrangements and majoritarian rule 
that is prone to sustainability 
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socioeconomic structures and their dynamics as well as structures of meanings and 
subjective aspects of the conflict as determinant sets of factors that contributed 
significantly to the eclipse of white rule in South Africa. Herman Giliomee (1995, 1979) 
shows how structural factors: a weak demographic base, a dramatically different regional 
and international conditions, and economic recession led to a serious debate within the 
white polity, which made the transition to democracy conceivable.  
This research takes into account the dialectical relationship between two main sets 
of factors: the relationship between structures of territorial legitimation and separation, 
and systems of domination on the one hand and the certain events and interactions 
between the adversaries on the other, as combined forces that led to the staged demise of 
white rule in South Africa. The apartheid regime represented a rational group dictatorship 
of a collective social entity justified and partially driven by ethno-national ideology of 
racial differentiation, which was by and large mutable and adoptive to socioeconomic and 
political power shifts. Therefore, what accounts more is to pinpoint the features and the 
unique forms of racial segregation and apartheid as domination systems of a settler-
colonial society seeking to reconstruct itself into ethno-national people.  The causal chain 
that led to the demise of white domination rule is found in four principal factors:  
First: the inability of the regime to create a valid separated territorial ideology 
accepted externally and ceded internally. Afrikaners’ regimes of territorial ideology’ 
were contingent, instrumental and indeterminate;    
Second: the persistence of white cleavages that prevented coherency and unity 
based on an ethnic core that may have gained the properties of a nation/people;   
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Third: the minority status of the white society undermined its ability to sustain 
domination as an ethnic-territorial group; and  
Fourth:  indeterminate territorial ideology and lack of ethnic unity had yielded 
two weaknesses: first the dynamics of exclusion and exploitation showed contradictory 
consequences that gave Africans a political leverage, and second divisions and weak 
ethno-territorial identification generated the inconsistency of the ideological justifications 
and mobilization especially in 1960s and 1970s. Weaknesses and inconsistencies were 
worsened by the rise of African nationalism starting early 1960s. African nationalism 
challenged the kernel of Afrikaner objective manifested by Bantustan policy and showed 
that Africans have maintained their sense of national identification with South Africa.  
The following empirical interpretations examine these factors through a process tracing 
method within a historical deep description narrative of the development of the conflict 
from colonial segregation to separation and apartheid as outlined in the introduction 
chapter of this research.  
 
South Africa: British imperialism and Afrikaner colonialism 
 
Afrikanerdom; Afrikaner ethno-national ideology was shaped and developed its 
political aspiration for power within a dual conflict: (1) a conflict with the British 
colonialism and English-speaking settlers that resulted in the wars of 1880-1 and 1898-
1902. However, the convergence between British colonial interests and Afrikaners’ 
ambition for statehood yielded the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910; a 
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new member of the Commonwealth that would serve British objectives in the region. 
Taking over the keys of power in the new state divided the white colonial communities; 
Afrikaners and English-speaking settlers. White cleavages have remained a salient 
challenge for the regime that compromised the unity and cohesion of the white polity and 
amounted in governments’ inability to “achieving complete political hegemony over 
society as it was much more difficult for the government to take action against white 
opponents” (Guelke 2005: 23) who possessed considerable economic, cultural and 
political power. This structural condition will affect regime’s pursuit of ultimate 
domination and shall hinder the efforts to construct a white ethno-nationality as one 
nation; (2) the conflict with the indigenous black people and other ‘Coloured’ groups 
who struggled for their right of self-determination, which had been a great challenge to 
white domination and a core factor in its eclipse.  
Internal challenges and external uneasy relationship with a colonial superpower 
founded the historical initial conditions that determined the main properties of the state as 
a settle-colonial construct. The Union of South Africa (read the Union) represented a 
system of state power based on racial differentiation. For the Afrikaners state power was 
the main source of political power that would enable them to establish their hegemony as 
a distinct ethno-nationality vis-à-vis other whites and in the face of the indigenous 
Africans. For a small minority (in 1904 the white community was roughly one-third of 
the population) capturing state power was a decisive condition for their supremacy in 
social, economic and political spheres of life. The state in this context was born outside 
and against the will of the majority of South African society whose exclusion and 
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subordination was a necessary condition for the success of white settlers’ enterprise. 
However, the foundation of the state, although externally imposed by Britain, had 
maintained the territorial integrity and contiguity of South Africa as a single country. The 
implications of political-territorial demarcation of the state would have fundamental 
effect on the political-geography of the conflict with the African national movement. The 
Union gained recognition as a modern state within this condition. Thus, slicing the 
territorial or spatial spheres of the country would be too costly for the regime while a 
system of segregation and exclusion would take a racially-based scheme whereby 
territorial segregation is instrumental in serving other supreme goals and objectives.  
 
Racial colonialism: Segregation and exploitation 
 
Although racial prejudice and segregation prevailed in the 18th and 19th centuries 
prior to the establishment of the Union, it was fragmented as each of the four European 
colonies enacted its own policies and measures. Lack of conformity in racial policies was 
fostered by geo-political fragmentation of Afrikaners’ ‘republics’ and British presence 
that blocked the emergence of a solid Afrikaner collective identity. Afrikaner identity 
emerged as a colonial-nationalist articulation of scattered settler groups in their fight 
against the natives for resources, and as a self-proclaimed anti-colonial (British) 
domination. The formation of the Union was welcomed by the Afrikaners as a perceived 
bottom-up process of state building that they were entitled to control in order to protect 
their interests and self-proclaimed national identity which otherwise was conditioned by 
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frontier (inland struggle for a foothold) conditions; a period that is out of the scope of our 
study and aptly covered in many studies (e.g. Giliomee 1979, Giliomee 2003, Worden 
2000, Adam 1971, and Thompson 1995). The Frontier conditions are considered, in some 
accounts, to have shaped Afrikaners’ deep sense of distinctiveness as a nation superior to 
natives and distinct from English-speaking white settlers in their struggle for political 
power within a racially defined context. 
White society in general was the locus of domination, coercion, and disdain of 
non-whites especially following the discovery of gigantic reserves of minerals in the 
interior. White settler, supported by the British colonial power became superior vis-à-vis 
the Black Africans (Guelke 2005: 56-58). Capturing the interior turned the settlement 
enterprise of white Europeans into extremely brutal and inhuman practices.  Hobson 
(1900: 53) describes modes of coercion, subordination and enslavement of the indigenous 
and taking over their lands which placed them “in such a position of political and 
economic weakness that they are unable to refuse wage work upon terms offered by 
white masters.” The conditions Hobson depicts, in agreement with most of his 
contemporaries
9
 had created the foundation for formal policies of colonial rule in which 
                                                          
9 John Barrow; the British traveler in Southern Africa in his book An Account of Travels into the Interior 
of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798 shows the features of frontier Afrikaners’ attitudes. He 
blames the Afrikaner for the plight of the indigenous who were pushed to live under conditions comparing 
to which slavery is a better life. It is remarkable that he doesn’t attribute these practices to any notion of a 
divine mission or religious mandate. He asserts that they are the inhuman deeds of peasantry that took place 
away from any government’s eye, which gave them the opportunity to practice absolute power over the 
indigenous. Dr. John Philip’s Researches in Africa corroborates Barrow’s conclusion on the underlying 
reasons of Afrikaners’ inhumanity in this era. He noticed that oppressive practices of the colonists had not 
sprung from peculiar religious traditions or racial ideologies; rather they were in large part due to material 
interests namely finding forced labor. By the same token the Missionary David Livingstone articulated the 
objectives of the Christian mission in Southern Africa as being the “promotion of commerce, imperial 
expansion, and the general diffusion of the ‘blessings of civilization as intimately and providentially linked. 
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territorial separation and segregation served a racially defined socio-economic system of 
differentiation and subordination. However, the economic imperative coupled with 
political power considerations were also combined with ideological justifications and 
other typical European colonialist notions. Other explanations recognize the effects of the 
frontier as the structure within which Afrikaners’ racial practices developed. 
 
Divinity and secularism in Shaping Afrikaner ethno-nationality 
 
Ideological explanations focus on Afrikaners’ Protestant Calvinist
10
 belief that the 
Afrikaner community constructs a Chosen Biblical people. This ideology remained 
salient and represents a major source of Afrikaner ethno-nationalism. Thus B. J Vorster 
(South African Prime Minister from 1966 to 1978) pressed the messianic role of the 
Chosen Afrikaners by stating: “Yes, I believe profoundly, as always, that we have been 
appointed by Providence to play a role here and we have the human material to play that 
role” (quoted in Adam and Giliomee 1979: 17). Afrikaner nationalism as a grid of ethno-
religious thinking and ethno-national identity offers a plausible explanation of racial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Livingstone though attributed the brutality and racial attitudes of the frontier Afrikaners to the conditions 
they endured that had a degenerative effect on their morality. (Cited in Du Toit 1989: 933-4, 939)  
10
The origin of the Calvinist myth (the chosen people) leys in the fact that the pioneering Afrikaner settlers 
were Calvinists who came to the country with the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) whose main aim was 
to take South Africa as a refreshment point on the long trip to and from India. As Calvinists settled in the 
country they brought with them some Calvinist cultural traits (Du Toit 1989: 923). This implies that neither 
these settlers were fully indoctrinated as Calvinists nor they settled for primarily ideological reasons. Most 
early settlers, as Adam and Giliomee (1979: 24) remark, arrived to South Africa as individuals and 
employees of the DEIC “many of them adventurers, usually representing the opposite attitudes of those 





segregation and, for this matter apartheid. However, the effects of Calvinism and the 
Covenant ideology remain controversial in terms of the degree to which they shaped 
Afrikaners’ racial attitudes and policies.  Calvinism, beyond its religious prevalence, was 
a system of social and political affiliation that provided for integration and constructive 
social life. It provided for the demarcation ad safeguarding of the relationship with the 
other may it be the indigenous or the other white British settlers. Thus Calvinist ideology 
was a politico-religious system of differentiation with political implications based on 
cultural supremacy of a nation in mission to carry on  a divine mandate to redeem the 
culture of Voortrekkers (the pioneering settlers in the frontier) and reduce the heathens 
(as Afrikaners described the Africans) to a position of perpetual servitude (Du Toit 1983: 
920).  
Calvinism had fulfilled political, cultural and social functions that shaped 
Afrikaners’ self-conception and distinct identity as an ethno-national people. Calvinism 
was functional in drawing the lines of relationship between the Afrikaners and other 
peoples according to their racial biological origins. The effects of ideology were 
intertwined with typical European secular colonial notions of modernization that 
introduced Afrikaners as a civilizing force. Both discourses converged to produce a 
single practice characterized with conquest of the indigenous people and taking over their 
land (Du Toit 1983: 920) while segregating them to maintain distinctiveness.  
The colonialist-secular nature of Afrikaner’s racialism becomes striking when we 
move from racial attitudes of individuals to social sphere where the structures of social 
relations unveil the political nature of racism in a colonial setting (Adam and Giliomee 
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1979: 20). The functional nature of Afrikaners’ Calvinism indicates its mundane origins; 
Afrikaners’ minority status resulted in high levels of anxiety, which made security and 
the privileges accrued from unity and conformity paramount. Cohesion and conformity 
are crucial for the sustainability of the social system of domination and racial segregation 
that protected white supremacy. Indeed, once well established, Afrikaners’ notions of 
nationhood and distinctiveness were a major source of political thinking and mobilization 
that bolstered racial discrimination and segregation as the base of political power and 
domination, and for social supremacy. In this sense Afrikaner ethno-nationalist 
sentiments  was an adaptive response to particular opportunities as well as new 
exigencies of the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions at the eve of 
establishing the Union and along the track that led to apartheid.   
To be sure, Afrikaner nationalism was not articulated and materialized as an 
organized political force until the last decade of the 19th century. Afrikaner Bong that 
was established in 1881 as the first political expression of Afrikaner national unity was 
indecisive in its politics as to whether or not it would attract the votes from groups 
(Giliomee 1979:101) other than the Afrikaners. Afrikaners’ racism and political 
organization was the product of a sphere of struggle within the white society and between 
the whites and native Blacks. The construction of Afrikaners as an ethno-nationality had 
to endure this structural difficulty of Black African existence as an overwhelming 
majority and the privileged English-speaking white competitor.  Thus, the term Afrikaner 
itself was an exclusive that applies to white settlers of Dutch or Huguenot descends and 
Afrikaan speaking persons who believed in the common cause of Afrikaners as a nation. 
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The salience of Afrikaner ethno-nationality in this sense exacerbated the divisions within 
the white society and among Afrikaners as segments of them supported unity with British 
while Afrikaner nationalists sought independence from British influence: this cleavage 
would prevail until 1948 when the Nationalist Party ascended to power.  The rise of the 
white as a distinct ethno-nationality based on the notions of Afrikanerdom remained 
blurred, weak, and adoptive to the developments in the social and, socio-economic, and 
political spheres at certain historical contexts (Giliomee 1979: 83). Ideological 
underpinnings of Afrikaner ethno-national identity  were immutable, protean and subject 
to political power configurations and socioeconomic changes related to shifts in the 
economic system of exploitation intertwined with the sought for political power.  
Afrikaners’ racial colonialism was shaped under the conditions of the ‘frontier’ 
conditions that created what Du Toit (1983: 931) conceptualize as the “Degeneracy 
Paradigm”. This syndrome depicts how Afrikaners’ morality had been by the harsh 
struggle for viability to the extent whereby demonizing the indigenous was inevitable. 
Thus lack of morality and religious constraints drove Afrikaners’ racial prejudices rather 
than religious impulse. Moreover, the minority status of the Afrikaners –and whites in 
general- generated another syndrome: security dilemma.  Confining indigenous Blacks 
and dominating them can be seen through this lens (Laundahl 1992, cited in Loenberg 
and Kaempfer 1998: 31). Perceptions of security threat worked on two levels: separating 
the non-whites and solidifying Afrikaner identity; both processes required a certain 
degree of political power and institutional arrangements. Afrikaners’ ability to practice 
such a power in per-state period relied on the geographical isolation they had in their 
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barren colonies from a central government. In the inland colonies Afrikaners exploited, 
by brutal means, the indigenous for their own material interests especially as forced and 
cheap labor. Therefore ideas of national destiny and mission can be understood as a 
rationalization of expansionist and greedy actions.  
Practices of racism were materialized through a set of legislations in the Colonies 
that aimed at achieving two complimentary imperatives: to territorially separate Africans 
from white communities and simultaneously to provide for labor in mines and farms
11
. 
Colonial governments and local Afrikaner republics enacted several laws that separated 
black farmers from their lands. At one level Africans’ success in managing their own 
farms enabled them to compete with white farmers and in some regions black peasant 
farmers earned higher returns than white smallholders (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 
33). Eliminating the competition was necessary for white economy to flourish. At another 
level, alienating blacks from the land was a modality of subordinated through which 
landless Africans were forced into a property-less labor in white-owned farms and mines 
(Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 33)  and to live in reserves at the periphery of white 
communities.  Black workers were crucial for the performance of South African economy 
as cheap and manageable work force but at the same time they were perceived as a 
menace to Afrikaners’ sense of distinctiveness and the social order they espoused.  
                                                          
11
 As Loenberg and Kaempfer (1998) notice South African economy had suffered from the shortage of 
working force in farms and mines and the “existence of a viable and flourishing black peasant sector raised 
the opportunity cost of black labour to white farmers” and min-owners who relied on coercive measures to 
deprive blacks from their lands and later to rely on state power to enforce political and legislative tools to 
achieve this objective.    
These governments resorted to a variety of methods to deprive the blacks from their land including the 
imposition of cash taxes, outright confiscation of land from Africa tribes, and the confinement of black land 
ownership to designated reserves. 
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Thus, territorial separation and the creation of reserves was not the linchpin of 
racist colonial enterprise; it rather was instrumental although it exhibited certain 
ideological aspects to justify it. The main feature of territorial segregation until the 
enactment of apartheid in 1948, therefore, was the separation of residential areas that was 
perceived by Afrikaners and English-speaking whites in terms of “different geographical 
regions of white and black land settlement” (Rich 1990: 667). It did not show any 
profound territorial ideology beyond drawing the boundaries of Black communities in the 
low areas and regions that are clearly less developed, over-crowded, and stigmatized. To 
be sure prior to 1910 the main features of territorial segregation were determined by each 
of the four former colonies and republics, each of which “had pursued separate policies 
of residential segregation” (Christopher 1989: 421)
12
. They had some conformity at 
specific aspects of segregation such as the colonies of Good Hope and Natal’s policy of 
denying citizenship and the right to hold land to all who were not officially white. The 
core issue of racist segregation was depriving non-white communities and especially the 
Africans of all means of economic, social and political viability and simultaneously 
exploiting them. Social and political was structures along a partial exclusionist policy that 
allowed exploitation. Partial exclusion, segregation, and exploitation would become 
systematic, formal, and consistent in the post-state era.   
 
                                                          
12
 For example, the British colony of Good Hope maintained a nominally colour-blind franchise policy 
where segregation was based on class and wealth. By the year 1910 this colony had diversified its system 
of segregation. The Natal colonial government on its turn was far more restrictive whereby blacks were 
expected not to remain in the towns except as single workers (see Christopher 1989: 425-6)    
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The Afrikaners: from Republics to state ethno-nationality 
 
Understanding Afrikaner nationalism as a system of settler-colonial 
differentiation and segregation starts from the point where Afrikaners revived as the state 
system of the Union of South Africa (USA). This development wouldn’t have been 
possible apart from British colonial policies. British Empire and English settlers in South 
Africa played a major role in shaping the nature and dynamics of South African white 
rule before and after the establishment of the Union. British colonial authorities turned a 
blind eye to the practices of settlers in the interior and failed to uphold a color-blind 
franchise; instead and in spite of British victory in the 1898-1902 the Treaty of 
Vereeniging of 1902 that ended the war enshrined the white-only franchise (Guelke, 2005: 
63) which was the most important legalizing underpinnings of segregation that served the 
interests of English-speaking white settlers who sought the perpetuation of the pre-
capitalist economies in the African reserves” (Rich, 1990: 665). Indeed for English-
speaking whites who captured the biggest chunk of the economy, segregation was crucial 
for them to maintain the source of their economic power and social supreme status 
through exploiting Black labor. However, and in contrast to Afrikaner’s total segregation, 
they opted to maintaining a narrow separation system that would create social 
differentiations within the African community that facilitate containment. This contrast 
was deepened by the question of the relationship between the new state and its backer, 
Britain.    
The formation of the state was a compromise between English-speaking settlers 
allied with segments of Afrikaner community who espoused a lasting tie between South 
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Africa and Britain on the one hand, and the Afrikaners who sought independent from the 
Empire as a free nation on the other. Thus the issue of white settlers’ unity had been a 
fundamental concern for the Afrikaner ruling elites that was threatened by these opposing 
trends. Afrikaner control over the state and the political system would be undermined by 
white divisions and their sought to establish their ethno-national identity would be 
compromised by lack of unity. Divisive pattern would be exacerbated by Afrikaner 
control of the state as we discuss below.  
The establishment of the Union in1910 was a major turning point in the 
institutionalization of racial-colonialism that provided Afrikaners with the source of 
political power they pursued for decades. Primarily, this development sparked Afrikaner 
ethno-national colonial ambitions (Rich 1994: 55) as the first and most organized and 
coherent institutional success they gained. As of 1910 the dynamics of social 
relationships and socio-economic structures of racial domination and segregation would 
become the state system and settler-colonial practices would become systematic and 
guided by vision of exclusive racial ethno-national nation-building. However, this task 
was conditioned by the compromise upon which the state was established. Until 1948, the 
rise of apartheid, Afrikaner efforts to ethno-nationalizing racial-colonial state system was 
significantly hindered by this condition (Giliomee 1979:104). Both parties that ruled the 
most in this period; the South African Party (SAP) and the United Party (UP) focused 
their political and institutional energies on creating one white nation out of the two 
competing settler groups.  
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Unifying efforts had been opposed by a strong Afrikaner political force of 
nationalist leaders mainly J. B. M Hertzog (Prime minister from 1924-1939) and D. F. 
Malan (Prime minister from 1948-1954) who believed that South Africa was entitled to 
separate development and full independence from Britain; the Afrikaners, within the 
political entity they espoused, “Should retain their unique nationality” as Hertzog 
contended. Malan went further to give this claim a divine dispensation (Giliomee 1979: 
105-6). Separating the development of the two white communities was perceived by 
nationalist Afrikaners as a precondition for the development of their community to 
achieve parity with the English-speaking white community who was much more well-to-
do economically and stronger culturally
13
. For Afrikaner nationalists asserting 
Afrikanerdom was more important than unity and their ethnic identification preceded 
their class affiliations, which resulted in the deepening of the divide within the white 
society and widening the colonial buffer that separated white settlers from natives. 
Although the nascent capitalist economy exploited Afrikaner workers as well as Blacks 
and Coloureds, for Afrikaner nationalists it was ethnic and racial issues that came first 
and prevented cross-class interactions and coalitions.  
Afrikaner community was mobilized mainly by language, Afrikaans, in order to 
establish the social and political bases of racial segregation within a hierarchy that would 
guarantee Afrikaners’ supremacy as a collective ethno-national group within production 
relations that prevailed in this period. Job market - already segregated when the Union 
                                                          
13
 Comparing to the well-established urban Anglo workers the Afrikaners who migrated to the towns 
often entered the job market at a low point of wage and skills beneath their Englishmen counterparts. 
The vast gap between the two communities in terms of their wealth was striking; the ration of the per 
capita income of the Afrikaners and the English is estimated at 100-300 in 1910 (Gilomee 1979, p107) 
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was established- was distinguished by the significant gap between black and white wages 
whereby the later gained much less than the former for the same job
14
. This competition 
explains partially white workers prejudice against their African counterparts and white 
workers refusal to receive the same rates as blacks for the same job in the same market 
indicates that underlying assumption that white workers must have a European living 
standard that blacks were not entitled to. As Malan put it “The white man, because he is 
white, is expected – whatever his chances in the labor market – to maintain a white 
standard of living” (cited in Gilomee 1979: 108). Segregation in this sense was not only a 
system of exploitation but also a means of asserting white supreme identity as racially 
defined ethnic group.  
The exigencies of unity coupled with Afrikaner’s effort to tighten their grip on 
state institutions postponed the creation of a well-defined segregation strategy. 
Segregation of races between 1910 and 1930 remained fragmented. However Afrikaner 
colonial ethno-nationalism with its strong segregationist impulse has had the appeal as 
the locus of white supreme status and privileges among the majority of the Afrikaner 
community. Opposing trends within the white community rendered the question of the 
Native an ultimate issue in the first years of the Union. This was a period of Afrikaner 
turmoil in which the effects of early capitalist industrialization
15
 and urbanization 
generated different reactions in the white society especially Afrikaner community. The 
                                                          
14
 For example, between 1900-1940black workers in the cities accepted to do unskilled jobs for two 
shillings and six pence per day while white workers were not willing to do the same job for less than three 
shillings and six pence (Giliomee 1979: 108) 
15
 At the beginning of the 20th century only 10 per cent of the Afrikaners lived in cities and villages; in 




latter, under the effects of modernization had shown diverging levels of ethnic-national 
affiliation which represented a threat to Afrikaner nationalist sought to reconstruct 
Afrikaners as an ethno-nationalist people.  
 
Following its victory in the war of 1899-1902 Britain enacted the legislation of 
South African Act of 1909 that founded the legal bases of the ‘Constitution of the Union 
of South Africa’ that enshrined white minority rule. Britain was preoccupied with 
retaining its power over the country through the Commonwealth, and had maintained its 
economic lucrative ties with it while offering vocal support to peaceful change and 
majority rule (Ohlson and Stedman, 1994: 44). The formation of the Union contributed 
significantly to the rise of Afrikaner ethno-national mobilization and segregationist 
practices. State system would become the main source of power utilized by Afrikaners to 
consolidate segregation as the defining system of social relationships. Harnessing state 
power enabled Afrikaner nationalists to mobilize Afrikaans speaking whites regardless of 
class status or social affiliation, behind a common objective: the achievement of 
Afrikaner nationalism involved the pursuit of both cultural and political goals. Invoking 
Afrikaner nationalism transcended the particularistic class interests within the group and 
inter-group relations alike. The result was the emergence of powerful collective 
nationalist actors (Adam 1979: 62) especially political parties and nationalist associations 
who believed in Afrikaners as a nation. Indeed “It was the entrenchment of Afrikanerdom 
as a political class, encompassing all economic classes of the ethnic group that made 
possible an ethnic revolution through the capture of state power” (Adam 1979: 36), which 
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gave significant popular support for the implementation of segregation as a state system.  
In this sense, segregation was a dual system of social status differences and unequal 
political entitlements on the one hand, and exploitation of the subordinate group on the 
other.   
In the social realm it was a system of expected conduct by the subordinate group 
that conforms to the criteria of the super-ordinate especially separate residential locations 
and social hierarchy; the defiance from such a conduct was intolerable. State discipline 
power and bio-power strands were deployed to facilitate exploitation and to tame political 
dissent while maintaining a certain level of exclusion. It was through administrative and 
regulative methods in the realms of economic and social relationships that the state 
sustained and consolidated segregation in this period.  Segregation and its modalities 
were conditioned upon Africans political weakness and fragmentation; in so far as 
African nationalism was tamed state power worked on those two levels (discipline and 
bio-power) which endured until 1930s where sovereign power was also introduced to 
entrench racism and social differentiation. It was in the wake of 1948, though when the 
state deployed a blanket sovereign power to reconstruct racial relations within ethno-
national separated terrains as we will see.    
Thus, segregation policies in the 1910 until early 1920s remained contextual but 
primarily aimed at excluding non-white communities from property rights regime and 
from central political institutions of the state but not from the production process as a 
work force. Indigenous Black community was confined and exploited simultaneously; 
two inseparable imperatives for the white society to accumulate and dominate within a 
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growing capitalist and rapidly industrialized country. To be sure, Afrikaners had shown a 
persisting permanent existence through which they invested capital and resources, which 
further increased their collective sense of identity and entrenched their interests in 
sustaining and maintaining racial-colonial relationships. Afrikaners conceived of their 
existence as an independent nation rather than compradors for a metropolitan center, 
Britain. As argued in chapter I, settler-colonial dominant groups differ from classic 
colonialism in this particular aspect that is a necessary condition for their transformation 
into an ethno-national entity. Therefore, formalizing and institutionalizing segregation 
practices was crucial in order to mobilize and unify the white and especially Afrikaners 
and give them a viable and stable system of social relations that champion and uplift their 
distinctiveness and independence taking advantage of state power and a tradition of 
segregation established before state formation and Afrikaners’ ascendance to power 
Shortly before 1910 Lord Alfred Milner (the British High Commissioner of South 
Africa, and Governor of Cape Colony since 1897) formed the Lagden Commission
16
 in 
1903 to examine what he described as ‘native policy’. The aim was to found a 
compromise between racial extremism within the white community that demanded an 
overt racist interpretation of political life on the one hand, and the colonial establishment 
that sought to reduce the effects of racial extremism on the other. The Commission 
represented the need for a unitary or an agreed upon policy on the Native issue (Rich 
1990: 670) and it proposed that the existing division of land and separate holding of land 
should be the foundation of territorial separation between the Africans and the whites, 
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 It was dubbed the “’South African Native Affairs Commission”, 1903-5 and was chaired by the secretary 
of native affairs in the Transvaal, Sir Godfrey lagden. 
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while it “recognized that Africans’ reserves could serve as labor reservoirs for the white 
areas” (Guelke, 2005: 64). Thus the recommendations espoused a segregated territorial-
residential social sphere within which the inclusion of African labor in economic 
processes imply social costs for the white society namely, the ability of Black Africans to 
disrupt white endeavor for a distinctiveness.  “Proletarianizing” the Black African work 
force as an indispensable factor for the development of white capitalism granted the 
former to practice political leverage over the latter.  Spatial and territorial separation 
wouldn’t become absolute or sought as a precondition for the constitution and 
consolidation of Afrikaner or white racial ethno-nationality. Lagden Commission’s 
propositions were formalized in the Native Land Act of 1913
17
 which meant to create 
conformity of social practices to organize an already established social reality of 
domination and subordination structured in territorial separation. The Act was a victory 
to segregationists amongst the Afrikaner community and deepened state involvement in 
shaping segregation policies including labor market regulations and resources allocation. 
The colonial buffer separating settler-colonial society from the indigenous was expanded 
by a top-down and formal procedure that attempted to circumscribe the effects of Black 
integration in the economic system of the state but also it represented the interests and 
attitudes of white electorate (Christopher 1989: 421).  
The conformity with which the state sought to practice segregation was a 
necessary policy for the articulation of a unitary white political entity that was otherwise 
split over the question of the natives and over white intra-group relations. On the level of 
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 The Act defined the areas designated for the Africans as reserves owned and used by Africans, which 
comprised less than 9% of the country. Moreover, it enacted that purchasing or renting land outside these 
reserves is prohibited for the Africans. 
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white politics state adoption of segregation as a formal policy aimed at bridging over 
divisions that plagued white politics through ethnic-class stratification across races 
whereby the widening gap between people of the same class category and different ethnic 
affiliation became more pervasive. Introducing state power to homogenize the whites and 
non-whites created a distinct domination system whereby African ethno-national identity 
and their class status and economic exploitation intersected to accumulate grievances of 
economic exploitation, social status and political injustice within a socio-economic 
structure of partial exclusion.  
In spite of state efforts to legalize and institutionalize segregation the Afrikaner 
polity remained inconsistent in its position over the level of segregation necessary for the 
social order and economic system to hold (Guelke 2005: 44). Thus while some political 
leaders warned against extreme segregation measures such as General Smuts who 
believed that such a policy would cause the gravest trouble for South Africa (Quoted in 
Rich 1990: 673), the supporters of all-out segregationist policies demanded more state 
intervention in consolidating segregation and differentiation especially  labor regulation 
and residential areas. Moreover, for some Afrikaners segregation and especially the 
resettlement of the African population in reserves - that is required for segregation to 
work - would disrupt the pattern of paternalistic structure of colonial control that was 
established in the preindustrial era (Rich 1990: 673). The most important outcome of 
these opposing currents was the politicization of the question of black-white relationships 
against the background of increasing anxieties accompanied the beginning of industrial 
era that gave more salience to Afrikaner national mobilization. Socio-economic changes 
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of industrialization and the salience of the native question turned political process 
especially elections into a tool of mobilization based on racial issues (Adam 1979: 67-68). 
Thus, white politics would be one of the most decisive elements in the development of 
segregation and racial-colonialism in South Africa as the Union entered the 1920s and 
well into the 1930s.  
 
White politics and the climax of segregation 1920s-30s 
 
The SAP lead by Jan Christiaan Smuts dominated the political arena since the 
establishment of the Union. The main opposition party was the English-speaking 
Unionist Party. However, socioeconomic changes emanating from the transition to a 
capitalist industrial economy came to change this balance of power.  The main social 
force that stood behind political alignment shifts was Afrikaner workers who demanded 
political arrangements that promote their interests and protect them in the face of rapid 
urbanization and the increase of black competition. With the increase of industrialization 
as Giliomee (1979: 108) remarks Afrikaner workers were more attracted to nationalist 
notions of separate unions and separate classes in order to preserve Afrikaners’ status and 
privileges. Industrialization processes of 1920s had triggered profound dynamics of 
socioeconomic changes that formed the social base of political polarization within the 
Afrikaner community. One of the most striking socioeconomic changes of the era was the 
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increase of the poor among the Afrikaner population
18
 especially in the cities and towns, 
which resulted in a remarkable rise of nationalist sentiments. 
The increasing Afrikaner nationalist sentiments had driven those workers away 
from white unions especially because most these unions were led by non-Afrikaners and 
considered foreign entities. On the psychological level Afrikaners in the 1920 through 
1930s faced social dislocation that stemmed from urbanization and resulted in a deep 
sense of insecurity and uncertainty. Poorest Afrikaner strata and middle class (especially 
clergy and educators) were the most attracted to nationalist rhetoric and political 
mobilization (Giliomee 1979: 111) in support of Afrikanerdom. Questions of racial and 
national affiliation and political identification had become overwhelmingly prevalent and 
were related to the native question and segregation policies; the later would become one 
of the most – if not the most, important issue in polarizing white society as it pertained to 
the very interests and social superiority of a wide social strata of Afrikaners.  
Social stratification resulted from industrialization only exacerbated malicious 
political cleavages that started to surface as early as the formation of the Union. 
Following the election of 1910 J.B. Hertzog; the leader of the Orange Free State defected 
from the government and formed the National Party (NP) in 1914. Further divisions 
occurred as a result of South African participation in the First World War alongside 
Britain. This decision instigated a white military rebellion that was soon crushed by force. 
Although the SAP remained in rule it could not sustain the support of majority 
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 The Carnegie Commission Report of 1932 estimated the number of poor white population at 300,000 or 





 (Barber 1999: 76) following the workers’ uprising and the controversy on 
the war. South Africa’s participation in the war allowed the regime to gain a regional role 
as an imperialist regional power
20
 which strengthened an outward focus of Smuts’ 
government that contributed to SAP loss of the 1924 election. Regional focus of Smut’s 
government overshadowed crucial domestic issues of racial relations and the amelioration 
of social repercussions of industrialization.  
The election of 1924 had shown the serious political polarization in the white 
community: The SAP lost for the alliance of the National Party (NP) and the 
segregationist South African Labor Party (SALP), which was a significant victory for the 
proponents of overt segregation and nationalist intransigence. While the SAP was 
supported by land and mine owners, and industrialists the winning alliance was widely 
supported by white labor and farmers. These allegiances were reasonable taking into 
account socio-economic changes we mentioned above that brought with it a strong 
unionized white labor aristocracy in new urban centers (especially in Witwatersrand and 
Orange Free State). For white workers segregationist policies will serve their interests by 
protecting them from black labor competition and by legislations that will promote their 
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 The National Party under the leadership of Hertzog gained 78,000 while the South African Party polled 
94,000 votes. Taking into account that the SAP had the English-speaking whites’ support whereas the NP 




 South Africa was appointed the status of a Mandate over South West Africa with the support of the 
British government. South Africa went so far in its Mandatory jurisdiction to allocate vast areas of land for 
the settlement of white settlers. This encouraged the regime to start seeking the annexation of Southern 
Rhodesia as well (Gulke 2005: 71). This expansionist attitude will witness a reinvigorating effort later by 
the P.W. Botha government in the late 1970s and 1980s. However, Smuts’ government could not change 
the territorial boundaries of the state that remained the same until 1960s. But the regional role the regime 
fulfilled and the alliance with Britain consolidated regimes position and the Union’s importance as an 




standard of living (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 35). Thus segregationist policies 
appear to have been the result of interest groups pressure on the regime. However, 
although economic and status calculations played an important role in these political 
shifts, mobilizing Afrikaner working and middle classes relied heavily on cultural and 
identity discourse. This was evident even as both the NP the Purified National Party 
(PNP) of Malan resorted to Afrikaner nationalist rhetoric to mobilize political support for 
diverging, and indeed conflicting, political goals. While Hertzog sought to redefine 
Afrikanerdom by building a white cross-ethnic middle-class coalition, Malan sought to 
unify the Afrikaners politically to go it alone and achieve their political superiority 
(Giliomee 1979: 113).   Moreover, tightening segregation and territorial separation 
coupled with increased Afrikaner nationalism was bound to the structural changes rather 
than to merely the pressure of certain groups. To be sure, social order during the 
transition into a modernized capitalist social system and economic performance depended 
on state measures to protect whites’ interests and at the same time to maintain economic 
vibrancy and stability of the country. The latter goal required the preservation of the 
‘reserve economy’ that provided for a portion of the means necessary for the 
reproduction of the migrant Black work force to urban white areas. The imperative in this 
era was to “maintain   separate areas with distinct production relations” (Legassick 1974:  
6), which formed the basis for segregation in terms of its spatial, territorial and property 
rights spheres.  
Segregation policies continued apace in the 1920s as well as in 1930s their 
territorial and spatial aspects. The government tightened influx control measures to 
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restrict Black Africans from moving from their reserves to white towns and cities. Influx 
control and other geographical constrain on black mobility and property rights increased 
the number of black workers who moved constantly to and from urban white working 
areas to their reserves. The increase of black workers in urban industrial projects driven 
by capitalist sought of more profits gained from cheaper labor raised the levels of 
competition with white workers. Therefore restricting the number of black workers turns 
to be a condition for better wages for the whites. White farmers also benefited from the 
existence of a large pool of unskilled black workers (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 
37).Thus to say that segregation was driven mainly by white working class and farmers’ 
interest groups is partial as the whole change in the structures of the economy and social 
relations required a remodeling of segregation policies and territorial separation.  
Racial segregation remained the dominant state policy during the 1925-1939 
regardless of the controversy within the Afrikaner community in particular and the white 
community in general over racial policy. Following on the footsteps of former 
governments
21
 this period witnessed an intensification of measures that extended and 
confirmed the essential features of segregationist strategy. However, resorting to 
legislation was increasingly characteristic to segregation policies in an indication of 
increased state sovereign power to sustain racial differentiation. Governments’ main 
focus in 1920s-1930s was urban areas and aimed at restricting Black integration in white 
                                                          
21 Between 1913 and 1930 consecutive South African Government of different political affiliations 
enacted a number of legislation: The Native Affairs Act of 1920, The Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, The 




social life and to fixate the geography of racial boundaries
22
. The Pact government (1924-
1938) under the Premiership of J.B. Hertzog
23
   enacted a series of measures to protect 
mine-owners and white workers from the shortage of labor and from African labor 
competition
24
. The ultimate aim was to secure a higher level of life for white workers and 
a cheap African labor for the mining industry. The Pact government also curtailed the 
electoral power of non-Whites especially in the Cape, and furthered the system of 
allocating reserved areas for Blacks as permanent homes while regulating their 
movements in the remainder of the country. These measures not only created conformity 
of the social order but also, and a result,  contributed profoundly to relaxing white class 
and ethno-national cleavages and tensions between Afrikaners and English-speaking 
communities and within the Afrikaner community between nationalists and their political 
rivals as Legassick (1974) notices.  
 Policies of racial segregation in this sense were a safeguard to mobilize the entire 
white community in defense of white settler power and domination, and the preservation 
of controlled influx of forced cheap Black labor that was a condition for economic 
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 For example, the Housing Act of 1920 remained intact and unchanged well through the 1920s-30s. It 
provided for financial assistance to municipalities in building housed for the poorer section of the 
community. The condition for this project was to establish racially homogeneous housing estates.  The Act 
resulted in the creation of mono-racial belts of residential arias on the margins of white urban towns. 
(Christopher 1989: 426) 
 
23
 Hertzog was Prime Minister and also Minister of Native Affairs, while his comrade in the nationalist 
Afrikanerdom stream D.F Malan was the leader of the NP in the Cape, and became Minister of the Interior, 
Public Health and Education. The English Labour Party was rewarded with tow ministries (ministry of 
Defense, and Ministry of Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs as a sign of gratitude by Hertzog for the 
Party’s help in getting him into power.    
 
24
 The most important measure was the enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which created 
an industrial council with the powers to lay down minimum wages in particular industries. This Act was 
complimented by the Wage Act of 1925, which enabled the government directly to set minimum wages for 
the employees who are not part of a trade union.   
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performance of white economy. Neither of these two related goals was achievable, the 
way Afrikaner elites saw it, apart from forming a coherent white community through an 
organized effort of mobilization and nation-building of racial ethno-national quality. The 
base of mobilization had changed at this turn; language alone was not sufficient to 
mobilize diverse political perspectives and the need for all-white unity rather than 
Afrikaner unity and ethno-nationalism, which was the core of Hertzog believes. This was 
a reasonable change as Afrikaners gradually became more confident in their grip over 
political power and their socioeconomic and cultural status vis-à-vis the Anglo whites 
and the natives.  The accommodation of English-speaking community within Afrikaners’ 
polity had become of a paramount importance for the creation of a single ethno-
nationality that will provide for the hegemony (Terreblanche 2002: 261) that Afrikaners 
lacked over the social sphere. Indeed white-white cleavage was a profound hindrance to a 
successful and ethnically viable nation-building and the consolidation of Afrikaners’ 
political power on a unitary white state.  
English-speaking whites, Rich (1990: 666) remarks, were in favor of a segregation policy 
based on discipline power and social control rather than segregation. Disciplinary power 
in this sense would suppress class struggle and stratifies African community along social 
rather than racial-ethnic lines and reduce its ability to political mobilization. Therefore 
they aimed at the establishment of a social rather than a racial hierarchy, which gives the 
regime a significant degree of legitimation from the society at large including certain 
segments of the native Africans and Coloured communities. Afrikaners, by contrast, were 
more preoccupied with racial and latter with racial-ethnic hierarchy as the system that 
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guarantees white supremacy regardless of the degree of legitimacy it derives from the 
non-white. The success of the Pact government to silence these cleavages in the 1920s, 
however, changed at the turn of the decade. 
The divisions within the Afrikaner community in 1930s were more salient; 
according to C.T. Loran’s classification three strands of thought on racial relations 
prevailed: “repressionists”, “equalists”, and “segregationists” with the latter hold the 
middle ground (Cited in Rich 1990:  667). Many justifications of racial inequality were 
articulated to support the segregationist perspective and present it as a benevolent 
endeavor that aimed at upgrading non-white in separation from white communities, 
which allows both communities to develop each on its own right and by its own means. 
Segregationists’ camp gained a new force with the emergence of the PNP (1935)
25
 that 
advocated Afrikanerdom and the supreme objective of constituting Afrikaners as Volk
26
. 
Malan protested the silencing of Afrikanerdom and aimed to counterweight what he saw 
as United Party selling out of Afrikaners’ interests to the British Empire. The UP that 
found its social base mainly among capitalist strata of Afrikaners and Anglo settlers 
represented a direct threat to the Afrikaner petty bourgeois that saw it as an imperialist 
coalition with the UK. By the same token, Afrikaner middle class (lawyers, teachers, 
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 The formation of the PNP resulted from a break away from the National Party of Barry Hertzog as the 
latter formed the United Party as the merger of the NP and Smuts’ SAP. Daniel Malan and other 19 MPs 
protested the step and defect the NP to establish the PNP. 
 
26
 The expression volk had a twofold function: in the first it asserted the distinctiveness of the Afrikaners 
from the indigenous not only as a race but more importantly as an ethnic-nationality with well defined 
boundaries, which amounted in the enactment of apartheid. It also emphasized the struggle to wrest the 
country from the English-speaking British and place its future in the hands of the Afrikaners, which 
indicates the long and eager lust for sovereignty and political power. In the latter sense it is striking that 
once the NP was in power in 1948 English-speaking bureaucrats, soldiers, and state employees were 
sidelined by reliable Afrikaners, with key posts going to Broederbond members. The electoral system itself 
was manipulated to reduce the impact of immigrant English speakers. 
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professors, and low-level civil servants) saw their positions and status threatened by the 
influence of English language, English bureaucrats, and the more sophisticated English 
culture. Moreover, UP strong commitment to capitalist development implied the de-
nationalization of the Afrikaner working class as a result of mobilizing class relations 
rather than racial affiliation (Giliomee 1979: 110-14) under the influence of English-
speaking elites. These material interests and cultural anxieties culminated in a wide range 
of polarization and mobilization between the UP and the PNP; both resorted to Afrikaner 
Nationalist tenets that each party defined and interpreted in ways that suited its political 
aims. The chief victor of this era was Afrikaner national identity and the revival of strong 
Afrikaner cultural sentiments, which the two political rivals competed to uplift and utilize 
in their political rivalry and struggle for power.  
The PNP strong tendency in favor of “extending the scope, depth, and details of 
segregationist policy (and apply it to the Coloureds) gave a high degree of saliency to its 
nationalist stance. The main success of the NP in this period was rallying most 
intellectuals - who joined other social forces that opposed UP policies -   to form the 
‘Afrikaner Broederbond’, which focused its energy in the cultural arena and the 
promotion of Afrikaner language
27
  as well to “igeologize Afrikaner history and identity” 
(Giliomee 1979: 112) as sacred, which amounted to the evolution of a civil religion or a 
politico-religious thought in the Afrikaner community based on the belief that Afrikaners 
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 By the year 1937 over 300 organizations were affiliated to the Broederbond, which put the movement in 
the lead to reinvigorate the cultural and ideological aspects of Afrikaner identity: the resurrection of the 
Great Trek mythology and its meanings that reminded the Afrikaners with the frontier settlement and 
heroism of the pioneering Dutch who colonized the inlands of South Africa. 
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belonged to an elect people.  Notions of Afrikaner bond gave political rise and social 
viability to the aspirations of Republicanism and Afrikaners’ nationalism.  
The period of 1930s was strikingly an era of a politico-religious grid of thinking among 
Afrikaners as the bedrock of establishing the Afrikaner nation. Thus the NP “with its 
immediate concern to preserve the ‘taal’, the ‘Kultuur’ and the priority of ‘South Africa 
first’ within the politics of the larger Commonwealth” (Rich 1994: 56) gave it more 
political viability especially with Hertzog powerful concept of a united Afrikaans and 
English-speaking volk united in a new Afrikanerdom. Hertzog’s new approach, which 
indicates a profound change in the ideological underpinnings of Afrikaner ethno-
nationalism, can be considered the intellectual genesis of apartheid: escaping the logic of 
racial colonial features of white-native relationships by ethnicizing the conflict as 
between one ethno-national group (the white) and other ethno-nationally defined black 
groups. Perceptions of white ethno-national entity increased significantly as political 
elites where in the race to win the minds and hearts of Afrikaners through nationalistic 
outbidding. This process will be seriously disrupted following Smuts government’s 
decision to participate in Second World War alongside Britain, which instigated fierce 
opposition within the Afrikaners especially within the UP government.  
Segregation and territorial separation until the turn of 1940s was part of a wider 
pattern of modernization processes that engulfed South African society” (Rich 1990:  666) 
and turned it into a capitalist system of social relations. Racial differentiation ideology 
and practices are less the product of Afrikaner unique cultural roots than the result of the 
ideological labors of modernizing elite seeking to insure social cohesion in transitional 
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times (Du Toit 1989: 9520) that threatened the already divided white community. 
Consequently, socioeconomic changes and political volatility radicalized the Afrikaner 
community and resurrected Great Trek ideology and culture, which reemerged not only 
from mere convictions; rather, as an outcome of a set of social, economic and political 
dynamics that spurred further evolution of the Afrikaner nationalist agenda.  However; 
World War Two came to interrupt this pattern and divide the Afrikaner community again 
and to set the scene for the ascendance of the Nationalist Party apartheid. Smuts decision 
to take part in the war alongside Britain, in the words of Giliomee (1979: 114) “rekindled 
all the old anti British and anti-imperialist sentiments and was ultimately decisive in 
persuading the majority of the Afrikaners to go it alone politically, which gave rise to 
















Apartheid as an ethno-territorial control system 
 
Introduction 
The landslide victory of the Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party 
from the PNP and the faction that had merged with the SAP) in the election of 1948 was 
a dramatic event that changed the political landscape in South Africa and introduced new 
notions of racial relationships and political power. The victory came within a process of 
mobilization of the Afrikaner community led by Malan who stirred Afrikaners’ bitterness 
against British taking advantage of wide opposition to participation in the war. In this 
sense the political appeal of the NP in the election can be seen through the lenses of 
Afrikaner strong identification with their sense of distinctiveness and their longing to 
ultimate political independence from British influence. However, NP revival in 1948 is 
fundamentally related to the dynamics within the Afrikaner community and its political 
identification that made this victory possible.  Until 1948, Afrikaners did not seem to be 
close to their original objective to constitute their distinctiveness into a coherent 
territorially based ethno-national people. As a minority threatened by a vast indigenous 
and partially integrated majority and another adamant rival, Afrikaners’ drift toward 
chauvinist ethno-nationalism under the leadership of the NP represented a strategy that 
would impede assimilation and integration. Apartheid can be seen as an answer to the no-
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exit stalemate within the system of segregation and an answer to white society fractured 
ethno-national identity.  
 
The National Party and the advent of Afrikaner ethno-territoriality 
 
The tenets embedded in apartheid were not entirely new to Afrikaner nationalist 
leaders of the NP. D.F. Malan assured in 1944 that one of the aims of the ‘Republic’ and 
the NP was “to insure the safety of the white race and of Christian civilization by the 
honest maintenance of the principle of apartheid and guardianship” (Guelke 2005: 3). 
Malan’s statement reflects Afrikaners’ disillusionment with their achievements after three 
decades of rule where rapid socioeconomic changes allowed the Black community to 
achieve a measure of social and economic viability and thus political leverage that 
threatened to bore the segregation system from inside out. Processes of modernization 
had given African community a chance to develop their income, education, and unionist 
bargaining power and therefore created a feeling among the Afrikaners that their “self-
proclaimed racial superiority over the black Africans was melting away” despite racist 
legislation (Olson and Stedman 1994: 41). Afrikaners’ feeling of threat also stemmed 
from the rivalry with the English-speaking community that possessed economic and 
cultural edge, which raised the stakes for the Afrikaners to unify their ranks in order to 
gain preponderance within the white society. Apartheid as the centerpiece of the NP 
portfolio was the gravitating notion that attracted Afrikaner electorate and at least 
partially explains NP victory.  
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National Party’s ability to interrelate ideology and notions of Afrikaner culture 
with political and socio-economic policies granted it a remarkable appeal among the 
Afrikaner electorate: its adoption of the demands for South African National 
independence, the promotion of Afrikaners’ economic interests, and its championing of 
the Afrikaans culture (Giliomee 1979: 114-115) put the NP in an undefeated position.  
The NP invoked not only nationalistic ideology, but equally asserted what the Afrikaner 
middle class (professionals, educators, and civil servants) saw as a redemption of the 
their country and the reclamation of their own political control over the state from the UP 
that sold it out to the British. The NP presented itself and apartheid as a salvation force 
that has the capacity to give nation-building efforts of white society a significant 
momentum through total territorial separation of putative ethnicizing of the population. 
Apartheid came to assure Afrikaners the security and certainty they sought: Although 
they maintained control over political power they were uncertain about their survival as 
minority that needed constant, stronger and more penetrating legislations that will secure 
their survival in the face of all challenges and threats real and conceived, present and 
forthcoming. The NP seemed to have the potential to achieve these goals and bring about 
unity of the white race as ethnicity.  
Apartheid: the creation of the ethno-national nexus 
 
Racial relationships of segregation had been institutionalized and pervaded every 
corner of South African society when the PA -group relations and intra-group affiliations 
(Adam 1979, p32) in an irreversible way. Introducing sovereign state power to change 
the constitutional and legal underpinnings of the state by changing the political-
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geography of the conflict was assumed to provide the answer ascended to power in 1948. 
As a qualitatively different system of domination Apartheid came to change the 
expressions and modalities of social relationships through changing the patterns of inter 
for Afrikaners’ debacle. Territorializing the domain of the conflict along ethnic-national 
stratification would have the effect and consequences of reshaping the entire structures of 
social, economic, and political aspects of racial-colonial relationships.   Redefining racial 
inequality in accordance with new developments within the structures of the society was 
the main objective of apartheid; the differentiation of distinct ethno-national groups 
rather than races would be less costly and more durable for the survival of Afrikaner rule.  
Racial segregation within a minority rule system was doomed to failure taking 
into account socioeconomic shifts in the South African society as a whole especially 
African community’s socioeconomic developments and the shifts within the white 
community. Racial segregation fill short from materializing the Afrikaner nation-building 
project based on racial differentiation and subordination. Indeed At the turn of 1950s 
Afrikaners and English-speaking communities were still racially self-defined ethno-
national groups occupying the top two positions in a racially defined social hierarchy. 
Redefining the conflict in ethno-national terms has had the capacity to unify the whites in 
general as a unitary ethnic group. To be sure Afrikaner identity within apartheid became 
a question of an ethno-national group that has fundamental claims of a privileged status 
in a country it perceives as its own (Giliomee 1979:  127). Cross-ethnic and cross-racial 
interactions based on class affiliation, regional belonging and interest are less likely in 
this context, and therefore social and political integration less conceivable; ethnicity 
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becomes the element that determines political behavior and identification. Apartheid, in 
this sense preserved and quantitatively deepened discrimination and exploitation directed 
against Africans and other non-white communities. Simultaneously it introduced 
qualitatively new ideological justifications of a different type of domination based on 
ethno-national differentiation and representation. Analyzing apartheid in depth is an 
exercise to grasp on the convergence and divergence between two distinct but interrelated 
eras through which the system of white domination evolved. Apartheid can be looked 
upon and assessed as a move of state contraction to preserve white supremacy with 
minimum costs to Afrikaners in terms of economic, political as well as cultural costs.  
Seen from this perspective, apartheid was a dynamic and adoptive response to 
particular socio-economic and political developments that South Africa had witnessed in 
four decades since the establishment of the Union. Thus one would not question apartheid 
per se as much as examining the conditions within which it sprung and developed. 
Therefore this section of the research contends that the state had been a unitary actor in 
the pursuit and the implementation of apartheid and it did not merely responded to the 
interests of these or other political or social actors
28
. Rather the state practiced its central 
institutional capacities and sovereign power to produce as a purposive actor aimed to 
maintain a distinct and privileged social status for the Afrikaners, and to enforce the 
separateness of white from other ethno-national groups (Giliomee 1979: 118); the state 
was acting as an ethno-national group.  In this we assume the presence of a high degree 
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 In this we contrast most of economical perspectives that assume certain supporters (workers and farmers) 
and particular opponents (capital owners and industrialists) of apartheid amongst the Afrikaner social 
stratum. This approach further assumes that politicians who sought to maximize their electoral gains 
enacted apartheid policies following these calculations. The state within this reasoning was a passive player 
that responded to these rational calculations (Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998: 42).    
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of conformity between the state as a political system and the socioeconomic structures in 
producing social relations of domination and inequality that led to the emergence of 
apartheid; a feature that can be seen in state intervention in labor market and economic 
processes as we discuss below. Thus the victory of NP and the enactment of apartheid is 
not a mere result of interest groups pressure as some analysts suggest (e.g. Merle Lipton 
1986; Lowenberg and Kaempfer 1998). Rather, it is the emergence of a specific system 
of social domination that stemmed from and responded to certain historical developments 
within which the Afrikaner community maintained its demand for social and political 
hegemony that was not exclusively related to apartheid; it has been the main 
characteristic of Afrikaner politics since early 1920.   
 
Changing the political-geography of the conflict by partitioning 
 
At one level, apartheid represents a quantitative extension and continuation of 
racial segregation in two ways: it expanded the system of forced and unequal labor to 
include the increasing urban industrial production, and in the significant increase in state 
intervention in economic processes and labor market through legislative measures. Both 
reflected the resilience of exploitation as an imperative for the secondary industry 
characteristic to the rising industrial society (Legassick 1974:  9). However, exploitation 
under new conditions required   more strict political and union organizations measures
29
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 As the Board of Trade and Industries put it: “The extension of manufacturing industry can be stimulated 
through a reduction of the high cost structure through increased mechanization so as to derive the full 




that would circumscribe Black labor unionism and political mobilization. This would not 
have been attainable without state intervention in labor regulations and in market 
operation at large. Thus state institutions regularized labor market through measures such 
as labor ‘color codes’ and ‘work-roles’ that assigned certain jobs’ classification on an 
ethnic basis to preserve white (mostly Afrikaner) workers.  White working class enjoyed 
many privileges and was turned into a kind of aristocratic working class, but it was under 
constant threat of cheap black workers competition that market preferred, which drove 
the government to intervene and fix what it saw as a replacement of European by non-
European labor. Two measures were put forth: restricting black labor mobility within 
urban areas and between different jobs, and raising the wages of white workers; both 
measures were apparently antithetical to capitalist economic growth. However, as 
Legassick (1974: 6) notices, rising white workers’ wages did not make a whole difference 
in economic performance.  NP government’s labor policies hadn’t differed but a little 
from that of the 1940s and by the time the legislation of ‘job color bar’ was implemented 
in 1956 South African economy was in a boom phase, which marginalized the issue of 
labor replacement. To be sure “South African economic growth since 1948 has proceeded 
apace – exceeded in 1960s only by that of Japan- while at the same time the system of 
racial discrimination has grown more effective and pervasive” .This explains why the NP 
government applied job color bar in a dynamic way that followed the requirements of the 
industry and the market rather than ideology.  Therefore apartheid existed as a result of 
something essential within the structure of social relations that yields different benefits 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  As the minister of Economic Affairs stated, the government “will not lose sight” of this problem in “the 
formulation and application of its industrial policy” (quoted in Legassick 1974:  12). 
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(material and ideal) and that is a priori to mere capitalist economic growth imperatives, 
which manifests in a racially stratified socio-economic system.   
Apartheid came to deepen and perpetuate the intersection between ethnic-national 
affiliation with class and social status exerting an ascribed status allocation in a racially-
ethnicized social hierarchy. Thus privileges that certain social groups accrued were one 
major aspect of the socioeconomic structure and the political economy of domination not 
a contradictory element. While it is true that private capitalists might not had reaped the 
full benefits of their business in a system of labor restrictions and state’s heavy 
intervention in the economy, but capital would not have made huge profit margins 
without state suppression of bargaining capabilities of the black unions, and without the 
low social costs of production that resulted from apartheid (Adam 1979: 46). Therefore 
apartheid deepened and intensified social, economic and political inequalities prevailed 
before 1948. But more equally important and dialectically linked to these continuities are 
the qualitative features of apartheid that made it a unique domination system.  
Capitalist industrialization in South Africa since 1920s and the accompanied 
modernization processes (economic growth, urbanization, education, and the spread of 
communication) did not culminate in effective nation-building and national integration of 
diverse ethno-national peoples in the mainstream of national life. Modernizing South 
Africa had been exclusive “due to the fact that … implementing the modernization 
process [was] controlled by a single ethnic group at the political center” (Simpson 1994: 
463-474). Dynamics of economic integration and social and political exclusion of 
Africans coupled with indefinite Afrikaner territorial-national identification created a 
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situation whereby neither assimilation and full integration ensued nor ultimate separation 
realized. ‘Regimes of territorial legitimation’ of the South African regime remained a 
function of a socio-economic and political dynamics and the reemergence of Afrikaner 
ethno-nationalism in s 1940 had to overcome undetermined territorial contours of an 
ethnicized system of differentiation and separation. Apartheid was a response to the 
prospects of cross-race, cross-class and cross ethnic affiliations and aspired to prevent the 
fusion of national life that transcend ethno-national affiliation through the establishment 
of a new regime of territorial legitimation as the defining structure of ethnic-national 
distinct identities. The ultimate goal was to craft a white South Africa by permanently 
excluding Africans in a separate sphere of political, economic and legal context. To serve 
this end, NP had envisioned the notion and policies of ‘separate development’ of white 
and non-white communities as the rationalization of permanent ethno-national separation 
that would totally ‘Afrikanerize’ the state. 
 Apartheid was a partitioning solution to a ‘problem’ that had been adamant; the 
existence of the indigenous Africans as part of the state. Partitioning is a form of 
territorial arrangement usually embodies in it the element of sovereignty, necessary for 
the formation of a new state. However, political ‘sovereign’ entities result from 
partitioning, as Muir (1975) described are ‘politico-territorial anomalies’ with a de facto 
sovereignty, and represent a geographic realignment of political forces (Falah, 2007: 
1344-1345). In essence Africans would be totally territorially and legally separated from 
state structure as foreigners of other ethno-national sovereign entities. As the last resort to 
solve the challenge of the Africans, apartheid was alleged to enable Africans to claim 
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their separateness not as a race rather as putative ethnicities. Afrikaner political 
leadership introduced the policy as a measure of justice, progress, prosperity, and peace. 
However, the new sovereign power deployed as embedded in apartheid only deepened 
inequality and exclusion which revealed how illusive notions of separate freedoms and 
development were. But, these inequalities were not any more justified by crud racial 
ideology; rather by economic and political realities of life that “do not allow the gap 
between black and white wealth to be narrowed more rapidly” as H. F. Verwoerd (Prime 
minister of South Africa 1958-1966 and the mastermind of apartheid) contends. He 
further argued that the causes of inequality were historical differences that do not allow 
but a separate development of the white and the black; it is not because blacks are inferior 
race, as he puts it, but because Afrikaners are different from others and will not give up 
their different status (Simpson 1994: 463-474).  
Thus apartheid represents a redefinition of social relations in terms of ethnic 
differentiation to block the development of South Africa into a plural society of mixed 
and integrated social groups that form one national identity based on equal civil and 
political rights (Posel 1991:  1). The erosion of racist colonialism loomed as the levels of 
industrialization and urbanization brought more Africans and Coloureds to the city and 
skilled labor market, which the NP was determined to reverse (Guelke 2005: 25). The 
‘influx control’ policies before 1948 set the stage for apartheid as a legal practice based 
on the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, which restricted the rights of Africans to stay 
in urban areas. It responds to the failed in reducing the number of Africans in cities and 





 . In this context, apartheid incorporated more in-depth measures based on social 
engineering to control black labor as an organized and militant working force and as a 
political and social menace. Complete physical territorial separation was presented as the 
ideal solution for the non-white and particularly the Black indigenous existence in the 
state; a solution that would propagate Afrikanerdom and Afrikanize the state permanently. 
Two levels of apartheid were introduced in which state sovereign power prevailed: ‘petty 
apartheid’ and ‘grand apartheid’. While the former embodied Afrikaner racist attitudes 
against social intercourse or cross-racial interactions through total separateness
31
, grand 
apartheid aimed at constitutionally enforce a system of territorial ethno-national 
separation and partition.  
 Grand apartheid is a qualitatively profound social engineering that creates ethnic 
classifications and separate spheres of life and the achievement of racial homogenization 
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 As early as the year 1942, the South African government criminalized black workers’ strikes and took 
measures to tighten up the pre-war influx control. In 1945 the government enacted the Native (Urban Areas) 
Act to achieve this control. But the number of Africans in Urban areas maintained an annual increase of 7 
per cent. 
  Petty apartheid was a set of legislations: The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 that made 
marriages across races illegal; The Immorality Act of 1950 which outlawed sex across color lines; the 
Population Registration Act of 1950 which compels every citizen too have an identity certificate showing 
his race, The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 that consolidated daily life segregation; Bantu 
Education Act of 1953 and The Extension of University Education Act of 1959 aimed at a separate 
educational systems. The latter illegalized the admission of non-white student to certain universities except 
for those the government allows on an individual basis.  
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for those the government allows on an individual basis.  





 territorially separated from each other. In this respect the dominant 
group doesn’t seek to control territory or to expand in the spatial sphere of the 
subordinate group. Rather, the dominant ethnic-national, especially as a minority, seeks 
exit by guaranteeing total disengagement from the indigenous population. Thus grand 
apartheid works on the level of collective entities per se to change their constitutional, 
political, and territorial identification.  
Apartheid, in addition of being a state system, concentration and separation of 
races reflected a strong attitude within the Afrikaner community to separate itself from 
other non-white communities (Christopher 1898: 428). State regulations before the 
enactment of apartheid responded to these attitudes, which sharply increased levels of 
urban and residential separation and ‘harmonization’ of races (Ibid). More significantly, 
patterns of white settlement were not related to the size or location of the land or the 
place, which indicates further the instrumentality with which residential and territorial 
separation in general played. Apartheid then represents a qualitatively different set of 
domination modalities of state sovereign power whereby the regime established physical 
and territorial segregation that aimed at articulating new boundaries of state sovereignty 
and the control of non-white communities as collective ethnic entities mainly through 
legal measures (legislations)
33
. The most important pillar of apartheid legislative and 
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 The NP governments were determined to curb black residency in urban areas not only through ‘influx 
policies’ but beyond it forced the removal of Blacks living in privately owned or rental properties in or near 
the centers of towns, and their resettlement on the urban periphery. One of the most known among these 
evections was the elimination of Sophiatowm in Johannesburg. Moreover, they exerted pressure on the 
employers of Blacks to reduce the number of those living in white areas (Christopher 1989:  427) 
33
The regime imposed ‘separate representation’ on Coloureds’ and they were removed from the common 
roll in the Cape in 1956 before this policy was abolished in 1968. Likewise, Africans were excluded by the 
Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 that set the legal basis for the creation of the ‘homeland system’ of 
territorial separation.  
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institutional base was the Population Registration Act of 1950
34
 that classified the entire 
population of the country (Guelke 2005: 25) in terms of assigned ethnic affiliation. 
Ethnically classified and zoned, Africans were to be the reserve immigrant labor that 
works for the whites without being part of whites’ life.  
The NP aimed at achieving this ethnic hierarchy through realizing three objectives: 
(1) to create an entirely separated communities that would preserve Afrikaner identity; (2) 
to sustain and secure white control over political life and the related economic privileges 
against all threats; and (3) to achieve Afrikaner parity with the English-speaking 
community (Olson and Stedman 1994: 41). These goals that are reminiscent of D.F. 
Malan’s statement of 1944 we cited earlier, epitomize the ultimate end of apartheid: 
guaranteeing white domination in perpetuity through separation and control practiced in 
terms of sovereign arrangements. The most striking aspect of apartheid was the 
implementation of the ‘homeland’ policy that was claimed to be a benign policy aimed at 
separate development. In essence apartheid fragmented the African community into 
separated homelands based on the classifications enshrined in the Population Registration 
Act and The Self-Government Act of 1959.  The policy reestablished black community 
into a number of ethnic groups
35
 which was meant to trigger new local and territorially 
based Black identities in place of collective sense of national identity. Simultaneously,   
this policy gave boost to Afrikaner and white identity as a distinct ethno-nationality not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
34
 The Act classified the population into three main categories: Native: the black; white; and Coloured. In 
addition, the Group Act of 1950 also came to enforce mobility restrictions and the zoning of non-white 
communities. 
35
 The Self-Government Act of 1959 classified African community that lived until then in black reserves 
into eight initial ethnic groups: North Sotho, South Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Swazi, Xhosa, Shanagaan-Tsonga, 
and Venda. Ndebele were added later to raise the number to nine. 
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merely a white race divided in two groups. Afrikaners of different classes and political 
affiliations were mobilized behind the apartheid regime by the power of ethno-nationalist 
political discourse rather than a cultural and linguistic parlance.  Afrikaner identity in the 
apartheid era turned into a political code of status and privileges that gave Afrikaners a 
hegemonic edge where interests, spoils, and privileges are protected and sustained by 
political control and separate development. The completeness with which apartheid 
sought was an effort to reconstruct South Africa as a pure white state surrounded by belts 
of pauperized and client pseudo-autonomous African homelands.  
Against all the opposition that the Bantustan policy encountered domestically by 
the African National movement and on an international scale, the South African 
government was persistent to carry it on as the only answer to the question of racial 
relationships. Prime Minister Verwoerd pushed the plan forward and worked consistently 
to turn South Africa into a Republic.  Apartheid and ‘homeland’ policy was presented as 
an actual implementation of the right of self-determination and independence for the 
Africans; a step akin to formal decolonization as Afrikaner elites alleged (Olson and 
Stedman 1994: 41). To make it more formal the NP government recognized the 
Bantustans as independent sovereign homelands. As a matter of fact conferring 
‘independence’ on some Bantustans amounted to a major violation of the principle and 
the right of Self-Determination as the UN General Assembly ruled
36
. As a 
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Separate development plan envisioned the establishment of 10 Bantustans on area that comprises 13 per 
cent of the total land of South Africa. The plan aimed at the resettlement of 50 per cent of African 
population in the country. These Bantustans were territorially separated from one another by white-only 
integrated areas. This policy did not change the applicability of United Nations Charter on decolonization 
especially article 2(7) on apartheid. Bantustan policy cannot be considered as an implementation of the 
right of self-determination as the regime invoked. The UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2775 E 
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geographically-based independence plan the Bantustan policy amounted to a gross 
violation to international law as it forced the resettlement of 900,000 Africans in 800 
exclusively designated areas separated from white areas (Richardson, 1978: 186-7). The 
most important aspect of the plan is that it deprived Africans in the Bantustans from their 
South African citizenship and turned them to foreigners.  Moreover, the fact that the 
white community at the time represented only 19.3 per cent of the population of South 
Africa (out of which 58 per cent Afrikaners and 38 per cent English-speaking), popular 
support for the Republic and Bantu policy was shallow (Guelke 2005: 102), which 
undermined its legitimacy significantly. Africans’ resistance to the policy would soon 
ensue and reveal the inherited injustice embedded in apartheid. The implementation of 
the plan counterproductively revealed the very nature of apartheid as a neo-racial colonial 
system that embodied “a complex new version of a type of colonial nationalism in its 
dual capacity to secure white interests while directing black political aspirations towards 
disengaged ‘homelands’” (Rich 1994: 60).    
The profound change of the structural properties of the conflict apartheid 
introduced triggered the powerful dynamics of two forces that exposed the essence and 
features of apartheid: the polarization and divisions within the Afrikaners, and the 
African national opposition and resistance. The interaction between these two forces 
helps us to a large extent to understanding how the regime survived the crises of 1960s 
and 1970s while, comparatively speaking it could not endure when the crisis of 1980s hit. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(XXVI) that stated that the Bantustan policy was in the pursuance of apartheid and it condemned it as a 
violation of the right of self determination and as prejudicial to territorial integrity of South Africa. The 
resolution was again consolidated by UNGA Resolution 3411 D (XXX) of 1975 on the same grounds (for a 
detailed discussion see Richardson 1978)   
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The most remarkable shift that started to take place as a result of this process in the 
1970s-80s was that the locus of political mobilization and power moved from the 
Afrikaner to the African National movement arena; a momentum shift that changed the 
balance of political power in favor of the later and contributed significantly to the eclipse 




































The African uprising of early 1960s made apartheid a politically obsolete project 
as it unveiled its lack of legitimacy. Opposition and resistance to apartheid uncovered the 
illusions of separate development and deepened political divisions within the Afrikaners 
on the efficacy and consequences of the ‘homeland’ policy. Along with international and 
regional environments that became profoundly more conducive to Africans’ struggle for 
self-determination, these developments put the country at the onset of a spiral of 
escalation and violence. Nonetheless, the regime endured the 1960s and achieved 
economic growth and crushed the uprising, and survived the 1970s crisis. There are three 
reasons that enabled regime to endure in this period: the first is the ideological 
pragmatism of the Afrikaner political elites that bought apartheid more time and ability to 
maneuver and combine flexibility with coercion that helped the regime to circumscribe 
the scope of protest and violence. The second is the limited ability of the African 
nationalist movement at this turn to mobilize on a mass popular scale against apartheid 
for long enough time that would make the persistence of the regime more costly than the 
regime could manage. Third, International inconsistent rejection to apartheid provided the 
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regime with a measure of legitimacy and endurance. We turn to discuss these factors in 
some detail for their importance in understanding the decline and ultimate demise of 
white domination and apartheid. 
 
The Contradictions between ethno-territoriality and social stratification 
 
Afrikaner political elites during the 1960s were more assertive and clear as to the 
response conceived adequate to the black challenge; oppression was the answer. Regimes 
police strategy against anti-apartheid movement would turn into one of its greatest 
misgivings as it pitted the whole non-white population against a brutal state oppression. 
The inability of the regime to implement territorial separation, the hallmark of apartheid, 
through modalities of bio- power and sovereign power triggered coercion as the only 
method remained. The dynamics of this phenomenon would yield more challenges to the 
regime in the coming years. However, the Sharpeville massacre
37
 not only showed 
regime’s brutality and willingness to coerce descent but more importantly revealed 
Afrikaners’ political strong grip over the state and its apparatuses and their self-
confidence as a nation defending their white state from African menace. Facing a 
growing mass upheaval and protest, Afrikaners became mobilized more strongly on the 
bases of their ethno-national identity and the political unity their leaders espoused. 
                                                          
37 The ANC had announced that it would hold a massive protest against the Pass Law. The protest was 
called for on 31 March. The PAC, in a move to pre-empt this call announced for a demonstration to defy 
the pass law on 21 March. This latter took place in front of the police station in Sharpeville. The police at 




Crushing the African upheaval of the early 1960s and oppressing their most organized 
and influential political organizations; the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
South African Communist Party (SACP) had given the government and the community a 
sense of strength and control that extended well into the early 1970s when a new African 
nationalism protest and resurrection irrupted.  
Thus 1960s was a decade of tranquility and economic growth that resulted in serious 
shifts in Afrikanerdom notions; it created an atmosphere within which the deracialization 
and denationalization of the Afrikaners would not have been a threat to their unity and 
status. The identification that Afrikaner elites sought to emphasize was broader and more 
to the purposes of apartheid, namely with the state per se (Giliomee 1979: 122-4). The 
state at this point was to a large extent Afrikanized and imbued with white identity and 
politics and Afrikaner nationalist ideology became less significant and more flexible.  
Gerritt Viljoen, head of the Afrikaner Broederbond, stated: “Apartheid is neither an 
ideology nor a dogma. It is a method, a road along which we are moving and is subject to 
fundamental reassessment” (quoted in Giliomee 1979: 120). Self-confidence and 
tranquility of 1960s would recede in 1970 with the renewal of African nationalist 
militancy and upheaval. 
African resurrection of 1970s and the rise of violence reintroduced the most 
fundamental questions of Afrikaner domination: political survival, unity, and socio-
economic status. Unprecedented levels of violence and adamant African nationalism 
triggered the mechanisms of survival for a minority undetermined on the path it would 
take to solve the challenge of indigenous majority. African rising challenge in 1970s had 
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provoked significant changes of Afrikaners community’s attitudes, values and political 
perspectives toward partial accommodation. Regime choices of action and policy in 
response to the 1970s events became more complicated but less costly in terms of internal 
cohesion of the Afrikaners. To be sure, although more than 80 per cent of the Afrikaners 
in the 1970s still supported the NP there existed serious divisions on the most crucial 
questions of political survival and the aspects of Afrikaner identity that must be stressed
38
. 
Opinion surveys in this period reveal these trends and their underlying political values: 
the strong Afrikaner commitment to the notions of ethno-national distinction envisioned 
by the NP in the 1950s and 1960s has changed significantly in the 1970s
39
. Surveys 
indicate the growing agreement among Afrikaners on a more relaxed notion of politics, 
and the relative acceptance of less restricted labor policies. More striking is the 
persistence of Afrikaners’ opposition to social intercourse; The same period has shown 
that a minority of Afrikaners (between a fifth and a third) accept measures of social 
integration such as the admission of blacks to white churches and schools and an increase 
in Afrikaners’ support of the prohibition of mixed marriages. These trends show that the 
Afrikaners were willing to expand the scope of economic interaction while maintaining 
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 Giliomee (1979: 121-6) identifies three strands of Afrikaner identification with the group and its 
relationship with the other in this period: (1) exclusion; seeing Afrikaners as an exclusive nation; (2) 
integration; seeing Afrikaners as the core and hegemonic power of a white South African nation  ; and (3) 
there were Afrikaners who envisioned the de-ethnicizing South Africa. Afrikanerdom in this view is seen 
as one of several identifications and Afrikaners as an interest group in a South African nation that 
encompasses all ethnic groups without exception. 
 
39
 In 1972 45 per cent of the Afrikaners indicated that they would call an Afrikaans speaking Coloured an 
Afrikaner. The same survey was repeated in 1977 and showed the increase of this figure to 52 per cent. In 
another survey undertaken in 1975, 47 per cent of Afrikaners thought that Coloureds shoud represent 
Coloureds in the Parliament. In the realm of labour regulations only 32 per cent of Afrikaners in 1974 
agreed that nonwhites should be trained for the ame jobs as whites and receive the same pay, but in 1976 42 
per cent of Afrikaners agreed to the abolition of job reservation, and 62 per cent accepted the admission of 
nonwhites to the same jobs as whites in 1977. Also 62 per cent accepted the principle of equal salaries for 
whites and nonwhites.   
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their social and political hegemony, which makes a lot of sense if we take into 
consideration socio-economic changes within the Afrikaner community in this period: 
Social and economic developments within the white community during the 1960s-70s 
gave rise to significant social forces that didn’t give a blanket support to apartheid 
policies.  
The Afrikaner middle class grew significantly; a bureaucratic stratum in diverse 
administrative institutions came to share portion of the political power; and a new 
business class arose out of the economic boom of the early 1970s resulted from 
industrialization. These new social configurations, as much as they benefited from the 
system, they developed certain vested interest in the political stability of the country to 
sustain their status. It is also important to notice that the 1970s were alarming for the 
regime as white immigration rates to South Africa declined, which testified to the 
widespread pessimism and uncertainty about the future of the regime. It is against this 
background and the pressure accompanied with the Soweto uprising of 1976 that 
Afrikaner political elites had to enact a new policy.  As Adam and Giliomee (1979:  7) 
remark, inaction was not a choice facing rising costs of apartheid. The alternative policy 
will also have costs and was to be calculated against its consequences on the Afrikaners’ 
interests and unity.  
The government has had to enact a synthesis between coercion and police strategy 
and co-optation. Ruthlessness and political oppression were proven to have their limits 
and constraining conditions amongst which maintaining white community’s unity is 
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paramount. The persistence of English-speaking and Afrikaner split
40
  and the existence 
of a strong concern among the whites to present their rule as just and legitimate; police 
brutality deprives the ideologues of their rational and ability to make justify apartheid. 
Large scale oppression would have alienated important segments of Afrikaner 
community and threatens the already delicate unity of the white in general (Adam 1979: 
27-29). Unleashed oppression was also perceived as a source of political and institutional 
threat to the state for it implied the increase intervention of strong and powerful security 
and military apparatuses, which would require more centralization of the state, the 
hegemony of a one-party and the rise of authoritarianism. Oppression assessed, as well, 
in terms of its economic consequences since it will be directed to black community 
whose workers represented 80% of the working force of a capitalist economy that can’t 
afford sacrificing these workers to the nationalist movement.   
The inability of the regime to gain the consent of Africans for the homeland policy 
made the regime realize the need for having allies within the black and the Coulouerd 
communities in order to confer a measure of legitimacy to apartheid. Co-optation of 
particular segments of the non-white communities that goes hand in hand with coercion 
was the optimal alternative. Thus on the one hand the sustainability of apartheid in the 
1960s through 1970s and its ability to avoid revolutionary change refer to the 
sophistication of the coercion system it had established that stratified to permeate all 
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 Although This period showed the increased anxiety within the Afrikaner and English communities alike 
following the Soweto upheaval it revealed different attitudes in regard to the best policy to face the Soweto 
uprising: “two-thirds of the white electorate expected a lower living standard for their children, as well as 
black upheavals…there is also 75 per cent who were ready to fight rather than make concessions among 
Afrikaners…but the enthusiasm for war instead of accommodation is markedly lower among the Anglo-
whites” (Adam and Giliomee 1979: 6)      
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aspects of life and followed very well calculated measures. Heribert Adam (1971:16, 61) 
argues that apartheid was “one of the most advanced and effective patterns of rational, 
oligarchic domination” and the power with which the system sustained was derived from 
the combination of coercion and a legal system that justified oppression and introduce the 
state as an impartial arbiter, which helped in concealing oppression. Co-optation of the 
Africans in the new policy still relied on atomizing their community by offering certain 
segments short term benefits within the Bantustans. The new policy meant that the same 
course was followed with some insignificant changes. Verwoerd and Vorster’s insistence 
to implement the self-government Bantustans policy reveals that the regime was running 
out of ideas to overcome the conundrum of sustaining white rule in the face of all 
contradictions and protest. As Paul Rich (1994: 60) eloquently puts it:   
The Afrikaner fascination with group identity, ethnicity, and government by 
‘own affairs’, has been the constant answer which has run like an ideological 
thread through modern South African history.”   
The fascination was actually the only alternative of reality in which a mass society; 
the majority of black South African was determined to achieve access to state system and 
into a common society. NP policies in this period can be understood as a state contraction 
move towards a narrowly defined political entity with clear territorial boundaries and 
institutional and social contours.  
The contraction that might have been achieved through the implementation of the 
Bantustan policy would have granted the Afrikaners what they have sought for so long; a 
free and united folk of whites in their own state. The move would not have threatened 
Afrikaners internal cohesion in terms of their identity; it rather was in part a response to 
113 
 
Afrikaners’ attitudes as we noticed above. Territorial disengagement from the majority of 
the Black community was not conceived as a concession; rather it was the prerequisite for 
realizing a white South Africa. The meaning of territory and territorial boundaries was 
subjugated to a supreme value: Afrikaners pursuit of a state and nationhood based on 
their sense of exclusive ethno-national identity that had not been necessarily 
corresponded with a territorial ideology or particular regimes of territorial legitimating. 
As we noticed earlier territorial segregation and separation were instrumental and 
prevalent ideology and political power requirements had not confer a pivotal meaning on 
the territory as such and focused on peoples and racial-ethnic differentiation. The 
minority status of the Afrikaners was also a major factor in this respect; the prospects for 
the political survival of the white rule were proven very uncertain and a short-term 
endeavor in the face of great majority of discontent and increasingly militant Africans. 
Territorial separation, apartheid seemed the only chance for Afrikaner hegemony to 
endure. 
To be sure, the NP consolidated its parliamentary political power by winning the 
elections of 1970 and 1974 with a comfortable mandate (54.9 per cent and 56.2 per cent 
of the votes respectively) and put its white rivalries in a weak position. Economic 
performance of the country showed strong indications of growth; and the regime regained 
the West acceptance if not support, which reinvigorated its international legitimacy. The 
government took advantage of these circumstances to expand and consolidate apartheid 
and furthering state contraction in terms of territorial and institutional disengagement 
from the African population.  Within this context two new important legislations were 
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enacted: the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Homeland 
Constitution Act of 1971: The former turned the entire Africans into citizens of their 
assigned homelands where very African now has a citizenship outside his mother country 
South Africa. The Bantu, whether an African had ever lived in or not, had become a 
homeland with pseudo political power. The later Act gave the government the authority 
to confer self-government on those territorially invented entities. These Acts implied that 
the end result of Bantustan policy would be cleansing South Africa from the majority of 
the Black community. Africans who stayed ‘illegally’ in the white urban areas were now 
regarded as ‘foreigners’ and their presence in these areas amounts to violation of another 
state’s rules (Terreblanche 2002: 327). 
African nationalism: restoring the political geography of the conflict 
 
Ironically the Homeland policy made Africans more aware of their mutual faith as 
one native people and a majority ethno-national group under the rule of a minority group 
that is self-identified as a racial ethnicity. Separation and exclusion dynamics made 
Africans more conscious about the injustices inflicted upon them by the white society. In 
spite of governments’ oppressive laws and measures African opposition to apartheid only 
increased and gathered momentum. Apartheid came to dismember an already long 
entrenched South African identity of Africans. The dynamics of partial exclusion and the 
levels of economic integration and undetermined regimes of territorial legitimation of the 
segregation era resulted in a strong African identification with South Africa. 
Democratization rather than liberation and ethno-territorial self-determination prevailed 
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especially in 1980s with the emergence of mass democratic anti-apartheid movements 
that coalesced with the ANC to further consolidate this inclusive African identification. 
 
The 1960s uprising and the prevalence of democratization 
Although in early 1960s organized black opposition was smashed, African 
resistance was resurrected in the 1970s through 1980s more persistent to achieve the end 
of apartheid (Posel 199: 1). The main African militant opposition during this period came 
from three politically organized movements: Black labor unions, the alliance of the ANC 
and CPSA, and the popular democratic mass movement of the 1980s. South African 
apartheid regime relied heavily on large and powerful arsenal of security laws and orders, 
and had launched unprecedented assault on its political enemies in the 1950s and 1960s 
in order to prevent the development of any effective and mobilized African resistance. 
Thus the government illegalized and outlawed any actions of resistance to government 
policies
41
. However, oppression added to the grievances of the Africans and raised their 
militancy and will to mobilize. The ‘defiance campaign’ and the Sharpeville massacre of 
1950s and early 1960s, although were limited and did not persist set the background for 
African nationalist movement politics and organization. 
  Following governments measures in 1950s the ANC adopted a ‘Program of 
Action’ that put forth the objectives of the struggle to end white domination and 
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 In 1950 the government passed the Suppression of Communism Act, which outlawed the CPSA and 
empowered the minister of justice to take a wide range of measures to suppress political opposition. The 
Act granted the minister the jurisdiction to declare any similar organization illegal, to restrict political 
activities, to prohibit gatherings. The Act considered any ‘political, industrial, social or economic change 
by the promotion of disturbances or disorder’ as communism as subject to suppression.         
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achieving self-determination through militancy and the use of mass protest including civil 
disobedience. The declaration was followed by the joint initiative by the ANC and the 
South African Indian Congress (SAIC) in 1959 to launch the Defiance Campaign against 
the injustice of apartheid (Guelke 2005: 94). The campaign was peaceful in a large 
measure and aimed at virtual ‘violation’ of government segregationist policies. The 
campaign gave rise and political legitimacy to ANC and SACP as mass movements with 
a wide base of membership ( Guelke 2005:  95) especially following ANC adoption of 
the “Freedom Charter” that drew the political philosophy of the movement as achieving 
racial unity and the reform of the state system on the bases of democracy and human 
rights. The charter established African nationalism’s consistent political position as 
nationally not ethnically driven movement; a feature that was further strengthened in the 
1980s and had been a major factor in the failure of the regime to creating a white South 
Africa by ethnicizing Black community. However, this progressive position did not 
prevent the emergence of radical nationalist African movements. The more the 
government implemented apartheid measures and oppression the more rigid some 
African nationalists became. The leading example of this trend is the emergence of the 
Pan-African Congress (PAC) in 1959.  
The ANC represented a profound challenge to the regime precisely because of the charter 
that aimed at abolishing the very core of apartheid and white rule; democratization and 
inclusion were the antithesis of racial ethno-nationalism of the Afrikaner rule. 
Confrontation turned more violent and showed regimes determination to quill this 
challenge; the government outlawed the AVC and the SACP while the Sharpeville 
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massacre of 1960 and its consequences that a serious blow to the apartheid regime 
domestically and on the international arena. The massacre had changed the nature of 
opposition to the apartheid from protest to resistance and militancy; it radicalized the 
ANC and other anti-apartheid movements. The ANC formed its armed wing: the 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (the spear of the nation or the MK) which gave the organization 
more legitimacy and capacity to mobilize. Protests over the ‘pass law’ were launched and 
the government imposed a state of emergency over the country.  
Banning the ANC and the SACP allowed the emergence of new Black 
movements such as “Black Consciousness’ in the early 1970 that was soon crushed as 
well. For the regime it was too risky to tolerate such a movement especially as black 
workers’ organization and activism started to regain momentum and self-confidence in 
the early 1970s. Economic changes of the 1960s and early 1970s that resulted in a 
significant increase in the employment of skilled and semi-skilled non-white workers and 
the ability of African workers to organize mass strikes
42
 uplifted their bargaining power 
and organizing capacity, which represented a major platform for African nationalist 
struggle against apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s. Government’s measures to restricting 
black workforce mobility and bargaining power had caused disruptions in the functioning 
of the economy and put whites’ interests on the line (Olson and Stedman 1994: 60). 
Moreover the resurgence of African nationalism in the region (in Rhodesia, Mozambique, 
South West Africa, and Angola) has complicated the South African regime’s status in the 
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region and at home
43
 ; a pattern that continued to collect momentum especially after the 
Soweto uprising of 1976 that reintroduced the question of ethnic racism and the failure of 
the Bantustans policy. 
 The Soweto uprising and beyond: popular resistance and convergence     
Soweto uprising was a bottom-up movement that emerged in the townhomes of 
the Black population
44
, thus it represented “new path of liberation which was based on 
the lived experience of ordinary people” (Mamadani 1996, cited in Neocosmos 1998: 
200). The resurrection gave the struggle against apartheid a profound democratic feature 
as more people participated and a number of popular democratic organizations emerged 
as the protest accumulated more strength and continuity in the 1980s, which played a 
decisive role in toppling apartheid. The uprising of 1976 planted the seeds for the eclipse 
of apartheid as it announced the vibrancy of African national sentiments and their strong 
identification with South Africa (Neocosmos 1998) and the persistent rejection of the 
homeland policy. Soweto laid the grounds for the rise of people’s power in the face of 
state hegemony, which gradually but consistently mobilized most of the African 
population and segments of the white community in a sweeping anti-apartheid movement. 
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 Following regime change in Portugal in 1974 and the resulted decline of Portugal’s colonial rule in 
Southern Africa, South African Nationalism was gaining momentum by the impact of decolonization in the 
neighborhood. Angola, in this context, was the most significant case. The involvement of South Africa in 
the civil war in this country that ended with defeat had exposed the regime and gave an opportunity to its 
opponents to take the initiative. It was at this juncture when the Soweto Africans’ uprising of 1976 irrupted 
to represent a major turning point in the history of the country along with the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. 
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 The uprising was triggered by police oppression to schoolchildren who protested the imposition of 
Afrikaner language as a medium of instruction in Transvaal. The imposition of Afrikaner language was 





People’s power and wide range participation in the resurrection reflected social 
developments within the African society: economic growth of the 1960s-70s resulted in a 
huge increase in the employment of black workers in industry (from 308,332 in 1960 to 
780,914 in 1980). It also witnessed a remarkable increase of educated Africans
45
, and 
simultaneously the rise of blacks’ consumption of domestic production. All of which 
made Africans more vigilant and willing to mobilize and protest against their inferior 
status as a majority, which undermined significantly the legitimacy of the regime and its 
ability to endure.  
Although Soweto uprising had dealt a serious blow to regime’s ‘internal stability’ 
(Saul 1993: 2) it did not undermine its ability to endure in terms of the capabilities of 
state power and institutions that was able to absorb the shock. The significance of Soweto 
uprising is that it marked the beginning of a shift in the locus of political action from 
Afrikaner internal politics and socioeconomic changes to African nationalism arena and 
its vigor to take the initiative, and hence a significant shift in the balance of political 
power in favor of African nationalism was in the making. These indecisive elements 
prevented a revolutionary change of the regime or its entire decline in the 1970s but as 
African masses flooded the streets of townhomes and reserves, the issue became clearer. 
The conflict was on the verge of a new phase where African nationalism would 
consistently challenge the foundation of the state as a racial-ethno-national regime while 
the state would persist on apartheid. Minority-majority syndrome would compel the 
Afrikaners to grasp on what they gained while territorial separation failure would make 
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 Between 1965 and 1975, the number of black students in secondary schools increased nearly fivefold, 
while between 1980 and 1984, their enrollment doubled from 577,000 to over a million; the number of 
graduates tripled during the same period (Neocosmos 1998: 200). 
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African nationalism more assertive to overthrow the regime. As Johnson (1977: 290) 
argues:  
There is no precedent in history anywhere of an ethnic minority of over 4 
million people voluntarily dismantling the dominance they enjoy over more 
than 20 million ethnically different others; anything other than white supremacy 
is, in this sense, unthinkable.   
The Afrikaners were not in a position to give up their preponderant status nor to give in 
and offer any significant concessions to the Africans, which created a state of impasse 
that would put the adversaries in a spiral of escalation and ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ 
that prevented revolutionary change but paved the road  for thwarting the regime.  
The eradication of Afrikaners’ ethno-territoriality 
 
The ill management with which Vorster’s government handled the rising 
nationalist attitudes inside South Africa and the surrounding countries in the 1970s and 
its economic consequences compelled business elites allied with high-ranked military 
officials and pressured Vorster to resign
46
. Vorster was blamed for his government’s 
“unwillingness to reform apartheid to allow greater labor mobility, the training of black 
skilled labor, and recognition of organized black labor” (Olson and Stedman 1994: 61). 
Vorster clearly couldn’t realize or recognize the changes in Afrikaner values and attitudes 
discussed above that brought more willingness to reform specific aspects of economic 
and political systems.  P. W. Botha; the new Premier and the President has had to 
overcome the impasse that the regime was facing; at the core of this impasse was the 
                                                          
46
 The official statement referred Vorster’s retirement to ill-health. Some resources indicate the role of the 
dubbed ‘info scandal’ or Muldergate. Vorster was accused of misappropriation of funds as his government 
sought to buy influence abroad (Guelke 2005: 136).   
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need for new racial policies and the restoration of South Africa’s regional and 
international role as a major African player. Botha’s government was fortunate that it 
came to power when the main conflicts in the region (Namibia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) 
were resolved, and at the time of right-wing revival in key Western countries: Ronald 
Regan administration in USA and Thatcher’s government in UK, which presented an 
opportunity for the South African regime to recover and to have a considerable margin to 
maneuver and adjust domestic and regional policies. Botha adopted the dubbed’ total 
strategy’
47
 that aimed at accomplishing three interdependent objectives: turning South 
Africa into a military state; destabilizing the region of Southern Africa; and reforming 
apartheid.  
(1) Militarizing the state: militarizing South Africa was primarily a response to 
international embargo on arms sales that was imposed earlier by the UN. 
Counterproductively, the embargo gave the government every reason to seek military 
strength by establishing a strong military industry, which gave the regime a political edge 
over its domestic and regional opponents. South African white rule seemed to be in a 
position to endure as a result of this military might, it has been argued. Comparing to the 
decline of Portugal’s colonial power as Gann and Duignan (1981:  291) argue South 
Africa was well prepared to deal with domestic insurrection and regional challenges. 
Whether this assessment is warranted or not is debatable. The military might of the 
regime did not eliminate domestic opposition to apartheid; the use of military might 
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 ‘Total Strategy’ was not entirely invented by Botha. As a matter of fact attempts to reforming apartheid 
took place in the last year of Vorster’s government; the concept of ‘total strategy’ was incorporated in a 
Defense White Paper in 1977, and this was followed by the appointment of two commissions to inquire 
into labor issues in order to introduce some reforms in labor regulations and laws. 
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domestically has its limits and constraints as we discussed earlier. Botha’s government, 
while aware of the regime’s shaky position sought to strengthen it to a degree whereby 
adopting reforms would not weaken its grip on political power and security. This was 
clear as the government of Botha continued to implement the Bantu self-government plan 
by adding two more Bantus: Venda and Ciskei (Guelke 2005: 139). Military strength in 
this sense has to be seen through the other two elements of the strategy, destabilizing the 
surrounding and political reforms.  
(2) Destabilizing the surrounding: the establishment of a strong military power 
was deployed to gain a regional dominant role. To the contrary of Vorster’s ‘out-look’ 
strategy that aimed at stabilizing the region in order to gain the acceptance of the West, 
Botha’s destabilizing belligerent strategy against neighboring Soviet-backed countries 
aimed at taking it by South Africa’s own initiative to gain regional hegemony and 
simultaneously introduce the regime as a pillar in containing Soviet imperialism in the 
region. Gaining this role embedded South Africa within the West and particularly the 
USA strategy of containment, which diffused international rejection to apartheid. The 
strategy found encouragement and acceptance by Regan’s administration that soon 
showed its intention to establish close working relationships with South African 
government and enacted the new policy of ‘Constructive Engagement’
48
  with South 
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 The way Chester Crocker; the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs –who crafted the policy 
put it, the USA wants to open a new chapter of relationships with South Africa based on the mutual 
interests of the two parties in the Southern African region and their ‘shared perceptions of the role of the 
Soviet Union and its surrogates in thwarting’ these interests. He goes on to describe the co-operation 
between the two countries as indispensable for the efforts to stabilize Southern Africa, and to assert that 
this co-operation should be premised on US ‘recognition of South Africa’s permanent stake in the future of 
Southern Africa’ and South Africa’s recognition of US ‘permanent interest in Africa as a whole’ (quoted in 




Africa; in effect the policy gave the latter carte blanche to militarily destroy the 
neighboring countries
49
  and to carry on a new domestic policy with a modicum of 
international legitimacy that allowed the regime to carry on apartheid and implement 
more of the Bantustan policy within a ‘reformed’ political structures.  
 (3) Political and Constitutional reforms: Botha aimed at introducing a new 
concept of apartheid that has the potential to sustain Afrikaners’ political and economic 
domination while permitting a margin of flexibility to co-opt certain segments of the 
black and Coloured communities into the state system (Olson and Stedman 1994:  61). 
The main goal of the plan was to grant the regime a measure of domestic legitimacy 
especially for the Bantustan policy, and to gain world’s acceptance to an otherwise a 
pariah state. “Total strategy” represents a major amendment to segregation and apartheid 
alike. Although the majority of black community in townhomes (reserves) was excluded 
from the agenda Botha’s version of apartheid accepted for the first time the 
accommodation of non-white political demands in the central state institutions. This 
metamorphosis in essence aspired to stratify the non-white population in another 
dimension: the first being through the Bantustan policy. Political and constitutional 
reforms would have established a dual non-white social reality by selectively 
accommodating some of the political demands of some significant non-white social strata 
in part of the country. The concept re-classified non-white population in terms of their 
eligibility for the entry to white state system.  To achieve this goal the new policy 
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 Between 1980-6 South Africa had involved in number of assaults against the surrounding countries: it 
invaded three capitals (Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique) and our other countries (Angola, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia); backed dissident groups that had brought chaos to two countries (Angola and 
Mozambique); disrupted the oil supply of six countries and attacked export and import railways of seven 
countries. (Guelke 2005: 140)   
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categorized the black community into ‘useful blacks’ - those who would benefit the 
economy as a labor workforce and specific elites who may function as intermediaries 
between the regime and the whole community, and ‘recalcitrant blacks’ - who continue 
their struggle against apartheid and then had to be oppressed. To make the reforms 
permanent constitutional reform and legal steps in the realms of political life and labor 
were enacted 
The centerpiece of constitutional reform was the ‘tri-cameral’ Constitution Act of 
1983
50
 that mimics some aspects of power-sharing that would enhance regimes domestic 
position vis-à-vis the rise of African nationalism and introduce South Africa as 
democratic state. According to this plan African ‘useful blacks’ especially the urban 
growing middle class were to be upgraded socially and politically, which represents a 
profound departure from Verwoerd’s total apartheid that suppressed social differentiation 
and mobility normal to a capitalist society (O’Meara 1996: 323). In order to gain some 
credibility within the African community, especially the working class and its rising 
organizations, the government amended the Industrial Conciliation Act which 
distinguished between white workers as ‘employees’ and Africans as not employees and 
pealed the job reservation policy that discriminated against black skilled and semi-skilled 
workers and other previous Acts that restricted the development of skilled black workers.  
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 According to the Act the parliament will be consisted of three chambers: white, coloured, and Indian 
each served by its own ministerial council and have jurisdiction over its community’s own affairs. In case 
of a dispute among chambers over ‘general affairs,’ disputants refer to the ‘President Council’. The latter 
body is formed proportionally from chamber representatives: 4 whites, 2 coulrds, and 3 Indians. The new 
constitution also provided for the election of the president, who was to be both the president and the head 
of the government. 
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The ‘total strategy’ and the momentum shift   
The ‘total strategy’ and particularly constitutional reform agenda put the regime 
in the defensive as it became clearer than ever that the regime is running out of answers 
to the growing difficulties apartheid was facing especially regime’s inability to find a 
permanent solution to the problem of  a growing mobilization of indigenous. The reforms 
provided the African national movement with an opportunity to take the initiative and 
mobilize for new wave of protest and popular resistance to apartheid.  The government 
allowed a significant margin of political expression in order for the reforms to succeed, 
which gave opposition forces a significant margin for political movement and 
organization that it took to undermine the reforms. African nationalist opposition to the 
plan sprung for the limited scope of reform and for the fact that it excluded the majority 
of Africans. Reforms further deepened Black Africans’ sense of demoralization and 
alienation at the time when the reforms offered Coloureds and minor black strata some 
political and social gains. It was clear that the regime will never entertain the 
accommodation of the Black African into the system and the plan aims at perpetuating 
the Bantustan policy.  
Nevertheless, the government rectified and put the reforms in effect in 1984 
following its approval by a white-only referendum in 1983. Non-whites, ‘Colourdes’ and 
‘Asians’ were to be represented disproportionally in the new parliament, while whites 
were assigned a majority veto on general affairs, which implied that the structures of 
political power will not be changed in any significant way. The arrangement granted the 
government the final say in all “general affairs” of the country leaving “own affairs” of 
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each racial configuration to its vaguely self-ruling entity. The reforms, although limited, 
attest the failure of the regime since 1948 to recreate South Africa as a white state:  the 
inability of the regime to construct the Afrikaner community as an ethno-territorial nation 
exclusively or through integration with English-speaking whites compelled the regime to 
reconsider its strategy. Thus Botha sought to sustain the main features of the regime but 
with the consent of particular non-white elites, which doomed the reform to failure 
sooner than the government might have figured. The plan “intensified the impact of the 
continuing denial of political rights to the African population outside the homeland 
system” (Guelke 2005:  143) and provoked the Africans political will to act. The 
opportunity and the deepening feeling of exclusion within the African community were 
exacerbated by the increase of life expenses in townhomes
51
, which founded a 
combustible mixture that resulted in a new nationalist uprising that irrupted in the 
townships in the Vaal Triangle in 1984 and 1986
52
 and was accompanied with workers’ 
campaign of strike in a major ‘stay-away’ from work. The African insurrection of the 
1980s had been more organized, largely mobilized in a bottom-up manner that made it a 
popular uprising bar excellence. It also was more succinct in terms of its political 
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 The economic crisis of 1980s had left many Africans unemployed. Over 25 per cent of the Africans’ 
working force was unemployed, and two-thirds of them were under the age of thirty; most of whom lived in 
the townships where the economic crises coupled with governmental measures that raised the rent costs 
through Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. Moreover and in order preempt black workers’ unionism and 
‘stay aways’ the government enacted the Industrial relations Act of 1979 that aimed at restricting union 
activities to the workplace. 
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 The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) estimated that 175 people were killed in the last 
two months of 1984 in addition to another 20 at the beginning of 1985 when government troops used live 
munitions to quell a protest in commemoration of the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Violence continued in 
1985 causing the death of 859 people half of them killed by security forces according to SAIRR while the 
rest were killed in within-black clashes.   
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demands as a democratic and civic movement, which the regime found more difficult to 
quell.  
Popular insurrection of 1980s: peoples’ power reveals  
The reform agenda triggered the unified the organizing effort of wide range of 
South African civil society movements in challenging the apartheid. The vibrancy of civil 
society movements in South Africa was vital in the emergence of a strong popular anti-
apartheid movement. Civil society movements in 1980s offered an opportunity to large 
numbers of people to get involved in the process of liberation that encompassed a whole 
variety of social organizations: parties, trade unions, women’s organizations, youth 
movements, and peasant cooperatives, to mention few. All of which represented the 
aspirations of the oppressed population for equality and freedom. These organizations 
“had distinct forms of organization and demands for social transformation, popular forms 
of democracy and equality, which went beyond the slogans of political parties” 
(Neocosmos 1998: 197) although it worked in coalition with them especially with the 
ANC.  
The movement was inspired by the non-racial stance of the ANC and the SACP 
and adopted its notion as the main slogan of the anti-apartheid movement especially the 
United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF main slogan “UDF Unites, Apartheid Divides” 
reflected the essence of the ‘Freedom Charter’ that espoused a non-racial democratic one 
South Africa.  The democratic essence and popular character of the mass movements and 
its convergence on a single goal namely, overthrowing apartheid made it a dangerous 
challenge to the regime. The movement established peoples’ politics in the face of state 
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power.  An African activist from the Eastern Cape postulates (cited in Neocosmos 
1998:195) 
Generally I can say that the community is the main source of power, because the 
state has really lost the control over the people. [The state] has no power over 
the people in terms of controlling them…What has been preached in the past 
about the Freedom Charter, even now we are trying to do that particularly.  
This political strength and clarity of vision contributed significantly to the momentum 
shift in the conflict in favor of African national movement and anti-apartheid mass 
struggle. As one UDF leader asserts this democratic goal can be summed up in the 
principal slogan of the Freedom Charter: “The People Govern” (Neocosmos 1998: 206-7) 
The unifying philosophy of the movement and its political slogans attracted a 
huge number of civil society organizations which increased their ability to organize 
popular resistance to the regime. At the peak of its activism the UDF included seven 
hundred affiliate groups with a total of over two million people. The activities it espoused 
were mainly actions of civil disobedience (bus and rent boycotts, housing movements, 
squatter revolts, labor strikes, etc), and the most important popular organizational aspect 
of it was the formation of “street committees”
53
  that served as local governments in the 
ungovernable areas where the state lost control. The well-organized efforts of the UDF to 
boycott the election of the tri-cameral parliament undermined the legitimacy of the 
reforms as the vast majority of the Colureds and the Africans boycotted the elections. The 
UDF not only encompassed a variety of local community associations in the black 
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 Street Committees flourished on a wide scale in urban townships. For example the year 1987, 43 per cent 
of the inhabitants of Soweto were reporting the existence of those committees in their neighborhoods. The 
committees provided for rudimentary services, maintain order, settle disputes, and formed ‘peoples’ courts’ 
to check and punish criminal acts. Furthermore the committees initiated a program of ‘peoples’ education’ 
in an attempt to bring local schools under the control of the people.   
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townships, militant student groups, and organized labor, but also the established alliance 
between with the ANC, which galvanized the latter’s political standpoint. The new 
resistance coalition was able to turn most of the country into arenas for protest, strikes, 
riots, and demonstrations during 1984 to 1986. Along with the organized activism of 
labor unions under the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) that was 
instrumental in pushing the business to exert pressure on the government to negotiate 
democratic transition African national movement gained a profound political power vis-
à-vis the state per se.  
Facing an escalating revolt and widespread violence the government imposed the 
state of emergency in most of the country, which turned 1986 into one of the most violent 
times of the decade. The government sent the South African Defense Forces (SADF) into 
townships to restore order, which only further undermined regimes legitimacy. Even 
worse was the involvement of the government in a clandestine campaign to assassinate 
UDF and ANC leaders, and its conspiracy to train and instigate black groups to create 
violence and chaos in townships. During the 1986 security apparatuses imprisoned and 
isolated more than 25,000 people, which crippled the organizational and contact capacity 
of the UDF and the Committees; the popular aspect of the struggle was seriously 
damaged by these measures. The UDF moved to a more territorially based activities 
espoused by a national leadership and the scope of popular resistance had shrunk 
remarkably and substituted by a militaristic and militant activism. Nonetheless, the spiral 
decline of the regime that started in the late 1970s was deepened and there is no question 
that African Nationalist revival and bold reaction to Botha’s reforms was one of the most 
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important factors that caused its failure. However, there is another crucial factor that 
contributed profoundly to this failure: Afrikaner divisions on the ‘total strategy’. 
‘Total strategy’ provoked instant and bitter debates within the ruling party and the 
Afrikaner polity. The first reaction came soon after the revelation of the agenda in 1982. 
A group of NP members of the parliament defected from the party and formed the 
Conservative Party. The reforms had put the National Party in the defensive and the 
pursuit of political survival as it abandoned the orthodoxy of apartheid: white only 
political control and domination. Botha’s attempt to salvage white-only rule by partial 
accommodation of non-white aspirations had failed particularly since it explicitly implied, 
no matter how superficially, changing the structure of social relations and political power 
dispensation. This move as it failed amounted to disastrous political consequences: it 
created an irreversible serious crack in the edifice of the apartheid. Constitutional reform 
that franchised ‘Coloureds’ (even within a well-designed social engineering) is 
considered as “the first decisive break with the concept of a white nation” (Knox and 
Quirk 2000:  152).  After more than thirty years of apartheid white Afrikaners could not 
turn their sense of shared identity into an ethno-national people with well-defined 
territorial, legal, and psychological boundaries. Effects of undetermined regime of 
territorial ideology doomed Afrikaner ethno-nationality precarious and fill short of facing 
an overwhelmingly mass revolution that aspired integration and democracy. The control 
over state power and using it to perpetuate the system of racial domination was proved to 
be insufficient to “dislodge imbedded social structures, or alter the economic ‘facts of 
life’” (Cohen 1988:  95) that were in the making for decades and within which African 
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nationalism maintained its affiliation with South Africa that prevailed over the narrow 
and ethnically based Afrikaner notion of a white state and nation.  
The revolt of 1985-6 unleashed international condemnation of apartheid on large 
scale. Protests against apartheid in many countries especially in the USA that were 
widely covered on the media demanded the overthrow of apartheid and exerted 
significant pressure on Western governments to take serious steps against South African 
government. Under this immense pressure and in spite of President Regan veto the 
American Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in October 1986
54
. 
The Act imposed a wide range of sanctions against the regime in South Africa, part of 
which were to be suspended if the regime made significant steps towards a non-racial 
democracy. The last of the six steps the Act listed reveals that the role of South Africa in 
the containment strategy was dwindling and with it the cart blanch the US gave the 
regime to destabilize the region and maintain apartheid. Botha’s reign 
counterproductively exacerbated regime’s impasse and created new political facts that 
were very hard, if not impossible, to reverse.  
International sanctions against the regime escalated and with it economic crisis 
worsened, and the later had generated more opposition and protest. The spiral decline had 
turned into a major crisis that the new government had to manage. It was clear more than 
ever before that apartheid could not be maintained, at least not the way it had been 
                                                          
54
 The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act listed six measures that the South African government was 
expected to take, the most important are: repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of 
equal justice under the law for citizens of all races; the release of all political prisoners at the top of them 
Nelson Mandela; establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws; negotiate the future of political 
system with representative of all racial groups in South Africa; and end military and paramilitary activities 
aimed at neighboring states. 
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crafted and amended by different governments of the NP. Botha’s government sought to 
implement the reform agenda by coercion when carrying it out failed by way of 
persuasion and co-optation. Oppression against opposition not only was directed to 
African Nationalists but also to political opposition within the Afrikaner polity especially 
against Afrikaners who demanded to open the system and conduct a dialogue with the 
ANC. As a result the divides within the Afrikaner community were deepened as the 
government “excoriated critics who advocated and indeed practiced dialogue with the 
ANC, such as the Afrikaner intellectuals who travelled to Dakar in Senegal to meet with 
leading figures in the ANC in exile” (Guelke 2005:  154). By late 1988 white polity’s 
disaffection with Botha’s policies was insurmountable and Botha stepped down and F.W. 
De Klerk assumed power.  
 State failure or democratization  
The new government main task was to control the pace and scope of political 
changes required to reform the system for it had become a commonplace to see that 
apartheid could not proceed on the same path.  When De Klerk became the prime 
minister – and afterwards the president in 1989- he recognized that the NP policies 
derived from ‘total strategy’ reached a dead end (Olson and Stedman 1994: 131).  Taking 
advantage of the majority the NP gained in the election that followed his inauguration
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De Klerk launched his reform agenda starting with the dismantling of the National 
                                                          
55
 Although the NP lost ground to the Liberal Democratic Party and the right-wing Conservative Party, it 
maintained majority; 48 per cent of the turnout. De Klerk as well took advantage of the political support of 
the Liberal Democratic Party, which had replaced the Progressive Federal Party. It is important to notice 
here that the Conservative party came second in elections with 13.2 per cent of the votes (39 seats) whereas 
it gained 26.4 per cent in the previous election of 1987 These results indicate that fluctuation of voters’ 
political affiliations that reflected the volatile and uncertain political processes in South Africa in the 1980s 
that resulted from the failure of strategies and the lack of answers to the challenges the regime faced. 
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Security Management System that Botha established and the release of eight long-term 
political prisoners including leading figures in the ANC. Furthermore, De Klerk 
announced that his government has repealed the ban on the ANC, the PAC, and the 
SACP, and that Nelson Mandela would shortly be released. These dramatic steps were 
considered a leap forward towards the liberalization of the political system. However, it 
seems that De Klerk realized the irreversible nature of the changes during 1980 and 
sought to minimize the damage by containing the trend. In this De Klerk’s policy can be 
seen as a logical extension of his predecessor: Botha in spite of his rigid stance before he 
left office had met with Nelson Mandela and he acknowledged that in public, and he 
released a leading member of the ANC; Goven Mbeki. However, De Klerk reforms went 
a qualitative step ahead of Botha’s reforms. As Saul (1993: 67) remarks, De Klerk’s 
agenda was more assertive than Botha’s in pursuing the reformation of a new political 
terrain and thus it has to be assessed in terms of its further departure from the orthodox 
apartheid tenets. Thus in December 1989 De Klerk announced that his government 
“accepts the principle of power-sharing and the involvement of the ANC in the process” 
(Guelke 2005: 157).  
Power-sharing was envisioned as an institutional arrangement that would 
maintain the underpinnings of the current social relations order although it was perceived 
as a step that detached political power from the old convictions of Afrikaners nationalism. 
The latter would not have tolerated any claims to political power of non-whites and 
political supremacy had been the clearest and most important domination tool in the 
disposal of Afrikaners as a minority. Therefore the arrangement De Klerk sought was 
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primarily a power-sharing that gives the non-white a share in political authority and 
keeps the power of the state, in the hands of the Afrikaners. Thus De Klerk offered a 
power-sharing formula based on a bi-racial rather than a non-racial political system and 
institutions in an attempt to prevent the total surrender of political power. De Klerk stated 
bluntly: “I do not believe in the existence of anything like a non-racial society in the 
literal sense of the word. What we have to build is a non-racist society…the diversity of 
our people would not disappear in such a society” (Rich 1994:  53).  
The new strategy was totally and fiercely rejected by African nationalist 
movement that saw the offer as euphemism of Botha’s reforms in which the center-piece 
of apartheid namely, racial ethno-national differentiation prevails. Racial domination and 
apartheid had strengthened the ethno-national identity of the Africans within a context 
where the nexus of national-identities and territory was not a decisive element which 
accentuated ethno-national demands for civic self-determination and democratic political 
system for all South Africans; a formula that De Klerk power-sharing fills short of 
accommodating. This dynamism suggests that assimilation in a single nation-building 
process rather than consociationalism was the answer for African nationalists, which De 
Klerk sought to bypass since it will lead to majority rule. Instead he attempted   to offer a 
plan that will freezes ethnic divisions and “elevate ethnicity to the status of primary 
organizing element of political life of society” (Simpson 1994: 469). By offering a 
power-sharing plan De Klerk attempted to reach a synthesis of the apartheid and a 
democratic state based on the concept and prerogative of citizenship; a synthesis that 
would sustain certain and core aspects of domination.  
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  De Klerk’s rapid move came to the surprise of every observer of the South 
African conflict and to those involved in it, especially the ANC.  In some accounts, De 
Klerk was profoundly affected by the fall of the Berlin Wall; as he himself writes, this 
moment implied that one of South Africa’s greatest fears; the Soviet threat and its 
influence on the ANC had disappeared. This looked as a window of opportunity “for a 
much more adventurous approach than had previously been conceivable” (De Klerk 1998:  
160-1).  This development also meant that the ANC had become weaker since one of its 
main sources of support disappeared, which gives De Klerk the opportunity to reach a 
better political deal for his power-sharing agenda.  
These events around the world and in the region affected De Klerk’s perspectives. 
However, these events did not weaken the ANC alone, the regime in South Africa also 
and maybe more profoundly, was weakened by world events.  The regime was deprived 
of a major pretext to justify his position and diffusing international castigation: 
containing communist threat in the region became obsolete. Moreover, the debacle South 
African government faced was exacerbated by the politically-oriented as well as market 
driven sanctions against the regime. These dynamics had embodied the intersection 
between political reality of increasing resistance to apartheid regime within the country 
and abroad, and the economic reality of growth decline. The growing linkages between 
democratic anti-racist struggle and resistance to capitalist system that overlapped with it 
have become a source of great threat to the white economic and political existence, which 
moved the reform program of De Klerk.  
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On the face of it, De Klerk seems to have engineered political changes from 
within the power structure of a coherent and impervious system by a top-down revolution. 
A closer insight to the events that preceded De Klerk’s moves shows that necessity rather 
than choice drove his policies. Inasmuch as he had the strength and political will to 
pursuit his agenda he could not stand against the forces of change and the dynamics of 
the conflict that had led to the impasse we above detailed. As a matter of fact De Klerk 
was a hard core Afrikaner and he came to power “because the elite group would no 
longer tolerate the obstinacy of his predecessor, P. W. Botha” (Rich 1994:  103). Internal 
pressure on the government to change course sprung from diverse interests and 
ideological transformation within the Afrikaner community.  De Klerk was the head of a 
seriously fractured regime and polity that was in a state of division and profound changes. 
Thus, a lot of pressure came from the business strata - a successful class of entrepreneurs 
and professionals to profoundly reform the regime. More telling are the demands for 
reform that came from one of the main leading Afrikaner ideological organizations; the 
Broederbond. This indicates that changes took place also on the level of convections 
reflected in the Broederbond call for an inclusive polity, which gave De Klerk’s initiative 
a significant measure of legitimacy within the Afrikaner community.  The Broederbond 
circulated a secret document in 1989 that argues that  
…the exclusion of effective black sharing in the political processes at the highest 
level had become a threat to the survival of the white man…there could no 
longer be a white government and the head of the government did not necessarily 
have to be white” (Olson and Stedman 1994:  133).  
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This position was a watershed in Afrikaners’ attitudes towards apartheid; a major 
ideological and political shift that contributed to De Klerk’s aggressive agenda and the 
dismantling of apartheid.  
One can conclude that De Klerk’s agenda came in tandem with already ripe 
conditions for the changes he put forth. Needless to say that he did not expect that his 
policy would trigger dynamics of its own that will yield different outcomes: he did not 
anticipate that his reforms will “lead to black majority rule and the end of Afrikaner 
nationalism before the end of the decade” (Sparks 1994:  12). Therefore it can be said 
that without the conditions prevailed when he came to office De Klerk wouldn’t have 
been in a position to present his reforms. It was in this context that De Klerk took the 
“bold steps of February 1990 seeking to break the political log-jam” (Saul 1993: 69) that 
crippled the country for years and threatened to push the country into chaos. The release 
of Mandela was yet another remarkable step in this direction. However, to many 
observers De Klerk’s new stance was dangerously limited as he envisioned a multiracial 
South Africa based on the protection of “group rights” with strong veto power to the 
white South African community which would have maintained the structures of power 
intact. Moreover, De Klerk’s expediency can be seen as he sought to regain political 
initiative and reclaim the locus of political power. His rapid move was designed to create 
a novel arena that was not familiar or comfortable to the ANC and other nationalist forces 
who found themselves in a hard position to respond to De Klerk’s proposal.  
The apparent weakness of the ANC was perceived by De Klerk as an opportunity 
to speed the pace of reforms to capitalize on the moment. However; regional 
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developments especially in Angola and Rhodesia gave rise to African Nationalism in 
general and to South African National movement led by the ANC in particular. Late 
1970s through 1980s were catastrophic to apartheid as we discussed above. In contrast, 
the 1980’s had witnessed the reemergence of the NAC as a central political force in the 
broad resistance movement by virtue of its ‘historical legitimacy’ and its ability to sustain 
unity and to adopt ‘armed propaganda’ (restrained armed resistance) against apartheid. 
The ANC had shown a remarkable political skill in uniting the broad resistance 
movement (including the UDF and the COSATU) around its slogans and program mainly 
the slogan: ‘first, ungovernability’ and then ‘from ungovernability to people’s power’ 
(Saul 1993: 15). The legitimacy of the ANC enabled it to mobilize the masses behind 
these slogans that were virtually implemented during the townships revolt of 1984-6. 
Thus the ANC popular appeal and its leading position in the South African national 
movement gave it a political edge over De Klerk especially with ANC consistent political 
vision that was based on two mutually enforcing pillars: (1) to establish a counter-
apartheid hegemonic socio-political base relying on a broad class front of black Africans 
in alliance with other anti-apartheid movements in order to overthrow the regime by 
means of mass action; (2) to perceive the conflict as one of democratic struggle against 
injustice and racial discrimination, not as an ethnic conflict. The apparent weakness of 
the ANC was at best contextual and was compensated to a significant degree by the 
strength and effectiveness of other national movement forces such as the Communist 
Party and the UDF. Thus when the ANC announced its willingness to involve in 
negotiations that would transform South Africa into ‘untied democratic and non-racial 
country’ it did not give in its core objective of thwarting the apartheid regime. Thus De 
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Klerk’s power-sharing offer was rejected and the ANC maintained its demands for a 
profound structural change that goes beyond the reforms of De Klerk.  
 
South African from a regional power to a pariah state 
 
 The events of 1960s in Southern Africa and worldwide had affected apartheid 
regime in contradictory ways; while at one level they undermined it, at another it gave the 
regime a measure of legitimacy and strength. As Guelke (2005: 100) notices “even 
without the Sharpeville massacre, the 1960s would have presented a severe challenge to 
the South African government” as many African countries gained independence. The 
decolonization era and the change in international political climate that upheld peoples’ 
right in self-determination and human rights represented a challenge and a source of 
threat to European settlers and colonists in Africa. South African white settler rule echoed 
this threat with the most assertive manner. The fear of the spill-over effect of this trend 
urged South African regime to resort to a new form of colonialism; one that would escape 
the logic of decolonization; apartheid. However, the severity and brutality whit which the 
regime sought to implement apartheid instigated international condemnation that 
undermined regime’s legitimacy. One of the earliest among these reactions was the 1960 
British Prime Minister’s ‘wind of change’ speech to the South African Parliament that 
generated deep discontent among the Afrikaner political leaders as it regarded African 
Nationalism as an irresistible force (Calvocoressi 1961: 9-10). The speech was followed 
by a short-term investment crisis as the confidence in the country’s stability declined as a 
result of Sharpeville massacre. Capital fled South Africa at a rate of 12 million rand 
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(domestic currency of South Africa) a month (Spence, 1965:  47). However, international 
pressure on the regime was inconsistent and fluctuated in accordance with regional and 
international political environments and the interests of the super powers and Western 
countries. It was until a late stage of the conflict in 1980s that international pressure took 
a constant rise and gave a measure of conformity to all efforts aimed at thwarting 
apartheid.  
Fluctuating international attitudes and policies toward South Africa had played a 
crucial role in the ability of the regime to endure. The early 1970s had witnessed the 
failure of South African government to relax its regional relations through dialogue 
(Guelke 2005: 115-16), which undercut the ability of the regime to gain regional power 
that would have strengthened its domestic position vis-à-vis African nationalist 
movement. However, a counterbalance development came from the USA when the newly 
elect president Richard Nixon adopted a policy to establish  
broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage 
moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in 
reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to 
encourage improved relations among states in the area (Guelke 2005: 115-16).  
This policy clearly turned a blind-eye to the apartheid and accepted the presence of South 
Africa in South West Africa as a de-facto situation that was expected to sustain. It was a 
significant gain to the South African government at all levels and was further reinforced 
by the ascendance of the Conservative Party to power in Britain in 1970 that soon 
resumed arms sales to South Africa and sough diplomatic disengagement from Southern 
Africa through a settlement with the South African government. These important 
developments came in the context of the Cold-War as the two superpowers entered an era 
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of détente in which each power tacitly recognized the spheres of influence of the other 
and refrained from intervening in one another territories.  Western powers’ interests in 
the region at this juncture were linked to their ties with the regime in South Africa as the 
latter was expanding its regional influence especially in security affairs creating its own 
sphere of influence. South African leaders in their turn claimed that their regional 
growing power and identification with liberal democracy could make them “serve as a 
bridge between Europe and Africans in the region…as profoundly anti-colonialist” force 
(Olson and Stedman, 1994: 45). 
In 1976 the USA administration of President Jerald Ford adopted a policy that 
promotes stability as the ultimate consideration whether achieved by majority rule or 
otherwise.  In order to engage this policy in a way that put South Africa in position as the 
guarantor of regional stability, the government of Vorster adopted a stabilizing strategy 
with neighboring countries; playing such a role would allow more implementation of 
apartheid with minimum international objection. This policy had its own detrimental 
consequences on the regime. Government’s acquiescence to the transformation of 
political power to a nationalist movement in neighboring Mozambique that was a price 
for stabilization precipitated a spell over effect that hit South Africa and weakened its 
position in the face of the nationalist challenge especially following the South African 
disastrous intervention in Angola in 1975-6. South African ability to maneuver on the 
international arena also was diminished after Jimmy Carter’s victory in the Presidential 
elections in the USA. The new Administration, with Carter’s doctrine of Human Rights 
protection dealt a serious blow to the South African position. In Africa this new doctrine 
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implied that the USA would back mainstream African opinion and work closely with the 
non-aligned bloc to reduce military intervention in Africa and especially the Southern 
region. It also implied that America would align with non-aligned bloc’s commitment to 
liberate this region from white minority rule (Guelke 2005: 134); apartheid regime was 
going to be at the top of the list. 
In response to these developments that had put the regime in a precarious position 
and in order to pre-empt the rise of nationalism inside South Africa, the government 
resorted to far reaching measures to undercut the nationalist tide. International reaction 
was prompt; in 1977 the UN Security Council adopted a mandatory ban on arms sales to 
South Africa. It seemed clear that further sanctions were to follow as the South African 
government went further with apartheid policies especially after the election of 1977 that 
gave the NP more political power in the domestic arena as it gained 134 out of 164 seats 
of the Parliament. The victory, as much as it revealed Afrikaner strong commitment to 
apartheid, couldn’t conceal how rudderless the government was under the circumstances 
we discussed; the major sign of this precarious position was the changing the prime 
minister Vorster.  P.W. Botha had become the new prime minister who entertained a 
different strategy to remedy regime’s maladies. 
Conclusion 
In early 1990’s South Africa seemed to be at the brinks of chaos and collapse. The 
rising stalemate threatened the country with the danger of political vacuum that may have 
led to an all-out civil war or state failure. Negotiations seemed to promise the least evil 
for the adversaries since sustaining the status quo was perceived as a costly alternative 
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that either party was prepared to accept. The stakes were high for both adversaries: for 
the Africans accepting racial-ethnic classifications and ethnically-based power sharing 
was anathema to their long and persistent struggle for restitution and justice in a 
democratic life. It also amounted to conferring legitimacy on a regime they fought to 
delegitimize and overthrow. As a majority that identified with South Africa as a single 
country and nation, Africans possessed the political leverage to change the foundation of 
the state.  Afrikaners on their turn sought to preserve the political power they obtained for 
decades as the main guarantor for their status and privileges; their ultimate fear was that a 
democratic majority rule will strip them of all privileges and status they possessed 
through racial domination over the majority of the population.  
In spite of Afrikaner’s efforts to transform their settler-colonial domination into 
ethno-territorial neo-racism through apartheid, African national movement’s struggle and 
consistency coupled with international pressure had exposed the inherited weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities of the segregation and separation domination system.  
First and most decisive, the regime couldn’t find a permanent solution to the problem of 
the indigenous especially as the latter represents a strikingly vast majority of the 
population and has a crucial role in the economic system of the country. Nor were 
Afrikaners able to augment their minority status by any source of European settler groups 
of immigrants.  
A majority, especially when ethnicized and entirely excluded from the central 
structures of political power and resources while exploited and demoralized can’t be 
easily, if at all, dismissed. Afrikaners’ domination system manifests the dynamics of 
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majority-minority syndrome in all its complications.  A minority in domination finds it 
harder to manage its political power and supremacy that secures its socio-economic 
interests when the majority comes to shape its collective awareness and shared identity, 
and mobilizes through struggle against domination. As a permanent small minority 
whites in South Africa were not able, and could not, totally exclude the indigenous as the 
latter labor was crucial for the economic system of the white to operate and function 
properly. The permanent minority status although generated deeper fears of political and 
social annihilation had significantly weakened the vey structures of the white political 
system as a democracy; the intersection of skin color and deprivation and 
disfranchisement of a huge majority mocked white regime’s attempts to confer a veil of 
liberal democracy on an explicitly racial domination system. Minority-majority 
relationships in South Africa can be considered as the main factor that impeded territorial 
total separation thus also undermined Afrikaner sought for gaining the properties of a 
territorial ethno-national people. As the Afrikaners did not seek to ethnically cleanse the 
indigenous Africans they decided to establish a racist system of domination. However, 
African existence in itself represented a structural impediment to racial exclusion and 
domination. Under apartheid the African majority for itself became a hindrance to 
establish a territorially defined white entity as African became more aware of their 
identity and common goals.    
Second, South African regional surrounding remained elusive to control. South 
African efforts to impose hegemony in the region failed and the policies it implemented 
created a hostile region especially with the revival of nationalism in surrounding 
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countries. Third, although white regime gained independence from Britain’s direct 
influence and South Africa succeeded in constructing a strong economic and military 
state, international pressure only increased against regimes racial policies. These 
vulnerabilities affected directly and profoundly regime’s ability to maneuver as it 
involved in the negotiations with the ANC.       
The negotiations between the ANC and De Klerk’s government was a struggle 
over the main features of the nation-building process in South Africa that will take the 
place of apartheid and white domination. On the micro level negotiating nation-building 
within the context prevailed in South Africa reflected the conflicting elements embedded 
in each party’s perspective and political demands. However, on the level of macro 
conditions, and as the history of the conflict attests there were four conditions that 
sustained and deepened Afrikaners’ regime vulnerabilities above-mentioned and led to 
the prevalence of the democratic solution and a nation-building that enshrines the rights 
and prerogative of equal citizenship in a unitary state system:  
(1) The inability of the dominant group to form an inclusive nation-state out of the 
conditions at state formation moment: first, white population is a small and divided 
minority. The formation of a nation-state would have threatened Afrikaners status and 
their sought for political and social hegemony. However, the minority status and the lack 
of a strong ethno-national territorial identification impeded the construction of Afrikaners 
as an ethnically-defined people; second, modern state in South Africa was formed within 
a territorially integrated geography whereby territorial legetimation of the state was 
bound to top-down institutional process based on racial differentiation. This constitution 
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implied that the main goal of the state system as a settler-colonial project was aimed at 
managing the indigenous majority rather than shaping the state as a territorial and spatial 
construct. Thus state formation and territorial ideologies it espoused targeted the 
population of the subordinate group in order to preserve the dominant interests and status.  
Afrikaners and white society cleavages had weakened the coherency required to 
constitute a well-defined ethno-national group. Moreover, the lack of clear and well 
demarcated territorial boundaries which the establishment of a white state would 
actualize. In fact Afrikaners on the level of elites and the populace –and to greater degree 
English-speaking whites- had shown weak territorial self-identification. Although 
Afrikaners possessed a significant degree of self-identification as a nation, they were not 
able to establish their entity as an ethnic core of a broader process of nation building. 
They were preoccupied more with establishing their political power position by 
controlling state institutions through which they guaranteed their domination over the 
non-white groups. In this sense the Union of South Africa was not a coherent nation-state 
that identify with solid territorial boundaries. As a matter of fact Afrikaner elites did not 
peruse a project of a nation-state; rather they espoused the perpetuation of a separated 
society.  
The case of Afrikaners’ rule shows that a minority in rule remains unable to 
establish a strong claim of territorial-national ideology that shapes the material and 
subjective bases of ethno-national political identity and institutions. This factor rendered 
Afrikaner identity and believes not fixated and the types of segregation and separation 
they practiced contextual.  Furthermore, profound divisions within the white society 
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between Afrikaners and English-speaking communities have weakened the claim of 
racial supremacy and prevented the articulation of a unitary white ethnic-national group. 
Even when the regime attempted to overcome this structural condition by collapsing the 
whites in a single group after 1948, Afrikanerdom was perceived as the hegemonic social 
and political power that provided the process with its tenets.     
(2) The weakness of the national-territorial ideology as the bedrock of demarcating a 
well-defined nation-state was dialectically linked to the contextually established 
domination and separation systems deployed by the Afrikaner ruling elites. Since 
Afrikanerdom had never envisioned the establishment of a nation-state, territorial-
national nexus lacked the driving force to be materialized and consolidated in state 
system and institutions. Afrikaners were mobilized on the bases of language during 
racial-colonial segregation era, and on the basis of their cultural identification as a volk 
during the 1939-1960s and at a very late stage they were mobilized and identified with 
the state per se. The belonging to a territorial nation-state arrived in a very late stage of 
ethnic-national constitution, which unveils the undetermined regime ofo territorial 
ideology of Afrikaners. Territorial separation at all phases of white domination was 
sought for its instrumentality and the political functions it provided and aimed at 
confining the Black community not for drawing institutional and normative boundaries. 
Thus state contraction that was embedded in the Bantustan policy was implemented with 
minimum divisive consequences for the ethno-nation identity of the Afrikaners that was 
not linked essentially to territorial underpinnings. This is why in the 1970s Afrikaners 
were able to redefine their ideology and self-identification in order to redefine the core of 
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their tenets that was perceived as immutable before 1970s events. Moreover, the 
weakness of the territorial-national nexus overlapped and at least partially explains the 
contextual nature of the systems of domination Afrikaners implemented in different 
phases of the conflict. As we discussed in details neither racial-colonial segregation 
policies nor apartheid represented integral systems and their modalities and 
organizational elements were associational; they were protean, adoptive, and at many 
levels pragmatic. This characteristic allowed the gradual decay and erosion of the whole 
system as cracks within its edifice started to surface especially when challenged by a 
well-organized counter-hegemonic project of the African National movement, and faced 
external shocks; sanctions, castigation, and regional failures.  
The indeterminacy of Afrikaner ethno-territoriality was further deepened by the 
partial integration of the Black African population in the white economic and to a lesser 
degree at different times- into the system. Exclusion in this sense was based on social 
differentiation of racial-ethnically defined grounds not on ethno-territorial grounds 
although it included territorial separation before and during apartheid. The dynamics of 
economic integration and exploitation mitigated the effects of segregation and territorial 
separation and enabled the African national movement to assume political leverage and to 
develop a strong sense of national belonging to South Africa as such not to territorially-
defined affiliation. This factor maintained African struggle as a pursuit of 
democratization.       
(3) The dynamics above-mentioned had diminished the ability of the dominant group to 
atomize their adversary and turn their struggle into a centripetal rather than centrifugal 
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force.  One of the main features of Afrikaner rule in South Africa was its failure to widen 
the colonial buffer that separated the dominant group from the rest of the population; the 
subordinate Black majority. Although the regime resorted to the three strands of power: 
disciplinary, bio-power, and sovereign power in order to widen and consolidate  legal, 
social, political and territorial buffer of white settler-colonial society the dynamics of 
partial integration and the indeterminacy of territorial ideology rendered the buffer less 
effective. Apartheid and ‘homeland’ policy represented the climax of this paradox: as 
segregation and other differentiation racial measures filed the regime attempted to 
homogenize the white race in a single territorially separated ethno-national group and 
atomizing the Africans into distinct putative ethnic groups. Apartheid, 
counterproductively have strengthened the sense of African collective national identity 
and sentiments of belonging to South Africa among African as a majority. African 
struggle for self-determination had shown a great deal of consistency in the sought for 
equality, justice, and self-determination in civic terms; a pattern that was strengthened 
and consolidated in the most decisive periods of the conflict in the 1980s when popular 
democratic elements of Africans’ struggle prevailed.     
(4) International legitimation that fluctuated through different phases of the conflict and 
in accordance with changes of world politics. The point at which international and 
regional effects against apartheid and white domination converged in terms of 
delegitimating it and legitimating African struggle for self-determination, the regime 
couldn’t endure the costs of sustaining white minority rule. The minority in a world 
where democratic notions of governance and the eclipse of colonization and 
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authoritarianism lost all possible justification to protect its rule and it became clear that 
democratic transition is the least costly of all other alternatives; the most prevalent of 
which was a racial civil war that might have weathered a way all that white settlers 
























Democratization, self-determination and liberation in Palestine 
 
Introduction 
 In the wake of the second Palestinian intifada and after a decade of the peace 
process initiated in 1992 the Palestinian national movement found itself in a precarious 
position as it neither remained a national liberation movement nor it achieved a genuine 
independence  and a sovereign state. For Israel, the decade enabled it to reorganize its 
occupation: Israel now is practicing occupation with less liability and responsibility 
towards the Palestinian population while simultaneously Israeli authority consolidated  its 
grip over the Palestinian people in the OPT and has introduced a new set of segregation 
measures: The construction of the separation wall that “graphically illustrates the 
territorial essence of the conflict” (Roy 2004: 32); cutting of Palestinian territories from 
each other by a regime of military check point (more than 500 military checkpoints had 
been established since the year 2000), by-pass roads, and permit policies; and isolating 
East Jerusalem from the rest of the OPT and the establishment of border-crossing gates 
between the city and the WB, all of which only consolidated Israeli virtual control of the 
space and time of the Palestinian population and reduced the Palestinians into groups of 
noncontiguous cantons—essentially, Bantustans.  
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Palestinian population in the years of the peace process and especially after 2001 
(the high day of the Intifada) has become more dispossessed and slowly dismembered 
like it never has; “Not since 1948 perhaps have Palestinians faced such loss and 
displacement” (Roy 2004: 32). The prevalence of virtual Israeli sovereign power through 
its control over the vast majority of the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem, and its 
control over the borders of Gaza Strip, and the tremendous increase in the establishment 
of Israeli-Jewish-only settlements
56
 virtually impedes the formation of meaningful 
Palestinian state. Rather, these policies and changes stiffen the status quo and stifle 
Palestinian efforts to gain self-determination.  
The PA possesses a nominal jurisdiction over main residential urban areas that 
Israeli military forces conquer whenever Israeli authorities render necessary for security 
considerations. While the PA is responsible to provide civil services in the rest of the 
OPT, Israeli authorities maintain direct military, security and legal control over the 
territory and resources. This matrix not only turned the Palestinian territories into 
enclaves but also has red Israel from its legal responsibilities towards the population. The 
realities Israel created under the auspices of the peace process are reminiscent, and indeed 
resemble, the Bantustans (African Homelands under apartheid) and can’t be hoped to 
transform into a sovereign state that embodies Palestinian’s right of self-determination. 
To be sure, a genuinely sovereign state and the right of self-determination cannot be 
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 In the 10 years since the Oslo peace process began, the Israeli government has expropriated at least 
70,000 acres of Palestinian land, largely for Israeli settlement expansion and the construction of new 
settlements and settlement infrastructure. The settler population has doubled since 1993 to more than 
220,000 people (excluding East Jerusalem) living in 150 settlements in the West Bank and 16 in Gaza 
(before Israel’s redeployment in Gaza) (Roy 2004: 31). 
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achieved apart from the territorial integrity of the OPT and the monopolization of 
coercion by this state: both conditions are not present.  
The only aspect of the peace process that has been sustained is the process itself 
and the institutions it founded; a protracted peace process “in which original causes of the 
conflict persist and are exacerbated by new grievances sparked by the peace process” 
(Darby and MacGinty 2003:  3). To make it grimmer for the Palestinians the Gaza Strip 
has been under Hamas control since 2007 following Palestinian-Palestinian division and 
fight. The Palestinian national movement has become divided not only in a factionalized 
fashion that prevailed for decades, but also geographically fractured, which added more 
challenges to realizing a Palestinian state.   
After more than six decades of the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 and four decades of 
Israeli occupation of the WB, GS and East Jerusalem the Palestinian national movement 
have failed in realizing any of its announced objectives apart from sustaining the 
Palestinian cause (question) alive and persistent on the political map of regional and 
international affairs. Without undermining this accomplishment Palestinian ends in 
national liberation and the establishment of democratic unitary state, in establishing an 
independent state on the OPT, in achieving Israeli recognition of their national rights, 
were all unfulfilled. The latter has been the most disillusioning following almost twenty 
years of negotiations with Israel. A two-state solution as  
engendered by the current Israeli-PLO agreements will remain dominated by Israel…not 
only will Israel’s domination persist through control over security, foreign relations, 
immigration, and the territories’ water resources, but the economic annexes to the Oslo 
agreements lock the Palestinians entity’s economic development firmly into Israel’s 
(Younis 2000: 4).  
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It is hard to see how a Palestinian government, with nominal jurisdiction and facing 
structural hindrances, could operate effectively to establish a viable institutional base for 
a sovereign state whether in terms of its ability to run a viable economy (Roy 2004:32)
57
  
or provide security for its constituency or to tame Palestinians’ eagerness for self-
determination.  
The elusiveness, even disillusionment of the two-state solution not only justifies, 
but substantiates the examination of the conditions prevailing in Palestine/Israel to assess 
other likely developments including a one-state solution or particular formulas of power 
sharing and bi-nationalism or the continuation of the current state of affairs where Israel 
is exerting a “creeping apartheid” in the words of Yiftachel (see Sussman 2004, and 
Yiftachel 2005). With the conditions for a two-state outcome are dim and Israel’s 
colonial expansionist policies proceed apace, the status quo has become more critical and 
fraught malicious dynamics. Among the most serious exits for Israeli policy-makers is 
the transfer policy.  Transfer (whether hard by means of force or soft by way of 
increasing pressure on the population as to make people leave) of Palestinians from the 
OPT to Jordan has a strong appeal for many Israeli political leaders, as discussed below. 
Although transfer would generate regional and international objection and create serious 
and long-term security threats, as Tilley (2005: 5-6) remarks, the history of the conflict 
and the difficult strategic choices Israel has suggest that transfer cannot be completely 
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 The Palestinian economy as Roy asserts was devastated by the effects of Israel’s continued occupation 
and control over Palestinian land and resources.  According to the World Bank, it will take some 20 years 
to return the Palestinian economy to where it was on the eve of the current Intifada, and According to UN 
figures, real GDP is presently below its 1986 level, declining by 24 percent in 2001 and more than 22 
percent in2002. Indeed, despite unprecedented levels of international financial assistance amounting to 
$315 per person per year, the World Bank calculates that the Palestinian economy has contracted by half 
(Roy 2004:  p32). 
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dismissed as a possibility. Furthermore, Taking into consideration the creeping 
segregationist system of Israeli domination, it is not less probable that Israel impose its 
full sovereignty over the OPT and establishing Greater Israel with a system of overt 
discrimination. The chapters that follow focus on the conditions that may or may not lead 
to the emergence of a one democratic-civic state in the Mandatory Palestine. This entails 
examining centrifugal forces within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that push in the 
direction of separation and those countervailing centripetal forces that may converge to 
create dynamics and conditions for the emergence of democratic one-state.  
This chapter proceeds as follow: first it presents to the political debates on the 
question of one-state versus two-state solutions and then provides this research 
understanding of the one-state solution as a concept and as an emergent property of the 
conflict. The two sections that follow introduce the historical origins of the conflict with 
emphasis on Zionism and its correspondence with European colonialism and racism, 
 
The term one-state 
 
Literature on the one-state solution lacks clarity as to the type of integration 
considered when talking about a one-state solution; a bi-national state, a secular 
democratic-civic state, a bi-ethnic or power-sharing or otherwise (e.g. Abunimah 2006, 
Ibish 2009, Klein 2010). This study considers the secular democratic-civic state that Tony 
Judt, Uri Davis and Virginia Tilley defined in their analysis of the conflict. Judt argues 
that the Israeli-Jewish settlement movement and its influence and power in Israeli politics 
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burry the prospects of two-state solution. He makes an unequivocal preference for the 
democratic-civic state that is based on the dismantling of Jewish ethno-national structures 
of Israel. In this sense Judt conceives of Israel as colonial system of Jewish supremacy 
and presents the one-state as the alternative (quoted in Sussman 2004: 38).  
By the same token, Uri Davis (2003:15) presents the one-state as the state of all 
its citizens. His normative take on the issue focuses on a vision of justice that is based on 
Kantian categorical imperative of equality of individuals and collective groups. This 
vision, he contends, cannot be achieved without a struggle that challenge political 
Zionism as a colonial power by “the native indigenous (non-Jewish) of Palestine.” 
Virginia Tilley (2005) argues for a civic-democratic one-state in which structures of 
politico-religious Jewish domination structures are challenged and replaced with 
universal democratic imperatives. 
The following analysis draws on the conception of the democratic-civic one-state 
where individual rights is the ruling political form of governance (the one-man one-vote 
system) not group rights that is characteristic to bi-nationalism (the recognition of two 
distinct groups within one political entity). The democratic-civic state entails that systems 
and structures of domination are to be transformed into constitutional democracy that 
guarantees equal rights and obligations of all citizens with strong bill of rights and 
institutions that prevents majority tyranny.   
Adopting a clear concept of the ‘One-State solution’ is necessary in order to 
examine the conditions that make it worthy to pursue apart from political manipulations 
and speculative exercises. Although the idea of one-state has not been entertained at any 
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stage of the negotiations between Israel and the PLO, many political leaders especially on 
the Palestinian side utilize the idea as a reaction to the stagnation of the peace process. In 
this sense it looks more of a threat aimed at convincing Israel to strike a deal with the 
PLO (Ibish 2009: 105-109). For Israelis, however, this kind of pressure “does not carry a 
whole lot of credibility” as Michael Tarazi (a legal advisor of the PLO during the 1990s) 
remarks (Cited in Abunimah 2006:162).  Nevertheless, these political maneuvers echo, at 
least partially, certain transformations of conflict following the political developments of 
the 1990s as mentioned above. Politicians on both sides of the conflict realize that the 
changes took place have transformed the stakes for any solution. The democratic solution 
(one-state) is examined here against these developments as an emergence. 
 
The One-State solution: a choice or an emergence? 
 
The discussion of a one-state solution has gathered some momentum in the last 
decade especially since the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. However, groups and 
individuals who reject the two-state solution as a waning option and advocate the one-
state agenda do not constitute a mainstream whether in Israeli or Palestinian politics or 
populations
58
. The main force in this camp is concentrated in leftist groups in 
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 It is indicative that the One-State idea has an appeal among the Palestinians, especially after the year 
2000. In a survey conducted by the Near East Consulting (NEC) in February 2007 in the OPT and involved 
over 1200 individuals (The margin of error is +/- 3.4% with a 95% confidence level), principal 75% of 
Palestinians do not think that Israel has the right to exist, 70% support a one-state solution in historic 
Palestine where Muslims, Christians and Jews live together with equal rights and responsibilities. 
http://electronicintifada.net/content/survey-70-percent-palestinians-support-one-state-solution/6773 
Surveys, however, remain less reliable in such a dynamic context. Other surveys indicate that a significant 
majority of both adversaries’ public opinions reject the one-state idea and endorses the Two-State solution; 
74% of Palestinians and 78% of Israelis would be willing to accept a two-state solution, while 59% of 
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international arena and in Palestine/Israel especially among Palestinian Diaspora 
intellectuals, Palestinian thinkers inside Israel, and Leftist Jewish scholars and thinkers. 
The idea is not unprecedented within the Palestinian and Israeli/Jewish political thinking. 
The PLO endorsed a one-state vision in its National Charter of 1968: The Charter 
envisaged an Arab Palestinian state not a bi-national one (Ibish 2009: 19-20). While the 
PLO sought to redress Palestinian peoples loss of home and land it made a clear 
distinction between Judaism and Zionism perceiving the latter as the enemy, it adopted 
“ a progressive, democratic, non-sectarian Palestine in which Christians, Muslims, and 
Jews will worship, live peacefully, and enjoy equal rights” (Younis 2000: 109).  
However, this integrative program was abandoned in 1974 in favor of a new agenda that 
espoused Palestinian independence on the OPT. Within the Israeli-Jewish community, the 
bi-national state was envisioned as early as the 1906s. This idea can be traced to the ideas 
of a number of Jewish thinkers; the founders of the organization B`nai B`rith and the 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Palestine Rabbi Judah Leib Magnes
59
, and in 
1940s the ideas of theologian Martin Buber are the most prominent in lobbying for the 
one bi-national-state in Mandatory Palestine that could blend the interests of the two 
people. Their ideas, however, waned and did not attract any significant support. Current 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Palestinians and 66% of Israelis find a single, bi-national state to be unacceptable. These figures turn to be 




 Magnes wrote “we must once and for all give up the idea of “Jewish Palestine”, and “Jewish and 
Arabs…have each as much right there, no more and no less, than the other”. He also was discontent about 
the Jewish state that established a Jewish ruling class; a political primacy rather than political equality, 
which contains the seeds of resentment and conflict, as he asserts. Buber mistrusted ethnic-nationalism and 
spend most of his professional life invoking a bi-national state. Along with Magnes and others, Buber 
founded the organization Ichud (unity in Hebrew). In 1947 he wrote describing the program of the 
organization “as that of a bi-national state-that is, we aim at a social structure based on the reality of two 
peoples living together” (cited in Tilley 2005: 214-215) 
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debate on the issue is not entirely cut off of this early precedence. But it differs 
fundamentally in terms of the context within which it takes place as we mentioned. The 
failure of the peace process and particularly the less likely two-state solution is the main 
premise upon which most arguments for a One-State solution are based.  
 
The two and the one-state solutions: correspondence? 
 Most advocates of the one-state solution predicate their arguments on the failure 
of achieving Palestinian people’s right of national self-determination in an independent 
state on the OPT. This failure, or more particularly the conditions that created it, seem to 
generate a situation that makes a One-State solution the only alternative. Opponents of 
the idea argue for the viability of the Two-State solution as the sole acceptable for all 
actors. The more leftist intellectuals reject the two-state solution on the grounds of 
castigating ethno-nationalism; they call for a democratic state and the dismantling of 
Israel as a Jewish state. They see Zionism as a “discriminatory ideology and Israel as an 
inequitable and pariah state” (Sussman 2004: 37).    
For many commentators and scholars Israel will never allow the establishment of 
a sovereign Palestinian state West of the Jordan River. John J. Mearsheimer (2010), for 
instance, asserts that  
Regrettably, the two-state solution is now a fantasy. Instead, those territories 
[the OPT] will be incorporated into a “Greater Israel,” which will be an 
apartheid state bearing a marked resemblance to white-ruled South Africa.”   
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Other thinkers indicate the almost inevitable development of the conflict toward 
integration in one-state. Palestinian intellectuals, especially those who live inside Israel 
and in the Diaspora such as Edward Said, Azmi Bishara, and Nadim Rouhana wrote in 
favor of a one state solution from the same perspective. Edward Said (Cited in: Aruri 
2003: 220) argues 
The whole idea of trying to produce two states is at an end. The Oslo peace 
process is really in tatters…The lives of Israelis and Palestinians are hopelessly 
intertwined. There is no way to separate them…in reality there is a common 
history. So we have to find a way to live together. It may take 50 years….  
But it will take place as Said asserts because the future of Israel is to turn toward the Arab 
world and this turn cannot be realized without the Palestinians. Said goes on to embed his 
point within a political and empirical context; “Of course, on the West Bank, the settlers 
and Palestinians interact, through antipathy and hostility, but physically they’re in the 
same place”, which cannot be solved through separation especially with the demographic 
reality that prevails in Palestine as a whole: Palestinians will realize demographic parity 
with Israeli Jewish in Palestine in the coming two decades Said remarks, and Israel 
comparing to South African apartheid, will not be able to maintain apartheid regime.  
Said concludes: a bi-national state “is the one idea that will allow people to live with- and 
not exterminate- each other.” (Aruri 2003: 220) 
The correspondence between the failure to establishing a Palestinian state in the OPT and 
the creation of a one bi-national state in all Palestine has been reinforced, unintentionally, 
by the repercussions of the peace process that created new realities and transformed the 
conflict in ways that make the one-state scheme more appealing. Nadim Rouhana (2003) 
argues that  
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The failure of the Oslo process to yield a viable Palestinian state could lead to 
the convergence of interests of all segments of the Palestinian people [those 
living in the OPT and in Israel, and in Diaspora] in calling for a unitary state in 
Palestine. 
Palestinians as Rouhana stresses will not accept  
a Bantustan system of government in the West Bank, but the development of a 
mainstream political program that redefines the conflict from one over territory 
and sovereignty to a conflict over power sharing and equality …in the form of 
a binational or secular state- the same issue that the Palestinians in Israel are 
struggling for (Aruri 2003: 222). 
A number of Israeli intellectuals and researcher have been grappling with new 
realities and structures of the conflict especially changes in the political-geography and 
dynamics resulted from the excesses of the peace process and the second Palestinian 
Intifada. Benvenisti (1990) argues for a re-definition of the conflict and contends that it 
has changed profoundly and “has shrunk to its original core, namely Israeli-Palestinian 
inter-communal strife” (Benevenisti 1990: 119).  Originally, the conflict, as Benevenisti 
remarks, is one of a clash between settlers and indigenous people, which has been a zero-
sum conflict. Therefore ‘means-ends’ approaches to settle this conflict are doomed to 
failure because of their linearity. The asymmetry between the two adversaries has 
deepened since the war of 1967 after which new political, institutional, socio-economic 
and administrative systems emerged to consolidate Israeli rule of all Palestine and 
rendered the demarcations between Israel proper and the OPT blurred and meaningless. 
For Benvenisti the question is not any more about binationalism, rather about the model 
to choose. He contends that the two-state solution can’t work because it “doesn’t reflect 
the depth of the conflict and doesn’t sit with the scale of the entanglement that exists in 
large parts of the country”. This reality, Benvenisti concludes, calls for a model that is 
162 
 
based on personal and collective equality within one regime throughout the country 
(Cited in Tilley 2005: 185).  Following the steps of Benvenisti the prominent Israeli 
journalist Daniel Gavron announces: “The territory between the Mediterranean and the 
Jordan River must be shared and cannot be sensibly partitioned”. The solution for Gavron 
is Israeli-Palestinian coexistence in one nation (Cited in Abunimah 2006: 171-172). The 
idea of one nation inasmuch as it reflects an inclusive precept it is still ambiguous as to 
the institutional underpinnings it would engender or the base of legitimacy it represents. 
Inclusive and universal democratic principles entails a political system and state 
legitimacy whereby forms of domination and inequality being eradicated and dismantled. 
The founding principle of political life in this state is neither ethnicity nor religion; rather 
it is the one-man one-vote principle.   
Whether the two-state agenda is making any significant breakthrough or is 
stagnant, and that a One-State solution requires an in-depth inquiry of the origins of the 
conflict, its underlying properties, and changes in its structures, manifestations, and 
actors. Such an inquiry not only pinpoints the causes that stand behind the stagnation of 
the two-state formula but also explain the impediments facing the One-State model. The 
conflict is primarily and essentially a territorial struggle; territoriality and the linkages it 
has with ethno-national identity and life viability implies that “land and its control lies at 
the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” (Roy, 2004:  32). Indeed, Israel’s control over 
the territory was further entrenched during the peace process and has benefited for the 
process to making occupation invisible: by suppressing the distinction between the 
occupied and the occupier, the powerful and the powerless the Oslo process created an 
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unusual situation whereby the abnormal (foreign military occupation) is being normalized. 
In comparison to South Africa, as Knox and Quirk (2000: 163) notice, the Palestinian 
Authority coexisted with the occupation whereas the ANC and mixed its position in favor 
of democratic transformation with a firm rejection to apartheid and Afrikaner racial ethno 
nationalism. ANC and its allies have turned most of the country into ungovernable zones 
and exerted peoples politics and rule, which undercut regime’s ability to sustain.   
Without close treatment of the conditions that made the conflict deeply ingrained 
in territorial legetimation and the dynamics that may lead to the decomposition of this 
feature the attempt to understand the conflict remains partial. The task, thus, entails 
tracing down the conflict to its roots and how it developed the way it did. This chapter 
presents a thorough interpretation of the nature of the Zionist settler-colonial enterprise 
and how it shaped the conflict and its main properties and what were the consequences of 
this type of colonialism on the relationships between Israeli-Jewish society and the 
Palestinian people at different turns of the conflict?  This approach emphasizes Zionist 
and Israel’s national-territorial identification as an ethnocratic-religious entity and the 
Palestinian reaction to it. Understanding these effects and conditions they created offers 
better grasp on the key to assessing the decline of Israel’s domination system that is 
based on ethnic-territorial exclusion. This decline is the precondition for the realization of 
either solution; two or one state as the arguments presented here contend. Tony Judt’s 
ideas stand as the most clear in rejecting the ethno-national grounds on which the state of 
Israel is premised and the two state solution that legitimate ethno-nationalism as the 
organizing principle of nation and state building (Quoted in Sussman, 2004: 38). 
164 
 
Therefore, the main task of this research is to deconstruct the structures of domination 
and their consequences and to examine the processes and dynamics those structures 
triggered on the level of the dominant and the subordinate actors to the conflict. 
 
The democratic-civic One-state as an emergence     
A one-state is a matter of emergence
60
 not an outcome of voluntarism or human 
agency. Nor it can be assessed in a linear manner where the one would connect current 
events with normative considerations without examining the deep structures of the 
conflict and there interaction with certain events and contexts. Emphasizing emergence, 
however, does not undermine the role of human agency as much as it is concerned with 
big the structural contexts within which human actions takes place and conditioned by. 
This approach departs from the most fervent advocates of the one-statemodel and their 
opponents alike. Hussein Ibish (2009) asserts that the idea of one-state is an illusion that 
lacks any significant support whatsoever and contends that “while Israel cannot and will 
not be compelled or persuaded to relinquish its control of 22 percent of the territory under 
its rule” it cannot, and will not be persuaded to give up its control over 100 percent of 
Palestine (Ibish 2009: 29). In contrast, Abunimah (2006) premises his advocacy of a one-
state solution on a normative basis; the idea of reconciliation. He notices the presence of 
                                                          
60 The concept ‘emergence’ refers to social phenomenon as a “coming into being of qualitatively novel” 
(Bunge 2003 p1,10) political entity or structure that stems from within the interactions and dynamics of the 
conflict, has the capacity to capture the dynamic nature of the conflict and its underlying causal 




two communities in Palestine, both have the right to exist and none of which can dismiss 
or exclude the other. Partition under these conditions is failing now as it failed in the past, 
as he remarks. The only conceivable way to end the impasse between the parties to the 
conflict has to be premised on “absolute equality” and freedom ala South African model 
whereby the establishment of an inclusive democracy is the best basis for legitimacy and 
recognition.  
Linearity and voluntarism prevalent in these accounts obscures the necessity of 
analyzing particular internal and external, structural and non-structural effects that may or 
may not allow the democratic solution to surface in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict the 
way they had accumulated and staged in the South African case. It implies that 
problematizing Israel’s system of apartheid, as a unique type of differentiation and 
domination is necessary. Political actors’ realization and will to espouse an integrative 
outcome of the conflict as the optimal and less costly than all other alternatives is not a 
mere function of human agency’s rational calculations; this was the case in South Africa 
and there is no reason why it should not be in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this sense 
assessing Israel’s regime as a settler-colonial system that implements a particular type of 
apartheid is aimed at uncovering the prevailing dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict and the conditions it endures to examine the one-state emergence.  
The suggestion that the failure of the separation agenda to the conflict and the 
need to redefine it in such a way to conform with a one-state trajectory reflects a 
mechanical and linear interpretation to the most crucial developments of the conflict. 
These developments have consolidated the structures of asymmetrical power relations 
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that Israel established and metamorphosed and led to the widening of the colonial buffer 
separating the Jewish society from the Palestinian society. Israel’s apartheid in this 
perspective is distinguished by the ultimate exclusion it imposes on the subordinate 
people. Without addressing and challenging the question of power and domination 
underlying such a system of domination neither outcome, two or one state can be realized. 
The changes in the conflict in the last two decades that resulted primarily and largely 
from Israel’s domination and its territorial-national ideology do not necessarily lead to 
the transformation of the conflict into an inter-communal strife. Rather they indicate the 
deepening of domination that has taken new shapes under the auspices of the peace 
process and concealed new systems of domination that is breaking asunder Palestinian 
national, social, economic and political networks by segregation regimes that turned the 
OPT into separated Bantustans and noncontiguous enclaves. Israel’s policies since 1987 
(the first Palestinian intifada) and especially after the initiation of the peace process and 
the eruption of the second intifada in 2001 have a consolidating effect of a system of 
apartheid that has been established since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Under 
these conditions a two-state solution is designed to preserve the Jewish purity of Israel 
while enabling it from controlling more territory within the OPT. By the same token a bi-
national state within this context would perpetuate ethno-religious and ethno-territorial 
underpinning of Israel and the conflict. A one-state solution under these conditions will 
be at best a mere expansion of asymmetrical power relations and domination. At worst it 
would be a one-state dominated by Jewish nationalism and embodying Greater Israel; a 
state of affairs advocated and sought by Zionist movement mainstream leaders since the 
establishment of Israel as we show. Those forces support carrying out an ethnic-cleansing 
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of the Palestinians and call it ‘transfer’ or the establishment of overt apartheid (an explicit 
system of official differentiation and discrimination) to maintain Jewish hegemony on the 
Land of Israel.  
Noam Arnon; an Israeli Jewish settlement leader sets it as the follow:  
…if there is a contradiction between this [Jewish] essence and the character of 
the government, it is clear that the essence takes precedence, and that steps are 
taken to prevent damage or changes to this Jewish essence. Democracy cannot 
be exploited to destroy the Jewish State” (quoted in Sussman, 2004: 39).  
Arnon’s ideas, as we show later, are not marginal in Israeli politics and Zionist founding 
ideological tenets. Efi Eitam; Chairman of the Israeli National Religious Party and a 
Minister in Sharon’s government in 2003 recently declared his vision for a one-state 
Jewish entity between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean. He introduces ethnic-
cleansing in terms of transfer as he suggests that the Palestinians who wished to remain in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be offered “enlightened residency,” as opposed to 
citizenship. Those unwilling to accept this status would have to relocate (quoted in 
Sussman, 2004: 39).These ideas lie in the heart of Israeli ethno-territorial regime of 
legitimation and upon them the state constructed its principles and policies to create a 
unique and covert type of apartheid in the Mandatory Palestine with differing levels of 
capacity in Israel’s proper and within the OPT. Challenging these foundations and social 
reality they are aimed at preserving is the locus of the processes that may lead to a 
particular eradication of Jewish ethno-religious system of differentiation and set the 
grounds for a democratic outcome of the conflict. 
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In this sense, the actualization of a Palestinian national identity and national self-
determination has become a prerequisite condition for the creation of a civil-democratic 
one-state in Palestine. The reasoning is straightforward, without the fulfillment of 
Palestinian national aspirations that implies the abandonment of Zionist Jewish doctrine 
of Greater Israel the status quo and stagnation of the peace process will persist. 
Achieving Palestinian national self-determination implies the invalidation of the Jewish-
Zionist doctrine of ethnic-Jewish supremacy and domination over the Great Land of 
Israel and over Palestinians. Challenging Israel’s own type of  apartheid in Palestine and 
the  abandonment of Zionist national-territorial ideology requires the convergence of 
Palestinians’ organized effort in the OPT, Israel and Diaspora to engage in a process of 
democratic-liberation struggle along with Israeli-Jewish democratic inclusive forces and 
international delegitimation of ethno-religious nationalism as an accepted form of nation 
and state building are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realization of a One-
State solutions and for ending Israel’s occupation of the OPT as the precondition for the 
democratic alternative to emerge.  Without the decline or the breakdown of Israeli system 
of domination that is organized around the fundamental linkages between four elements:  
the Jewish identity as an ethno-national icon; the state as the ultimate sanctuary of this 
identity; the land (territory); and the ultimate economic, social, and political exclusion of 
Palestinians (within the OPT, in Israeli proper, and in the Diaspora) the emergence of a 






European Colonialism and Zionist implantation 
 
The promises Britain made to the Arabs, particularly to Sharif Hussein Bin-Ali of 
Mecca in 1915 as articulated in Hussein-McMahon Correspondence
61
  to recognizer Arab 
independence in Asia and support Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire were not kept. 
As a matter of fact McMahon promises in the Name of the Kingdom were at odds with 
other simultaneously given promises and pledges: one with Britain’s colonial ally France 
as enshrined in the Sykes –Picot agreement
62
, and the other to the Zionist movement 
made in November 1917 by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Walter 
Rothschild on behalf of the British government and to be transmitted to the Zionist 
Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. Whereas McMahon exceptions made on the Arab 
territorial boundaries was to keep the British-French division of the region between the 
two colonial powers intact, the Balfour declaration remained as unfettered a commitment 
that Britain kept aiming at the establishment of a Jewish “homeland” in Palestine. The 
degree to which the Balfour declaration was consistent or non-consistent with the 
McMahon pledges to Hussein Bin-Ali has been a matter of controversy. It is not in our 
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 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence is a set of letter-exchange between the Sharif of Mecca Hussein Bin-
Ali and Sir Henry McMahon; the British Higher Commissioner in Egypt between July 1915 to January 
1916. Britain, needy of Arabs as ally against the Ottomans pledged to support Arab revolt and 
independence when the War (World War Two) ends. In his letter dated 24 October 1915 McMahon 
clarifies the territorial boundaries of the Arab independence and declares that “Great Britain is prepared to 
recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories in the limits and boundaries 
proposed by the Sherif of Mecca”.  
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 The Sykes-Picot agreement was signed in secret between the UK and France in May 1916 with the 
consent Russia; their ally at the time. The agreement defined British and French “spheres of influence” in 
countries of Western Asia (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon) as the War comes to an end and the 
Ottoman Empire defeated as expected. The negotiations were led by British and French Foreign Ministers: 
Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, respectively, and hence they dubbed Sykes-Picot. The 




intention to examine the validity of rival interpretations of the declaration. The British 
government reiterated its pledge for Arab independence and unity when the Arab 
revolution forces were advancing northbound well into Jordanian territory. In 1918, 
Britain dispatched its Higher Commissioner in Egypt to Mecca to convey a letter by Sir 
Mark Sykes on behalf of the British government in which Britain once again stressed its 
recognition of Arab independence and Arab unity as a nation. British government, the 
letter firmly stated, was intent to maintain its commitment for the Zionist movement. The 
letter unequivocally states 
Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favor of a return (my emphasis) of 
Jews to Palestine and in as much as this opinion must remain a constant factor, 
and further as His Majesty's Government view with favor the realization of 
this aspiration (my emphasis), His Majesty's Government are determined that 
insofar as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both 
economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization 
of this ideal. 
The letter neatly restates the provisions of the Balfour declaration of 1917
63
. It 
represents the first and most instrumental international recognition of the Zionist colonial 
ambitions in Palestine. The letter added to the terminology the term “return” to depict 
Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the term “aspiration” to refer to the aim of 
establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Both terms to be of the main pillars of 
Zionist political claims in Palestine and kindle the animosity between the Palestinian 
Arabs and the Zionist movement. The latter justified its endeavor in Palestine primarily 
by claiming that Jewish people has a divine right in the return to Palestine and that Jews 
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 The Balfour declaration states that “His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country” (Davis, 2003: 27).   
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have for a millennia aspired to reestablish their nationhood in the Promised Land.   The 
implementation of the Balfour declaration had meant primarily allowing unlimited Jewish 
immigration into Palestine and thus seeding the seeds for the implantation of a settler 
community from tens of different nationalities.  
The immediate and profound effect was that Jewish immigration that increased in 
the last quarter of the 19th century and was spontaneous and ideologically neutral, turned 
into a systemic, enormous, ideologically motivated, and organized by the Zionist 
movement. Immigration of this magnitude and sort was a watershed in the onset of the 
Palestinian-Zionist/Israeli conflict. The implantation of the Jewish in the land of Palestine 
alarmed the indigenous population and triggered their disillusionment with British 
intentions and their resentment in the face of Zionist creeping colonialism onto their land. 
Jewish settler colonialism would increase exponentially through the first there decades of 
the 19th century and the implantation of the Jews would take particular organizational 
features and establish its own buffered and isolated sphere of life. British colonial 
government, while restraining Palestinian institutional and economic viability, either 
supported or turned a blind eye to Zionist practices. In particular British allowance for 
Jewish immigration was significantly essential for the success of the Zionist movement to 
gain ground and strength; gathering more Jewish immigrants to Palestine was the 
precondition for the creation of a viable settler-colonial society.  British policy of 
allowing the Zionist movement to establish its own administrative structures and to gain 
autonomy in running Jewish communities was significantly instrumental in Jewish settler 
community’s leverage over the indigenous population.   
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Crafting Zionist religious ethno-territoriality  
Jewish immigration to Palestine up until the last two decades of 19th century; the 
pre-Zionist immigration fluctuated in numbers and point of departure. Jews immigrated 
to Palestine in an almost regular manner in small numbers from different European and 
Middle Eastern (Arab) regions. Jews immigrated to Palestine in the 17th and 18th 
centuries primarily for religious reasons, and then the persecution they suffered in Europe. 
Numbers of immigrants were in increase in the early and mid of 18th century (see Arie 
Morgensten 2006) for immigrants’ belief of the arrival of the Messiah in the Hebrew year 
5600; 1840 on the English calendar. Declining life conditions and persecution and 
pogroms in Eastern and Southern Europe drove more Jewish immigration to Palestine, as 
well. Moreover, political and economic changes in the region attracted Jews from 
Southern Europe and some Arab countries; notably more Jews immigrated to Palestine 
during the expanding rule of Mohammad Ali in Egypt in 1832. Starting 1882, however 
the pattern and drivers of this immigration were fundamentally in a remarkable transition.  
Rates of Jewish immigration to Palestine starting the last two decades of the 18th 
century were one of the highest, and the capital transfers that accompanied it was 
unprecedented in the world. Substantially, Jewish immigration had become an organized 
effort orchestrated by the ascending “political Zionism”
64
. The implantation of Jewish in 
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 Uri Davis (2003:7) distinguishes between “spiritual Zionism” and “political Zionism”. The school of 
spiritual Zionism inside the movement opposed the project of “political Zionism”. As the latter committed 
to a normative and practical project for turning Palestine into a Jewish sovereign state, the former, led by 
Asher Ginsberg (Ahad-ha-Am) opposed the project. Following his visit to Palestine in 1891 published a 
critique of political Zionism titled “Truth from Eretz Israel” in which he defies the claim that Palestine was 
a barren land void of people. We draw on this distinction and wherever this study uses the terms: Zionism, 
Zionist movement, Zionists it refers to ‘Political Zionism”. 
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Palestine by means of organized and well-funded Zionist effort represented the 
convergence of interests between certain segments of Jewish capital in Europe with 
Jewish labor in the creation of self-sufficient and exclusive settlements in Palestine 
(Younis 2000: 55) with the consent and protection of the British colonial government that 
recognized Zionist institutions as legitimate. In fact the British Mandate Government 
following the enactment of Balfour Declaration recognized the Jewish Agency for the 
Land of Israel (Jewish Agency JA) “as the appropriate public body to advise the Mandate 
administration in such economic, social, and other matters as may affect the 
establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine” (cited in Davis 2003:28).  
Initially, capital and labor without military power enabled the Zionist movement to 
establish viable isolated communities (yishuvim and Kibbutzim) that benefited from 
capital to construct advanced industries, agricultural projects and residential settlements.  
The Jewish settler society constructed its social, administrative and institutional, 
and economic structures in isolation from, and at odds with the indigenous Palestinian 
population and their livelihood. Isolation from, and exclusion of the Palestinians were the 
main two characteristics of Zionist colonization of Palestine and they, in effect, founded 
the principal bedrock for the constitution of the Jewish immigrants as a distinct religious-
ethno-nationality bound to the space (territorial and socio-economic) it occupied. The 
pattern of total exclusion and isolationism that distinguished the Zionist endeavor from 
other types of colonialisms produced a wide buffer that was initially territorially based.  




The degree of exclusion that Zionism implemented had been very unique and was 
consolidated in tandem with the increase of Jewish immigration. Thus after the arrival of 
the second through Fifth Jewish immigration waves between1904-1928, exclusion was 
tightened and galvanized through and reached a climax with the establishment of the state 
of Israel. State phase of the Zionist enterprise came to officially and formally adopt this 
type of differentiation and exclusion; an apartheid of a distinct type, as further illustrated 
below. Immigrants of these waves, and most of subsequent waves, were ideologically 
motivated and driven by the Zionist motto that Palestine was “a land without a people” 
for “a people without a land” that negated the Palestinians altogether. Negation of the 
indigenous Palestinians, economically, politically, and physically culminated in the 
Zionist movement’s emphasis on conquering the land and the establishment of self-
sufficient and well administered and well-defended Jewish entity. The viability of Jewish 
settlement communities was pivotal for the establishment of the state of Israel: they 
provided the infrastructure, institutional and economic bedrock, ideological coherency, 
and military power that contributed significantly to the ability of Israel to come into life 
and sustain 
Jewish settler-communities were economically, socially, and politically structured 
to meet the main objective of the Zionist movement, namely the “restoration of the 
Jewish people as an independent and self-sustaining community in its homeland; 
Palestine” (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 659). The ‘ingathered’ of Jewish and the 
implementation of the Jewish labor policy “Hebrew work” that aimed at the restoration of 
the immigrants as a nation distinct and separated from the indigenous Palestinians were 
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the primary pillars of Zionism in this era. ‘Restoration’ took the form of establishing the 
settler communities; Kibbutzim (communal villages) and Yishuvim (residential villages 
and towns) that have viability to receiving and absorbing more Jewish immigrants. The 
more Jewish immigrants arrived, the more these constructs the more settlements were 
consolidated and with that differentiation and separation between Jewish settlers and 
Palestinian increased.  
Differentiation and exclusion implied a dual mechanism: dispossessing 
Palestinians from their land and prohibiting their employment in Jewish labor market. 
This policy founded the grounds of the notion of segregation and isolationism that make 
Zionism a system of apartheid on its own right. The absorption of vast numbers of Jewish 
immigrants especially after World War Two
65
 has given a crucial boost to this process by 
virtue of numbers right before the creation of the estate. Virtually, exclusion, land 
acquisition, and immigration were the main tools that Zionism –and later the state of 
Israel- has deployed in order to solve the main problem that faced the consolidation of the 
Jewish settler colonialism in Palestine: the presence of another people, the Palestinians 
(the Canaanites). Zionist motto of ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’ 
did not rest well with this fact, and the question becomes on the relationship between the 
Jewish settlers of the indigenous people. Ironically, Biblical wrath and fury is not 
directed to the peoples who enslaved or exiled the Jews, rather against the inhabitants of 
Palestine. Biblical reasoning of this is that the presence of an alien people in the land of 
Israel could threaten the political structure of the Chosen people and could possibly 
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 By the end of the war, and at the eve of establishing Israel the Jewish community of Palestine consisted 
302 farming communities, and 28 urban communities. Between 19949 and 1952 687,000 Jewish 
immigrants arrived to Israel (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 659). 
176 
 
undermine the cultural and religious character of Israel. Goyim (aliens) will contaminate 
the purity of the Jewish state and people. The answer to Goyim presence in the Promised 
Land is to enslave and abuse them, not to mix with them if not cleansing them altogether 
as Moses instructed the Israelites as they were about to enter Palestine. These perceptions, 
although not explicitly invoked by mainstream Zionists or Israeli officials in general can 
be observed in the practices of Zionism in the pre-state period and by the state of Israel 
since it was established. 
Zionist exclusivist character prevented to a large extent any mechanisms of 
integration or significant cross-cutting interactions along the divide that was widening 
between the Jewish community and the Palestinian population. One of the main 
consequences of total exclusion was that the indigenous population was unable to affect 
or challenge Jewish preponderance from within the system they established; a feature that 
distinguishes Israel’s apartheid and represents the bedrock of the domination system it 
established in the whole of Palestine. Thus the structures of settler-colonial Zionism did 
not permeate the Palestinian society at any level and the colonial buffer that separated the 
settlers from the indigenous population was ultimate. In order to give cultural life and 
vibrant ethno-national dimension of the nascent settler-colonial Jewish community 
Zionist movement cemented the ethnic ties within through the use of Hebrew as the 
dominant and only language. Virtually, this mobilization tool has deepened the 
differentiation and distinctiveness of the two groups; Jews and Arabs. While a discourse 
of secular-nationalism amalgamated with religious precepts was deployed to ‘ingather’ 
the Jews in Palestine and convince them to immigrate, Hebrew was the main tool of 
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mobilization and unification within the immigrants. Hebrew, in addition to resurrecting 
many religious symbols and preserving them was the central core of the construction of 
the Jewish society as an ethno-linguistic group. Although the language spoken by the 
majority of immigrants and of the Palestinian Jews (whose homeland is Palestine prior to 
the arrival of immigrants) was the Yiddish, Zionists preferred Hebrew for its ancient 
connection to Abraham and the Bible and for the differentiation it consolidates.  
Total exclusion, segregation, and hegemony; rather than exploitation were the 
pillars of a blueprint that was the hallmark of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. Zionistist 
colonialism in Palestine encompassed features of European colonial practices intertwined 
with religious ethno-national attributes that make it a unique type of a buffered 
colonialism:  colonial ethno-territorial force that aimed from the outset to negate rather 
than control and exploit the indigenous. Thus Zionism encapsulated, in the words of 
Yiftachel (2010: 226) the  
ethos of ‘collective survival-revival [and] an Orientalist colonial attitude typical 
to Europeans in settler societies [that] created a dual society, manifested in 
separate residential areas, education systems, cultural milieu, labor markets, and 
political organization,   
that established Zionist apartheid system before the creation of the state of Israel.   
Zionism and the racial answer to the Jewish question in Europe 
The creation of Jewish colonial presence in Palestine finds its justification in 
Zionist ideological tenets derived from Biblical myths
66
; particularly to the Old 
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 Myth in this doesn’t mean an untrue context has the power of factual historical event. We subscribe to 
Akenson’s definition of it as a true set of views about historical events; “views of the past that take on 
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Testament and Talmudic narratives
67
. However, early European initiatives and 
discussions on the implantation of European Jews in Palestine dates long before the 
founding of political Zionism in 1897, and at some point it intersects with Zionist’s 
efforts and pleas for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.  Ideological zeal of 
Zionist Jews for the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine was also driven by 
materialistic; economic and political/strategic underpinnings within the broader European 
colonial ambitions in the region. Theodor Herzl; the founding father of Zionism himself 
was not an observant Jew; he was born to an assimilated western European family and 
had received no Jewish education. The underlying material aspects were not unique in the 
era of colonialism except for the fact that European colonial powers (French and Britain 
in particular) instead of establishing their own setter-colonial communities (as was the 
case in India, Algeria, and South Africa, for example) they espoused the implantation of a 
proxy that has sufficient justification and motivation. Thus, Zionism was preceded with 
European calls for Jewish colonization in Palestine to serve the interests of European 
powers; the private secretary of Napoleon III in 1860 promised that all Europe would 
support Jewish acquisition of Palestine (Ab-Lughod and Abu-Laban 1974: 22) to serve 
                                                                                                                                                                             
extraempirical meaning, by virtue of being closely related to the society’s views of its collective identity 
and it special, virtually divine, origin.” (Akenson 1992:138). 
     
67
 The Old Testament contains the only available record of the ancient state of Israel. It encompasses three 
main beliefs: (1) Jews are separate and exclusive people chosen by their God to fulfill a destiny, and 
therefore they are a covenant and elected people as opposed to other neglected peoples; (2) the covenant 
grant the chosen a definite and exclusive ownership of the land of Canaan (Palestine) for them and their 
descendants; (3) the reclamation of this land is a divine duty of all the Jews and the Jewish purity of the 
land is sacred. These beliefs and justifications are prevalence in Zionist leaders’ thinking secular and 
religious alike. Ben Gurion calls the Bible “the sacrosanct title-deed to Palestine” for the Jewish people 
“with a genealogy of 3500 years” (Ab-Lughod and Abu-Laban, 1974 p4), and therefore the redemption of 
the land of Israel and the return of the Jews to the land of the birth moladit is called aliah. The claim of 
divine mission and exclusivity farther entrenched by a strong convection that the Jewish people has some 
essential characteristics that no people possesses, which make the Jewish history incomparable in terms of 




European interests in the region. Thus religious ontology of Zionist foundations doesn’t 
negate the existence of timely philosophy and material basis for Jewish settler-colonial 
project in Palestine. One of the most prominent Zionist thinkers, Moses Hess endorsed 
the colonial argument and the mutual interests that may materialize out of Zionist-
European colonial cooperation. Since European powers will need to establish colonies 
along the new trade routes to the east after the work on the Suez Canal, Jews would serve, 
as a colony, in establishing channels of communications and mediation with far Asia. 
Herzl made the same argument: 
If His majesty the [the Ottoman] Sultan was to give us Palestine, we could in 
return undertake the complete management of the finances of Turkey. We 
should there form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of 
civilization against barbarism. We should as a neutral state remains in contact 
with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence” (Ab-Lughod 
and Abu-Laban 1974: 23).  
Herzl emphasized the mutual benefits that European (British, German, and French) 
powers and a Jewish state would reap as a result of establishing and protecting a Jewish 
colony in Palestine. Herzl spearheaded Zionist efforts to establish a broad Jewish 
coalition supporting his ideas and Zionism succeeded in bringing to the action Jews from 
different class affiliations including bourgeoisie, middle and working classes. In this 
sense Zionism and the colonial ambitions it represented was a phenomenon embedded 
within the broader current of European colonialism as well as European industrialization 
and its discontents.  
Zionism emerged as a set of ideas bound to the concrete social, economic, and 
political conditions surrounded its founding in Europe. It represents a colonial movement 
that claimed to have a solution to the Jewish question in Europe using European methods: 
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colonization. Capitalism and socio-economic changes accompanied it at some level 
precipitated racial tenets of nationalism and fascism. Zionism emerged in the era of 
European industrialization with all its malaise including the most two prominent strands 
of thought: enlightenment and racism. For the Jewish, this historical process was a 
double-edged sword: in the one hand it brought them emancipation and legal equality 
under the rule of law and democracy in some countries. On the other hand, the rise of 
racism and national chauvinism created anti-Jewish trends, which materialized in 
persecution, pogroms, and mass-murder of Jews. As a consequence, Jewish communities 
either opted to secular liberalism and democracy in their respective countries, or 
committed to secular racism as the base for ethno-national resurrection embodied in 
Zionism (Davis 2003: 9).  
European racism was met by a response of the same kind by Zionism; the answer 
for Jewish negation in Europe was “not to destroy our lives in miserable indecision and 
spiritual sorrow” wrote Rabbi Joachim Prinz in 1934. Prinz further clarifies that the 
answer to persecution and anti-Jewish sentiments is the creation and sustaining of Jewish 
racism 
The theory of assimilation has been destroyed. There is no longer any hiding 
place for us…We want to posit instead of assimilation something new: 
undertaking the yoke of joining the Jewish people and the Jewish race. Only a 
state based on the principles of the purity of the nation and the race can 
possibly endow dignity and honor on [and only] on those Jews who 
themselves subscribe to this principle” (Italics in origin) (quoted in Davis 
2003:10).  
Therefore, Zionist justifications of the colonization of Palestine and claiming 
exclusive right to the land were generic  
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they were the same arguments employed in the previous centuries by the 
Australian colonists concerning the aborigine…the Afrikaners concerning the 
Xhosa and Zulu…The same canonical justifications were used by all Europeans 
imperialists when explaining why it was all right for the colonists to bash the 
indigene” (Akenson 1992: 170).  
Zionists arguments in this respect were real and typically colonialist regardless of their 
content of truth or logical coherence: Palestinian Arabs were not really a people; their 
emotional and historical ties with the land are weak; they are backward, not productive 
and they were not really dispossessed and by extension they have a lower level of rights 
than the Jewish; and that Zionist colonization of Palestine was good for the Arabs. In this 
sense Zionism sat very well with liberal notions of postindustrial Europe and therefore 
was able to convert the processes it launched in Palestine. Thus, as Said (1992: 87) 
argues 
The Jews were not supplanting, destroying, breaking up, a native society. That 
society was itself the oddity that had broken the pattern of a sixty-year Jewish 
sovereignty over Palestine which had lapsed for two millennia. In Jewish 
hearts, however, Israel had always been there, and actuality difficult for the 
natives to perceive. Zionism therefore reclaimed, redeemed, repeated, 
replanted, and realized Palestine and the Jewish hegemony over it. Israel was 
a return to a previous state of affairs, even if the new facts bore a far greater 
resemblance to the methods and successes of nineteenth-century European 
colonialism than to some mysterious first-century forbearers  
This line of argument has been the hallmark of the Labor wing in the Zionist 
movement and embodies the rationality of pioneered modernists and liberals who argue 
that their endeavor is messianic and aims at civilizing the uncivilized peoples (Nady, 
cited in Nic Craith 2002:  37). However, similar to other ethno-national colonial societies, 
Zionism created and consolidated a spiral of exclusionist and segregated system of 
domination. One of the major differences is that Zionism resorted to profound religious 
fundamentalist precepts to consolidate its colonial discourse and practices.        
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Religious ethno-national exclusionism and isolationism of the settler Jewish 
community in Palestine was a reflection of the circumstances that precipitated the 
emergence of political Zionism: European racist anti-Jewish sentiments argued that, 
given the fundamental incompatibility of non-Jews and Jews, Jews -as individuals and as 
a group- cannot be equal citizens and free in non-Jewish communities. These were the 
same premises upon which the Afrikaners in South Africa justified, at some point, the so 
called “separate development” that would, so claimed at the time, serve the interests of 
both Black Africans and white Afrikaners. Isolationism of the settler-colonial Jewish 
community in Palestine entertained and practiced what European anti-Jewish racists 
called for: since incompatibility is evident by definition, the answer is separating the Jews 
from the Gentiles in Europe and in Palestine alike since  
For political Zionism, Jewish society must also be segregated outside the body 
of the Gentile society, in this case in Palestine redefined and reified in Zionist 
ideology as the Land of Israel” (Nic Craith 2002:  11).              
Zionism, thus was a cross-class movement that represented a classic colonial 
resolution to the Jewish question in Europe in direct and close coordination with the 
European powers of the time. However, it needed a more profound and articulate solution 
to the issue of mobilizing the Jews to rally behind the project and to create a moral and 
sufficient ideological justification that would provide the secular colonial nationalism 
with ethnic depth.   
Constituting Zionist Jewish ethno-territorial ideology 
 
The secular and class-based coalition that Zionism was predicated upon and the 
Oriantalist colonial underpinnings of European origins were necessary but not sufficient 
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for the success of the Zionist colonialism in Palestine. Mobilizing Jewish support and 
immigration to Palestine especially when the vast majority of Jewish emigrating from 
Eastern Europe preferred Western Europe or Northern America as their destination 
required justifications beyond secular nationalism and vulgar colonial interests; the 
resurrection of Jewish national identity provided the answer.  Primarily, Biblical myths 
constitute the main authority the Zionist movement invoke to support the claim of an 
exclusive Jewish right in Palestine. The central piece of the claim is that the Promised 
Land (Palestine) was actually occupied by other foreign peoples for hundreds of years, 
and that time has come for the Jewish people to redeem what is his. This right is cited as 
God’s ordainment given and sustained by the Covenant between him and the Chosen 
People (the Jewish people). Chaim Weizman, the founder of the institutional 
infrastructure of Zionism in Palestine, articulates the concept of redemption with its 
political implications as follows:  
It seems as if God has covered the soil of Palestine with rocks and marshes and 
sand, so that its beauty can only be brought out by those who love it and will 
devote their lives too healing its wounds (Quoted in Said 1992: 85).  
The divine exclusive right of the Jewish people in the Land of Palestine is 
strengthened by attaching to it a burden that the Jewish people have to carry; the 
fulfillment of God’s commandment to establish the just society in the Land of Israel. The 
covenant and the scripture works as a “conceptual grid” in which land, exodus, and blood 
sacrifice are the reflex points or the ultimate principles and great sensitivity touching 
them “energizes the entire grid and calls forth an immediate, focused, sometimes violent 
response” (Akenson 1992: 31) to threats that might undermine the sacred connections 
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between God, the Land, and the unity and purity of the Chosen. Territory and space in 
this sense is more than a Jewish property but also the burden of making it what God 
commanded. Intertwining this religious-ethnic claim with secular notions of colonial 
precepts and Jewish suffering in Europe, Zionism was able to present itself as a national 
liberation movement, even as anti-colonial. A claim that would not survive the question 
of practice: The question here is not whether political Zionism was a national liberation 
movement or a settler-colonial enterprise. Rather, “the critical question is what actions 
and /or omissions adherents of political Zionism justify in the name of Zionism” (Davis, 
2003 p8). Emphasizing the practices of the Zionist movement and revealing social, 
political, economic and institutional reality it created in Palestine has the priority over an 
abstract discussion on whether it was a national liberation movement or not. Where 
ideology reveals the nature of the movement is ultimately in the realm of reality.    
The most striking aspect of Zionist ideology is not only the religious belief it 
exhibits but rather the ethno-nationalistic territorial component it incorporates and 
justified by religious precepts. In effect, invoking the exclusive divine right of the 
‘Jewish people’ in the land of Palestine implies controlling the land as one element in an 
inseparable triad: God, the People, and the Land.  Zionism cannot be divorced from this 
profound devotion to the land in spite of its nationalistic and socialist character (Davis 
1974 quoted in Cohen and Kliot 2011:664) and Zionist Jews, whether religious or secular 
share the belief that the Jewish people have a missionary task that makes its connection to 
the land very special and its spiritual unity as a nation a unique feature because of the 
Promised Land upon which the establishment of today’s Israel (“The Third Jewish 
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Commonwealth” as it is called by Zionists) is the continuation of the ancient Kingdom of 
Israel (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 662). The logical outcome of such articulations is the 
sought of Jewish purity in Jewish Land, which by definition implies exclusion and 
territorial control. Both are intertwined and constitute the politico-religious grid centered 
and focused on the essential connections between the land and ethno-nationality that 
distinguishes Zionist settler-colonialism.  
Exclusion of the other non-Jewish and the imagined organic connections between 
the land and the people implies that notions of bi-nationalism and universal inclusive 
democracy entail the dissolution of the spiritual aspect of the nation and its unity. 
Realization or even discussion of bi-nationalism or inclusive democracy have a more 
stunning effect on Zionists than political considerations. From this perspective Israel 
embodies, in full terms, the “State of the Jews” Der Judenstaat envisioned by Herzl in his 
book that has the same title. This property is best illustrated by Zionist territorial 
legitimating regime and ideology as an expansionist colonial power driven by a type of 
apartheid without which realizing Jewish domination as a nation over the Land of Israel 
would not be possible. The expulsion of the native population is concomitant to these 
precepts; Jewish nationalism cannot be constructed with the presence of the non-Jewish. 
As Herzl put it in his Diaries  
We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the border by 
procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any 
employment in our own country. Both the process of expropriation and the 
removal of the poor must be carried discreetly and circumspectly (Quoted in 





Zionist pre-state Territorial ideology: total exclusion and negation 
 Underlying Zionist territorial-nationalism is a legitimating system of meanings 
derived from ethno-religious connections to the ancient history of Palestine. Based on 
biblical scripts, Zionism has established the Jewish claim of the Land as the sole property 
of the Jewish people. It gave the name ‘Zion’ to Palestine although the Biblical name of 
Palestine is not Zion. Rather, it is Canaan or the Land of Israel. Zion is the name of 
sanctuary built by King Solomon in Jerusalem. Conflating Zion with Palestine, as 
Weissbord (2011: 192) remarks was to justify a choice that was not reasonable from a 
secular point of view. This can be noticed in Herzl’s initial proposal for the location of a 
Jewish state; Herzl in 1895 accepted any place for the establishment of Jewish entity and 
location was not relevant. Naming Palestine as the destination and location was 
reasonable only in its religious and ethno-national sense. The debate within the Zionist 
movement over the location settled down in favor of Palestine during the First Zionist 
Congress in 1897.  The arguments deployed in favor of Palestine are highly indicative of 
the territorial ethno-national ideology of the movement. Phrases such as: “There is no 
Zionism without Zion”; “Even if we are shown the lushest countries, full of milk and 
honey, we will prefer the bare rocks of Palestine, because they are in Palestine”; and 
“Zion is the country we love, the land of our aspiration…there is only one country which 
has such an attraction for the entire people and that is Zion”. The conflation of religious 
beliefs, territorial aspirations, and nationalistic notions come together to create a unique 




The principal difference between Zionist settler-colonial adventure in Palestine 
and other colonial-settler regimes, such as the white in South Africa, is that Zionist 
movement claims “to be the restoration of a state that had temporarily been disrupted” 
(Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban 1974: 3) by reconstituting the Jews from all over the world 
in a single ethno-nationality bound to the territory in the manner we discussed.  
Ethnicizing the conflict and endowing it with essential territorial-spatial dimension is 
unique for the Israeli regime in Palestine. Territorial absolute exclusion of the indigenous 
embedded another major distinction of Zionist colonialism; unlike other European 
colonial efforts Zionism did not seek the colonization of the indigenous and their 
dispossession and exploitation. Rather it sought their ultimate dispossession and ultimate 
exclusion which makes the consequences more disastrous for the Palestinians (Davis 
2003: 27) Whereas other examples of similar regimes can be found in Serbia, Estonia, Sri 
Lanka and South Africa, these cases have not necessarily incorporated rigid territorial 
ideologies based on ethno-religious premises. As such, the specificity with which the 
movement identified its project with territorial boundaries is remarkable and has 
profound implications for the development of the state of Israel and the territorial 
legitimating regime it employ to justify the expansionist nature of its colonial policies 





Essentializing territory and ethnic identities 
Leaders of the Zionist movement justify Jewish immigration to Palestine by 
secular values such as justice, humanitarian principles, creating psychologically sane 
people, etc. Simultaneously, they invoked basic religious justifications to reinforce their 
secular discourse. In the words of Syrkin these secular values must be the guidelines of 
the Jewish state so that “the hope for a Messiah…may be converted into political fact” 
(Quoted in Weissbord 2011: 193). The arrival of the Messiah cannot be seen apart from a 
certain territory; Palestine and amongst a certain messianic people; the Jewish. The 
redemption and possession of the Land of Palestine becomes an imperative and an end 
sought for its own sake as an ultimate duty of the Chosen people.  The reconstituting of 
the Jewish history and the resurrection of Jewish people cannot be achieved in any 
territory other than Palestine, which turned Jewish nationalism into a-historical 
phenomenon “providing a unified linear and repeatedly recited backdrop for 
contemporary practices of territorial expansion” (Yiftachel 2010: 224). In effect this has 
conferred a state of homogeneity on the Jewish history that exempted, even suppressed, 
any attempt to question it, or even to question Zionism as the bearer of this mission.  
Zionism, in this sense is the embodiment of the reconstruction of ancient and 
continuous ties and connections between the Jewish people and their land. The ‘Jewish 
people’ although had never seen this land had dreamed of it for generations as Abba Eban 
contends (Eban 1968: 17). Perceiving the Land of Palestine as the exclusive property of 
the Jewish people is a matter of consensus within Israeli Jewish community and polity 
and world Jewry. Territorial claims are   the less ambiguous aspect of Zionist ideology. 
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As Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban (1974: 9) remark “while the question of people (Who is 
the Jew) may be open to…interpretations, and the problem of the indigenous population 
may be subject to some moral considerations, the right to the land is so basic that it is 
hardly contested: “Eretz Israe as defined in the Bible is not an ambiguity”. In Biblical 
terms territorial considerations are paramount and supreme to all other imperatives. Thus 
territory has been essentialised and given a-historical subjective meaning that pertains to 
the core of Jewish identity.  
Perceiving territory in an essentialist manner confers a subjective sacred meaning 
to the spatial component of nation-building and turning it into an ethno-religious 
endeavor. The other non-Jew (an individual or a group) has no place within Jewish 
nationality understood and articulated in ethno-territorial terms. Establishing the 
correspondence between the land and the Jewish people, as Buber (1952) clarifies, is  
a consummation that could not be achieved by the people or the land on its own 
right but only by the faithful cooperation of the two together …land is not a dead 
passive object but a living active partner… [both needed each other] to realize 
the fullness of life. 
The unique connection to the land is further essentialised by the belief that the 
Jewish people as a whole share transcendental spiritual attribute by virtue of this unique 
connection to the land and God’s grace which makes territory and land the equivalent of 
ethnicity, nationality, religion, and the state.  For some Jewish scholars (e.g. Shilhav 
1985:111-124) the missionary precept of ethno-religious Jewish nationalism hinders the 
morality of this mission by worshipping territory and turning it into an end and confers an 
essentialist meaning to controlling territory and alienating it from the indigenous. The 
sanctity and essentialist precepts of territory and spatial sphere turned the land into an 
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indivisible subject and extra-territorialized the spatial domain of the conflict and the 
connotations of the nation. 
 
Extra-territorializing the geography   
As an ultimate subject, the redemption of the land of Palestine from the foreigners 
and establishing Jewish settlements and Jewish sovereignty on it becomes an act of piety, 
righteousness and religious must. Whether within the Israeli proper or in the OPT, Jewish 
settlement building is considered a higher value and described as a pioneering practice; 
“The land of Israel was, with its borders, defined for us by Divine Providence. Though 
shalt be, say the Almighty, and there is no power on earth can alter that which was 
created by him” as Rabbi Nissim (chief Rabbi of Israel in 1968) puts it (Shilhav 1985: 
111). Legal and political implications of this belief can be found in early legislations 
enacted after the establishment of the state of Israel. Since the land of Palestine is the 
property of Yahweh (God) it shall not be sold to non-Jews, which represents the mandate 
of the Jewish National Fund (JNF)
68
. The extraterritorial value Zionism conferred on the 
land and especially the OPT can be best captured by noticing the nature and scope of 
Israeli settlement grid. Ironically, the portion of Palestine allotted for the establishment of 
Israel in UN resolution 181(II) of 1947 includes low-lands that do not have the same 
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 The JNF was one of the first institutions the Zionist movement established for the aim of redeeming 
Jewish land in Palestine. Herman Schapira proposed the establishment of this organization to the First 
Zionist Congress in 1897. The funds allocated to the JNF were to be spent on land purchase and 
development. Although land acquired by the JNF is to be the Jewish people’s ownership, land should not 
be sold to the Jewish settlers; rather to be leased for specific period of time question of terms and renewal. 
The JNF became active shortly, and in 1905 it made its first purchases, and by 1907 it managed to 
purchases a total of 12,400 dunums. In 1936 the JNF possessed up to 370,000 dunums. In 1948 the JNF 
became the largest landowner in Palestine holding the title of 53.8 per cent of the Jewish-owned land. 
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religious relevance to the Bible comparing to the highlands of the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem. “The Jewish realms of antiquity were located primarily in these highlands, and 
the West Bank settlements are promoted to potential Jewish immigrants on grounds of 
“redeeming” or “returning to” the long-lost Jewish homeland” (Tilley 2005: 34).  
 
Therefore the importance given to settlement in the WB by the Zionist movement 
has been entrenched not only by settler movements such as Gush Emunim (The Block or 
League of the Faithful). Conferring a subjective indivisible and extraterritorial meaning 
to the space has yielded not only Jewish fundamentalist movements like Gush Emunim; 
the movement encompassed religious-national extremism of the National Religious Party 
(NRP) combined with military hardliners to form a messianic front to expand settlement 
construction and oppose any attempt to withdraw from any part of the occupied Arab 
territories of 1967 (Ishay 2011: 72, 78).    It also underlies systemic state policies and 
military measures that aim at transforming property rights of the land, confiscating it, and 
ultimately Judizing the entirety of the spatial sphere of the land by a variety of methods 
as we discuss in the Third section of this chapter. Moreover, Zionist tenets and Israel’s 
laws have extraterritorializede the meaning of the nation/people to include world Jewry 
regardless of their nationality. For Jewish people all over the world the territory of 
Palestine is their ethno-national home, which leaves no right whatsoever for the 
indigenous Palestinians in the land. Exclusion in this sense transcends the typical 
implications of apartheid as the world knows it in the South African case; it negates the 
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Palestinians out of territory and out of history all together. This can be seen through the 
patterns of territorial control and expansion in the pre-state phase of Zionist colonialism. 
 
Territorial-national nexus in the pre-state colonialism   
 Land possession by the Zionist movement in pre-state phase using the intensive 
capital flows from European Jewish investors and donors took advantage and exacerbated 
a process that had been generated by Ottoman regulations especially high taxes imposed 
on land, which rapidly turned more and more Palestinians into landless masses. British 
colonial effective methods of tax extraction contributed significantly to this process
69
. 
Dispossessed as they turned to be, Palestinians were excluded from the labor market in 
public sector as a result of the “civilized labor” policy of the British Mandate that paid 
higher wages for Jewish employees (Younis 2000: 64). In the private sector, those 
peasants migrated to cities where the Palestinian industrial sector was small and restricted 
whereas the Jewish sector was advanced and heavily supported with capital. The latter 
was exclusively opened to Jewish labor as an implementation Zionist policy of “Hebrew 
labor only” and the creation of an exclusively Jewish entity. Under these circumstances 
the Zionist movement was in a position to consolidate the settler community that 
sustained by its own means and gained a life of its own capabilities especially the 
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 The combination of British land laws and taxation, Zionist land purchases, and the Ottoman Land Code 
of 1858 (the code aimed at raising the revenue to serve the increased debt of the empire) Palestinian 
peasants (three-fourths of the Palestinian society in the period) rapidly and steadily lost their land holdings. 
They lost access to communal land (musha`) and huge portions of land turned into privately owned to 
wealthy individuals who afforded taxation. Zionists could pay and henceforth possesses large tracts of land. 
These dynamics resulted in dramatic increase of landless Palestinians in the 1930 where 30.7 per cent of 
rural families lost their access to land, and more than an additional one-third of peasants owned less than 
the minimum required for subsistence. The average size of Palestinian holdings decreased steadily from 75 
dunums in 1930 to 45.3 dunums in 1936 (Yunis 2005: 63-4).   
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exclusive control of land. The core Zionist agency that implemented and sponsored land 
control and economic development of the Jewish settler community in this ear was the 
Jewish National Fund (JNF).   
The JNF was established to carry on land purchases, development, and settlement 
expansion. Laws by which the JNF operates assert that the land is “the inalienable 
property of the whole Jewish people. Arabs may not buy or rent it. The importance of 
JNF’s role was crucial in determining the bounding linkages of different aspects of the 
Zionist enterprise in Palestine: Land purchases it made and agricultural development it 
funded contributed significantly to linking “national policy, security, and strategy… with 
the settlement objectives, all being welded together into a united, systematic, purposeful, 
and far-seeing policy” (Younis 2000: 64). Asserting the Land as a sacred asset of the 
Jewish people was further stressed by political accounts of Zionist leadership. To be sure, 
Ben Gurion declared in 1937 that “no Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the land of 
Israel” (Younis 2000: 11), clearly referring to the Mandatory Palestine since at the time 
the boundaries, let alone the establishment of Israel was not yet a political reality.  
Nonetheless, the concept of the Greater Israel was debated within the Zionist 
movement following Herzl’s definition in which he refers to the Biblical definition; “Our 
slogan shall be: The Palestine of David and Solomon” (Younis 2000: 13). Therefore, 
Zionism in the pre-state phase was clearly a self-conscious colonizing force and its 
creeping land control reflected this attribute through settler communities it established. 
As Akenson (1992: 166) notices, “…the Zionists of the Yishuv were indeed settlers and 
they engaged in a collective act of colonization” that was driven by the plans and 
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strategies put forward mu the Zionist movement institutes. The 16th congress of the 
World Zionist Organization’s resolution of 1929 states under the Article titled 
“Colonization Policy” that 
The congress declares that it must for all time be the fixed policy of the 
Jewish Agency [established in the same congress] to use every effort to ensure 
the development and expansion of the Jewish agricultural colonization in 
Palestine to the furthest possible limit in accordance with the principles laid 
down by the Congress for cooperation in the Jewish Agency” (Akenson 1992: 
166).  
For Labor Zionist concealing this feature was paramount. However, for 
Revisionist Right Zionists such as Vladimir Jabotinsky colonization was explicitly sought. 
Jabotinsky wrote: “Colonisation can have only one goal. For the Palestinian Arabs this 
goal is inadmissible. This is the nature of things. To change that nature is impossible.” 
(Akenson 1992: 166) 
Territorial acquisition and control by the Zionists have imbued the conflict from 
the outset with ethno-national enmity and mutual exclusivist attribute. For both 
adversaries the spatial dimension of the conflict has been turned into the kernel of 
national identity, socio-economic viability, cultural continuity, and political rights. 
Palestinian nationalists confronted Jewish immigration to their country not only as ethnic 
menace but rather as a national identity challenge deployed by taking over the land and 
the dispossession of the Palestinians. Extraterritorialization of the spatial realm of the 
conflict not only turns territory into a subjective and indivisible value but has also fixated 
the conflict as an ethno-territorial one and makes political-geography of the conflict the 
defining element of the struggle. In this sense space becomes the ultimate embodiment of 
national identity, culture, history, collective memory, religious beliefs and future 
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(Yiftachel, 2010: 216); all of which were institutionalized and internalized in Israel’s 
social milieu, polity, and ethnic-national identity through state system and its legal 
structure. Therefore Israel foundation and formation, and its “regimes of territorial 

























This chapter highlights the institutional attributes of Israel and the fundamental 
characteristics of its system of exclusion, differentiation, and sublimation predicated on 
ethno-national tenets. The main argument presented here is that Israel is not a nation-state 
in the normal sense of the term; rather it was established and remained an ethno-territorial 
construct. The chapter starts with showing the ethno-territorial base of Israel and the 
foundation of its “regimes of territorial legitimation” and then moves to discuss the 
characteristics of the state as an ethnocracy. Finally, the chapter discusses the peculiar 
aspects of Israeli settler-colonial system as a type of apartheid.  The analysis focuses on 
the ideological, institutional, and economic underpinnings of Israel’s regime in Palestine 
as a single geographical and political unit; a factual aspect created by Israel’s virtual 
domination over the whole region of the Mandatory Palestine. Thus “regimes of 
territorial legitimation” are de-constructed into their practices, institutions, laws, and 
procedures to unveil their nature as a system of differentiation and structural 
discrimination. The foundation of the state of Israel has structured the main character of 
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the conflict as ethno-territorial in which the political-geography plays the most crucial 
role in determining the trajectory the conflict has taken. As discussed in chapter II, there 
are three factors that shape the territorial legitimation system of a state: the political-
territorial status of states at the time of entry into the modern state system and prevailing 
ideas about the cultural-historical character of state territory” on the one hand, and the 
challenging group’s capabilities and chance to control the territory; and groups believe in 
the legitimacy of its cause.    
 
Israel’s “regimes of territorial legitimation” 
 
Chapter VI has shown how the Zionist movement succeeded in creating the 
primary administrative, institutional, and economic bases for achieving statehood prior to 
1947. By 1948, and following UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) Israel’s viability 
was out of question. The Arab state, on the other hand lacked the necessary 
infrastructures of all kind: The long and draining confrontation with the British 
government and the Zionist movement; the dispossession and the expulsion of more than 
half of the population; and British policy in hindering the establishment of self-sustaining 
Palestinian economy and defense in the 1920-30s rendered the Palestinian society 
fractured and lacks all means of livelihood, let alone the ability to head-off the well-
armed and organized Zionist forces. Labor Zionism within the movement was more 
flexible to accept the partition resolution. Labor’s practical stance attempted to reconcile 
colonial practice with the mainstream tenets of European enlightenment concealed and 
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obfuscated the nature of the Zionist enterprise. Thus, Labor policy succeeded in 
embedding Zionism within the ranks of modern secular racist and imperial expansionist 
European stream (Davis, 2003: 19) by using intensive propaganda to generate popular 
sympathy and diplomatic support to the newly established state. Zionism and the state of 
Israel were presented as part of the enlightened European endeavor to bring civilization 
and prosperity for otherwise backward and primordial population. This policy also helped 
Israel to justify and maintain its expansionism following the war of 1948 (the War of 
Independence in Zionist parlance).   
  
The military victory Israel accomplished resulted in the expansion of Israel’s 
territorial control to encompass 78 per cent of the mandatory Palestine (adding 22 per 
cent to the 57 per cent allotted for the Jewish state in the UN resolution 181 of 1947). 
International legitimation of the state of Israel as enshrined in the partition resolution has 
three profound implications in regard to the main character of Israel as an ethno-national 
territorial entity: first, it endorsed religious ethno-nationalism as a legitimate principle for 
the organization of a political system of the state. In effect the resolution reinforced the 
ethno-national aspects of the conflict and fixated adversaries’ identities upon their ethno-
national affiliation. Second, in recognizing Israel as a Jewish state the resolution legalized 
ethno-territoriality as the defining element of sovereignty and reinforced the 
extraterritorial aspects of the state in terms of its boundaries and the people (nation) it 
represents. A Jewish state in this sense has people (Jews) on its proper and beyond. In 
essence the international community has legitimated a colonial settler adventure in the era 
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of decolonization and accepted ethnic-control over space as a legitimate means to create a 
modern state. Third, it endowed international effects with a crucial role in the 
development of the conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most highly 
internationalized conflicts of all times, and international involvement in the conflict at 
many turning points proved to be decisive (we return to this point in the last chapter of 
this part).  
For Israel, this unprecedented legitimating was taken as recognition of all that 
Zionism stood for.  Israel in this sense was not a pre-existing independent unit except in 
the claimed ancient Biblical history, nor did it emerge as a fragment of a waning empire 
or colonies. Rather it was initiated by external powers. The recognition of Israel under the 
circumstances abovementioned granted the new entity with the consent of the 
international community as to its founding principles as a Jewish entity. In effect, this 
encouraged Zionist forces to carry on a series of massacres against Palestinians and 
ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of them in order to guarantee Jewish majority 
and controlling the space of the region allocated by the will of international community. 
The “purification of this space became a prime goal; buttressed by strong feelings of 
historical mission and justice (Yiftachel 2010:227) that characterizes Zionist ideology. 
The first two factors that determine territorial-national legitimating regime were 
established and reinforced as early as 1948. The challenging national group; the 
Palestinian national movement, as we discuss below, was not in any position that enables 
it to challenge the Zionist movement.  
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Primarily and most significantly, Israel was created as a religious ethno-national 
entity. International endorsement of the establishment of a Jewish state was basically an 
endorsement of Jewish nationhood with all its implications and excesses in regard to the 
indigenous population, land, and nation building. Nation Building espoused by the 
Zionist movement and institutionalized in the shape of a Jewish state represents an 
anomaly, to say the least, to nation-state underpinnings where the state does not aspire to 
“merge nation and state; rather and to the contrary it aimed at essentialise and segregate 
group identities” (Yiftachel 2010: 215).  
Therefore international community in principle endorsed a colonial apartheid state 
system in the ear of de-legitimizing racism, inequality, and ethno-national exclusivist 
tenets as principles of political organization, nation and state building, and governance. 
Judt’s depiction (abovementioned) of the state of Israel as an anachronism sits very well 
with the counter-historical manner in which Israel was created.   The modernity of the 
Jewish community in pre-state and after the establishment of Israel coexisted with 
Biblical beliefs in justifying Jewish settler-colonialism in Palestine and the establishment 
of the state as the sanctuary of a religious ethno-national configuration of nationhood. All 
Zionists regardless of their philosophical inclinations share the belief that Israel is the 
embodiment of Jewish nationhood not Israeli nationality.  
While the extreme version of Zionism calls for the restoration and the re-
establishment of the Great Israel, the more liberal recognizes that the indigenous people 
has some rights but at the same time holds that the Jewish people has an exclusive 
historical right in Palestine. Arie Eliave; a prominent liberal Zionist remarks that the 
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Arabs also have rights and this doesn’t negate or detract the full historical rights  of the 
Jews to the “undivided land of Israel- that is, the land of the Twelve Tribes” (quoted in 
Abu-Lughod and Abu-Laban, 1974: 8). Ben Gurion is more firm when it comes to the 
right of the possession of the “land of Israel”. He presents a distinction between human 
rights in general and the specific right of the Zionists in claiming Palestine exclusively. 
Ben Gurion in this respect puts the divine right of “Return of the Jewry Dispersed” above 
and in a supreme status vis-à-vis human rights, and the Bible with its supranational 
concepts over human thinking and modern concepts of nationality.  
The state of Israel as the supreme protector of Jewish nationhood within the 
undivided land of Israel, the ancient and the contemporary, becomes ahistorical 
phenomenon in itself and conforms to the ahistorical and essential conceptualization of 
the land and the people, as mentioned earlier. Israel in this sense represent the 
embodiment of “Jewish statehood and seen as essential or even sacred Jewish-nationalist 
mission” (Tilley 2005: 9). Thus nation-building in Israel, from the early stages, was 
coherent, well envisioned and followed a premeditated blueprint predicated on exclusion, 
territorial control, and the sanctity of Jewish ethno-nationalism; Israel was established 
and remained  an “ethnocratic” entity as Yfitachel depicts it.  
 
Israel as an “ethnocracy” 
 
Yiftachel (2005: 126) captures the essence of the state of Israel as a religious-
ethnic group rather than a nation-state. The concept ethnocracy  
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account[s] for regimes and societal processes found in contested territories in 
which a dominant ethnic nation appropriates the state apparatus to further its 
expansionist aspirations while keeping some features of formal democracy.  
The inherited oppression and exclusion directed to the subordinate group; the indigenous 
essentialize group identities and polarize territorial-spatial and political systems of 
differentiation that is antithetical to universal democracy. The state in this sense is 
perceived as the precondition for the Jewish people to survive and flourish, not as a 
political and institutional expression of inclusive nation-building. In an ethnocratic 
regime the state is the condition for the security of the Jewish people and its ability to 
collectively express the unique social, cultural, and spiritual qualities of Jewish 
experience. The loss of the state implies the loss and dissolution of Jewish national life 
and heritage; defending the state becomes the equivalent of defending the survival of the 
Jewish people that exceeds individual survival. “Statolatry” or the “worship of the state”, 
in a Gramscian sense (see Ishay 2011: 70-2) essentialized the state and gave it a supreme 
status over the civil society since it embodies the conflation of religious, ethnic-
nationalism, and territory. The unity of the Jewish nation on the Land of Israel ‘Eritz 
Israel’
70
 became bound to well-defined, even pre-defined territory and the state of the 
Jews.  
Being the state of the Jewish people Israel has had, and still has, to face the 
question of universal democracy and the incompatibility of Israel’s “ethnocracy” and the 
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 The term Ertez Israel denotes the term Greater Israel in Hebrew. English translation of Zionist 
documents and Israel’s discourse uses the term Israel, which gives an impression that the term refers to the 
state of Israel. This duplication of official Israeli narrative plays an important role in the deception and 
concealment of Zionist long term objectives of establishing Jewish sovereignty on the whole of the 
Mandate Palestine. Thus the official English name of the Jewish Agency is the Jewish Agency for the Land 
of Israel, whereas the Hebrew name refers to Israel as Eretz Israel; Greater Israel referring to the Biblical 
boundaries of ancient Israel.   
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democratic-civic state system. This question underlies the bitter debates inside Israel on 
the one-state solution. The democratic civil One-State implies, by definition, the 
dissolution of the Jewish character of the state and uplifting the prerogatives of inclusive 
and equal citizenship and the dismantling of ethno-national dominations system of Jewish 
supremacy. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948 Zionism could claim Israel has been 
a democratic state and simultaneously Jewish. In the words of Chaim Weizmann, the first 
President of the state of the state of Israel, Israel would “be as Jewish as America is 
America or England is English” (quoted in Davis, 2003: 19).  Ironically the expulsion of 
the Palestinian people and the absorption of hundreds of thousands of Jews in their place 
enabled Israel to establish a Jewish majority, which facilitated the claim of modern 
democracy.  Nonetheless, the claim has been accepted and embraced in Western 
democracies even though Israel’s is a democracy only for the Jews. 
Israel, according to its own laws is not a nation state in the regular sense of the 
term. Although technically all Israeli citizens (ezrahim in Hebrew) have equal rights such 
as the right to vote, those citizens do not comprise the nationals of Israel. Israel is not the 
state of all its citizens. Rather it is the state of the Jewish nation and non-Jews can be 
citizens of the state but not nationals which make them virtually residents not citizens. 
Therefore there is no such a thing in Israeli law as an ‘Israeli nationality. Juridical status 
in the state is given exclusively to the Jewish with a great set of civil rights and privileges 
attached to this status and not applicable to non-Jews.  
Thus Israel can easily make the claim that it nurtures a universal democratic 
regime while preserving unequal status for all other non-Jewish communities who have 
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Israeli citizenship. In effect this discrimination deprives these communities from a great 
array of privileges in building/construction and housing; public sector employment; 
cultural and educational services; municipal development and governmental subsidies; 
and above all property, in particular land possession rights. The state as ethnocratic 
regime serves the interests of the Jewish people as individuals and groups and Jewish 
national interests in general, not Israeli public interests. Differentiation and 
discrimination against non-Jews in this context has been structured within state system 
especially in determining the belonging of the spatial space and territorial considerations.  
The primary element of recognition in Israel’s state system is the Jewishness of 
the individual and the group. No matter how religious or observant or secular an Israeli 
Jew or a group of Jews are the Jewish nationalist sentiment prevails over other 
identifications. As Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook suggests  
The spirit of Israel is so closely linked to the spirit of God that the Jewish 
nationalist, no matter how secularist his intention may be, is, despite himself, 
imbued with the divine spirit even against his own will (quoted in Tilley 2005: 
56).  
Ethno-religious foundations of Zionism are embedded within the founding principles of 
Israel in ways that makes it anathema to modern liberal democracy. Chaim Weizmann’s 
above cited statement reflects Labor Zionist deceptive discourse and attempts to escape 
the reality that above this Jewish democracy (ethnocracy) and shadows it there exists an 
inclusive ethno-religious definition of the state and the nation where either Judaism could 
escape the logic of colonialism or colonial underpinnings of Israel could escape or do 
without religious precepts. Religion, territorial essentialism, and ethno-nationality are 
correspondent and inextricably linked in the state system of Israel. The separation of 
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religion and religious institutions (whether tangible or intangible) on the one hand and the 
state on the other that distinguished modern secular democracies is absent in Israel’s 
ethnocracy.  
 
The state and religion in Israel’s regime cannot be separated: while religious 
precepts and believes provide for the ancient history of the Jewish people that has been a 
core element in Zionist claims in Palestine and hence a source of legitimacy and 
justification, secularism and modern norms of nationalism provide for the continuity and 
contemporary underpinnings for a vibrant state system.  Last chapter has shown how 
Israeli-Jewish community and polity as the super-ordinate power have established their 
preponderance from the belief in the covenant and the scripture (the chosen people in 
their Promised Land) as the foundation of their set of values and practices. Religious 
beliefs have been positioned in the heart of a “conceptual grid” in which land, exodus, 
and blood sacrifice are the reflex points or the ultimate principles and great sensitivity. 
Touching any element of the grid “energizes the entire grid and calls forth an immediate, 
focused, sometimes violent response” (Akenson 1992: 31) for it threatens the collapse of 
the whole system. Therefore religion and religiosity in this context transcend the regular 
meanings and implications of state-religion relationships; both become conflated in a 
single stream of legitimacy and coherency that bound the whole structure of the entity.  
Lacking a modern history of the ‘Jewish people’ except for the Diaspora history, 
Zionist movement led by Ben Gurion before and after the establishment of the state 
adopted the ethnic-religious grid in order to establish the necessary territorial-national 
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nexus of the state. Ancient history of Israel provided by the Bible is indispensable for the 
coherency of Zionist claims and Israel’s policies to sustain. Without founding 
connections between religious, ancient history of the Israelites, and modern secular 
nationalist discourse justifying the settler-colonial adventure in Palestine and the creation 
of Israel on secular ground would have been precarious. Thus “Israelis were defined as 
the people who lived in the state of Israel, and the justification for claiming rights to this 
territory was primarily historical” (Weissbord 2011: 197). The old history is emphasized, 
and the Diaspora history is ignored. The former represents the period when the Jews lived 
independently in their land as a nation. In order to reveal these ancient religious history 
archaeological explorations has been emphasized by Ben Gurion and all his successors as 
a substitute for the recent history of the Jews. In Ben Gurion words recent history of the 
Jews matters “but in the state of Israel we aspire to some other Israeli wisdom” 
(Weissbord 2011: 197).     
Although self-defined as a “Jewish state” Israel is not quite a religious state; it 
doesn’t introduce the teachings of Judaism as the source of the basic laws of the state or 
social life. Jewish identity is not simply a religious affiliation but encompasses notions of 
lineage, culture, and nationhood (the ancient history of the Jewish people). As Cohen and 
Kliot (2011: 659) notice: “In Israel it is difficult to draw the boundary between the 
ancient and the modern, between purely religious expressions and the secular goals of 
modern nationalism”. Indeed Religiosity and secularism are bound together in the ethno-
religious basis of Jewish nationalism. Zionists seculars’ adoption of religious-based 
discourse and imperatives doesn’t stem necessarily from religious fervor. Rather it is 
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derived from the role Judaism (religion) played in shaping and materializing 
Zionist/Jewish national identity. Religion in this sense provides a decisive source of 
legitimacy and justification of the Zionist colonial enterprise.  
Religious beliefs and justifications were at the core of the ideology that founded 
the normative aspect of settler colonial nationalism of the Zionist project; a project whose 
main pioneering force was not the Orthodox Jews or even nationalist-religious groups; 
rather it was a secular nationalist force that was affected by European ideas of socialism, 
nationalism, enlightenment and colonialism.  Conflation of religion and nationalism 
remained effective and substantial in the formation and legal underpinnings of the state of 
Israel. Although Israel is self-defined as a secular democratic entity “religion has 
continued to play a significant role in [its] jurisprudence”… [and it] retained a peculiar 
mixture of civic and religious law” (Weissbord, 2011:195). Furthermore, the state and 
religion are not quite separated; Jewish religious institutions in Israel are legally 
recognized and financed by the state, there is no civil marriage and no civil burial of the 
dead for example. 
The intertwined system of recognition in state system that brings religion (the 
history of territorial legitimation) and Jewish nationalism (the modern continuity of 
ethno-territoriality) manifests the structure of politico-religious foundation of citizenship. 
This system defines who the Jew is, and therefore the rights and privileges pertaining to 
Jews only. There is wide range of privileges and rights that are given exclusively to the 
Jews which makes determining ‘who the Jew is’ a prime issue in Israel. The Law of 
Return of 1952 defines the Jew as a person “who was born of a Jewish mother or has 
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become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion”. Waves of 
Jewish immigration had included numbers of people whose Jewish affiliation and lineage 
was problematic, which stirred fierce debates within the state and Jewish community on 
the issue. In order to accommodate more Jewish into the state, Israel enacted the 
Amendment 5714 granted the right of return to the Jews who do not meet the criteria 
mentioned in the Law of Return but the Amendment did not recognize those as Jewish in 
terms of their ethno-national affiliation. They can gain the status of citizens but not 
nationals and the ministry of Interior doesn’t register them as Jews. They, according to 
the law, can’t marry from Jewish persons, and can’t be buried in Jewish graveyards.  
The debates and laws on the issue of Jewishness indicate the extent to which 
Israel and Zionism are obsessed with ethno-religious purity. It might be said without 
losing track that this obsession explains why Zionists have not attempted any missionary 
efforts to convert non-Jews to Judaism. In a deeper level it indicates that Israel is more of 
a Jewish tribe with traits of ethno-religious chauvinism. Corresponding secularist 
nationalism and religious ethnicity in Israel might be explained as an act of political 
expediency; the need for coalitions to make any government viable since no single party 
could achieve majority in the parliament compelled big parties to give concessions to 
religious and nationalist-religious groups. The demands of those groups and their political 
parties were by and large in the realm of religious affairs not in economy or foreign 
policy issues.  
This is true as an explanation of coalition policies but not sufficient to explain the 
intensified and constant use of religious discourse, religious definition of Jewish ethnicity, 
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and emphasizing Israel as a Jewish state. As mentioned earlier the basic law of Israel 
denies nationality to non-Jews, and therefore preserves the religious base for citizenship. 
Disputes on issues of citizenship are settled by religious courts that possess the sole legal 
right to determine who is a Jew and who is not and henceforth who may and who may not 
enjoy the bill of rights that is attached exclusively to Jewish. In this sense Israel’s 
political system and its internal dynamics not only created the correspondence between 
religion and ethnic-nationality and the state but also buttressed the power that religious 
precepts and their political manifestations gained in Israel.  
The conflation of religion and the state, and the rise of religiously-driven political 
parties in Israel since the mid-1970s can be also plausibly explained by the socio-
economic changes in Israeli society and their political repercussions on the one hand, and 
the changes in the nature of the conflict on the other. Both resulted from the very 
structures of Israel’s domination and justification system. Explaining the rise of 
fundamentalism in the Palestinian-Israeli context Ishay (2011: 70) draws upon Antonio 
Gramsci’s analysis of the relationship between capitalism, fragmented civil societies, and 
the rise of fascism; a phenomenon that Gramsci called “statolatry” or the worship of the 
state. It is striking that religious and national religious parties in Israel have been in the 
rise since the victory of the Likud Party in 1977 that, among other consequences led to 
the emergence of the fundamentalist settler movement “Gush Emunim”. This trend that 
has been consistent in the 1980-90s and had witnessed a dramatic increase in the 
elections of 2006 and 2009 whereby right-wing extremist parties (Shas, the National 
Union, United Torah, and Yisrael Beiteinu) gained significant victories.  
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Ishay (2011) argues that globalization and the shift of Israel’s economy from a state-led 
to privatization system has exacerbated tensions within the Israeli society and between 
Israelis and Palestinians, and “forged the conditions underlying increasing religious and 
nationalist radicalism” that undercut peace efforts. Social repercussions of liberalization 
of the economy in 1970-80s especially the concentration of wealth and social disparities, 
recession, and the fragmentation of the civil society, coupled with the intensification of 
the conflict created a political and ideological void. Religious parties moved to fill this 
void and provide for an alternative policy and socio-political affiliation. Within a 
factionalized polity and a fragmented civil society, and the absence of a “Caesarits” 
solution - an entity or a charisma that can reign over conflicting political forces- dark 
anti-democratic forces will prevail.       
This analysis of religious and secular fundamentalism in Israel provides a very 
useful tool to look beneath Israel’s society’s rift to the extreme right. This rift has led to 
the ascendance of the most extreme political forces in the history of Israel’s political 
system. Whether Israeli domestic political shifts or the rise of radical national-Islamic 
movements in Palestinian are best captured by accounting to the effects of asymmetrical 
power relations, and the domination system Israel established and to a large extent 
determines the dynamics of political processes in both societies.  The fascist-like feature, 
into which Israel’s politics are drifted, however, cannot be fully understood apart from 
the conflict. As Ishay (2011: 72) remarks,  the effects of “conflict over the occupation of 
Palestinian land after 1976 is central to any account for rising religious and secular 
extremism on both sides” . 
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Israel’s policies contributed significantly to the rise of a fascist-like politics in 
Israeli polity and the rise of religious extremism within the Palestinian national 
movement. This can be captured by revealing Israel’s expansionist policy and its legal, 
ideological, and political justifications that we now turn to discuss. It also sprung from 
Israel’s systems and methods of domination practiced against the Palestinian people 
within the whole region of the Mandatory Palestine as we present in the next chapter. For 
now we turn to present the two phases of Israel’s territorial expansion and their 
underpinnings in order to show how the properties of the state in Israel, abovementioned 
led to its colonial practices and the rise of a unique form of apartheid as a state system 
before the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 1967. The 
following section shows how this apartheid system had been structured and consolidated 




The state of Israel took all measures and enacted laws that would make changing 
the ‘nature’ of Jewish colonization and domination impossible. In this phase, territorial 
and spatial expansionism had been established as a strategy that has been initiated the 
next day after the founding of the state of Israel and has been developed through 1980s 
when the Palestinian first Intifada irrupted. The focus here is on the consolidating of 
Israel’s state system as a distinct form of covert apartheid. The overlap between this 
phase and the one that followed 1976 in the OPT uncovers the continuity of state policy 
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of territorial expansion and ethnic-national discrimination and domination. The ability of 
Israel’s system to adapt to events and changes in its environment without losing its main 
features is the most striking.  
As discussed above, Zionism’s supreme goal in Palestine was the  
establishment and consolidation, through the Jewish colonization of the 
country of Palestine, of a sovereign state, a Jewish state, that attempts to 
guarantee in law and in practice a demographic majority of the Jewish tribes in 
the territories under its control” (Davis 2003: 19).  
This prime objective was tailored in a more principled and policy-bound agenda 
that was set by the Zionist Congress of 1951. The Congress adopted the “Jerusalem 
Program” to replace the “Basle Program”. “Jerusalem Program” of 1951 stated that: the 
task of Zionism is to consolidate the state of Israel and to ingather the exiles, and the 
unity of the Jewish people. In order to achieve these ends the movement has to: 
encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine and integrate them in agricultural settlements. 
Land acquisition as the property of the people (Jewish people) is a crucial part of the 
program. Land acquisition and control by the pioneers (Halutzim) is pivotal. The program 
goes further to assert the “fostering of Jewish consciousness by propagating Zionist idea 
and strengthening Zionist movement” (Tilley 2005: 170).  
As such territory acquisition and control, unity of the Jewish community apart 
from the indigenous population, and exclusion were the imperatives of the state of Israel 
since to it the implementation of the program was assigned. Israel exclusivity in terms of 
the defining elements of its identity is upheld by a cluster of laws that define Israel as 
such. The newly founded state had committed its first expansionist steps in the same year 
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of its creation: the takeover of another 22 per cent of the land of the Mandated Palestine. 
Moreover, within an overnight the Palestinian population in these areas was reduced from 
50 per cent to 20 per cent of the population of the newly established state within its 
borders as defined by Resolution 181 (II).  
The expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians by means of force was coupled and 
followed by two policies: First, Israel in defiance to UN resolution 194 (III) of 1948
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denied Palestinian refugees their right to return to their homes and property. In order to 
assure that the expulsion of these refugees is permanent, Israel demolished entire 
Palestinian villages; the number of which differs but approximated between 400-500 
villages in the most conservative estimates. Second: in its effort to legalize expulsion and 
territorial control over the property of the refugees and the ‘internally displaced’ 
Palestinians, Israeli government enacted the “Absentees Property Law” of 1950. 
According to the law all Palestinians outside of the green line (the 1949 armistice line) 
were denied their property rights as ‘absentees’ who were not present on their property at 
the time of first Israeli census. They were also alienated from Israel’s legal system by 
denying the citizenship. The law enabled Israel to out hand on 70 per cent of the territory 
west of the armistice line; all of which was the property of ‘absentees’ (Fisk, cited in 
Davis 2003: 33).  Achieving a unified Jewish majority on the maximum territorial area 
had been thus guaranteed by means of expulsion or transfer in Zionist discourse (Masalha 
                                                          
71
 United Nation General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) states that “the refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date, and 
that compensation should be for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage of 
property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the 
Governments or authorities responsible” http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r3.htm.  
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1992: 199). The expulsion of Palestinians, in today’s term ethnic cleansing, would not 
have been a successful without Zionist forces’ terror and massacres against Palestinians 
in 1947-8; Deir Yasin, Tantura, and Al-Dawayma being the most shocking and best 
documented
72
. Cleansing the indigenous population and taking over their property, 
especially territories, was seen as a pre-condition for the achievement of Zionist goals. As 
Israel Eldad (a former military leader of the LEHI; Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) 
revealed in 1967 that “Had it not been Deir Yasin- a half million Arabs would be living 
in the state of Israel [in 1948]. The state of Israel would not have existed…this country 
will either be Eretz Israel with an absolute Jewish majority and a small Arab minority or 
Eretz Ishmael, and Jewish emigration will begin again if we do not expel the Arabs one 
way or another (Quoted in Davis 2003: 23).  
Thus, by the end of 1948 Israel had guaranteed a Jewish majority within its 
expanded territorial boundaries; the grounds were well prepared for the consolidation of 
Jewish sovereignty and domination. In doing so, Israel was crowning the efforts of 
Zionist organizations (World Zionist Organization WZO, the Jewish National Fund JNF, 
and the Jewish Agency for the Land of Israel JA) that set the institutional bedrock of the 
state in 50 years of Jewish settlement in Palestine. The consolidation of Israel and Zionist 
                                                          
72
 The three massacres took place between April and November 1948. Witnesses from the Israeli armed 
formations Zionist National Military Organization (Irgun Tzvai Leumi; IZL or Irgun in Hebrew, and 
Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Lohamii Herut Israel; LEHI in Hebrew) who attacked the village of Deir 
Yasin, and the International Organization of the Red Cross Delegate in the area leave no space for doubt 
that the massacre in which nearly 250 (out of 750 the total population ) Palestinian were slaughtered 
including children and women was planned and cold-bloodedly carried out. For the documentation of the 
Tantura massacre, Theodor Katz; an Israeli scholar revealed in his research for the M.A degree at Haifa 
University the events in Tantura. He describes the killing as an orchestrated slain of more than 200 
Palestinians. AL-Dawayma massacre was revealed in the Official Hebrew daily of the Histadrut (General 
Federation of Workers) ((see Davis 2003: 21-5). Although the number of such atrocities and their detailed 
documentation vary it is evident that an act of ethnic cleansing took place. 
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idea (as put forth by “Jerusalem Program” found their materialization in early laws Israel 
enacted:  the Law of Return of 1950 that grants any Jew the right to Jewish immigrants to 
Israel. Upon arrival Jews immigrants under this Law are granted citizenship according to 
the Citizenship Law of 1952. The Population Registry Law of 1965 provides those new 
citizens the status of ‘Jewish nationality’, not Israeli nationality henceforth depriving the 
non-Jews remaining within the Jewish state from a wide range of privileges and rights 
that Jewish exclusively enjoy
73
.  
Laws enacted before the establishment of the state of Israel also were sustained 
and further entrenched the linkages between ‘Jewish nationality’ and territorial 
boundaries as Jewish homeland. As a matter of fact Zionist organizations that were 
‘voluntary’ before 1948 have become incorporated in Israel’s state system; state laws and 
these organizations’ objectives became legal, compulsory and judicial. The World Zionist 
Organization-Jewish Agency Law of 1952 authorizes Jewish Agency to administer most 
of the state’s land, property, and other resources. According to the law the WZO and the 
Jewish Agency for Israel (JA) are recognized as a sort of supra-state bodies primarily to 
carry all practices and mobilize necessary resources for the purpose of “ingathering the 
Jewish people in its historic homeland, Eretz Israel. In effect, all Zionist institutions in 
close coordination with state agencies and institutions were fundamentally instrumental 
in obscuring the nature of Israel as a colonial system involved in formal apartheid. The 
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 In addition to these laws Israel enacted the establishment of the Keren Kayemeth (Jewish National Fund) 
Law of 1953. The Keren Kayemeth had been the main institution that executes land acquisition, water 
extraction, and other land-connected development projects; none of which for the benefit of non-Jews 
whether in Israel or in the OPT. Keren Kayemeth and other institutions relied on complementary laws 
pertaining to land and agriculture; all of which consolidated Jews-only possession and development: the 
Basic Law of 1960, and Israel Lands Law of the same year and the Agricultural Settlement Law of 1967.   
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fact that Palestinian citizens of the state of Israel have certain political and civil rights: to 
vote in local and general elections, to be elected and serve as members of the Israeli 
parliament, and they have an equal standing before Israeli courts, doesn’t nullify the fact 
that differentiation and discrimination is a state policy.  
The rights abovementioned have been used to manipulate and misrepresent reality; 
Palestinians are deprived of all rights pertaining to inherit property; to access material 
resources of the state (particularly land and water), and to access social welfare system of 
the state, to have equal or equitable allocation of resources for educational and local 
authorities, and to gain equal access to public sector employment. Clearly, these state 
policies fit in UN definition of apartheid abovementioned. They also represent policies of 
racial discrimination; racial discrimination in this sense refers to the UN definition that is 
incorporated in UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
2016 (XX) of 1965
74
. The Convention states that  
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or 
any other field of public life.  
In this sense Israel has three classes of citizenship: class A for those classified as “Jews” 
who are allocated access to all state resources; class B for citizens designated as non-Jews 
(Arabs) who are denied access to significant state resources. There exists class B of 
Palestinians classified until today as ‘absentees’ (25 per cent of the Palestinian citizens of 
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Israel) who live inside Israel and yet unrecognized as citizens and denied all their right 
(except voting) although they are taxpayers.   
Conclusion 
UN Resolution 2016 of 1965 clearly defines apartheid as a generic concept that 
refers to any a policy framework that is based on racial and/or ethnic exclusivity and 
differentiation.  Differentiation and discrimination regardless of the basis upon which 
they are  justified is an act of racism and apartheid. The United Nations Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (or the Apartheid Convention) 
although was established to deal with the South African apartheid is applied generically 
regardless of country specific context (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2011: 337). Therefore 
apartheid is a state system of domination and discrimination where racism is being 
regulated and formalized in laws and legislations.  
Although the one may find forms of racism and discrimination in democracies all 
over the world, the victims of these forms are protected by the constitutions and laws of 
these democracies. This is not the case with Israel’s apartheid since it was established. 
Israel admitted the UN on the basis of a clear commitment to the obligations of the UN 
Charter. However, Israel violated systematically and consistently the Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to which Israel is a signatory state. The 
laws and regulations abovementioned that Israel enacted are antithetical to these 
commitments. In fact the admission of Israel in the UN was premised upon it to be 
international law-abiding state; the failure to show obedience to international law would 
have seriously put the recognition of Israel in jeopardy (Mazzawi 1997: 129). The 
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Partition Resolution of the UN of 1947 is still valid and has not been undone by the UN 
General Assembly. The first and most obdurate violation, without which Jews would not 
have become a majority in Israel, is the massive ethnic cleansing of the indigenous 
Palestinians in 1947-8.  
The discriminatory foundation of Israel’s national-territorial nexus is founded in 
the religious ethno-territoriality of Zionism and the exclusivist foundation of Israeli 
‘regimes of territorial legitimation”.  These are articulated and manifested in the juridical 
system that discriminates against “non-Jews” as a category. This category is denied 
access to state resources especially the land, and another set of rights and privileges that 
Jews enjoy. It is for these formal, state-based properties of Israel - in addition to Israel’s 
occupation of and policies in the OPT, that the UN General Assembly issued the 
resolution 3379 (XXX) of 1975 that equates Zionism with racism, apartheid, colonialism 
and neo-colonialism. Although the resolution was nullified in 1991 its efficacy as 
pertained to the nature of Israel’s apartheid is still valid if we notice that the nullification 
was part of a political process not a legal scrutiny of actual Israeli policies.  
Israel’s strong affiliation to ethno-territorial identification represents the bedrock 
of its domination and differentiation system that is aimed at depriving non-Jews from 
property rights of the land. Thus, the state in Israel controls 93% of the land within the 
Israeli proper that is designated for cultivation, development, and settlement by, of and 
for, Jews only. The peculiarity of Israel’s apartheid is that in the realm of territorial 
legitimation and state legislation (the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) it is more 
radical than apartheid legislation in the Republic of South Africa. This peculiarity refers 
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to Zionist territorial ideological underpinnings that embody the constitution of the state of 
Israel and aim at advancing the interests of the Jewish community.  
The fact that a significant array of apartheid policies is being implemented by 
Zionist institutions has enabled Israel to conceal apartheid implications of its system of 
differentiation. As strategic colonial-settlement expansion, land acquisition and 
development were vested and hidden in Zionist Organization laws that are committed to 
their own discriminatory constitutions, the state per se distanced itself from the 
accusation of apartheid by not incorporating any terms of “Jewish only” or distinctions 
between Jews and non-Jews in Israel’s laws.    However, these Zionist institutions act in 
the capacity of state-affiliated entities and they represent a third party that has state 
mandate and jurisdiction to act on its behalf. Moreover, racist aspects of Israel’s 
apartheid are overt and structured in the body of laws, regulations and legislation of the 
state, as shown above. This body of laws and legislation stems primarily from Zionist 
colonial tenets derived from politico-religious precepts especially in regard to the land. 
This was clearly stated by Zerah Wahrhaftig (Minister of Religious Affairs and Chairman 
of the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament Constitution, Law and Justice Committee) as he 
presented the Basic Law to the Knesset in 1961:  
…to give legal grab to a principle that is fundamentally religious, namely ‘the 
land shall not be sold forever, for the land is mine’…the law gives legal grab to 
this rule and principle in our Torah…the holiness of the Land of Israel belongs 
to me” (cited in Davis 2003: 24).    
Territory in particular not only essentialized and extraterritorialized as an object 
of religious belief, but also as a subject of identification and discrimination. Israel’s 
sovereignty over the land as a Jewish sovereignty has been uplifted by the legal mode of 
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thinking and behavior assigned to apartheid and colonization. Amongst which the most 
prominent were the laws and regulations of land possession and acquisition. Politico-
religious nature of Israel’s legal structure reflects the dualism of sacred-profane stance 
that pervades every detail of life. Israeli military rule of the OPT took a very similar 
course in which legalism of occupation and land control constituted its own legitimacy. 
The next chapter examines the properties of Israel’s national-territorial nexus beyond the 





















Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 1967 can 
be assessed as a new phase of the regimes of territorial legitimation” of Zionism and the 
state of Israel. Zionist-Jewish colonization of the OPT took a strikingly similar pattern of 
early Zionist settlement colonialism in Palestine: implanting Jewish settlers on the 
Palestinians’ land and simultaneously separating the newcomers from the indigenes 
population that has been alienated from the land. Dispossession and exclusion of 
Palestinians were sustained as the main two pillars of Israel’s colonialism.  
In post 1967 Israel’s occupation has renewed the ethno-national threat of Zionism 
to Palestinian national aspirations and identity and buttressed the territorial-spatial aspect 
of the conflict. The memories of 1948 and current day repercussions of Israel’s 
occupation have deepened the animosity between the two parties as ethno-national 
groups. Moreover, military occupation accompanied with settler-colonial control of the 
land reintroduced Israel as a colonial territorial power; territory and space prevail in a 
more profound level that reinforced segregation and fixated distinctions between 
possessor and dispossessed, colonizer and colonized, and occupier and the occupied.  
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The chapter is organized to capture the expansion and consolidation of Israel’s 
ethno-territorial “regimes of legitimation” through the OPT to encompass the entirety of 
Palestine. The second section examines the main features of Israel’s settler-colonialism in 
the OPT as a grid that is aimed at controlling the Palestinian territory and space. The 
following part of the chapter discusses the transformation of Israel’s national-territorial 
nexus to encompass the Palestinian occupied territories and the last section illustrates 
Israel’s domination system in the region that is derived from the imperatives of the 
“regimes of territorial legitimation”. Ultimately this chapter shows how Israel’s 
occupation of the OPT has established the structures (territorial, legal, political) of a 
tripartite dualism of domination and subordination:  
-A dualism of domination on both sides of the green line. While Israel subordinates its 
Palestinian citizens through racial discrimination in a form of apartheid, as discussed in 
the previous chapter it implements grand apartheid in the OPT. Disregarding Palestinians 
in Israel as an ethno-national minority, and oppressing Palestinians in the OPT and 
depriving them from their land and rights;  
-the differentiation Israel established between Israeli Jewish settlers in the OPT and the 
Palestinian population. At this level Israel has created a system of segregation that 
extends Jewish privileges and stretches Israel’s national territoriality; and  
-Israel has founded dual systems of coercion and separation within the Palestinian society 
in the OPT. This layer separates Palestinians from each other in the OPT turning the WB 
into Bantustans and enclaved areas.   
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Expanding the “Regimes of territorial legitimation” 
 
Israel’s occupation of the OPT in 1967 provided Zionism with a unique 
opportunity to turn the extraterritorial value of the Land of Palestine as a whole into a 
political, institutional, and demographic reality. In 1968 Zionist movement reasserted its 
original objective of establishing Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel, Eretz Israel 
and gave it a new ideological and political impulse. Territoriality is now being 
intertwined with notions of unity, survival, and Jewish sovereignty over the Land of 
Israel. Jewish sovereignty in this sense refers to the processes through which Zionist 
organizations and state institutions systematically Judize the geographical and spatial 
domains of Palestinian territories. The “Jerusalem Program” articulated by the Twenty-
Seventh World Zionist Congress in 1968 stressed the new credo: survival-as-nationality 
although Israel gained military and strategic advantages vis-à-vis its Palestinian and Arab 
adversaries. The credo not only re-assured the correspondence of Jewish nationhood and 
territorial ethno-religious ideology but also reconstructed the connections between the 
sustainability of the Jewish people and its survival on the one hand, and the control over 
the newly occupied territories on the other. Thus the “Jerusalem Program” stressed 
Jewish people unity “beyond geographical and cultural barriers”; and that the “survival of 
the Jewish people is a supreme and absolute Jewish and universal value”. It further 
asserted “the unity of the Jewish people and the centrality of Israel in Jewish Life; the 
ingathering of the Jewish people in its historic homeland, Eretz Israel” (Tilley 2005: 170).   
Israel’s and Jewish people’s survival and unity have been organically linked to the OPT 
as the heart of Eretz Israel and essentially linked to the existence and sovereignty of the 
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state of Israel. In effect Israel would start to practice its sovereign powers and domination 
over all the Mandatory Palestine not as a belligerent occupation force but as a Jewish 
Sovereign. Short from imposing formal sovereignty on the OPT Israel practices the legal, 
judicial, and institutional powers of a de facto sovereign.  
Founding Jewish sovereignty by land control and spatial expansion has changed 
the demographic, topographic, physical, and legal status of the OPT. Most importantly it 
draws a new deeply entrenched level of ethno-national differentiation that would cut off 
any possibility of integration or accommodation. Thus, apart from annexing the OPT 
Israel’s territorial and spatial practices fixated the conflict on its ethno-national 
foundation. Israel aimed at implementing a two-fold process: controlling the widest 
geographical terrain on the one hand, and circumscribing Palestinian spatial sphere in the 
minimal territorial periphery on the other.  Formal annexation of the OPT or 
accommodation would have altered the demographic balance in favor of the Palestinians 
in the entirety of Palestine. It also would consolidate Palestinian collective sense of 
nationhood and would give rise to their demand for a majority rule and henceforth change 
the very character of the state of Israel as the state of the Jews. Changing the foundation 
of Israel as a Jewish entity is perceived by many Zionist as a dread and dark, and may 
result in Jewish suffering if not expulsion (Tilley 2005: 10). The least evil for Zionism if 
Israel annexed the OPT is the emergence of a bi-national or bi-ethnic state where Jewish 
maintain and sustain domination over the Palestinians by means of discriminatory laws 
and measures. However, overt discrimination would expose Israel as a racial state; a case 
that is very hard to defend morally. Therefore, for many Zionists if a choice has to be 
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made it would be a two-state solution that would maintain Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic having not to include Palestinians within Israeli territory. However, the very 
policies Zionist organizations and Israel implemented in the OPT have made the two-
state solution less likely if not impossible. 
For many hard-core Zionist leaders (those dedicated to the concept of Greater 
Israel) the question of Jewish nationhood and Jewish sovereignty cannot be sustained 
within the west part of ‘Eritz Israel’ (referring to the Mandate Palestine whereas the East 
part is Jordan. See map 3) apart from taking permanent control over the territory with the 
less possible Palestinian population living in them. For example, Joseph Weitz; one of the 
leading architects of Israel’s settlement grid in the OPT, and Deputy Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the JNF from 1951-1973 contends that  
…colonizing the liberated territories” [West Bank, Gaza Strip and East 
Jerusalem] must necessarily answer three problems that Israel face following 
the 1967 war. These problems or challenges are: regional security, 
demographic security, and the settlement of the refugees [Palestinian 
refugees].  
 
Weitz’s solution for the demographic and refugee issues is the deportation or transfer of 
Palestinians; “it is easier to carry our [Israel’s] surveillance over the activities of a 
neighbor than over those of a tenant”, he asserts. This is true; he goes on, also for  
the need to sustain the character of the state which henceforth be Jewish, and 
obviously in the near future, by the majority of its inhabitants, with a non-
Jewish minority limited to 15 per cent…there is no place in the country for 
both peoples together. The only solution is Eretz Israel, at least the west part 
of Eretz Israel, without Arabs…and there is no other way but to transfer the 
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Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, transfer all of them, not one 
village or tribe should remain (Italics in origin, quoted in Davis 2003: 20). 
Transfer, although has not been dismissed altogether by Israeli governments 
especially the Labor Party, did not prevail as the official policy of the state of Israel. 
Instead a middle ground policy had been enacted. The “Jerusalem Program” 
(abovementioned) set the principal foundation for the policies in the OPT. It firmly states 
that  
This nation [the Jewish] is worthy and obligated to exist forever…the 
recognition that the Jewish people must achieve national sovereignty in its 
historic homeland” implies that it is the duty of every Zionist to “strengthen the 
state of Israel through personal aliyah [immigration] to Israel”;  
and the recognition of the centrality of the state of Israel in the life of the “Jewish people” 
as the only living expression of Zionist values and the “focus of worldwide Jewish 
identification” (Cited in Tilley 2005: 170). 
Extending the main tenets of colonial Zionist principles to the OPT is to be 
achieved by means of land Judization and the Israelization of the OPT as part and parcel 
of the historical definition of the state. Judization of the territory of 1967, the heartland of 
the Bible would materialize the long-awaited opportunity to manifest the primordial 
spiritual and cultural ties to the entirety of the Promised-Land. Consolidating Jewish 
control over the OPT has been seen as an actualization of the Jewish ethno-national 
identity through re-establishing Jewish lineage that goes back to Abraham within the 
entirety of Palestine. Orchestrated efforts to Judaize Palestine, with an intense focus on 
the OPT represents a phase of colonial expansionism that consists of two interrelated 
strategies: the continuation and assertion of Jewish-only immigration to Palestine, and the 
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establishment of Israeli Jewish-only settlements on Palestinian land acquired by massive 
land confiscation and expropriation. 
The new strategy of Judizing the OPT went uninterrupted in any significant way 
to an extent where the “green line” (the 1948 armistice line) was de facto abolished and 
the Zionist strategy to establish Jewish sovereignty over the whole region of Palestine has 
made significant success in terms of settlement construction
75
. Blurring the distinctions 
between the OPT and Israel’s proper allowed the Palestinians within the whole Palestine 
to sustain their ties and connections as and to cement their collective consciousness as an 
ethno-national people subordinated by a colonial power. In addition to the concomitant 
economic depletion of the Palestinian economy and the exploitation of the Palestinian 
work-force from the OPT in the Israeli market (Hebrew employment has been outdated 
as the state now guarantees subordination by other means rather than Jewish-only labor), 
Israel’s territorial expansion and its oppression culminated in the first Palestinian intifada 
(uprising of 1987).  
The intifada represented the apex of Palestinian nationalism within the OPT and 
Israel.  In this sense it sent a powerful alarm to Israeli authorities on the decline of the 
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 Since 1967, Israel has built 120 settlements in the West Bank, and 12 settlements in East Jerusalem. The 
Interior Ministry calls them “communities,” though some settlements’ land boundaries are not contiguous. 
In addition to the settlements, Israelis have built 100 so-called “outposts” that don’t have the status of 
settlements in the Interior Ministry’s eyes but do enjoy the same protection from the Israeli military, the 
same funding from Israeli nationals and the same special treatment from Israeli authorities, such as roads, 
utilities and schools for the exclusive use of settlers. The Jewish rate of population growth in the 
settlements, at 5.8%, is far higher than in Israel proper (1.8%), leading to a rapid rise in settler the 
population. In 2009, some 300,000 Israelis lived in the West Bank, not including East Jerusalem. At the 
end of 2006, the total Jewish population of the settlements in the West Bank, according to Israel’s Central 





sense of normalcy Israeli authorities sought to found and consolidate in the OPT.  Most 
importantly, the intifada redrew the ‘green line’ as the political geography of the conflict, 
which rendered questionable the sustainability of the settlement enterprise in the OPT and 
the durability of open-borders policy. In the early 1990s (the last two years of the intifada) 
Israel started to change strategy towards segregation and more coercion to circumscribe 
the rise of Palestinian nationality and consolidate settlement grid in the OPT. With the 
initiation of the peace process and the changes in the regional and international 
environments following the Gulf-War of 1990, Israel faced another element of pressure 
on its colonial practices in the occupied territories. Israel’s territorially-oriented strategy 
is now facing the challenge of time to accelerate its expansionist policies while the peace 
process has been on track and the Palestinian state is in the wait. Initially, the new phase 
has started in a territorial massive offensive combined with extreme harsh oppression that 
aimed at the consolidation of “major territorial and political gains. These included 
aggressive policies such as a wave of new “outpost” settlement, accelerated expansion of 
existing settlements, increased “anti-terror” offensives, and the separation wall” 
(Yiftachel 2005: 126) and at the same time show the willingness to relinquish minor parts 
of the land. 
Under certain circumstances such as those prevailed in Palestine in early 1990s 
ethnic-territorial regimes may take limited contraction steps in response to particular 
internal and external pressures but that can only be understood within the context in 
which it took place. Thus Israeli redeployment in the OPT in 2005 (handing control over 
major Palestinian cities to the PA) although a precedence in partial disengagement from 
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parts of the ‘Land Of Israel’ was not a step towards decolonization. The redeployment of 
2005 was accompanied with massive settlement expansion and land confiscation and 
expropriation. Actually it allowed Israel to implement the twofold strategy 
abovementioned: more land with less Palestinians under the cover of the peace process.  
This marginal contraction eased Israel’s burden to manage its occupation by sparing 
itself the management of Palestinian population who became confined in fractured 
Bantustans nominally controlled and served by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Following 
the construction of the separation wall a new Israeli consensus has ensued; Israeli will 
take over all regions of the OPT west of the wall until the peace talks with the PLO take 
off again. This entails, from Israel’s perspective Palestinian fulfillment of a series of 
commitments and obligations especially in security issues. The last few years can be 
marked as a period of conflict management for Israel rather than conflict resolution as 
Sussman (2005) notices.  
 
Reconstituting Zionist settler-colonial expansionism 
 
This section aims at capturing the essence of Israel’s occupation of the OPT as a 
colonial project that seeks the annexation of significant parts of these territories apart 
from its population. Thus, it does not seek to present detailed informative data on Israeli 
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Jewish settlements after 1967
76
. Rather we seek to uncover the driving force, patterns, 
main goals, and consequences of the settlement grid in the OPT.  
Israel’s occupation of 1967 represents another dramatic transformation of the 
territorial aspect of the conflict; it changed profoundly the political-geography of the 
conflict and with it actors’ strategies. The conflict is now focused on a narrower 
definition of ethno-national territorial boundaries instead of a struggle on democratic 
liberation. In this sense Israel’s occupation of the OPT resurrected and buttressed the 
ethno-national segregationist character of the conflict that it created in 1948. Israel’s 
presence in the OPT and particularly its settler colonization of the West Bank, Gaza Strip 
and East Jerusalem have extended Jewish ethnocratic rule to the whole area of Mandated 
Palestine. Jewish settlement enterprise is  
now placed in the midst of Palestinian population centers. Ancient Jewish time 
was thrusted again into contemporary political moves, by settling at biblical 
sites, thereby shaping anew the nature of Zionist and Palestinian geographies 
and identities” (Yiftachel 2010: 231).  
                                                          
76 There are currently 121 Israeli colonies, often referred to as "settlements" inhabited by a population of 
some 462,000 Israeli settlers. 191,000 Israelis are living in settlements around Jerusalem and a further 
271,400 are further spread throughout the West Bank. The settler population has grown consistently 
between 4-6% per year over the last two decades, a much higher rate of growth than Israeli society as a 
whole (1.5%). http://www.palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.php?article7 . It is not in the scope of this 
research to present any accounts for the types of Israeli Jewish settlements in the OPT. However, it is 
worthy to notice that different types reflected the preferences of certain settlers’ demands and government 
support. Particular political parties in the government supported different types of settlement and the same 
party or settler political movement may sponsor more than one type. Types of settlements are: Kibbutzim 
(communal villages); Moshavim (cooperative villages); collective Moshavim (a combination of Kibutz and 
Moshav); Moshavot (private landholder villages); and Yishuvim Kehilatyim (community settlements). The 
last category was especially supported by the Likud party and the nationalist religious parties, and it turned 




The occupation has deepened the ethno-national underpinnings of the conflict and 
exacerbated the exclusivist natures of Israel’s domination. Thrusting ancient time in 
contemporary political struggle required the construction of Jewish material existence in 
the newly controlled territories; without which Israel’s control of them would have 
remained precarious and subject to the dynamics of the decline of traditional military 
occupations and foreign domination. Virtually, Israel’s military domination and Jewish-
settler colonization of the OPT as a single system is best captured as a form of state grand 
apartheid.  
Israeli Jewish settlements in the OPT coupled with other Israeli draconian measures 
are antithetical to Palestinian viability as a socially and politically integrated entity, a 
viable economic structure, a territorially and geographically contagious space, and 
ultimately hinders the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state on the OPT. As such it 
embodies and galvanizes the strategies and goals set by the “Jerusalem Program” and 
state policy that is derived from these goals. Israel presence in the OPT has been 
sustained through policies of petty apartheid.  
As Akenson (1992: 209) defines petty apartheid as the negative or administrative 
practices through which Israel exerted its power on the level of Palestinians as 
individuals and as a group of population (disciplinary and bi-power) and it consists of all 
rules, laws, procedures that regulate social, political and economic life of two ethno-
national groups segregated in a dual system of domination. Although total exclusion that 
characterized Zionism in per 1967 phase has been slightly changed to encompass the 
element of exploitation of the Palestinian workers from the OPT, those workers were not 
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integrated in the Israeli economic system since they were fully immigrant labor (they 
commute on a daily basis to their working places and back to their homes in the OPT). 
Under these circumstances Palestinian workers couldn’t establish any basis for exerting 
any significant political leverage on Israel’s politics, as Younis (2005) eloquently 
illustrates. This quasi-inclusion resulted in a complex alienation of a significant segment 
of the Palestinian society; the workers. Workers have become not only deprived of 
political voice as part of the subordinate group, they were also deprived from their rights 
in the marketplace as an unrecognized immigrant workforce.  
Petty apartheid in this context enabled Israel from handling a cost-effective 
occupation and to render the population amenable to its rules. In congruent with petty 
apartheid Israel has established a system of grand apartheid; territorial arrangement of 
segregation and social gerrymandering that targets the subordinate group with restrictions 
and prohibitions pertaining to the land and other aspects of national identity expressions 
and aspirations.  
Colonial Settlement as a state policy 
The Zionist assertion that ‘the land’ of Palestine belongs to the Jews only has 
established “an exclusive ethno-national culture [that was] coded, institutionalized, and 
militarized by the new state [Israel] in order to quickly ‘idegenise’ immigrant Jews, and 
conceal, trivialize, or marginalize the land’s Palestinian past” (Yiftachel 2010: 228). 
Alienating the Palestinian from the land by colonizing it has been carried with religious 
ethno-national zeal that aimed at the negation of the Palestinians and replacing them with 
new pioneer Jews. Settler-colonization of Palestine, now in the OPT, glorifies the frontier 
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Jew; a ‘new Jew’, a settler fighter who negates the other Palestinian and the other 
Diaspora Jew. Jewish settlement in Palestine is a prominent Zionist ethos through which 
a new Zionist Jew is created; without “knowing, walking, settling, loving and staking a 
claim to the land” (Yiftachel 2010: 228) Jewish ethno-nationalism remains incomplete.  
Notwithstanding these attitudes settlement construction in the OPT was not an 
outcome of religious zeal only or the result of right wing maximalist political forces 
actions. Although those forces spearheaded the settlement project at different junctures 
and succeeded to establish strong political blocks (in and outside the parliament), the 
complicity of the state and governments in settlement building and expansion cannot be 
obscured. Actually, “the entire settlement grid has been designed and subsidized by the 
state, in coordination with the settlement movement” (Tilley 2005: 35) and relevant 
Zionist organizations especially the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and the 
World Zionist Organization. Without an exception Israeli Prime Ministers facilitated and 
endorsed the policy. Linking settlement policies exclusively to the Israeli right wing 
politicians or the pressure of Zionist religious and national-religious parties is a common 
misrepresentation of the actual record of settlement expansion. Settlement building and 
expansion started under the rule of the Labor Party right after 1967 war and reached 
unprecedented levels under the Labor government in the 1990s. During periods of 
‘national unity’ governments (1984 and in the 1990s) settlement construction continued 
apace, as well as under governments led by the Likud in 1977 and late 1990s through the 
2000s (as we show below). Thus regardless of governments’ partisan build up colonizing 
the OPT has been an immutable policy. 
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State systematic involvement in settlement building and particularly the 
promotions Israeli governments offer Jewish families and individuals encouraged more 
and more Israeli Jewish citizens to move and live in the OPT
77
 . Furthermore, Israeli 
classified the OPT as “Class A National Priority” development zones in 1972, which 
means that settlements are entitled for the same treatment other cities and towns in Israel 
receive from the government in terms of tax exemptions and investment incentives. 
These policies made some settlements hubs for economic, technological, and agricultural 
development projects
78
. Let alone that settlements are a significant source of benefits and 
profits for individuals, entrepreneurs, and companies who enjoy a wide range of 
incentives and preferable terms for housing, investment, and other activities  settlements 
construction reflects the “deeper ties [that] concretize the state’s commitment to 
[settlement] grid” and state’s identification with this enterprise as a defining aspect of its 
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 Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing provides generous loans for the purchase of apartments, 
part of which is converted to a grant; the Israeli Lands Administration offers significant price reductions in 
leasing land; the ministry of Education extends incentives for teachers, exemption from tuitions and fees in 
kindergartens, and free transportation to schools; the ministry of Industry and Trade provides grants for 
investors, infrastructure for industrial zones, etc; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs gives incentives 
for social workers; and the ministry of Finance offers reductions in income tax for individuals and 
companies (B’Tselem, Land grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank; Comprehensive Report, 
Jerusalem, May 2005). Vast amounts of governmental and non-governmental funds were allocated to 
establish and galvanize the settlements: the WZO estimated the costs of the ‘Major Plan for the West Bank’ 
of 1978-83 at IL (Israeli Lira) 32 billion for new settlements, and an additional IL 22 billion to ‘thicken’ 
existing settlements. This pattern remained steady through the years and in 2001 total spending on 
settlements by eight Israeli ministers was US$ 553.6 million, military spending and transportation are not 
included (Strasler2002).  
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 In 1984 the WZO distributed an ad that hailed ‘Judea and Samaria (the WB) as Israel’s new high-tech 
industrial zone. It describes the WB as the scientific and technological anchor of the entire nation. The 
Ministry of Science, as the ad confirms, was determined to establish a science-based park in the settlement 






. Indeed “the policy to settle all of Eretz Israel not only runs deeply through 
the fabric of Israeli politics but is embedded in the state’s very design” (Tilley 2005: 46).  
As a matter of ‘national consensus’ among the Zionist Jews settlements in the 
occupied territories have become in the heart of an orchestrated effort to nurture the 
Jewishness of the Jewish state as the Jerusalem Program abovementioned states. The 
mission of the settlement operation in the OPT is to implement a single vision of an Israel 
united between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. To be sure Israel has never 
shown the presence of any distinction between the borders of Israel and the occupied 
territories; all the maps and publications made by Israeli authorities show Israel stretching 
well through the OPT eastward to the Jordanian River (see maps 1 and 2). Taken from 
the Israeli Foreign Ministry official website, Israeli maps depict the OPT as Judea and 
Samaria (Yihuda vi Shomron in Hebrew) and/or ‘areas under Israeli control after 1967’. 
Maps and official state documents never use the term ‘Palestinian Territories’. Before the 
Oslo agreement the terms: Shtahim (regions) and ‘administered territories’ prevailed in 
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 According to Tel Aviv Macro Center for Political Economics the cost of construction in the West Bank 
settlements over the last 40 years was a total of $17.4 billion. The cost of buildings for housing was nearly 
$13.7 billion, which is 78 percent of the total." These numbers do not include the huge military spending on 
the security of settlements. In the fiscal years 2000-2002 the Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing 
allocated 47 per cent of its annual budget to local authorities of settlements in the West Bank. Israeli 
government contribution to the budgets of these local authorities in 2006 reached 57 per cent whereas it 
was 34 per cent to local authorities inside Israel for the same period 
http://www.macro.org.il/lib/3218049.pdf. These subsidies reflect on the standards of life settlers enjoy. The 
settlements receive more than double the equivalent per capita funding provided to municipalities within 
the Green Line (when the security costs are added, an average settler receives about $9,000 annually in 
extra funds. http://www.peace-with-justice.org/Israeli%20Settlements.htm. More recently, the Israeli 
government spent well over US$533 million in sustaining Jewish settlements in the occupied territories in 
2001, more than half the amount provided it by the United States as direct economic assistance during the 
same year, according to a report released by the Israeli Peace Now movement. 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0127-05.htm Although Israeli authorities refrain from 
announcing or revealing the detailed data on governmental expenditures in the OPT especially on 
settlements and the income generated by controlling natural resources and investments in these areas a 
study conducted in 2011estimates that since 1987 Israel’s occupation total cost reached $88.5 billion in 
subsidies, security costs, governmental budget, and tax exemptions. http://liamgetreu.com/2011/10/09/the-
economics-of-israels-settlement-enterprise/.    
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Israel’s official discourse. These are not isolated manifestations of linguistic guise or 
formal correspondence deliberations; that represent a state policy that aims at altering the 
spatial outlook of the territory and buttress Jewish historical lineage in Palestine. 
Naming and Judaizing the space 
Naming (and re-naming) policies are indicative if state policies in regard to the 
status and the futures of the OPT; it illustrates state systematic effort to invade the spatial 
sphere of the Palestinians and to establish Jewish existence in Palestine as an indigenous 
presence.  Meaning and connotations are the most important qualities of place-names for 
any nation and political entity; however among all connotations (social, religious, and 
political) Israeli Jewish naming of Palestine and especially the OPT aimed at altering the 
spatial sphere by emphasizing Jewish ethno-religious ancient presence and suppressing 
all non-Jewish existence. Naming and renaming policy has been concomitant to Israel’s 
actions of land confiscation and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians since 1948 and 
establishing Jewish residential centers in place of Palestinian expelled from them (Israel 
built 400 Jewish settlements in the first 10 years after 1948). Naming embodies the 
intersection of Zionist ideology, the symbolism it confers on the spatial sphere, and the 
behavior of the state and non-state organizations and institutions that consistently and 
systematically aimed at Judizing the geographical and spatial terrains of Palestine.  
This pattern is prominent in all the Mandatory Palestine and has been “premised 
on a hegemonic myth cultivated since the rise of Zionism, and buttressed by the ‘nation-
state’ myth, that ‘the land’ (Ha’aretz) belongs to the Jews, and to them only” (Yiftachel 
2010:228). Idegenising Jewish immigrants and reconstructing the new entity (the state) as 
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a Jewish state required remarking and reshaping the space in accordance with the concept 
of Eretz Israel, Israel of David and Solomon (see map 3). Judisation plays a crucial role 
in establishing the extraterritorial value of the space that has become a vital aspect of 
identification in the Israeli polity in reference to the whole region of Palestine.   
The term Zionism itself is derived from a place-name; Jerusalem’s Mount Zion 
that refers to the time of King David and the ancient name of the state Israel that was 
chosen to take the place of Palestine. Naming and re-naming spatial spheres of the 
territory conforms to the efforts to reconstitute the Jewish as a nation in Palestine; they 
embody an ideological upheaval that aimed at reconstructing the history of the landscape 
in accordance to the Biblical claims to the Land
80
. Thus “place names are symbolic 
expressions of Israeli nationalism in the face of Palestinian Arab opposition” (Cohen and 
Kliot 2011:654) and considered part of the effort to exert ideological clout and political 
impress on the landscape.  Ultimately the resurrection of biblical names emphasizes the 
historical lineage of the Jewish people traced down to Abraham that was interrupted by 
force. In order to materialize the claim of Jewish indigeneity in Palestine that precedes 
Arab idegineity remapping history and remarking landscape in conformity to this 
remapping is crucial to Zionism and Israeli-Jewish settlement to sustain. Renaming 
policy has suppressed the non-Jewish presence in Palestine and uplifted and re-center not 
the Jewish but the Jewish-national presence as the defining historical element of the land. 
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 The renaming processes started even before the establishment of the state of Israel as the Jewish National 
Fund formed a Naming Committee in 1930. The committee’s mission was to eliminate Arab place-names 
that are considered as carriers of Hebrew names from the regional map. In 1950 the state of Israel assigned 




This pattern is as valid in the OPT as it has been within the Israeli proper in which Arab 
names were suppressed and substituted by Jewish Biblical/Talmudic names
81
. 
Naming and renaming have given a deep sense of supremacy of territorial and 
spatial dimensions of the conflict more than historical narratives. Particularly after 1967 
spatial and territorial excessive struggle has focused the conflict on  
the temporary political spaces shaped by the people living in Israel/ Palestine 
itself. Consequently, the main feature of the conflict during the last three 
decades has pitted expansive Jewish settlement versus Palestinian resistance and 
steadfastness (Yiftachel 2010: 217).  
The conflict in this sense is not a struggle over narratives as much as on the 
spatial/territorial domain that correspond to and consolidate the narrative. Naming in this 
sense is an embedded element of the whole structures of domination and exclusion that 
uplifts Jewish religious ethno-nationality.  
The ethno-religious definition of the state and nationality as Jewish rather than 
Israeli took a dramatic dimension after 1967 that brought world Jewry into a massive 
identification with what became a reality: the entire Promised-Land (Weissbord 2011: 
198-200). From that point on Israel has become the dominant political and legal entity in 
the entirety of Palestine; in order to reestablish the historically symbolic relationship 
between the state of Israel and the OPT, re-naming landscape took a new impulse that 
also buttressed particular behavior: Israel’s Jewish-only settlement building in the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. One short trip in the OPT can show the dramatic 
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 Forty Seven per cent of Jewish settlements’ names in the OPT (Old Israel) are Biblical/Talmudic while 
Twenty per cent of settlement established in the Israeli proper have Biblial/Talmudic names (Cohen and 
Kliot 2011: 663). The discrepancy can only be explained by the exceptional sanctity with which the Zionist 
movement and settlement planners perceive the OPT as the heart of the ancient Kingdom of Israel. 
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and profound changes in the spatial outlook of the land that gives the visitor an 
impression that she is travelling in a place that belongs solely to the Jewish people; 
names of streets, squares, reservations, street signs and intersections, ancient sights, and 
monuments were all changed into Hebrew Biblical/Talmudic names
82
. Signs that hold 
names of Jewish settlements and the roads leads to them are exceptionally large and 
positioned on eye-catching spots, while signs leading to Palestinian cities and villages, 
and the roads leading into them are smaller, marginalized in side-ways and dwarfed by 
those Jewish ones.  
Renaming along with actual changes in transportation routes and settlement 
expansion have marginalized the presence of Palestinian sights and uplift that of Jewish 
domination over the spatial sphere. The reconstitution of the space to imbue Palestine 
with Jewish religious ethno-national outlook is part of Israel’s efforts to create a new 
reality not necessarily driven by religious interpretation as much as by political and 
strategic ends. To be sure biblical names were conferred to locations and sights that have 
no historical authenticity in terms of their particular geographic position especially in the 
OPT (Cohen and Kliot 2011: 666). Since the settlement in the WB as a whole represents 
                                                          
82 A cursory look at the names of many Israeli Jewish settlement in every region in the OPT offers a strong 
evidence of the Biblical underpinnings of settlement construction. For settler movements and Zionist 
adherents of the notion of Great Israel Biblical sites abound in the heartlands of the OPT that witnessed the 
prevalence of the Kingdom of David and Solomon and their successors. For example, the settlement of 
Elon Moreh (to the East of Nablus) refers to Abraham’s trip to the land of Canaan; Brakha (on Mount 
Gerizim adjacent to Nablus) means blessing and derived from the verse “Thou shalt put they blessing on 
Mt. Gerizim and the curse on Mt. Ebal; Bet-El (house of the Lord) to the north of Ramallah is related to the 
era of Abraham and the Second Temple; Bet-Horon (House of Horon) is mentioned in Joshua; Anatot (at 
the Eastern tips of Jerusalem) is believed to be where Jeremiah was born; and the settlement Shilo (between 
Nablus and Ramallah) is described as “where the Holly Ark and Tebernacles stood for hundreds of years” 




the materialization of the ‘Return’ to the Land of Israel the certainty of location matters 
less. What matters in this respect is the process through which the OPT - as the whole of 
Palestine should be Judized.         
State policies withstanding, the development of the Jewish settlement enterprise 
in the OPT has gathered a self sustaining political and social momentum within the Israeli 
political system and society. Today, after more than four decades of settlement expansion 
and military rule settlers’ community –numbered 500,000 in 2010- and political forces 
uplift it represent an unstoppable political configuration. Settlement, colonization, and 
land control have become inextricably linked to the very social, political, and economic 
structures that hold Israel as a state and a polity together. 
 
Transforming the national-territorial nexus 
 
    As early as first years of 1970s two mainstream perspectives prevailed in Israeli 
polity: the Labor Party position and strategy stated that Israeli control over the OPT can 
be sustained within a regional compromise with Arab neighboring states (not the 
Palestinians). In such a compromise Israel would maintain certain strategic parts of the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem and relinquish domination over highly Palestinian 
populated parts. The motto “territory in exchange for peace” was perceived to serve 
Israel’s strategic interests more than the insistence on controlling all the territories. The 
other perspective adopted by the Likud Party and other right wing Religious National 
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parties states that Israel must sustain its control over the entire OPT in perpetuity as part  
of the Land of Eretz Israel. This block is known as the Greater Land of Israel camp.  
The Center-Labor strategy triumphed in the first decade of Israel’s occupation 
mainly because until the year 1977 Labor had been the dominant political party in the 
Israeli governments. The Labor Party sought to materialize its ‘regional compromise’ 
strategy through diplomacy on the one hand and the consolidation of Jewish control of 
the OPT in the other. Within this context it accepted the UN Security Council resolution 
242
83
 at the same time it established the first settlement in the OPT
84
. Settlement 
expansion followed a pattern that conforms to Labor’s strategy: avoiding Jewish 
settlement in highly populated areas in the heartland of the WB and GS while focusing on 
the Jordan Valley and the parameter of Jerusalem as designated in the Allon Plan
85
 (see 
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 UN Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 emphasized “the inadmissibility of the 
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in 
peace”.  It further reiterate the commitment of all actors to the respect of the UN Charter especially Article 
2. The resolution stated that just lasting peace in the M.E should include the application of two principles: 
withdrawal of Israeli military forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, and the 
acknowledgment and recognition of territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the 
region. The French version of the resolution (as appears in UN archives) refers to the OPT with the definite 
‘de territories occupies’.  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement  
Israel has for so long asserted on the English translation that omits the article ‘the’ from the resolution. This 
translation gives Israel a ‘legal’ leeway to claim that any withdrawal from the OPT is in effect an 
implementation of the resolution 242.   
       
84
 As early as September 1967, Kfar Ezyon became the first settlement to be established in the West Bank. 
It was established because of the pressure of a group of settlers, some of whom were relatives of the 
residents of the original community of Kfar Ezyon, which was abandoned and destroyed during the 1948 
war. http://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf. 
85
 The Labor government endorsed and adopted the “Allon Plan” (referring to Israeli Defense Minister in 
1967 Yigal Allon) for Jewish settlement. Allon presented the plan as a political settlement plan with the 
Arabs. According to the plan Israel would retain control over the Jordan Valley and the ‘back of the 
Mountain’ (the precipice vas area leading to the valley). This would allow Israel to control the WB 
militarily while granting Palestinians access to Jordan. Israeli military and settlement presence in the Valley 
will prevent any military power from entering west of the Jordan, which would be the eastern borders of 
Israel, so the plan suggests. Moreover, Israel would annex the corridor of Jerusalem, and the Palestinians 
would be given control over three populated enclaves: a north enclave including the cities of Nablus, 
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map 4). The plan espoused a permanent situation in which the Palestinian population in 
the OPT would be reduced to separate masses connected to each other by a network of 
roads and separated by belts of settlements and military bases. The ultimate goal was 
convincing Jordan to accept the plan that would grant Israel sovereignty over most of the 
OPT area while allowing the Jordanian ruling monarch to regain control over the rest of 
the territory and over the entirety of the population; this would be dubbed ‘the Jordanian 
Option’. Thus by 1976, about 40 percent of the OPT land had been confiscated and 
became under Israeli control and some 4500 Israeli settlers were brought to reside in 30 
settlements. Another 50,000 settlers were living in the settlements of Jerusalem86. In 
effect, Labor’s strategy provided a solution to the problem of Palestinian population 
intensity by a segregation plan that conforms to Likud’s perspective. The Allon Plan slice 
the OPT into three separate areas with those highly populated to be turned to the 
Jordanian rule whereas Israel would sustain control over most of the region. Settlement 
was the main tool to carry on the strategy.   
Starting of 1977, with the ascendance of the Likud to power, a massive colonization 
process of the occupied territories has been launched. This change marks the onset of a 
new dynamism of Israel’s colonization of the OPT; the new dynamism is characterized 
with profound ideologically-driven settlement intensive expansion; the introduction of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Tulkarm, Jenin and Ramallah; a southern includes Hebron and Bethlehem; an a third that includes Jericho 
and border-crossing to Jordan.   
 
86
Although these settlement constructions followed the lines set up by the Allon Plan, Allon proposed 
expanding settlements in areas adjacent to populated Palestinian areas such as the establishment of the 
settlement Kiryat Arba near the city of Hebron, and suggested the “Jericho Plan” according to which Israel 
would return the city and its surrounding to the Jordanian rule in exchange for an intermediate agreement. 
See also Btselem special report “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, 2002. 




the issue of the OPT into domestic Israeli politics as a matter of political outbidding, 
mobilization and legitimization; and the rise of Zionist/Jewish consensus on the vitality 
and indispensability of settlements for the survival of Israel and the Zionist objectives in 
Palestine. 
The climax of Jewish ethno-territoriality  
The Likud
87
 came to power leading a social coalition of forces converged by their 
disaffection with Labor Party policies. A disparate group of Israeli social segments voted 
for the Likud for different interests: the Mizrahi community in protest of Ashkenazi-
dominated Labor party; the business strata discontent with Labor’s welfare policies; the 
religious groupings offended by secular stance of the party; and national-religious forces 
unsatisfied with what they perceived as Labor Party’s soft policies with the Palestinians 
and especially its slow implementation of settlement policy in the OPT.   
With the Likud in power the question of the OPT and its relationship with Israel took the 
forefront of political debates within the Israeli polity and society. While the Labor party 
maintained a low-profile creeping annexation of the territories without stirring political or 
legal confrontations, the Likud announced its adaptation of an overt expansionist policy 
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 The Likud part is the ideological offspring of the Herut movement, which had originally “asserted that 
all of 1917 Palestine, including Jordan, belongs to the Jews by right, and was unjustly divided by the 
British.” While most Herut and Likud members came to accept the reality of Jordan as an Arab state east of 
the Jordan River, from the mid-1970’s on secular ultra-nationalists from Herut and Likud who believed in 
territorial maximalism before all else—now in the entire area west of the Jordan—joined forces with their 
religious counterparts in the Gush and the NRP to build Jewish settlements throughout the territory. “These 
ideologies formed the core of a ‘Greater Israel’ movement.” 




by declaring that Judea and Samaria would never be relinquished (Younis 2000:147) to 
any other entity. Likud’s ideology as Avi Shalim puts it “could be summed up into two 
words- Greater Israel. According to this ideology, the OPT were an integral part of Eretz 
Israel the Land of Israel” (Cited in Oberschall 2007: 131). Likud’s manifesto of 1977 
leaves no space for controversy in regard to its rejection of the establishment of a 
Palestinian state in the OPT and its unfettered commitment to the Judization of 
Palestine
88
. For Ariel Sharon-the most hawkish Likud leader and the God Father of the 
most expansionist settlement projects in the West Bank- Palestinian state is to be 
anywhere but not on the W.B. or at least in segregated enclaves within the WB. In the 
words of Amos Elon, Sharon “is ready to allow a Palestinian state to be established only 
in Gaza and a very few disjoined enclaves in the W.G surrounded by Israeli settlements 
and military installations” (Oberschall 2007: 131132). 
 Likud’s adherence to the notion of “Greater Land of Israel” yielded a certain 
unintended consequence: the existence and demographic increase of the Palestinians in 
the OPT and the relatively limited numbers of Jewish settlers brought to live in these 
territories (comparing to Israel’s plans) coupled with Likud’s annexationist policies were 
creating dynamism of integration. Extensive colonization and Israeli domination by 
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 Likud’s Manifesto reads “The same Likud that people keep wrongly accusing of not wanting a Pal 
state...' says FSM. This is what it actually said: The Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria are the 
realization of Zionist values. Settlement of the land is a clear expression of the unassailable right of the 
Jewish people to the Land of Israel. Likud will continue to strengthen and develop these communities and 
will prevent their uprooting. The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab 
state west of the Jordan River. The Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but 
NOT as an independent and sovereign state. Jerusalem is the eternal, united capital of the State of Israel 
and only of Israel. The Likud government will act with vigor to continue Jewish habitation and strengthen 
Israeli sovereignty in the eastern parts of the city. That's pretty clear then - Likud OPPOSES a Palestinian 





means of sovereign power were heading towards the establishment of a single entity 
which would undermine the Jewish character of the state. It has become clear that 
Likud’s strategy was attempting to attain the unattainable.  Israel would not be able to 
survive as a “democratic, great, and Jewish state” altogether. As Arye Naor (former 
Israeli cabinet secretary) puts it: “Israeli goals of a Jewish, democratic, and large state 
were irreconcilable; any two could be met, but never the three simultaneously” (Ibid). 
The logic here implies a racist assumption on the precondition of less or no Palestinians 
in the region for Israel to maintain its characters as democratic and Jewish. It echoes, 
with different language, the notion of transfer (ethnic cleansing) as the remaining solution 
for this Israeli dilemma. The sole obstacle to achieving a large, Jewish, and democratic is 
the presence of a majority of Palestinians in the OPT and within the envisioned Greater 
Israel on the whole of the Mandatory Palestine.  
The Likud government came with an all-out settlement agenda that aimed at 
consolidating Jewish presence in the OPT making no differentiations between security, 
political, or religious settlement enterprise. Years of the Likud government in late 1970s 
had witnessed the emergence of the most dedicated settler movements in the history of 
the conflict at the time; Gush Emunim. Settlements are now established close to and 
around Palestinian residential areas and on hilltop with a tremendous infrastructure 
emerged to serve the new settlements and to circumscribe any Palestinian attempts to 
develop their rural areas. The policy not only “superimposed an exclusionary physical 
and spatial reality onto the occupied territories” (Younis 2000: 148) but more importantly 
this policy established the grounds for the creation a dual political, social, physical, and 
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legal reality within the OPT: two distinct communities living on the same territory and 
ruled by two entirely different sets of laws, norms, and measures; the Palestinian 
population and the Jewish settlers.  
Thus, segregation was rapidly imposed founding a settler- colonial reality that 
turned the OPT into a colonial periphery to Israel within which the colonial buffer that 
separate the occupied from the occupier grew more entrenched. At this point the 
settlement grid has crossed a threshold: domestically settlement building and 
consolidation has become a ‘national priority’ and Jewish consensus.  Daniella Weiss; 
currently mayor of the settlement Kidumim in the West Bank and one of the most 
prominent settler leaders, was amongst the initial wave of settlers, describes the reaction 
of the non-believers to the Gush Emunim faithful's actions in settlement expansion:  
Who are these strange hallucinating people?' they would ask. 'What are they 
doing [in these] Biblical hills? There's nothing there!'... They thought they'd be 
able to control us, to keep us in place and watch over us. They thought we'd 
grow tired and go back to Tel Aviv… This was the start of Kedumim."
89
  
  Likud’s policy of total settlement in the whole of the OPT has blurred the 
boundaries: legal, political, and psychological between Israeli proper and these territories 
as the result of the wholeness with which settlement construction was sought. During the 
1980s through 1990 Likud governments’ political objectives were clear: taking control 
over the entire biblical land of Israel that would consolidate the “Greater Israel” under the 
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 In his article ‘The real price of Israel's settlements’, Seth Freedman shows the ability of settler 
movements to influence Israeli decision makers’ policies on the issues of settlement expansion and 
allocating funds for settlement building. As he notices, the Likud period turned settlement activities into a 
massive process that each government succeeded the Likud had to follow. His interview with Weiss gives a 
flavor of this metamorphosis. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/25/israel-settlements-
palestinian-territories-price   
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sovereignty of the Jewish people. Yitzhak Shamir; Israel’s Prime Minister in this period 
bluntly articulated these objectives:  
This is our goal: territorial wholeness. It should not be encroached or 
fragmented. This is an a priori principle; it is beyond argument. You should not 
ask why. Why this land is ours requires no explanation. Is there any other nation 
that argues about its homeland, its size and dimensions, about territories, 
territorial compromise, or anything to the effect?”  
To realize the wholeness of the settlements Israeli governments of the Likud and 
the national unity government of 1984 adopted and implemented three major settlement 
plans
90
 that resulted in the establishment of twenty-three new urban settlements and the 
construction of 300-450 Kilometers of roads. The number of settlers brought to these new 
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 Likud settlement policy was informed and followed two leading plans: The first in 1977 articualted by 
Matitiyahu Drobles, head of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Division. Drobles prepared a 
comprehensive plan for the establishment of colonies throughout the West Bank. Most of the colonies that 
were established as part of the Drobles plan were constructed on the central mountain ridge around 
Palestinian population centers.  The Drobles Plan embraced the aims of Gush Emunim and signaled a 
governmental shift away from the Allon Plan. The second presented by the former Israeli Minister of 
Agriculture Ariel Sharon (1977-1981) (and former Israeli Prime Minister) modified and expanded the 
Drobles Plan and Gush Emunim, by intensifying colonization along the Green Line in order to secure the 
borders between the West Bank and Israel.  
The Sharon Plan also called for increasing the colonization along the central mountain ridge. According to 
the Sharon Plan, only a small number of high density Palestinian communities were not to be under Israeli 
sovereignty in the future.  The Allon Plan dealt with the 'demographic problem' posed to Israel by the 
Palestinian population through avoidance, whereas, the Sharon Plan continued the more aggressive policies 
that relied on removal and transfer of the Palestinian population out of the OPT.  The ultimate aim of the 
Sharon Plan was the annexation of the West Bank, excluding small densely populated Palestinian enclaves. 
Following the preparation of Sharon's plan, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Construction 
and Housing established ten colonies on the western slopes of the central mountain ridge in the West Bank, 
north of Jerusalem. Sharon's vision also included preventing the contiguity of developed Palestinian areas 
along the Green Line, by disconnecting and segregating the West Bank in areas north of Nablus, west of 
Jenin, and north of Ramallah, from the Palestinian communities adjacent to the Green Line within Israel. 
According to his vision, this disconnection would be accomplished by the creation and construction of sets 
of Israeli colonies on those areas. Sharon also planned to create corridors of colonies and a network of 
bypass roads all over the West Bank, connecting the 1949-Armistice Line (Green Line) with the Jordan 
Valley. As a result of the implementation of these plans in the year 1980 alone the Palestinians lost control 
over more than 27 per cent of the total area of the WG apart from East Jerusalem, and one-third of the 
entire GS, and by the year 1987, 52% and 42% of the land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
respectively, had been expropriated by Israel. Land has been confiscated both for so called 'Security 
Reasons' and for the construction of Israeli settlements. http://www.arij.org/atlas40/chapter2.4.html 
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settlement reached to 51,000, which fill short of the targeted number according to the 
plans which was 80,000 (Btselem 2002:15).  
The failure to meet the goals of the plans can be referred to the economic 
complications Israel was grappling with in the same period and contributed significantly 
to the rise of the Likud and other right wing forces. Thus Sahmir’s statement at one level 
reflected deep socio-economic changes and their political repercussions that marked a 
drift toward political right, nationalistic, and extremist politics.   Those changes have had 
a fragmenting effect on the political and party system in Israel that stamped the 
ascendance of extremist religious, national-religious, and ultra-nationalist political 
parties
91
. In effect these developments had turned the issue of settlements into a crucial 
factor in Israel’s policies in terms of its prevalence as an immutable policy implemented 
on a large scale regardless of the party or the coalition of parties in the government. 
Differences between different governments were insignificant and affected primarily by 
factors other than internal politics namely, Palestinian reactions, regional and 
international effects especially the initiation of the peace process.    
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 The late 1970s through 1980s was a period of deep economic transformation in the state of Israel; 
moving away from the socialist system to a capitalist economy. The liberalization of the economy was 
embraced by the two main Zionist streams of thinking: the Labor Party and the Likud party. This process 
had left significant portions of the Israeli society behind especially among the poor masses of the Mizrahi 
Jewish (Jews from Oriental descent) , the Haredim (ultraorthodox), and Palestinians. Social change resulted 
from the process was exacerbated more in the 1990’s with the arrival of one million Russian Jews to Israel. 
Liberalization, as in most regions of the world has deepened social disparities, increased levels of poverty 
and unemployment. Discontent with the new policy has led the affected masses to affiliate and identify 
with nationalist sentiments that the political right embodied, and to religious parties in the sought of redress. 
A multiplication of parliamentary parties and a drift to the right have become prevalent in the Israeli polity. 
Forming and sustaining governments have become more difficult and institutional instability has created a 
crisis (Ishay2011: 76-77)       
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Beyond the “ideological threshold”   
Israeli governments have never shown any serious intentions to stop, freeze, or 
slow the pace of settlement construction. The 1970s and early 1980s had set the tone for a 
persistent pattern of colonization that witnessed relative fluctuations due to particular 
events and momentary factors. In particular, Israel’s political system had witnessed 
profound changes in the course of 1970s that culminated in a two-block politics in the 
1980s that replaced Labor’s hegemony. As mentioned earlier, socio-economic changes in 
Israel has led to the fragmentation of the political system, which renders governments 
formation hard to achieve without offering significant concessions to small parties for a 
coalition.  Under the circumstances prevailed in the election of 1984 the two big parties 




The most remarkable change in the period was the increase of small parties; 
distribution of political power had changed dramatically with the decline of midsize 
parties. Building ruling coalition under these new configurations took an ideological path 
in which the Likud and the Labor tended to chose small parties from their ideological 
camps to form the government (Elazer and Sandler 1994). In effect this strengthened the 
political power of small parties especially supporters of Greater Israel ideology; a trend 
that would increase in the forthcoming two decades. Likud’s own failures in the late 
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 The electoral rise of the Likud started at the 1973 election where it gained 39 seats of the 120 that 
consists the parliament comparing to 51 seats for the Labor Party. In 1977 and 1981 elections the Likud 
won 43 and 48 seats, respectively sending the Labor to the opposition for the first time since the 
establishment of Israel. However, the election of 1984 witnessed Labor’s electoral revival with a gain of 47 
seats. Small parties in this period flourished in number to reach a total of 13 parties. Notably, those who 
were in the rise were religious parties such as Shas (See Elazer and Sandler 1994).   
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1970s and early 1980s (in the economic arena rates of inflations hit a peak that brought 
Israel to the prinks of bankruptcy, and Israel’s war in Lebanon turned into a protracted 
conflict that led to Likud’s popular decline), and Labors image as the party of the 
constitution that aimed at offering territorial concessions to the Arabs, led to a coalition 
of necessity. Both parties needed to repair their popularity and gain legitimacy that 
resulted (among other things) in tightening Israel’s colonial policies in the OPT. Thus 
during the years 1983-1988; last year of Likud’s government and  years of National Unity 
government between the Labor and the Likud the number of established settlements 
increased from 67 to 110 and the number of settlers leaped from 22,800 to 63,600 in the 
WB and to 100,000 in East Jerusalem (Btselem 2002: 17-18).  
The election of 1988 the Likud and the Labor Parties tied up with 40 and 39 seats, 
respectively. The Likud led by Yitzhak Shamir formed the government with a wide 
coalition of small parties (National Religious Party, Shas, Agudat Yisrael, Degel 
HaTorah, the New Liberal Party, Tehiya, Tzomet, Moledet) all of which conform with 
Likud’s Greaterer Israel ideology.  In this period the government focused on expanding 
the existing settlements (settlement population increased by 60 per cent) and built ten 
new settlements (Ishay2011: 76-77). The limited settlement expansion under this 
government was the result of the economic crises in Israel on the one hand, and more 
importantly it stemmed from the unprecedented pressure the U.S.A exerted on Shamir to 
halt settlement expansion. Israeli government involved in a confrontation with H.W. 
Bush Administration on the issue as the later sought creating conducive environment for 
the initiation of the peace process. Shamir’s refusal to U.S.A demands compelled her to 
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freeze loan-guarantees that were promised to assist Israel to absorb Jewish immigrants 
from the USSR. The crisis had led to the fall of Shamir’s government especially when 
most of the parties in the coalition withdrew protesting Shamir’s participation in the 
Madrid peace conference.   
The revival of the Labor Party in the election of 1992 (44 seats) that also gave rise 
to pro-peace parties such as Meretz gave a measure of hope that creeping territorial 
takeover of the OPT would halt. Yitzhak Rabin’s government announced that a change of 
‘national priority’ should be carried on; it committed to the U.S.A that it wouldn’t 
construct any new settlements or expand any existing ones except for purposes of ‘natural 
growth’. Another exception was added that Israel would continue settlement construction 
in the area of ‘Greater Jerusalem’ and the Jordan Valley; in conformity with the Allon 
Plan. However, these exceptions were all Rabin’s government needed to trick the 
America and the rest of the world. Rabin’s government expanded settlements in areas of 
post 1967 and annexed to Jerusalem; the natural growth (interpreted not in terms of birth 
rate but also in terms of new Jewish immigrants) had been used to construct 9850 new 
housing units in the existing settlements and new settlements were established as 
neighborhoods of existing settlements. Thus in the period of 1992 to 1995 the number of 
settlers rose from 146,000 to 282,000 in the WB and East Jerusalem (Btselem 2002: 17-
18). Not less important under Rabin’s government Israel started to apply the system of 
movement-permit for the Palestinians from the OPT who wanted to move into Israeli 
proper. The restrictions on Palestinians’ mobility especially targeted workers, and it 
included prohibitions on goods exchange, movement of vehicles and people between the 
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WB and GZ and within the WG. Jerusalem was also isolated from the rest of the WB by 
military checkpoints and barriers. Using physical methods (military checkpoints, barriers, 
and roadblocks) and administrative methods especially the permit regime Israel aimed at  
Controlling Palestinian movement and at channeling it to a few major checkpoints, 
depending on Israel’s needs. They are intended to keep Palestinian traffic away from the 
settlements, main roads used by settlers, and areas where Israel wants to strengthen its 
control and exclude Palestinians. Therefore, most of the checkpoints and obstructions are 
located on roads leading to Area C (the 60 percent of the West Bank under complete 
Israeli control), in East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, enclaves west of the Separation 
Barrier, and the settlements in Hebron (Bt`selem 2010).     
Thus Rabin’s strategy echoed his realization that Israel need to redefine its 
domination in the OPT towards consolidating territorial control couples with segregation 
and oppression in response to the profound change the Palestinian intifada brought with it.  
The intifada had challenged Israeli domination system and it redrew the boundaries of the 
conflict as an ethno-one whereby Israel has to confront a persistent people. As Rabin 
explained in 1995:  
we had to choose between the Greater Land of Israel, which means a binational 
state whose populations would comprise, as of today, 4.5 million Jews and more 
than 3 million Palestinians…and a state smaller in area, but which would be a 
Jewish state; we chose to be a Jewish state” (Rabin: 1995).   
It has become clear that Rabin was referring to an extended Jewish-democratic state that 
would encompass vast areas of the OPT. Rabin’s colonial policies and the segregation 
system his government entrenched in an unprecedented manner had created the 
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foundation of the following rapid and profound measures that consolidate the system of 
grand apartheid in the OPT.  The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in May 1995 was 
alarming in the sense that it uncovered the deep extremist currents beneath the Israel’s 
society and polity rift to the right; a trend that would take an exponential rise in the rest of 
the 1990s and the 2000s until today. Directly affecting Israel’s colonial polices in the 
OPT, this rift only consolidated and already comprehensive settlement building during 
the peace process. Settlement expansion during the peace process embodies Israel’s 
determination to defy the element of time by consolidating its territorial and spatial 
hegemony over the land. Rabin’s approach clearly aimed at determining the geographical 
parameters of the aspired Palestinian state. So did all Israeli Prime Ministers regardless of 
the peace process. The period also uncovered the increasing influence of Israeli right and 
extreme right politics on governments’ policies. The chart below shows a striking pattern 
of settlement expansion in the periods of negotiations between Israel and the PLO: As 
notices above, Rabin’s “change of national priority’ gave a huge boom to settlement 
expansion especially in and surrounding East occupied Jerusalem. In 1995, the 
endorsement of Oslo Two agreement and the supposed Israeli withdrawal from additional 
Palestinian territories and the end of the interim (transitional) period of the Oslo process 
territorial control and settlement construction went up. Thus the number of housing units 
in the settlements in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip rose from 
20,400 to 31,400 − an increase of approximately fifty-four percent in just seven years. 
Israel’s persistent territorial expansion in the OPT took another profound level in 
1996 by the new electoral victory of the Likud led by his hard-line Benjamin Netanyahu. 
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Although the Likud won 32 seats and the Labor 34 Netanyahu was elected separately 
from the rest of the parliament members under the new electoral law implemented in this 
year for the first time in Israel (to be revoked in the succeeding election). Netanyahu’s 
victory exposed the false assumption that years of U.S. efforts to bring political 
settlement to the conflict had achieved substantial progress. As a matter of fact 
Netanyahu came to power as the man who firmly opposed the Oslo agreements. This 
Likud hardliner victory represents the equivalent of the victory of Likud in the year 1977 
in terms of the shift in the Israeli political spectrum to the ‘right’ and the trends prevailing 
in Israeli society. The election show the increase political power of religious and right 
wing parties: Shas gained 10 seats, the National-Religious Party 9 seats, Yisrael (Avigdor 
Liberman’s party) BaAliyah 9 while center-to-left Meretz lost 3 seats. With a government 
consisted of a narrow coalition of Likud, Tzomit, and Gisher Netanyahu came with new 
policy guidelines in regard to the peace process, which is considered to be a substantial 
change in the ‘peace process’ terms. A greater and more territorially-based emphasis on 
Israeli security was introduced: “Israel should be in a position to take responsibility to its 
external security by maintaining forces along the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, and 
Rafah border forever. In effect this means that Israel will control all points of entry and 
exit to the region; an aspect of sovereignty denied to Arafat (Aruri 2003:107). The 
election of 1996 entrenched the increasingly fragmented Israeli political system and 
Netanyahu’s strategy set the bar high for any government to come into office concerning 
any agreement with the PLO.  So, when the Labor gained the election of 1999 it came to 
power in a highly fractured parliament with remarkably powerful small right and extreme 
right wing parties (Shas and Yisrael BaAliah won 17 and 6 seats, respectively). Ehud 
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Barak; the new Prime Minister formed a government of odd bed-fellows: Shas (the 
religious Mizrahi party), Meretz (the center-to-left) Oslo proponent party, and Yisrael 
BaAliah (Russian immigrants party that identify strongly with the Greater Land of Israel 
ideology).  
The government announced Barak’s doctrine that drew on all previous efforts to 
consolidate Israel’s control of the OPT. Strikingly it also endorsed crucial elements of his 
predecessor Netanyahu. Barak announced his ‘four NOs’ as the basis for the achievement 
of a permanent peace with the Palestinians: no to any change for unified Jerusalem under 
Israeli sovereignty, as the eternal capital of Israel; no withdrawal to 1967 borders (the 
green line); most settlement dwellers in Judea and Samaria to remain under Israeli 
sovereignty; and no foreign army west of the Jordan River (Oberschall 2007: 150). This 
policy narrowed the gap between the two big parties in terms of the future of the OPT 
within a political system that has become stratified and the two-blocks politics in Israel 
entirely waned. Under these circumstances the two parties took a profoundly strategic 
step to unify their positions on the peace process and the limits of Israel concessions in 
regard to the OPT. Both parties agreed on the final outcome of any settlement as 
precluding Palestinian sovereignty in any portion of historic Palestine…the 
concept of limited autonomy, adopted by the Knesset [Israeli Parliament] in 
1977…was the centerpiece of Likud’s Camp David. It also became the essence 
of Labor’s Oslo agreement, and together they seem to promoting the ongoing 
atomization of the West Bank (Cited in: Aruri 2003:115).   
The Likud and the Labor parties came along to solidify their rejection of the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state by the agreement they signed in January 
1997. The agreement entitled “National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the 
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Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians” rules out “Palestinian sovereignty, rejects 
the removal of Israeli settlement colonies from the OPT, negotiating the status of 
Jerusalem, repatriating the refugees, and dismantling the occupation” (Aruri 2003:218). 
Reaching this agreement is the ripe fruit of a long process through which Israeli polity 
came to stiffen its position concerning the OPT. The arrival of number of small parties to 
the parliament and the government following these developments turned the OPT into the 
most sacred issue in Israeli politics. Advocates of transfer (ethnic cleansing) are now 
setting in the government especially in the 2000s with the ascendance of the Likud led by 
Ariel Sharon and the eruption of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000.  
The agreement between the Likud and the Labor coupled with the rise of pro-
settlement political forces in Israel generated a blanket support for the doctrines included 
in Netanyahu and Barak strategies concerning the OPT. The events accompanied the 
Palestinian intifada especially the high levels of violence contributed to the ongoing rift 
to the right in Israeli society and polity; it added to the already established structures of 
segregation and colonization established in the 1990s. Regimes of segregation and 
territorial control reached a climax by the construction of the separation wall (the barrier 





Israel’s security necessities used to justify the construction of the wall cannot 
survive the question of route and location of the wall.  The most important aspect of the 
wall is that it has not been established on the ‘Green Line’. According to the UN only 11 
per cent of the wall runs along the border line between Israel’s proper and the WB and in 
some parts it cuts and curves deep into the WB territory. Moreover, the wall is an 
institution of physical configurations and a set of measures and procedures that regulate 
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and limit the mobility of Palestinians who live in the buffer zone of the wall
93
. As such it 
creates another threat to individual and collective well-being and the possibility of an 
ordinary life (Roy 2004: 32). During the first phase of the wall’s construction, 51 
Palestinian villages were isolated from most of their land, and 25 lost total access to their 
land, a critical problem for future economic survival. In the village of Jayous, for 
example, 138 of 3,250 acres were taken to build the wall and 2,150 additional acres (two-
thirds of the village’s land) now lie in the seam zone. Early in the construction process, 
approximately 12,000 Palestinians in 14 villages and towns were wedged between the 
wall and the Green Line, an area known as the seam zone. They were cut off from the rest 
of the West Bank, from essential market outlets, and, to varying degrees, from the 
agricultural land they have farmed for generations. The most important issue about the 
wall for the purposes of our discussion is that the construction of such a giant institution 
has drawn the territorial counters of Israel’s domination within which Israel practices 
ultimate control; this area includes the vast majority of Jewish colonial settlements in the 
OPT. In this context Israeli state attorney has indicated that the territory between the 
Green Line—Israel’s border with the West Bank—and the wall will be declared a “closed 
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The wall is not just a wall, the World Bank analysis notes. “Depending upon location, sections will 
comprise some (or all) of the following elements: four-meter [12-foot] deep trenches on either side; a dirt 
path ‘to which access will be forbidden’ where potential infiltrators would be exposed to IDF [Israeli 
Defense Force] fire; a trace path to register footprints; an electronic warning or ‘smart’ fence; a concrete 
barrier topped with barbed wire; a concrete wall rising as high as eight meters [24 feet]; a two-lane military 
patrol road; and fortified guard towers placed at regular intervals. See the report of the “Mission to the 
Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) of the Local aid Corporation Committee (LACC). 
http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/wallreport.pdf.  
For detailed accounts of the social and economic effects of the wall see: Mission to the Humanitarian and 
Emergency Policy Group (HEPG) of the Local aid Corporation Committee (LACC). http://www.nad-
plo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/wallreport.pdf; Bt`selem report “The Separation Barrier” 
http://www.btselem.org/topic/separation_barrier; International Commission of Jurists, Geneva report 
“Israel’s Separation Barrier Challenges to the rule of law and human rights” http://www.nad-
plo.org/userfiles/file/Document/walllawhr.pdf.    
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military zone” (Roy 2004: 33). Therefore, the wall is designed to swallow the largest 
portion of the OPT lands while consolidating the segregation regimes (the dual systems 
of domination discussed above). It imposes prohibitive restrictions on the movement of 
Palestinians within the West Bank. Its route, continually modified by Israeli authorities, 
falls well within the boundaries of the West Bank and is designed to incorporate as many 
Israeli West Bank settlements as possible within Israel proper. Furthermore the Wall will 
effectively institutionalize the system of closure and restriction that has paralyzed the 
West Bank economically since late 2000 and fragmented it territorially since 1992. The 
wall in this sense serves a means to consolidate Jewish sovereignty on the majority of the 
OPT geography and simultaneously to undercut Palestinians’ sought of independence and 
self-determination by dissecting the OPT, territory and population into isolated enclaves. 
As such it is a tool of domination and hegemony that targets the Palestinian population as 
a whole with profound devastating effects. In essence the wall comes to close a cycle of 
simultaneous creeping grand apartheid that targets the territory and space on the one hand, 
and irreversibly atomizing the Palestinian Population into enclaves with no significant 
ties that preserve and galvanize their collective sense of belonging and collective 
aspiration for self-determination. Aruri (2003: 116) puts it eloquently 
Now the Arab population lives in subordinated enclaves within a Jewish state. 
Oslo II provided Israel with the land without the people, thus meeting Labor’s 
requirement of ethnic purity and separation…and at the same time, 
accommodating Likud’s proclivity for penetration deep into Arab population 
centers. At last, Labor’s presumed ‘territorial settlement’ and Likud’s 





Domination and duality 
 
Israel’s refrain from formally annexing the OPT withstanding, the growing number of 
the Palestinian population in these territories and their determination to achieve Israeli 
withdrawal from their land remain a serious challenge to Israeli occupation and its 
policies. Land control and Judizing the space of the Palestinian life in such a sweeping 
manner discussed above, wouldn’t have been possible without the implementation of an 
equivalent system of domination that seeks to render the Palestinians into manageable 
fragmented masses segregated from the colonial society.  Israel applied a multi-layered 
domination system that primarily aimed at sustaining distinctions between the 
Palestinians and the Israeli Jewish settlers in particular and Israeli society in general. 
Simultaneously this system was designed to control Palestinians as a fixed menace to 
Israeli Jewish original and driving imperatives discussed earlier.  
This section examines Israel’s domination policies as derivatives of the primary 
overarching strategy of Judizing and colonizing the OPT and superimpose Jewish ethno-
national identity on these territories. Thus methods of domination and control have been 
the result of the structural elements of Israel’s colonialism that were designed to 
“administer the lives of the people and normalize the colonization, while exploiting the 
territories resources (in this case land, water, and labor)” (Gordon 2008: xix). 
Israeli polices in the OPT and their consequences can be assessed as a coherent 
system that works on two levels: (1) a macro level whereby Israel sought to sustain 
certain degrees of exclusion and control through land and resources control and economic 
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suppression. Alienating the Palestinian from the land and taking over their space is the 
most striking in this respect. Beyond ideological precepts and cultural underpinnings 
Isarel’s domination system is a tangible and timely phenomenon  
that is designed to redistribute wealth in order to draw as many Jews as possible 
to this area and to maintain a sustainable control of the Jewish population over a 
piece of land which is by nature bi-national” (Hever, 2010);  
(2) a micro level in which Israel deployed the various strands of power to dominate the 
population as individuals and as a group through a set of military orders, administrative 
arrangements, legal procedures and means of oppression. 
 
 Alienation and exploitation: Israel’s colonial periphery 
The pattern of Israel’s system of exclusion was sustained in the post 1967 phase 
of Israeli colonialism. Land control and exclusion would couple with the exploitation of 
the OPT (population and resources) to undermined Palestinians’ ability to form a 
coherent socio-political configuration that would challenge Israel’s occupation more 
successfully. Combined with the fragmentation of the Palestinians in Bantustrans, these 
policies are aimed at oppressing the expressions of Palestinian national identity and the 
prospects of Palestinian self-determination. Macro policies aimed at undercutting 
Palestinians’ ability of organized political action and mass mobilization.  
-Land and Resources 
Control of the land and alienating Palestinian from it not only reconstitute the 
spatial terrain of the land as a Jewish terrain but also it prevents the appearances of 
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Palestinian history and past that is tied to the land. Taking over the land in this sense 
fragments the Palestinian society and consequently prevents its ability to form a coherent 
and organized challenge to Israel. The attempt to cut the ties between the Palestinians and 
their land is an attempt to undermine and eliminate the rise of Palestinians as a people 
that has the right of self-determination on the land (Gordon 2008: 59). The principle and 
right of self-determination is linked to the integrity of the region on which a certain 
people has the right to practice this right. In this sense Israel’s land confiscation and 
expropriation represents a creeping annexation that “was intended to achieve the 
integration of the territories with Israeli terrain of hegemony but without people (Younis 
2005: 145), and to deprive the Palestinians from the material geographic bedrock of their 
national identity and spatial connections.  
Israel’s occupation of the OPT from the outset exhibited similar patterns of 
exclusion the Zionist movement had shown before the establishment of the state of Israel: 
the possession of more land and territory with a minimum, if any, non-Jewish population. 
After 1967 Israeli authorities launched a sweeping regime of land confiscation and 
expropriation using a set of mechanism: military orders, ‘legal’ procedures, bureaucratic 
regulations. The main tool remains declaring and recording land as “state land” that has 
been implemented since 1979.  The procedure represents a policy that manipulates the 
Ottoman Land Law of 1858
94
 by implementing those provisions of the law that allowed 
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 The Ottoman Land Code of 21 April 1858 defined five classes of land ownership: milk (individually or 
ptivatly owned), waqf (Islamic endowment), m r  (public or state land), matr k and maw t (abandoned and 
uncultivated). For m r , matr k and maw t, the raqaba is vested in the hands of the state. M r  is cultivated 
or cultivatable land acquired for the state through conquest or through forfeiture of milk due to a failure of 
heirs. An individual could gain rights over m r  land by cultivating it and paying taxes; but the state 
continued to regulate its transfer and improvement. The tenant's rights to m r  were forfeited by failure to 
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Israel to play the role of the sovereign (the Ottoman Sultan). Other means included 
military orders to size and control land for security needs, declaring land a s abandoned, 
and expropriating land for public utilizes.  
Thus By 1980 Palestinians in the OPT would lose 27 per cent of the WB land to 
Israeli authorities, most of which was reallocated for settlement construction. Using the 
Ottoman Law abovementioned between 1979 and 1993 Israel took over 913,000 dunams 
(16 percent of the West Bank) using this law (Bt’selem 2010). Settlers, with the 
acquiescence of the military authorities practiced de facto methods to take over lands 
adjacent to their colonies; during the first intifada settlers and Israeli military surrounded 
the settlements with rings of buffers that Palestinians were denied access. Those 
remained closed and annexed to the settlements.  Using ‘legal’ methods of a kind was the 
hallmark of Israel’s land policy that turned most of the land to the exclusive benefit of the 
Jewish settlers, which not only violates the Geneva Fourth Convention of 1949 but also it 
is ultimately injustice as the duty of the occupying force is “not to ignore the needs of an 
entire population and to use land intended for public needs solely to benefit the settlers” 
(Bt’selem 2010). Among the different methods of land confiscation and expropriation 
Israeli governments resort to secretive measures such as resurrecting the “Absentee Law” 
of 1953” to take over land in the OPT (Cook 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cultivate the land; such forfeited land is termed ma l l. In practice, neither the Ottomans nor the British 
ever repossessed ma l l.  M r  included the largest portion of the landed property in Palestine. M r  land 
could be converted by order of the sultan into matr k ma miyya (property for general public use such as 
lakes or roads) or into matr k murfaqa (property for use by a particular community such as market places 
and cemeteries). Maw t is wasteland which an individual could (until 1858) turn into milk with the 
permission of the sultan and (until 1921) turn into m r  by cultivating it for a given period of time and 
paying for it. 
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The regime of land takeover reinforced the dual system of domination and 
segregation that distinguishes between the Palestinian population and the Jewish Israeli 
settlers; Palestinians in the West Bank live in a series of roughly eight squalid, ringed 
ghettos and are governed by military courts. Jews living in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, like all full Israeli citizens, are subject to Israeli civilian law and constitutional 
protection. This differentiation tied to the land and territorial terrains that give 
segregation a rigid character. Moreover, changing the landscape of the OPT has been 
pervasive and intense as Chris Hedges (2010) observes the spatial outlook of the WB and 
East Jerusalem  
…has altered dramatically since I first went to Jerusalem over two decades ago. 
Huge fortress-like apartment complexes ring East Jerusalem and dominate the 
hillsides in the West Bank. The settler population is now more than 462,000, 
with 271,400 living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and 191,000 living 
in and around Jerusalem. The settler population has grown at the rate of 4.6 
percent per year since 1990 while the Israeli society taken as a whole has 
grown at 1.5 percent. 
The pattern noticed in these lines goes for the rest of the West Bank that Israel has 
controlled 42 percent of its land until the year 2010; Bt`selem (estimation stands at 50 
percent). Most of this land is controlled and/or allocated to the exclusive use of more than 
200 Jewish settlements although the virtual area these settlements occupy is estimated at 
1 percent of the WB. However, settlement local and regional councils have control over 
the 42 percent; (Stewart and Usbors 2010) most of which extend far beyond the built-up 
area and defined as "closed military zones" in the military orders. Palestinians are 
forbidden to enter these areas without authorization from the Israeli military commander. 
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Israeli citizens, Jews from throughout the world and tourists are all permitted to enter 
these areas without the need for special permits.  
-Economic suppression 
Economic effects of Israel’s colonial policies are intertwined with land control 
and resources takeover. Israel’s policy of land takeover was reinforced by a lust for 
exploiting natural resources especially water. The process has dealt the Palestinian 
agricultural sector a serious destructive effect; the share of this sector in Palestinian GNP 
and employment has dropped dramatically as a result of land loss, Israeli competition, 
and lack of water resources that has been extracted for the benefit of settlers’ agricultural 
projects and their life style
95
.  Settlement expansion on Palestinian land had already 
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In 1967, 2,300 sq km of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under Palestinian cultivation. In 1989 that 
figure had been reduced to 1,945 sq km, or 31.5 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Agriculture 
comprised 24 percent of Gross Domestic Product in 1966, the same percentage as in the 1980-85 (pre-
intifada period). By 1994, the percentage had decreased to less than 15 percent. In 1966, the agricultural 
sector provided employment for 55,000 Palestinians, or 43 percent of total employment, whereas in the 
1980-85 there were 40,000 people employed in the agricultural sector, comprising 24 percent of employed 
Palestinians. In 1993, the percentage of employed persons working in agriculture was 22 percent. These 
gross indicators do not lead to specific conclusions regarding the effect of settlements on agricultural 
employment or production or land under cultivation, because settlements are only one of a number of 
variables that must be considered when assessing these trends such as the competition with a much more 
advanced Israeli agricultural sector, Israeli restriction on export of Palestinian products…etc. There exists 
no systematic research on the direct effects of settlement on the decline of the Palestinian agricultural 
sector.  However, there are specific regions, such as the Jordan Valley, where a direct link can be 
established between the loss of Palestinians’ agricultural opportunities and Israeli settlements. The 
confiscation of agricultural lands and their transfer to settlements result in the loss of agricultural income 
and employment, although this has never been quantified beyond anecdotal reporting. Contamination by 
sewage also directly affects Palestinian agriculture in the region around Kiryat Arba and elsewhere. There 
are also unquantified economic and environmental costs associated with Israeli-owned industries in the 
occupied territories, such as a recycling plant for used motor oil, stone quarries, and other plants where 
harmful and toxic by-products are produced. The effect of settlement construction is more direct on the 
Palestinian loss of water resources, which directly affected the development of agriculture and other vital 
aspects of life. Access to water, rather than a scarcity of land, remains the greatest obstacle to Palestinian 
agricultural development. For Israel, water has been a vital precondition for achieving its fundamental 
challenges—the creation of a vibrant economy to sustain an increasing Jewish community. According to a 
1992 report for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences by Miriam Lowi, “almost the entire increase 
in Israeli water use since 1967 derives from the waters of the West Bank and the Upper Jordan River.”  Not 
only Israel is exploiting water for its own population in Israel and the occupied territories, amounting to 15 
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reduced the cultivated area in the Palestinian territory from 36 per cent of total land area 
in the West Bank in 1966 to 27 per cent in 1984 and from 55 percent in 1966 to 28 per 
cent in 1985 in the Gaza Strip (Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 4). The decline of this 
sector was primarily the result of Israel’s official policy that would provide for “no 
development initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for 
expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel” (Khalidi 
and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 4). Depriving the Palestinian economy of the main two resources 
(land and water) is the primary factor that explains its underdevelopment. As the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2009) noticed, Israeli policies in the 
OPT since 1967 have evolved from aiming to integrate Palestinian economic resources 
(especially land, water and labour) into Israel’s “mainland” economy, to acting to 
marginalize and isolate the economy and markets of the Occupied Palestinian Territory” 
(Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 1).On the other end of the equation, Israel’s occupation 
provides for  
                                                                                                                                                                             
percent of total consumption, it has also prevented the Palestinian community from increasing its water use 
to barely 20 percent beyond the amount used in 1967—and only for personal use, not for agriculture and 
economic development. Since the beginning of bilateral and multilateral negotiations earlier this decade at 
Madrid, Israel has sought to protect its continuing control over this resource in the West Bank, which was 
described by Israel’s state comptroller in February 1993 as the “principle reservoir of drinking water for the 
Dan region, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Beersheba, “and the “most important long-term source in the 
[national] water system.” The water requirements of Israel’s settlements are a small segment of this larger 
mosaic of Israeli exploitation of the water resources in the occupied territories. At a time when settlers were 
barely 10 percent of the population in the West Bank (1987), Palestinian consumption totaled 115 million 
cubic meters while settler consumption equaled 97 mcm. A 1993 report by Peace Now noted that “the 
Jewish settlers’ per capita irrigated areas are seven and thirteen times larger than the areas accorded to 
Palestinians for irrigation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank respectively.”  A November 1992 report by the 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), “Israeli Obstacles to Economic Development in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories,” notes that lack of water has forced Palestinian farmers to remove tracts 
from cultivation and that the digging of new, deep wells for settlements, particularly in the Jordan Valley, 
has caused subsequent shortages for Palestinian farmers. http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/question-3-
2-2   
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immense benefits to be derived from rule over more than one million 
Palestinians: Israeli producers prospered from the conveniently located and 
captive market; employers profited from the pool of cheap, unorganized labor; 
and the resulting expansion of industry and services permitted Israeli workers to 
advance into better and higher paying jobs, abandoning those least desired to 
Palestinian workers from the newly acquired territories (Younis 2000: 145).  
The new emerging conditions after 1967 led to a partial economic inclusion of the 
Palestinian working class into Israeli market as migrant labor on a daily basis from their 
homes in the OPT to their jobs. Opening the Israeli market to the Palestinians from the 
occupied territories contributed significantly to decrease in unemployment rates among 
the population and resulted in a boost of standards of living thus obfuscating the 
economic damage Israeli policies created. It also was aimed at silencing the national 
sentiments of the Palestinians and preventing a popular upheaval against occupation 
(Gordon 2008: 88).  Israel’s initial strategy towards the Palestinian population was aimed 
at co-optation and containment  
rather than seeking to subjugate them violently. At that stage, consent was 
more important than coercion. Nonetheless, Israel prevented the development 
of a viable independent Palestinian economy, ensuring the occupied population 
was heavily dependent upon Israeli imports, Israeli financial institutions and 
employment by Israeli companies” (Snowdon 2010).   
The structural contradiction between employment and its ‘positive’ consequences 
on the one hand and the systematic destruction of the Palestinian economy kindled 
Palestinian willingness to resist the occupation as the consequences of its policies became 
more entrenched. Israel’s destruction of the Palestinian economy had left a diverse strata 
of the population deprived of sources of living. Landless refugees in camps, small 
holding peasants in the countryside who lost their land and/or couldn’t afford the 
competition with the Israeli products, artisans, and small traders, turned into laborers in 
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the Israeli market by the mid of 1970s: in 1970, 49.3 percent of the WB and 60.0 percent 
of the GS workforce were employed for wages. This percentage increased to 57.3 percent 
and 67.6 percent, respectively in 1982. Those workers would have to apply for and get a 
work permit from local bureaus in the main cities in the OPT. Working permits was a 
means to prohibit workers from work any time Israeli authorities or employers saw in 
their interests. More important within this profound socio-economic change is that the 
majority of this new workforce would be employed inside Israel; by 1982 51.1 percent of 
the WB and 63.9 percent of the GS labor were working in the Israeli market. This pattern 
continued until the eve of the Oslo peace process and the late years of the intifada of 
1987. By then  
some 115,000 Palestinians worked in Israel, and unemployment in the 
Occupied Territories had declined to under five percent. These workers, who 
comprised one-third of the workforce in the Occupied Territories, supported 
hundreds of thousands of dependants” (Bt`selem-workers 2010).     
Israel’s policy of open borders between the OPT and Israel allowed the Israeli 
economy from reaping the benefits of the occupation: Israeli producers are now making 
profits from a captive market with low production capacity and a destroyed agricultural 
sector; employers in the Israeli market were provided with cheap and poorly organized 
labor from the territories; and Israeli Jewish workers were advanced into better and 
higher-paying jobs. Palestinian workers were absorbed in sectors and jobs at the low level 
of production (construction, sanitation, farming…etc). Introducing exploitation annulled 
the Zionist credo of “Hebrew labor only” in favor of a more far-reaching objective 
namely, the containment and suppression of Palestinian viability as a people.  Thus until 
late 1980s the result of this “deliberate “integrationism” was increased vulnerability of 
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the Palestinian economy to Israeli economic and political trends. For example, the 1986 
recession in the Israeli economy, combined with the Government’s austerity program 
which aimed to increase wage and price controls inside Israel, had direct and dire 
consequences for the Palestinian labor market, social expenditure, and living conditions: 
This was particularly the case given the lack of domestic Palestinian institutions that 
could regulate the effect of these external factors” (Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad 2009: 4).  
Mechanisms of controlling the Palestinian economy after 1967 were diverse: 
Israel imposed a custom union on the OPT with limited movement of the Palestinian 
labor across the green line, and Israeli investors were allowed to invest in these territories 
mainly in settlement construction and the establishment of industrial zones and 
agricultural projects. Moreover, Israel imposed its own currency (the shekel) alongside 
the Jordanian Dinar and the US Dollar (Zagha and Zalmut 2004: 121-2). Palestinian 
economy was forced to integrate into the Israeli larger and much more advanced 
economy in which the exploitation and oppression of Palestinian labor was paramount.     
In addition to the discriminatory methods applied on the Palestinian workers in 
Israel
96
 and economic repercussions of this process on the Palestinian economy, 
Palestinian middle class was crushed under the pressure of economic changes and the 
Palestinian society was homogenized and confined within their residential areas. Most of 
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 Palestinian workers were channeled to lower levels of Israel economy, mostly to jobs that Jewish 
workers would not take. They were prohibited to form their independent unions and not allowed to join the 
Israeli union (the Histadrut), and Palestinian unions in the OPT were denied representing those workers. 
Moreover, they received in average half the wage a Jewish worker has gained for the same job, and were 
denied a wide range of social, health, and retirement benefits although their wages were subject to 
deductions (20 per cent of the paycheck) that goes to such benefits.  In addition, Palestinian workers have 
been subject to different types of exploitation and abuse; “Not infrequently, Palestinian workers entering 
Israel also fall victim to exploitation by their employers and to abusive and cruel treatment by Israeli police 
officers and soldiers. http://www.btselem.org/workers. 
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them earned their living as daily immigrant workers (Younis 2005: 150). In effect this 
transformation created Palestinian reserves of labor and delayed the emergence of a 
national middle-class leadership of the nascent Palestinian national movement in the OPT 
and rendered the Palestinian working class politically crippled as a result of its 
fragmentation and the conditions of as day-to-day controlled immigrant labor . These 
conditions “inflicted huge costs on the Palestinian economy, it also increased its political 
dependence closures were increasingly used as a political weapon” (Zagha and Zalmut 
2004: 120).  
On another level, this process homogenized the Palestinian society within their 
reserves and henceforth facilitated the rise of national integration that galvanized national 
sentiments and opened venues for mass mobilization against the occupation, which 
contributed to the eruption of the first intifada. The 1980s were the worse for Palestinian 
economy when the euphoria of high income began to regress due to a combination of 
factors: Falling oil prices led to falling demand for Palestinian migrant workers in the 
Gulf States; the economic crisis in Israel, as we indicated above,   led to problems for 
Palestinian workers in Israel as their income had fallen combined with the tightening of 
work opportunities for Palestinians, accompanied by discrimination and abuse. The 
growth of Jewish settlements inside the Occupied Territories involved the theft of 
Palestinian land, damaging the local economy. And Israeli policy became more 
belligerent, shifting away from seeking consent and accommodation. All these factors 
influenced the emergence of the first intifada, the militant rebellion by Palestinians 
against oppression, which started in 1987 (See Hever, 2010). Not less importantly the 
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intifada was a turning point in the sense that the profits Israel’s occupation generated 
from exploiting Palestinian land, labor, and resources and outweighed the security 
expenditures Israel accrued have turned into a costly endeavor. Israel’s approach to the 
population in the OPT would change profoundly into more exclusion and confinement, 
which exacerbated rates of poverty and unemployment. Now Israel would opt to closure, 
permit regime, and high levels of harsh measures and brutality against a population she 
sought its containment and cultivated its co-optation. Therefore Israel’s participation in 
the peace process and the acceptance to establish a Palestinian Autonomy in one level 
was to get read of the burden of the population while sustaining the core of the Israeli 
colonialism: land and resources. The rise of Palestinian nationalism and the perceived 
demographic threat (Zagha and Zalmut, 2004 p128) can be seen as vital elements in 
Israel’s willingness to sign the Oslo Accords in 1993. This would be clear by Israel’s 
change of attitude to the Palestinian labor and the restrictions it imposed on their mobility 
and the high rates of oppression and brutality against the population.  
Thus the organization of economic relationships with the nascent Palestinian 
Authority (PA) was a priority for Israel. The Paris Economic Protocol (PEP) signed 
between the PA and Israel came to replace Israel’s integration of the Palestinian economy 
by mechanisms of control that turned it into a subordinate zone to Israeli economy. Under 
the terms of the PEP the OPT has become part of the “Israeli-Palestine zone” which 
enabled the Central bank of Israel to “effectively oversee the monetary union between 
Israel and Palestine, which is administered by the Bank of Israel alongside a virtually 
toothless Palestinian Monetary Authority” (Daud 2011). and henceforth facilitated 
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Israel’s occupation of the OPT. PEP provisions allowed Israel to monopolies fiscal and 
monetary policies of the PA;  the Israeli central bank determines all monetary policy for 
both Palestine and Israel and the protocols provide no say for Palestinians in Israeli 
central bank decisions. So for example if Israel wants to increase short term interest rates 
it can do so without regard to the economic situation of the Palestinians. Moreover, the 
agreement allowed Israel, as the party controlling the borders of Palestine, to collect and 
transfer PNA taxes and custom duties imposed on Palestinian imports from or via Israel. 
These arrangements rendered the PA “fatally dependent on Israel rebates of customs and 
income taxes…Israel would interpret ‘imports’ into Palestine in a restrictive way” (Zagha 
and Zalmut, 2004: 124) that stripped the PA from important sources of revenue on 
imports to the OPT.   This asymmetry notwithstanding, the Protocol recognized that 
Palestinian would continue to seek employment in Israel and no guarantees provided for 
free access. Actually the PEP gave Israel the right to solely determine the conditions for 
labor movement from the OPT into the Israeli market.   Needless to say that any 
economic union of this type includes labor mobility, this provision of the agreement 
denied the Palestinian economy a vital source of revenue. It also provided Israel with a 
source of political leverage with a crucial magnitude. Palestinian workers’ accessibility to 
the Israeli market was paramount for the functioning of the Palestinian economy. Israeli 
authorities, in disregard of the PFP, imposed restrictions on the movement of specific 
agricultural products exported by the OPT.  
Thus the PEP was utilized by Israel as a means of political subordination and 
oppression against the PA and the Palestinian population in the OPT; in addition on the 
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restrictions on labor movement, Israel opted to frequently delay and then often freeze the 
transfer of tax revenues collected for the Palestinians by Israel , which inflicted huge 
costs on the PA and sinuously undercut its ability to fulfill its duties in paying salaries for 
its public sector and in providing appropriate public services. Israel’s goal is primarily to 
show that the PA survival and political relevancy is in the hands of Israel. Israel has 
effectively undermined the emergence and development of the Palestinian economy. 
Israeli closures, its military order imposed on the OPT, and the most recent control of PA 
economic structures including Israel’s boycott of Palestinian labor  
have turned [the Palestinians] into simply an imprisoned population with almost 
no capacity for economic activity…a situation that is worse for Palestinians than 
Apartheid was for black South Africans” (Daud 2011).  
Indeed, Israeli policies in the OPT were primarily aimed at confining the 
Palestinian population and undercutting its capabilities in order to render it amenable to 
Israel’s colonial expansionism. The development of Israel’s domination in the land, 
resources and economic arenas reveals that Israel primarily aimed at preserving and 
sustaining its occupation of the OPT. As Khalidi and Tghadisi-Rad (2009) put it  
there is no Israeli economic policy towards the Palestinian people or the 
occupied territory; rather there is a policy to maintain occupation and 
administration of the Palestinian territory by whatever means available, 
including economic strategies. 
 
-The invisible apartheid 
Israel’s strategy towards the Palestinian population in the OPT has been dynamic 
and subject to the level of domination Israel accomplished in terms of Land control and 
settlement colonial expansion on the one hand and its ability to suppress and oppress 
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Palestinian nationalism in the territories on the other. The more success Israel achieved in 
its colonial territorial expansionism, and the more the Palestinians showed nationalist 
identification, the more it increased levels of exclusion, oppression and confinement. 
Whereas in the pre-1967 borders Israeli was relatively restrained by its own basic law and 
couldn’t implement total exclusion against its Palestinian citizens, this was not the case in 
the OPT. In 1948 exclusion and domination was achieved initially by the expulsion of 
almost two-thirds of the Palestinians which left a small minority that Israel would be able 
to manage. The OPT has a Palestinian majority and more importantly the social and 
political forces in these territories remained intact to a large extent in spite of the exodus 
that accompanied the 1967 war. Israeli’s strategy of exclusion within was designed to 
render the Palestinian population marginal and irrelevant (physically, politically and 
economically), if not to turn it into a minority on the long run.  Israel took advantage of 
the loose legal framework in the OPT (a range of laws was in place, Ottoman, British, 
and Jordanian) and the effects of Jordanian and Egyptian control of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, respectively to maintain an obscure relationship between the occupied 
territories and the occupier. This strategy allowed Israel to implement a set of measures 
and procedures that would turn the OPT into zones of control; an open space for 
colonization with minimum costs and liabilities. The primary principle that informed 
Israeli policies in the OPT is that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not applicable to the 
1967 territories and henceforth they are not occupied. Rather they are disputed lands. 
Thus Israel recognizes the applicability of humanitarian provision of the Convention 
apart from the right of the Palestinians of self-determination, and denies this applicability 
on the land (Grodon 2008: 26). In this sense Israel’s strategy of separating the people 
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from the land is the overarching principle that informed its strategies in the OP. Focusing 
on a set of laws and ‘legal’ measures, Israel presented its control over the people in terms 
of order and law in an attempt to give it a sense of normalcy and legitimacy to its policies 
and to conceal its colonial nature behind institutionalized and stratified lawful practices.  
-Co-optation and normalization 
Israeli strategy of total exclusion remained a leading tenet in the post 1967 
territories. However, a significant change was introduced to mitigate exclusion of a 
majority of Palestinians in the OPT. In 1970s Israel opted to the co-optation of certain 
segments of the Palestinian society, particularly the traditional elites. Co-optation, 
however was coupled with coercion and oppression of militant forces and organized 
political activities, and aimed at creating intermediaries between Israeli authorities and 
the population not at political accommodation. In this period the ‘stick and carrot’ was 
instrumental in implementing a minimum direct intervention in administering the public 
sphere. However, controlling the population would take a dynamic nature beyond ‘stick 
and carrot’ in conformity to the rise of the Palestinian national movement and the needs 
of Israel’s apparatuses to update its institutional infrastructure of domination and control 
(Gordon 2008: 46, and Younis 2005).  
Israel strategy at this stage was aimed at normalizing the occupation by adopting a 
control system that avoids intervention on a state scale. The policy was to encourage the 
population to carry on their life as usual and to make the occupation invisible (Gazit 
2006). The locus of domination methods resided in the military commanders of the 
region who became the legislator and the executive atop of two military governments, 
276 
 
one in the WB and the other in the GZ and both were subject to Israeli government 
policies. Co-optation was provided by preserving and sustaining particular administrative 
institutions that prevailed in the OPT before 1967. Municipal councils, mayors and other 
functionary posts were reinforced and reactivated along with the preservation of 
Jordanian laws and currency. Setting local administrations in position was instrumental to 
avoid Israel’s direct involvement with administration of daily life. In the GS Israel kept 
the British mandate laws and regulations in effect. In both cases Israeli authorities 
appointed ‘moderate’ members of notable families in civilian posts; a policy that 
reproduced the traditional leadership for the role of intermediaries between the 
occupation authorities and the population in order to maintain calm and tranquility 
(Younis 2005: 113-4). In order to reinforce the policy Israeli government held municipal 
election in the WB in 1972 that resulted in the prevalence of Jordanian-affiliated 
traditional elites. Meanwhile Israeli policy in the GS differed significantly in terms of its 
military coercion stance. This may be referred to the armed resistance that Israeli faced in 
the Strip. The presence of the Palestinian Liberation Army (an army that was formed by 
Arab states following the establishment of the PLO in 1964) and significant numbers of 
armed residents enabled the Palestinians to wage more effective armed resistance from 
within the community. Israel responded with a massive offense during which it bulldozed 
avenues through residential areas especially refugee camps to quell the resistance.  
However, Israeli policies of land confiscation, settlement expansion, and turning 
the economy into an open zone for Israeli exploitation have undermined the traditional 
elites Israel relied on to deliver tranquility and social order. The destruction of the 
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Palestinian economic viability undermined local bourgeoisies’ socio-economic status 
(Younis 2005:146) and increased public disillusionment with their role. Nationalist 
elements of the middle class especially from rural areas and refugee camps with an anti-
imperialist and anti-occupation discourse rose as the alternative to the traditional elites 
(Robinson 1997). This development was faced with Israeli intolerance; no differences 
applied whether in the WB or GS.  
Nonetheless, levels of oppression and coercion remained relatively law.  However, 
Israeli policies in the OPT, particularly the ultimate use of military orders that codified 
Israel’s control in a wide range of areas (including imposing restrictions on movement, 
curfews, and the use of public parks, currency exchange rates, postal laws, and the 
transportation of agricultural products)  (Gordon 2008: 27) led to a wave of protest 
among the Palestinians especially in the city of Jerusalem as Israel  annexed the occupied 
Eastern part of the city, which ignited protest and militancy among the Palestinians. In 
1972 many religious figures and social prominent leaders and associations in Jerusalem 
called for civil disobedience in protesting Israeli measures. Israeli authorities’ prompt 
reaction of deporting 514 leaders indicated its firm intentions to crush any signs of 
resistance. Israeli authorities issued military orders to eliminate political activism and all 
sorts of protest; they categorize all forms of resistance as insurgency
97
.  Israel’s assault on 
the rise of protest did not carry the Palestinians to watch passively even after the 
deportation; they renewed the attempt to form an internal leadership by forming the 
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 All manifestations of political activities or/and national sentiments were subject to banishment. This 
includes political meetings, raising Palestinian flags or any other national symbols, publishing or 
distributing any material with political or national content, singing or listening to national songs, and 
acquiring publications (including books) on other national movements or revolutions in the world.         
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“Palestinian National Front” (PNF) in 1973. The PNF represented the first politically 
organized leadership that was not only endorsed by the PLO but as well had popular 
legitimacy for it encompassed a wide range of political and social forces and for its 
organizational abilities. The PNF presented itself as a political arm of the PLO and 
declared its objective as the establishment of a Palestinian state through diplomatic means 
(Younis 2000: 115) and it managed to lead mass demonstrations and protest in 1974-5 
before it was outlawed by Israeli authorities. 
Municipal election of 1976 and the ‘Land Day’
98
 the same year represented a 
watershed in the shift of the structure within which the relationship between Israeli 
occupation authorities and the Palestinians in the OPT. Adherents of the PLO had won 
the election of most of municipal councils while the Land Day signaled the vibrancy of 
national sentiments within the OPT and inside Israel alike as Palestinians took to the 
streets to protest Israel’s land confiscation policy. These events dealt a serious blow to 
Israel’s strategy of containment and normalization of military occupation and domination. 
Palestinians have shown a high degree national identification that had proven to be 
persistent and to override other identifications. Israel’s non-interventionist strategy and 
its efforts to atomize and neutralize the population failed and the national movement was 
able to mobilize and pose a challenge to Israel’s occupation. 
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 Until today Palestinians in the OPT and their brethren in Israel commemorate the ‘Land Day’ on March 
30th. In 1976 Israeli authorities announced its intention to confiscate thousands of dunams Palestinian land 
in the Northern Triangle. Palestinians responded with mass marches in the Galilee to the Negev. 
Palestinians in the OPT joined the protest in masses especially after Israeli security forces shot dead six 




 ‘Land day’ alarmed Israeli authorities on the degree of Palestinian vigilance and 
willingness to challenge its domination and the 1976 turned to be a millstone in the 
relationship between the occupied and the occupier. The two adversaries would change 
their behavior profoundly in ways that lined the majority of the Palestinians in the face of 
an increasingly overt domination and coercion regime of foreign rule. Israel’s strategy 
would implement a dual system of coercion and confinement on the one hand and 
cultivating alternatives to the PLO in the OPT on the other. Israel established the Civil 
Administration in 1981 particularly to increase intervention in Palestinians lives on the 
level of the state and the government of Israel alongside other apparatuses that were 
already established. The Civil Administration marked Israel’s introduction of its 
sovereign power to control the population.  
With the Likud Party now in power population was reduced into masses that pose 
an obstacle to the achievement of the Greater Israel. The Likud opted to a dual strategy: 
applying a heavy hand against PLO supporters, and attempting to cultivate local rural 
surrogates to compete the influence of the PLO among the masses. The Likud realized 
that turning the population into a politically potent mass is the precondition for the 
success of its strategy. Thus, while Israel implemented an “iron fist” against pro-PLO 
leaders in the cities, refugee camps and towns (arrests, hose demolishing, and 
deportations were ubiquitous) it cultivated an alternative local leadership in the country 
side; the ‘Village League’. The latter policy was espoused to impair the linkages between 
urban political-active Palestinians and rural residents who started to show strong signs of 
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mobilization. This attempt was reinforced in the aftermath of the peace treaty between 
Israel and Egypt in 1978; the treaty incorporated the establishment of a Palestinian 
autonomy within the OPT; which the Israeli authorities perceived as an opportunity to 
undermine the PLO by establishing rural representative bodies and local self-rule regions. 
The Civil Administration was established primarily to carry on the Likud plan of 
founding Palestinian autonomous enclaves. In this respect Israel encouraged Palestinians 
to identify with different local entities (religious, family, clan, and region) and Arab 
identification other than the nationalist which would facilitate their control. The Likud 
sought the total separation of the Palestinian from their lands and their utter division in 
segregated areas. Thus forms of sovereign power were introduced in this period in 
addition to the deployed forms of disciplinary and bio-power that meant to control the 
population as individuals and as groups. Sovereign power was deployed through the Civil 
Administration that had repealed whatever authority Israel allowed municipal councils, 
local/village councils, and Chambers of Commerce to practice. Israel also banned fund 
transfers to the OPT from the Arab countries as means to undermine the leadership 
(Gordon 2005:109). Thus by mid 1980s most city municipals councils were run by Israel 
military officers and Israeli military started to impose collective punishment measures 
such as curfews, blocking towns and villages, and more extensive house demolishing and 
massive arrests especially in the 1982-3. These measures withstanding Israel’s control 
strategies remained in place.    
Although the phase of overt control during 1977-1987 and the high levels of 
oppression and colonization of the Likud differed from the previous phase by the 
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introduction if the Civil Administration and the departure from Labor’s ‘invisible 
occupation’ it sustained and maintained the main features and methods of control over 
the population. Both phases implemented   the strategy of monitoring, controlling, and 
the surveillance of Palestinians that had been pervasive and penetrated every aspect of 
Palestinians’ lives. The General Security Services (GSS, known as the Shabak) played 
the major role in shaping the daily lives of the Palestinians in the OPT; the Shabak 
influence decisions about if, when, and where to impose curfews, who to arrest, 
who to deport, and which houses would be demolished. It was involved in 
hiring and firing of principals and teachers as well as doctors and clerks, and 
decided when to open or shut down schools, universities and charitable 
organizations” (Gordon 2008: 31).  
Another major element of control was adopted by the military institution; the 
permit regime. The regime was introduced in the 1967 and consists of a range of military 
orders, licensing (for vehicles and drivers), registration of business, building homes. The 
permit regime also included other daily activities such as changing address, traveling 
abroad, and for growing certain kinds of fruits and vegetables. To gain a permit of any 
kind was a long process of paper work, paying fees, and interviewing the Shabak. In 
effect the permit regime turned all activities of life in the OPT into a means to generate 
discipline as a privilege that the military commander may revoke under the pretext of 
enforcing the law.    
In 1968 Israel began issuing Identity Cards for the Palestinians at the age of 16. 
The Card must be carried all the times to enable the military to track the movement of the 
people all the time. This regime has been functional in isolating areas in the OPT from 
each other by declaring a particular area a military closed zone; those who are not 
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registered in the area have to issue a permit to enter or exit it. The Jordan valley region 
has been under such a procedure for more than a decade. Moreover, Israel issued car 
registry plates that differ in color from those registered in Israel (blue for the OPT and 
yellow for Israel), and those in the OPT held the first litter of the city or region they 
registered at. The identity-card regime and car registry functioned as a repressive tool for 
the prevention of movement, imprisonment, and collective punishment of individuals and 
groups who belong to particular region or city or refugee camp that carries resistance 
activities.   
These regimes and institutional measures, legal and procedural as they were 
presented have controlled the spatial sphere of the Palestinian social, economic, cultural, 
educational and political lives. Palestinians, in the name of the law were deprived of all 
rights of movement, free enterprise, expression, organization, work, and access to 
resources. Furthermore, the system of control atomized and segregated   the Palestinian 
society in the OPT by means of differentiation; identity and permit regimes. The 
atomization of the population and suppressing Palestinian national sentiments included 
Israeli authorities’ control of the Palestinian educational system through monitoring 
curriculums prohibited teaching and learning texts about Palestinian national identity. 
The only identity affiliation Israel allowed is the identification with an Arab.  
 
 In 1987 Israel’s assumptions on the dismemberment of the Palestinians and 
fragmenting them that would lead to the decline of their national identification were 
blown away as the intifada (shaking off) burst in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East 
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Jerusalem. The intifada also had ignited the Palestinians inside Israel who took to the 
streets in solidarity with their kin and kith in the OPT. The intifada was characterized 
with the high level of popular participation and the democratic means by which it was 
organized; it showed the mobilizing capacity of the national movement and its ability to 
turn the OPT into an ungovernable zone for the Israeli occupation authorities
99
. As such it 
was the first serious and well organized challenge of Israel’s occupation since 1967. 
Under the leadership of Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, Israel tried to smash the 
intifada with "force, power and blows." Army commanders instructed troops to break the 
bones of demonstrators. From 1987 to 1991 Israeli forces killed over 1,000 Palestinians, 
including over 200 under the age of sixteen while 16 Israeli civilians and 11 soldiers were 
killed by Palestinians. By 1990, most of the UNLU leaders had been arrested or deported 
(a total of 418 Palestinians were deported until 1992 including the 415 Hamas affiliated 
persons) and the intifada lost its cohesive force, although it continued for several more 
years. 
The main two effects of the intifada were first that it shattered the status quo that 
Israel had established in the OPT. The normalization strategy and the divide and rule 
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 A full account of the causes and natures of the first intifada of 1987 is beyond the main focus of this 
research. Among detailed scholarly accomplished studies Robinson Glenn E. (1997) Building a Palestinian 
State: The Incomplete Revolution is a leading effort. Also Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari’s (1990) The 
Intifada offers a useful insight from closely affiliated Israeli journalists.  , The intifada involved hundreds 
of thousands of people from all ages and social affiliations. For the first few years, it involved many forms 
of civil disobedience, including massive demonstrations, general strikes, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of 
Israeli products, political graffiti and the establishment of underground schools (since regular schools were 
closed by the military as reprisals for the uprising). It also included stone throwing, Molotov cocktails and 
the erection of barricades to impede the movement of Israeli military forces. More importantly, the 
organization of the uprising reflected democratic elements; the National Unified Leadership of the intifada 
was a broad coalition of political organizations and national figures, and local and regional leadership 




policy failed to turn the OPT into an impotent political zone. As we mentioned earlier, 
the intifada redrew the political geography of the conflict to refocus it on the 1967 
borders. Second, it shifted the center of gravity of the Palestinian national movement and 
the locus of Palestinian political activity from the exiled leadership of PLO to the OPT; 
he intifada had challenged Israel with a strong movement that exists at its doorsteps. 
Therefore Israel responded by deploying a large scale and full assault that was 
characterized with collective punishment and the ultimate use of coercion and sovereign 
power of the state: ordinary civilians found themselves without freedom to pursue even 
the most routine daily activities. Curfews were ordered for weeks and thousands of 
Palestinians were arrested
100
. Schools and universities were closed by the military 
commander of Israel’s troops in and education effectively became illegal and teachers 
and students had to resort to “underground” (or popular schools) classes. Homes were 
demolished without warning, olive trees and agricultural crops were destroyed, vital 
water supplies were redirected to Israel and then water usage restricted so severely, 
people had to queue with containers for hours to buy back their own water. Under these 
circumstances calls for tightening these measures to force the Palestinians to flee the OPT 
arose inside Israel; Israeli Former Military Intelligence Chief General Shlomo Gazit 
(1988: 7) said that these measures were intended so that Palestinians would “face 
unemployment and a shortage of land and water and thus we can create the necessary 
conditions for the departure of the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.”   
                                                          
100
 During the first year of the uprising 1,600 curfews were imposed, so that by the late 1988 more than 60 
percent of the population had been confined to their homes for extended periods of time. I the GS the 
military imposed permanent night curfew from May 1988 to May 1994 (Gordon 2008: 160).   
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The uprising marked peoples’ ability to take the initiative; it empowered the 
masses who turned many areas in the OPT into claimed ungovernable zones, and 
articulated their own civil services to their communities. The sense of empowerment 
changed the relationship between the subordinate people and their oppressor in an 
irreversible manner; as Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari (1990) notice in their book The 
Intifada, “This was a sharp psychological turnabout for a public that had discovered what 
it could do — and how to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses”. Beyond this positional 
achievement, the intifada marked the failure of Israel’s strategy of fragmentation and its 
efforts to turn the OPT into an economically integrated and subjugated area to the Israeli 
economy. It also dealt a serious blow to the normalizing policy that allowed high degrees 
of interaction across the green line, all of which came into a sudden halt. In terms of its 
responses to the intifada, in addition to oppression and collective punishment 
abovementioned, Israel resorted to three major strategic moves: First it increased and 
tightened the permit regime to encompass more categories of the population and to widen 
the criteria of differentiation among the Palestinians. Working in Israel turned into a 
distinguished privilege instead of a right. The new entry-permit (to Israel) was stratified 
to create divisions and to deter individuals from taking part in the intifada or even have 
any connections with activists and/or political organizations. (Gordon 2008: 160-2). 
Second, starting 1990-1991 Israel introduced the regime of closure that targeted the 
whole population of the OPT. The new regime sealed off the borders between Israel and 
the territories for long periods of time in one-way direction: from the OPT into Israel. 
Closure has become the norm in Israeli practices in the OPT and marked the initial phase 
of the complete segregation that would follow in the 1990s and in particular after the 
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Palestinian second intifada of 2000. Third, within the closure regime and increased 
restriction on movement and other draconian military measures Israel launched a massive 
settlement expansion (as abovementioned) and started building by-pass roads (Jewish 
settlers’ only) and constructing permanent and semi-permanent military checkpoints to 
consolidate the lines of segregation between the OPT and Israel on the one hand, and the 
Palestinian population and settlement areas inside the territories on the other. Ultimately, 
these policies led to the construction of the ‘separation wall’ and the confinement of the 
Palestinians in segregated enclaves. 
 
Conclusion 
These strategies withstanding, Israel’s domination and control in the OPT is in 
indistinguishable from the apartheid of South Africa. Military occupation implies a 
temporary or interim phase following a military conflict or war to maintain order and 
security until a peace agreement being held. The main difference between Israel’s 
occupation and South Africa under apartheid is that the latter had been designed and 
implemented as a formal system of racial subordination and discrimination whereas 
Israel’s occupation is originally a temporary situation. However, the practices and 
policies of Israel’s occupation show its planned perpetuation  
in the manner of a colonizing power, under the guise of occupation. It has 
permanently seized the territories' most desirable parts — the holy sites in East 
Jerusalem, Hebron and Bethlehem and the fertile agricultural lands along the 
western border and in the Jordan Valley — and settled its own Jewish 
"colonists" throughout the land” (Dugard: 2006). 
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 Israel’s colonization of the OPT through settlement construction and its takeover 
of the territory and separating the Palestinians from their land and controlling their spatial 
terrain are typical to colonialism. However, Israel’s policies in regard to the people living 
in the OPT have striking characteristics of apartheid in terms of its fragmenting and 
segregationist effects. “The West Bank has been fragmented into three areas — north 
(Jenin and Nablus), center (Ramallah) and south (Hebron) — which increasingly 
resemble the Bantustans of South Africa” (Dugard: 2006). In international law, apartheid 
is a general category of state practices and it is prohibited wherever it occurs. The 1973 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
defines the word as acts “designed to divide the population…by the creation of separate 
reserves and ghettoes for the members of racial groups, the prohibition of mixed 
marriages…[or] the expropriation of landed property” (Peteet  2011). South African 
apartheid “pass system” and the so called ‘influx control’ are a strand of the more 
ubiquitous and pervasive Israeli restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by a rigid 
permit system  and other control measures we referred to above. Indeed  
many aspects of Israel's occupation surpass those of the apartheid regime. 
Israel's large-scale destruction of Palestinian homes, leveling of agricultural 
lands, military incursions and targeted assassinations of Palestinians far 
exceed any similar practices in apartheid South Africa. No wall was ever built 
to separate blacks and whites (Peteet  2011). 
As noncontiguous as this entity will be, it wouldn’t be able to sustain any 
integrated strategy toward services, economic development, labor mobility, and most 
crucially Palestinians could not gain access to water sources already under Israeli control. 
Furthermore, the incoherency of the Palestinian autonomous enclaves will lead to the 
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erosion of Palestinian national coherency. Separated by Israeli settlement blocks, Jewish-
only bypass roads, Israeli military checkpoints, and the separation Wall the Palestinians 
in the OPT will not be able to establish a viable social, economic, cultural, and political 
ties. The PA, already crippled by Israeli measures can manifest only very limited 
administrative capacities, which renders its polity and constituency split and factionalized. 
All of which are essential to nation and state building.  
This state of affairs can hardly be sustained taking into account that Palestinian 
demographic growth in the OPT and their growing sense of alienations and strangulation. 
The enclaves’ population enduring poverty, mobility constraints, erosion of land 
available for residential and agricultural expansion, the narrowness of social spheres of 














































This chapter examines the emergence, characteristics, and development of the 
Palestinian national movement. It shows how the very nature of Zionist and Israel’s 
national-territorial nexus and their domination structures affected and shaped the main 
features of Palestinian struggle for liberation and then for independence and national self-
determination.  
The sections that follow discuss the consequences of international intervention in 
this conflict and the ways in which external forces, through the founding and legitimation 
of religious ethno-nationalism as the founding principle of political practices, contributed 
to the protractability of the conflict. Ultimately the lack of international convergence over 
the question of differentiation and exclusion of Israel domination created ‘Israeli 
exceptionalism’ from the norms and principles of universal democracy. The prime goal 
of these analyses is to show how territorial/spatial legitimating regimes and the 
fragmentation of forces confronting them result in a less likely processes of integration 
and the emergence of unitary entities based of secular democratic-civic norms and 
principles of governance 
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The main argument here is the nature, properties and practices of the Zionist 
movement and the strategies adopted by the state of Israel were determinant factors in 
shaping the characteristics, political thinking, strategies, and the means the Palestinian 
national movement used since the early stages of its formation in the early 1900s. 
However, this doesn’t imply that internal effects within the movement were insignificant 
in shaping the features of the movement and the transformations it went through. External; 
particularly regional effects also have had their influence on the fluctuations and 
inconsistency of the political objectives of the movement at certain turning points in the 
history of the conflict. Palestinians’ strategic inconsistency is assessed against these 
conditions. 
 
Challenging Colonialism and Zionism 
 
British and French colonialism of the Arab East Mediterranean region, Greater 
Syria (including Lebanon), Palestine and Jordan at the turn of the 19th century came to 
disrupt an embryonic but consistently rising Arab nationalism demanding independence 
from the Ottoman rule. Inspired by the writings of intellectuals such as Najib Azuri and 
Abdul Rahman Al Kawakibi and provoked by the tyranny of the late Ottoman rule under 
Sultan Abdul Hamid, Arab elites in the region waged a nationalist struggle for the 
independence of Arab countries (Rogan 2009). The demand for independence has had to 
face the challenge of the Ottoman Empire in its decline and the colonial division of the 
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region as enshrined in the Sykes Picott agreement
101
. The assignment of British and 
French mandate by the Supreme Council of the League of the Nations and its ratification 
in the San Remo Conference came to increase Arab disillusionment of the intentions of 
Britain and France.  
Arab nationalism would rise to challenge both powers in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. 
Palestinian nationalism, as an integral part of this movement in terms of geography and 
identification was caught in a qualitatively different challenge: in addition to the British 
Mandate, the advent of the Zionist movement and Jewish immigration represented a 
complex challenge. Indeed, this unique challenge would determine the peculiar 
Palestinian history that is quite different from Arab history (Said 1992: xxxv). Thus the 
early formation of the Palestinian national movement was to a large extent conditioned 
by the broader effects of Arab nationalism on the one hand and the struggle against 
British colonial government and the Zionist movement on the other. Identification with 
Arab nationalism had a divisive effect among the Palestinians in this period. The rivalries 
and to some extent the conflicts among Arab national elites on the question of 
identification with the Ottoman Caliph as opposed to the visions of Arab unity and 
independence were echoed within the Palestinian elites and intellectuals. Ottoman 
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 Ottoman Empire involvement in the World-War One marked an opportunity for the Entente Powers to 
achieve their imperial ambitions towards the region: Great Britain, France, Russia each wanted a foothold 
in the East Mediterranean Arab countries. For Britain; the dominant among these powers dividing the 
region had to be craved in a way that maintains British simultaneous pledges to different actors. The Sykes 
–Picott (referring to Georges-Picott of France and Sir Mark Sykes of Britain) Agreement was the most 
important. The agreement was signed in 1916 according to which British and French officials drew lines 
for the division of the parts of the region that were coveted by Britain and France during the course of the 
war: France reserved the greater part of Syria, a portion of  Southern Anatolia and the Mosul district of Iraq. 
Britain’s dominion extended from Southern Syria to Baghdad and Basar and the whole region from the 
Persian Gulf to the edge of France’s dominion. Britiain’s also included Haifa and Accer. The agreement 
left Palestine out of the arrangement as a special international regime of its own (Antonius 1939: 244-5). 
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officials played the elites one against the other and henceforth created the chasms 
between the notable families who led the movement until the war of 1948: the Khalidies, 
the Nashahibies, and the Husseinies. However, with the rise of Turkish nationalism, 
repression against Arab nationalist sentiments increased and nationalist demands 
(Palestinians included) for independence became prevalent. Palestinian intellectuals were 
active in the rising Arab nationalist societies such as Young Arab Society (Al Fatat) and 
al-Lamarkaziyya (Decentralization) party. The most prevalent thought was of regional 
nationalist identification with Greater Syria (Bilad Al-Sham) including among part of the 
Palestinians elites. Palestinian Arab identification remained robust until the increasing 
Jewish immigration and British policies gave rise to Palestinian nationalism and “set [it] 
apart due to its confrontation with another people claims to the same land” (Pearlman 
2011: 27) supported by British colonial government.  
The implications of British colonialism in Palestine were more profound and 
threatening as it was intertwined with a unique challenge; the Zionist movement and 
Jewish immigration. In addition to the demand for independence from British rule, 
Palestinians also entertained the future threat of Zionism that was translated into their 
comprehension of the tangible and eminent threat of Zionist Jewish immigration to the 
life and livelihood of the indigenous population.   
Zionism and Palestinian survival 
 
Discerning the effects of British mandate and the influence of the Zionist 
movement on British policies in Palestine remains a difficult endeavor. As Antonius 
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(1939: 386-389) remarks, pseudo-facts, propaganda, and the secrecy with which British 
governments managed its involvement with the Zionist movement, and the clear 
influence of pro-Zionists in the British Parliament created a state of inequality between 
the positions of the Palestinians and the Zionist. Nonetheless, British colonialism and the 
Zionist settlement adventure had increasingly violated the natural rights of the indigenous 
Palestinian population: rights “derived from actual and long-standing possession” of the 
land of Palestine and the uninterrupted connection they have with their homeland that 
goes back to centuries. British colonial policies coupled with massive Jewish immigration 
and Zionist policies threatened the mass dispossession and dismemberment of the 
Palestinians that violated their natural rights. It also violated their political rights as 
indicated in Husain-McMahon Correspondence (Antonius 1939: 390). Violation of these 
rights sprung primarily and most effectively by “Zionist success in bringing Jews to 
Palestine and constructing a nation for them…meant in loss, dispersion, and catastrophe 
for the Palestinian natives” (Said 1992: xxxix).   
British policies manipulated and obfuscated the dual process of constructing a 
nation and simultaneously negating the already existing one. As Hannah Arendt portrays 
it  
After the Second World War it turned out that the Jewish question, which was 
considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved –namely, by means of 
colonized and hen conquered territory- but…the solution of the Jewish question 
merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the 
number of the stateless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people” (Quoted in 
Said1992: xxxix).  
Thus Palestinian nationalism primarily rose in defiance to these violations and to preserve 
these rights and the right of self-determination especially after the revelation of the 
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Balfour Declaration content and the imposition of British mandate on Palestine in 1920 
(Pearlman 2011: 28). The threat increased as the Palestinians witnessed how the Zionist 
movement was out for a Jewish majority and was using the Balfour Declaration, and 
European powers’ complicity as a legitimating base for the establishment of a Jewish 
state rather than a Jewish homeland.  
Fundamentally, Palestinian national movement came into being as a response to 
an existential threat. As written in the Arab delegations response to Winston Churchill’s 
White Paper of 1922: “The intention to create a Jewish National Home is to cause the 
disappearance of the Arab population, culture, and language” (Cited in Sadi 1992: 83). 
British policies withstanding and the Zionist movement creeping control of the land, 
economy and the resources turned increasing numbers of Palestinians into landless 
masses; the reaction to which was the surge of nationalist self-preservation dynamics. As 
Antonius (1939: 397) puts it, the Arabs were  
determined upon defending their own existence as a majority for the sake of 
their existence on the land; when there was no doubt left that the problem was 
fundamentally one in which an aspirant nation from abroad aimed at ousting 
from its secular holding the nation in possession at home. History shows that a 
conflict of that kind, if allowed to develop, can only be resolved in blood”.  
 
Indeed, the nature of the Zionist enterprise pitted the Palestinians in the face of 
what they saw as a colonial settler ethno-national force with exclusive and isolationist 
nature. The threat was surfaced more acutely following British implementation of the 
mandate provisions in 1923: the text of the Mandate reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to 





. Thus the conflict was shaped from the outset as an exclusive ethnic- territorial 
struggle that “underline the existential bedrock on which…our [the Palestinians] 
experience as a people depends” (Said 1992: xiii) which is the source of violence that 
came to distinguish the conflict. However, the years of 1900 to early 1930, although 
witnessed violent outbursts especially in 1920s, were marked with the politics of 
inclusiveness and peaceful protest under the elitist traditional leadership of the 
Palestinians. 
Well organized and wealthiest social stratum, members of notable families (a`yan) 
took the lead of the nationalist movement by virtue of their previous role in the Arab 
nationalist movement and the status they gained under the Ottoman rule. Palestinian 
feudal land-based elite had derived its influence and power from family and clan 
affiliations and patronage networks and political status they gained as intermediaries 
between the population and the Ottoman rule and then the British colonial government 
(Robinson 1979: 1). Notables refrained from mobilizing the masses or taking a militant 
stance against the colonial government or the Zionist movement. On the one hand 
mobilizing the masses would weaken their social and political position, and on the other 
it would undermine their role and threaten the privileges they gain from their 
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 Three Palestinian Arab Congresses were held in 1921-3 with large number of delegates representing the 
country’s regions, associations, and religious denominations. At the time the Arab Congress elected an 
Executive Committee and a wide range of local and regional associations (commerce and municipal 
councils, clubs, and societies) declared that the Congress represents them. This wide support enabled the 
Congress to establish a wide network of communication and coordination that embodied the structure of the 
movement (Younis 2000: 67-68).        
  On the eve of 1882 (the first documented Zionist Jewish immigration wave), the religious Jewish 
community in Palestine (who were as Palestinians as other religious groups) numbered about 24,000 (5 
percent of the population of 500,000). By the conclusion of 1914 (after the second immigration wave) the 
number of Jews jumped to 85,000 (Pearlman 2011: 27). 
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intermediary role such as public employment, responsibility over crucial endowments, 
and the ability to reach to markets abroad.  
The politics of this leadership were characterized mainly by its belief in petition, 
appeals, and delegations to the British government and other European powers. The 
demands were reflected a sound degree of national awareness. As the Third Arab 
Congress of 1921 stated them 
…a national government responsible to a parliament elected by the native 
population Muslims, Christians and Jewish; the abolition of the Jewish Home 
principle; and not to separate Palestine from the neighboring Arab states 
(Pearlman 2011: 34).   
 
The means above-mentioned and the objectives set forth by traditional national 
leadership clearly reflect a certain degree of political wishful thinking:  In retrospect, 
those elites were acting out a false assumption that Britain was standing at the same 
distance between the Palestinians and the Zionist movement. Thus convincing the British 
with the fairness of Arab demands would yield. However, all these demands were met 
with rejection and instead Britain offered a representative assembly as a consultative 
body to the colonial government which the Arab leadership rejected. The offer reiterated 
the commitments of Balfour declaration and granted the Jewish community 
representation on an equal foot with the Arabs (at the time in 1922 the Jewish population 
represented 13 per cent of the total population) (Younis 2000: 58). It is very important to 
notice, though, the inclusive stance of Arab demands. Until the 1930s those demands 
were not ethnically, religiously, or territorially driven, at least the way they are articulated 
in the quote above. To the contrary; the democratic component of Palestinian nationalist 
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demand reflects the nation-state (Qutriyya) concept of nationalism that swept the region 
at the time, as the term ‘native’ indicates.  
Inasmuch as Arab Palestinian nationalists opted to inclusive nation-building they 
were aware of the dangers of the Zionist enterprise that would impede the achievement of 
democratic and parliamentary elected government. In this sense those demands are 
indicative of Palestinians’ awareness of the long-term objective of independence but 
failed to understand the immediate threats of colonial policies and Zionist practices that 
would soon surpass those demands. The effects of the immediate threats and British 
policies would undermine the traditional elite and usher for an era of violence. 
The ability of notables to maintain their status and close relationships with the 
colonial government was conditioned upon their success in providing social order. 
However, colonial government’s policies and the confrontation with the Zionist 
movement undermined the notables and increased popular disillusionment with their 
leadership, as we discussed earlier. The popular legitimacy of the Executive Committee 
of the Arab Congress and its parliamentary, legal, nonviolent tactics was indisputable in 
1920s, as Porath (1975) remarks. However, the increased Zionist influence and Jewish 
immigration undermined this legitimacy and increased its divisions which exacerbated its 
decline. The Notables were divided on the question of nationalism versus social change; 
whereas nationalist elites sought to gain political power through independence without 
changing the order of social relationships, status elites sought to maintain the political 
and the social status quo. Factionalism along these lines would prevail in the hierarchy of 
the movement for decades and would be a major source of weakness and inability to 
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adopt a cohesive and consistent political strategy or organize an increasingly changing 
society. 
Profound socio-economic changes were sweeping the Palestinian society. 
Landless peasants lost their social status and ability to affect the events, while the attempt 
of increasing numbers of them to obtain jobs in the labor market met very limited success. 
Working class was small in number and scattered in small industrial projects, which 
prevented effective organization or mobilization. British non-recognition of Arab unions 
and prohibiting Arab workers from joining the Jewish Union (the Histadrut) left 
Palestinian workers to fend for themselves and left behind by the elites. The latter 
neglected workers specific class demands and the elitist nature of the national movement 
hindered their participation (Younis 2000: 66). Moreover, divisions within the elite found 
their proxies in the social structure, which divided the Palestinian society horizontally 
along regional belonging and vertically along Family affiliation; usually between the two 
main Jerusalemite families; Husseinis and Nashashibis or majlisiya and mu`arada.  
Traditional elites’ hegemony in the Palestinian society during this period prevented the 
rise of political parties genuinely independent from the influence of notable coalitions. As 
Robinson (1997: 7-8) notices, all political parties and institutions of the era were mere 
facades of notable politics with one late exception: the formation of the Istiqlal 
(independence) Party in Haifa in 1932. Although the leadership of the party was from 
notables, it had shown a significant degree of nationalist orientation and militancy. The 
party called for the independence from Britain, the end of Zionist settlements, for pan-
Arabism, and for greater democratization within Palestinian politics. However, the 
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Istiqlal effect was limited and couldn’t change the taming effects of the elites’ politics 
that rendered the Palestinian society less politically organized and harder to mobilize.    
Thus, the Palestinians entered the 1930s; a period of increased confrontation with 
the colonial government and the Zionist movement fragmented and lost between 
nationalist political demands and social exigencies of the rapid change accompanied 
Jewish immigration and colonial policies that recognized Jewish settlements (Yishuvs) as 
self-governing communities while dealt with the Palestinians as Muslims and Christians 
rather than a single nations (Pearlman 2011: 35). These circumstances had significantly 
undermined the political position of the Palestinians in comparison to that of the Zionist 
movement. 
The existential connotations of this asymmetry were materialized as the economic 
base of the Palestinians development lagged behind the Jewish, and the Palestinian 
working class was impoverished and more peasants turned into landless masses, while 
the middle class was crushed and lost political viability. The ultimate result was the 
inability of the Palestinian national movement to exert significant political pressure on 
the British colonial government or to challenge the Zionist movement by tactics of legal 
protest. The prophecy of Antonius on the violent development of the conflict would come 
true. The policies of the colonial power and the creeping Zionist takeover of the land and 
their visible institutional structures that represented a political autonomous entity on the 
one hand, and the failure of the Palestinian politics of petition on the other hand explain 




By 1930s disillusionment with Britain’s policy coupled with the sharp increase of 
Jewish immigration and the clashes with the Jews in 1929 ignited Palestinian resistance. 
The independence of number of Arab countries in the region made Palestinian 
nationalism more assertive on the sought of independence and gaining control over the 
mandate Palestine as their national homeland. Political means of protest became more 
militant developing from demonstrations, strikes, and sporadic violence into an armed 
revolution. The violent events of 1929 especially in Jerusalem revealed the weakness of 
the national movement leadership neither to maintain tranquility nor to change British 
policies or Zionist threat. Masses disaffection and resentment increased watching 
aggressive depilation of their livelihood. In this sense 1929 clashes marked a shift from 
restrained mobilization from above to wide range mobilization from below that was 
facilitated by the aspects of modernization that changed the socio-economic features of 
the Palestinian society (Lesch 1977: 126). Advent social forces within the Palestinian 
society accompanied socio-economic transformations and political mobilization 
(professionals, artisans, and intelligentsia) in addition to peasants, villagers and workers 
who had to pay the highest price as displaced and dispossessed took the initiative from 
the traditional elite. The Istiqlal Party role was prominent in setting the popular stage for 
the General Strike and the revolution by mobilizing and organizing ‘National Committees’ 
in nearly all Arab towns before the close of 1935 (Pearlman 2011: 42). Traditional elites 
decided to jump into the mobilized nationalist wave and established the Arab Higher 
Committee (AHC) that claimed the leadership of an already in-the-making militant and 
increasingly armed campaign.   
305 
 
New political forces changed the structure of social forces in the national 
movement by creating an equilibrium that allowed a certain level of convergence over the 
main demands of the Palestinians and the means to achieve them. Along with the 
continuous British ignorance of the repeated Palestinian demands for independence, 
restraining and stopping Jewish immigration and the dynamics of increased dispossession 
mid 1930s provided a moment of ripeness for the revolution. However, the ability of 
AHC to sustain its leadership regenerated rivalries and fragmentation within the 
movement and between different armed factions which undermined Palestinians’ 
capability to turn the revolution into a political achievement as Pearlman (2011) lucidly 
argues. The AHC, in an attempt to co-opt the revolution in favor of its own interests  
appealed to the British parliament to establish a legislative council for all inhabitants of 
Palestine; a proposal that this leadership rejected in the 1920s as abovementioned. Now 
with the increased consolidation of Zionist colonial settlements the proposal seemed the 
only way to slow it down from the perspective of the AHC, not the revolution and mass 
militancy.  
Nonetheless, the armed revolution engulfed nearly every region in Palestine 
especially in the countryside. The revolution aggravated mostly those wretched masses in 
city suburbs and villages. Political leadership of the national movement, the AHC 
neglected the armed resistance and distanced itself from armed struggle although claimed 
leadership of the broader uprising and the 6 months strike that accompanied the 
revolution.  The strike of 1936; the longest in the history of the region, galvanized the 
traditional leadership of the national movement and the death of al-Qassam; the most 
306 
 
prominent revolutionary leader and the decline of armed resistance provided this 
leadership with a new opportunity to consolidate its position. The AHC soon organized 
another delegation to London appealing for the same demands to which the British 
government assigned the Peel Commission of 1937 to explore the causes of the conflict 
and to present recommendations for resolution. The Commission recommended the 
partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, which the Arabs unanimously rejected. 
The proposal provoked a new round of violence for it envisaged the permanent 
dislocation of a large Arab population to make room for the Jewish immigrants in the 
proposed Jewish state (Antonuis 1939: 406). The Commission, however, noticed that 
Palestinian grievances were the same as those triggered previous protest and disturbances 
in the 1920s namely, “the desire of the Arabs for national independence” and “their 
hatred and fear of the establishment of a Jewish National Home” (Cited in Farsoun and 
Zacharia 1997: 107).  
The revolution and particularly the wide popular participation and the diversity of 
the means of resistance (the general strike, disobedience, noncooperation campaigns, and 
the armed struggle) gave the national movement a strong state of convergence and the 
Palestinian community a strong sense of purpose. The Peel Commission Partition 
proposal embittered the Palestinians and created “a common feeling that they have been 
betrayed” (Cited in Pearlman 2011: 48), wrote Lewis Andrews British District 
Commissioner in the Galilee; the region where a vast majority of the Palestinians were to 
be dislocated according to the Partition proposal. The continuing revolution and British 
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harsh measures to curb it, and the divisions within the traditional national elites put the 
whole country in a state of random violence and chaos at the turn of 1940s.   
 Shaping the ethno-territorial boundaries   
The second wave of the armed revolution that followed the Peel Commission 
recommendation couldn’t sustain under British extreme measures including the 
deportation and imprisoned most of the leaders of the national movement. Not less 
important an effect was the renewed rivalry within the movement and divisions among 
different armed groups. British cooperation with segments of Arab society (local “peace 
bands” formed and supported by the Nashashibis) gives an insight in the effect of 
divisions. More telling was British-Zionist alliance to curb the wave of armed struggle; 
the Zionist Hagana paratroops participated alongside British troops in the fighting. 
Coalitions against the revolution show the extent to which it threatened the political and 
social status quo within the Palestinian social and political configurations, and between 
the Palestinians, on the one hand and the British government and Zionist movement on 
the other. The achievements of the revolution: revolutionary forces controlled most of the 
rural areas by 1938
103
, and a new set of demands were adopted in a clear departure from 
the traditional leadership demands.  
The revolution asserted on economic and political fundamental requests 
“including a moratorium on debts, a rent freeze on urban housing and other claims” 
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The year 1938 was also the most violent. The revolutionary factions took control of large stretches of the 
country and the British troops waged brutal offensive to quell the revolutionaries, at the time with an 
estimated participants of 15,000. The number of British killed in 1938 was 77 comparing to 30 in 1936, and 
the number of Jews killed in this year reached 255. Between 1936 to1938 a total of 5,000 Palestinians were 
killed (Pearlman 2011: 51).   
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(Younis 2000: 62). These demands reflected the emergence of new leadership more 
assertive and conscious of its status as being subjugated and dislocated by the British 
colonial government and the Zionist movement. Moreover, these demands and 
achievements were the ultimate counter-partition plan that Britain adopted and 
represented a serious challenge to Zionist plans. While Peels Partition plan would have 
drawn the ethno-national territorial formation of the conflict, revolution demands aimed 
at empowerment and political independence that would have annulled Zionist project. 
Taking into account Zionist parallel territorial achievements reinforced by a well 
organized institutional structures (Jewish Agency, authorized by the colonial government 
established and consolidated a set of separated social, economic, administrative, political, 
and military organizations and institutions that guaranteed a de facto autonomous settler 
community, Jewish political authority within the Palestinian Mandate government had 
become entrenched as a state-within-a-state” (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 88). At this 
point Zionist Jewish structures of separation and ethno-territorial presence provoked 
Palestinian reaction as a threatened ethno-national people. This emerging character of the 
conflict is yet to be reinforced in the early 1940 by the continuation of violence and the 
sharp increase in Jewish immigration and the overt Zionist military actions against the 
Palestinians and the British.  
The renewal of the armed insurrection in 1938-9, on one level marked the decline 
of Palestinian national movement as it became more random and lacked the 
organizational coherency and united political leadership; deep cleavages hunted the 
movement and traditional elite rivalries revived. The citrus harvest season was also 
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approaching; the disruption of the season would have caused an insurmountable cost for 
the Palestinian economy.  Arab intervention also contributed to the decline of the 
revolution as king Abdullah called for the halt of armed resistance.  The dissemination of 
the revolution escalated under the British oppression that led not only to the political 
quietism of the national movement, but also it weakened the Palestinian society as a 
whole. By the imprisonment and deportation of Palestinian leaders that played a crucial 
role in the fragmentation of the movement, British collective punishment of the 
population undermined society’s collective purpose. Terrorizing the populace by British 
brutality weakened its unity and dealt huge damage to its economic viability (Pearlman 
2011: 49-50).  
On the other side of the divide, the Zionist Jewish community became more 
organized politically as the different factions within the movement came to unify their 
efforts to face the increase Arab challenge. Their military apparatus (Hagana), well 
armed and trained by the British and the British initiative to establish joint British-Jewish 
policing force (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 108) gave Zionist settlers the upper hand as 
the UN resolution 181 was issued. However, British-Jewish alliance would suffer a fatal 
blow as a result of British White Paper of 1939 and its implementation. The White Paper 
asserted that Britain had never intended to create a Jewish state in Palestine, and 
restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine since, according to the paper, immigrations 
rates at the time had met the Balfour Declaration provisions. Furthermore, it pledged to 
grant independence to a unitary Palestinian state in ten years.  The Zionist reaction was 
fierce and immediate: a diplomatic campaign in Europe and the United States coupled 
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The UN resolution 181 launched all-out hostilities between the Palestinians and 
the Zionist paratroops while British was preparing to withdraw their last remaining troops 
from the country leaving the Palestinians to defend themselves in an asymmetrical 
confrontation. The Palestinian society was already drained by the years of the revolution 
that left its national movement and social and economic structures in tatters. By contrast, 
Zionist movement troops were well armed and trained, and their organizations remained 
enact and prepared for an all-out confrontation.  The Zionist movement emerged 
victorious even after Arab military intervention in the war of 1948 that was undermined 
militarily and politically by the political ambitions of Prince Abdullah of Transjordan 
who secretly accepted the Partition resolution. The 1948 events especially the 
establishment of Israel (the Nakba, catastrophe in Palestinian Historiography) came not 
only to formally and profoundly consolidate a system of exclusion created by the Zionist 
movement with the support of the colonial power, but also to announce the failure of the 
Palestinian national movement to thwart its adversaries and their objectives. The UN 
resolution yielded one state; Israel. The Arab state is yet to be established, and the 
Palestinians would endure another major setback in 1967 before they revive their national 
struggle. Meanwhile, the minority Jewish community led by the Zionist movement was 
turned into a majority overnight within a top-down established state of their own. British 
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 The Jewish paratroops of Hagana and Irgun launched a campaign of terror and rebellion that was 
marked with bombings and assassinations against the British. In 1946 Jewish terrorists blew up the King 
David Hotel, the Headquarter of the Mandate government in Jerusalem killing 91 people including Jewish, 
British and Palestinians. The military stand-off between the two parties resulted in the death of 169 British 
soldiers and 37 Jewish terrorists between 1945-1947 (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997). 
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complicity with the Zionist movement and international legitimation of the establishment 
of Israel has turned an otherwise heterogeneous settler colonial society into an ethno-
national cohort and a sovereign state.  
The lost two decades: Re-establishing a captive movement 
The events of 1947-8 and the Nakba destroyed the Palestinian society and 
national life in every respect: The dispersion of the Palestinians (10 percent remained in 
Israel’s proper, 10 percent of the population went to Jordan, 39 percent to the West Bank, 
26 percent to the Gaza Strip, 14 percent to Lebanon, 100 percent to Syria, and 1 percent 
to Egypt) would structurally condition the development of Palestinian socio-economic 
configurations and the revival of the Palestinian national movement. The movement that 
lost its political and armed struggle against the Zionist movement partially due to its 
factional politics would have to overcome geographical fragmentation of its people. 
Moreover, Palestinians refugees -scattered in refugee camps administered by the United 
Nation Relief and Works Agency of Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)- 
were expelled from their homes leaving behind them all means of livelihood. 
Reestablishing their lives from scratch represented another challenge to resurrect their 
national identification and viable social life and political affiliation. Inside Israel, the 
Palestinians faced a unique situation: separated from the rest of the Palestinians they had 
to maintain their social texture and political life facing discrimination and military rule. 
The participation of those Palestinians living in Israel in national struggle was no less of a 
challenge than mobilizing Palestinians in the WB and GS and Diaspora. The resurrection 
of the movement also confronted the Arab increased intervention in the Palestinian 
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question. In particular, Jordan’s control of the West Bank and Egypt’s administrative 
authority in the GS following the Nakba represented another odd situation that undercut 
the ability of the Palestinians to reconstitute their movement in a collective and cohesive 
manner.  Arab regimes manipulated the Palestinian cause for their own purposes and to 
manage their rivalries while restricted, if not oppressed Palestinian political activities in 
their countries especially before the 1967 war.          
Palestinian dispersion and Israel’s rejection of the UN resolution 194 denying the 
return of the Palestinians to their homes was supposed, as the Israeli leaders hoped to lead 
permanently to the assimilation of those refugees in their new locations. This hope was 
not completely unfounded as the Palestinian national movement, defeated as it turned, 
was in a precarious position taking into account the structural challenges abovementioned 
it had to struggle against. The mission confronted the movement was beyond its 
organizational abilities and resource in its disposal: the reconstitution of the Palestinian 
society and its social and national ties; securing refugees’ right of return, and reversing 
the consequences of the Nakba and liberation. Palestinian national movement had to 
resurrect a near disintegration Palestinian national existence (Pearlman 2011: 63); an 
uphill fight that exceeded the capabilities of the Palestinians.   
In exile, dispersal and fragmentation engendered the emergence of competing 
political plans as segments of the movement were co-opted by Arab regimes, others 
sought to overthrow those regimes as a necessary step in the way to liberate Palestine, 
while a third segment espoused the creation of an independent Palestinian movement 
(Younis 2000: 100). Moreover, many Palestinian intellectuals, professionals, and 
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intelligentsia joined political parties and nationalist movements in the surrounding Arab 
countries which increased the difficulty to establish a coherent movement with a certain 
sense of unity and centrality. These difficulties withstanding, Palestinian elements in the 
WB, GS and the Diaspora started to re-organize the movement in the late 1950s. These 
attempts were faced with three systems of oppression and power: Israel, Jordan and 
Egypt; each for its own reasons oppressed Palestinian national sentiments and their 
sought to revive. The instability created in the neighboring Arab countries following the 
Nakba in 1948 (military coups in Egypt and Syria and the advent of Arab nationalism), 
and especially the war of 1956 against Egypt under Nasser provided a window of 
opportunity for mobilization and revival for the Palestinians. 
A new nationalist cohort emerged in GS and the WB that took the lead to 
resurrect and   strengthen Palestinian nationalism around the collective feelings of 
historical injustice, exile, and alienation from homeland. The consequences of the Nakba 
were still fresh in the hearts and the minds of Palestinians. Not surprisingly, those 
consequences were the in essence the ground in which the reconstruction of Palestinian 
national life was planted. Reuniting the dispersed and fragmented population required a 
powerful aggravating centripetal process with a core. Palestine, land and history have 
become the ultimate inspiring core of mobilization of Palestinian nationalism regardless 
of the location, social status or profession. As Anis al-Qasim puts it  
“Every Palestinian was lost…it made no difference whether he left the 
homeland or remained in it, whether he was impoverished and lived in a tent or 
became rich and purchased gardens, or whether he carried a refugee certificate 




Exile, loss, homeland, and return became the main identification elements of the 
re-emerging Palestinian nationalism and identity. The depopulation of Palestine in the 
eve of 1948 and its population with Jewish Settlers resulted in a strong Palestinian 
identification with the land as the ultimate sanctuary of social cohesion and political 
expression of the common identity. The replacement of Palestinians with hundreds of 
thousands of new Jewish immigrants who took their land, businesses, and properties was 
echoed in strong identification with land and space; homeland. Therefore Palestinian 
refugees and the Palestinian national movement saw in the Right of Return a core 
element of collective identification. Return of the refugees “was always a matter of when 
and how, not whether they would return” (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 127) that links 
national identity with the territory, space, and political rights.    
Yet, reshaping the Palestinian collective national identity is one thing and turning 
it into a politically organized action is quite another. Unifying the Palestinians; the 
‘Nakba generation’ and the ‘generation of revolution’ (to use the Palestinian parlance) 
and mobilizing them behind a well-defined objectives and strategy would take almost two 
decades of organization. The effort to resurrect the national movement by the ‘generation 
of the revolution’ in 1950s and 1960s ushered the emergence of new social forces that 
would take the painstaking burden of reconstruction. New conditions coalesced to 
produce different socio-economic and political configurations: the Palestinian population 
was transformed from agrarian rural and illiterate to urbanized, increasingly 
prolitarianized, and literate (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 127). These processes increased 
levels of social differentiation and allowed the emergence of new young educated 
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middle-class leadership that took the initiative in the 1950s to establish the “National 
Liberation Movement” (Fateh). At the time, Fateh echoed the rising nationalist 
sentiments and longing for redress, repatriation, and reversing the consequences of the 
Nakba. Thus it adopted a nonpartisan organizational scheme and took ‘unity and 
liberation’ through armed struggle as the pillars of its agenda. However, the ability of 
Ftah to unite the Palestinians in the Diaspora and those remained in Palestine was 
compromised not only by geographical fragmentation and dispersion but also by the Arab 
regimes’ heavy hand on the Palestinian cause during the 1950s until the Sex-Days war of 
1967.  
Nascent clandestine Palestinian armed groups in Gaza Strip and the Diaspora 
initiated by Fateh in the late 1950s and early 1960s lacked the structural capacity and the 
resources to form a coherent and politically effective institutional framework. This 
framework was provided through a top-down Arab effort to co-opt the rising trend among 
Palestinians to widen and increase armed struggle against Israel. Jamal Abdul-Nasser of 
Egypt held the first Arab League summit in 1964 and announced the formation of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Ahmad Shuqayri.  Fateh 
and other Palestinian armed groups resented the plan not just because they were excluded 
from its constitution but as well for Fateh’s mistrust of the intentions of the Arab regimes 
and their ability to deliver the goal of liberation. Nonetheless, Shuqayri, following 
Nasser’s decision and support succeeded to hold the first Palestinian National Council 
(PNC) in Jerusalem the same year. The PNC as the legislative body of the PLO adopted 
the first Palestinian National Charter and announced the formation of the Palestinian 
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Liberation Army (PLA). The Charter, as the informing document of the goals and means 
of struggle reflected a broadly stated agenda. It firmly cites the Palestinian people’s right 
in his sacred homeland, Palestine and confirms the inevitable combat for the liberation of 
Palestine by mobilizing Palestinian material, military, and spiritual resources in the 
sought of this goal.  
Although both the PLO and Fateh aspired the same end namely, the liberation of 
Palestine neither side spent a serious effort to mobilize the Palestinians masses whether in 
the Diaspora or inside Palestine. Fateh’s approach was still in the phase of underground 
recruitment while the PLO was meant to contain Palestinian mass mobilization. Fateh 
waged a campaign of armed operations inside Israel to show its relevance and the 
weakness of the Arab-led PLO. Other armed groups joined the effort to prove their 
nationalist credentials (Pearlamn 2011: 66).  
Unified by the means of struggle, these groups were divided under the effect of 
Arab regimes’ rivalries and antagonisms: Egypt-Jordan tensions on issues of Arab 
nationalism and the relationships with Britain and the participation in Baghdad Pact, and 
Egypt-Syrian competition to take the lead of the Arab Nationalist movement (See Rogan 
2009: 83-92) split Palestinians on the question of the relationship between Arab 
Nationalism and the liberation of Palestinian. Fateh insisted on the notion of self-reliance 
and the independence of the Palestinian decision; a position that was emboldened after 
Israel’s invasion of the GS in 1956 and the armed resistance she faced.  Contending that 
the liberation of Palestine is the precondition for Arab unity, Fatah gave supremacy to 
Palestinian unity and populace politics whereas other Palestinian-Arab-Nationalist groups 
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preached for the opposite logic. Fateh published its own journal Filastinuna (our 
Palestine) that incorporated the movement’s principles and tenets: as the name of the 
journal indicates, Fateh simply sought to “call to life” the Palestinians and to restore their 
common purpose, the liberation of homeland
105
 through the reconstruction of their own 
movement independently.  
Palestinians were already involved in Arab politics through active participation in 
the plethora of political parties and movements emerged after 1948: communists, Muslim 
Brotherhood, Ba`thists, and pan-Arab and Arab Nationalist movements aggravated many 
Palestinians including those turned in the early 1960s to form autonomous Palestinian 
armed groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Arab parties and movements 
offered the Palestinians a window of opportunity for political expression and identity that 
promised to compensate for the dispersion and fragmentation. Thus at the eve of the 1967 
war, Palestinians in the Diaspora and in the WB and GS were struggling primarily to 
reassemble the pieces of their shattered social, political, and economic, structures and to 
give a sense of identity and direction to their forthcoming liberation mission. The period 
from 1948 until the eve of 1967 was strikingly a period of survival and rejuvenation 
through which the Palestinian national movement could not exert any significant political 
pressure on Israel. The latter consolidated its sovereignty in its proper and strengthened 
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 Filastinuna argued in a language of embittered and angry nationalists that “…hysterical or 
anaesthetizing broadcasts and rousing speeches, the contents of which we all know in advance…The Arabs 
have [bound] the Palestinians’ mouths, tied their hands, deprived them of their freedom of action in what is 
left of their country, resisted the idea of their regroupment, turned them into theatrical claque which 
applauds this and reviles that…We cannot just sob and wail…we cannot just recite our woes and reiterate 
our complains. We must gird ourselves-we alone- to solve our problem in our own way” (Quoted in 
Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 175-6).   
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its political and military structures to a degree where any military challenge from the 
Palestinians or/and Arab neighboring countries would be rebounded.    
 
The rise of Palestinian ethno-territoriality 
 
Falistinuna, cited above echoed Palestinian disillusionment with Arab regimes’ 
policies towards the Palestinians and Fateh’s sought for political representation and 
national revival in the Diaspora and in Palestine. However, a clear plan to deal with the 
differences between the conditions of different Palestinian cohorts in different locations 
wasn’t articulated.  At the eve of the 1967 war Palestinians in the WG and GS endured 
both similar and different experience. Jordanian and Egyptian regimes adopted a dual 
policy of co-optation and suppression: both regimes co-opted traditional social elites in 
their bureaucratic apparatuses as well as in their political institutions in the case of Jordan. 
Simultaneously, they suppressed political expression and organization especially in the 
WB where the Jordanian monarch practiced sovereign powers.   The emergence of the 
middle-class that would take the lead of the national movement in the WB and GS was 
had been crippled by these factors. No socioeconomic profound changes took place as the 
pattern of weak industry and shrunk market persisted. Most of the Palestinians in these 
areas especially in refugee camps were dependent on UNRWA aid and on seasonal jobs 
in agriculture. The merger of the WB with Jordan and opening Jordanian economy to the 
Palestinians made the development of a national movement weaker. The emerging 
middle-class in both areas, however, managed to mobilize popular support, even though 
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slowly, to its radical nationalist and anti-imperialist stance (Younis 2000: 105). In GS 
extreme exclusion from the rest of the Palestinians and the Suez war against Egypt of 
1956 and Israeli invasion of the Strip triggered a stronger armed resistance movement 
against Israel. In the Diaspora, Palestinian armed groups were gaining more ground 
whereas the Arab-led PLO was increasing its legitimacy among Arabs and Palestinians 
alike. Palestinian armed groups, inspired by the Algerian revolution, Vietnam liberation 
wars and Cuban revolution, ignited a new spirit for people’s liberation armed struggle as 
the key to redeeming the lost homeland (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 178).  
The PLO was gathering political viability in a large context due to the 
endorsement of a wide range of popular and professional organizations that were 
established after 1948 in an effort to rebuild Palestinian ties and social structures
106
. Thus, 
1960s was a period of revival and rejuvenation for the Palestinian national movement in 
spite of factional politics, ideological rivalries and Arab manipulations.   The 
Palestinization of the struggle against Israel by means of people’s revolutionary war 
became the motto of the newly formed Palestinian factions (Younis 2000: 107) that 
started to mobilize and recruit Palestinians and Arab cadres to their ranks.  
The war in 1967 marked a turning point in the conflict: now the entirety of 
Palestine became under Israel’s control and the WB and GS have turned formally into the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. The war disrupted a process of Palestinian national 
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 Early 1960s witnessed the formation of several occupational, sectorial, and public organizations that 
subscribed to the PLO and became part of its structures. These organizations were growing in size, 
representation and activities: The General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), The General Union of 
Palestinian Workers (GUPW), The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPWomen), The General 
Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT), and the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), were established 
and represented the main popular backbone of the PLO 
320 
 
revival that was in the making accompanied, and indeed resulted from the reconstruction 
of Palestinian social networks in exile.  The consequences of the war on the Palestinian 
political thinking and strategizing were profound. In the first place it confirmed Fateh’s 
argument that Palestinians could not rely on Arab states to solve the Palestinian calamity. 
Thus the aftermath of the war witnessed immense Palestinian efforts to unify ranks 
especially following the battle of Al-Karameh on the Jordanian soil in 1968 in which 
Palestinian guerilla fighters and the Jordanian army fought a heroic battle against the 
invading Israeli troops that were forced to retreat behind their cease-fire positions of 1967 
(Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 182).  
The Arab defeat in the war and the renewed Palestinian catastrophe has injected a 
new spirit of survival and national identification: “The word ‘Palestinian’ for two decades 
synonymous with the downtrodden and displaced came to conjure images of youth, 
intelligence, courage and sacrifice” (Pearlman 2011: 67). The new spirit gave a 
remarkable opportunity for mobilization and unity as the Arab regimes eased their 
restrictions on Palestinian political activities following their defeat. The late sixties and 
early seventies ushered Palestinian national resurrection which, in the words of Edward 
Said (1992: xx) had been  
a painful reconstruction of an exiled Palestinian identity. The efforts of many 
Palestinian political workers, fighters, poets, artists, and historians to sustain 
Palestinian identity –all of these have teetered alongside the confounding fear of 
disappearance, given the grim determination of official Israel to hasten the 
process to reduce, minimize, and ensure the absence of Palestinians as a 
political and human presence in the Middle Eastern equation.  
The torn apart Palestinians in Diaspora were rising in unity and national pride in the wake 
of a major loss with a collective sense of purpose as a people; the Palestinian now has 
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regained her identity and assured his purpose in liberation of the homeland. In the OPT 
steadfastness on the land and its protection and collective self-restoration were supreme 
goals in the face of Israel’s colonialism.    
More profoundly, Arab defeat and the following events enabled the Palestinian 
factions led by Fateh to take over the PLO in 1969. Yasir Arafat was elected as the PLO 
Chairman by the PNC and a new era of national unity under the umbrella of the PLO was 
ensued marking the revival of the movement within a new structural framework.    Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem in 1967, ironically, 
contributed to the solidification of Palestinian nationalism by pushing them to the wall. 
Israel’s dismissal of the Palestinians as ‘Arabs’ and then as a ‘demographic reality” –
never as a people
107
 - produced unintended consequences; it provoked Palestinians’ 
collective instinct for survival and revival. For the Palestinians their very existence as a 
relevant political entity was on stack. Simultaneously the mobilization strategy of the 
PLO re-established the ties between Palestinians in the newly occupied territories; the 
Palestinians remained inside the Israeli proper; and the Palestinian in the Diaspora. 
Popular organizations of the PLO and the recruiting efforts of the factions within it made 
remarkable achievements in terms of resurrecting Palestinians’ collective sense of 
identity and unity as Lustik notices (Cited in Knox & Quirk 2000: 91). However, the 
revival of the Palestinian national movement was compromised by the lack of 
organizational coherency and factional politics, and strategic inconsistency of the PLO.   
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 In 1969, Golda Meir said that there were no Palestinians and her consultants called them ‘Southern 
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policy sought turning them into Jordanians. Menachem Begin referred to the Palestinians as the “Arabs of 




Perhaps no other national liberation movement has gained the degree of solidarity 
all over the world, especially in the Third World that the Palestinian national movement 
elicited:  
It has been the most successful in obtaining worldwide attention and formal 
recognition from governments and international organizations. It is the only 
political movement in the recorded history that is formally recognized, by more 
governments throughout the world, than its adversary’s government” (Ahmad 
2006).  
This paradox becomes more perplexing taking into account that at the turn of the twenty-
first century the PLO has to struggle not for liberation but rather to salvage a portion of 
the Palestinians’ rights for a portion of the Palestinians on a portion of the Palestinian 
land. This “discrepancy between important political, moral, and cultural gains on the one 
hand, and, on the other, a droning ground bass of land alienation is at the heart of the 
Palestinian dilemma” (Said 1992:  viii). It becomes more striking when we think of the 
ability of the Palestinian national movement to endure despite not only its inability to 
achieve its goals but also to circumscribe the successes of its adversary.  
This section discusses the failure of the PLO to adopt and sustain a consistent, 
coherent and functioning strategy based on a meaningful ideology or vision that is drawn 
from the lessons of confrontation with its adversary since the onset of the conflict. This 
misgiving indicates another failure: the inability of the PLO leadership to grasp the 
complexity and dynamism of Zionism and the nature of its power, and therefore to adopt 
strategies and goals that can challenge Israel’s power and domination. These dysfunctions 
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impeded PLO ability to develop and adopt a coherent and consistent winning strategy 
that minimizes dangers and maximizes opportunities.     
There is a wide agreement among scholars and observers of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict that PLO strategic objectives and the tactics it deployed were distinctly 
inconsistent (E.g. Said 1992, Gordon 2008, Pearlman 2011, Ahmad 1996, Klien 2010, 
and Abunimah 2006). Writers on this topic notice the volatility of the contexts within 
which the conflict developed. Indeed, the two characteristics of PLO strategy shifts and 
the volatility of domestic and regional contexts are interlinked at many levels. PLO 
inconsistent political aspirations and the lack of a coherent blueprint that it may have 
sought persistently since the articulation of the National Charter in 1969 cannot be 
explained apart from understanding certain contexts that constituted and reconstituted 
PLO political thinking until its sharp turn toward capitulation in 1990s.  
PLO Internal dynamics 
The Fourth Palestinian National Council of 1968 adopted the Palestinian National 
Charter (PNCH)
108
 that enshrined the objective of the Palestinian national struggle as the 
liberation of Palestine from the Zionist colonial grip. The Charter articulated the triad: 
“[Palestinian national] unity, [Arab] national mobilization, and liberation (Article 11) that 
                                                          
108
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intensified the main goals of the movement. Articles 1 and 2 of the charter asserted the 
Arab identity of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people. The logic of the 
Charter is based on the linkages between the Palestinian people’s right of self-
determination and the liberation of Palestine (Article 3) as the prerequisite for practicing 
this right on the one hand and the illegitimacy of the state of Israel and the partition 
resolution of 1947 (Article 19) as antithetical to the Palestinian natural right in their 
homeland on the other. Moreover, the Charter annuls the Balfour Declaration and all that 
resulted from its implementation, and rejects the historical claims of the Zionist 
movement in Palestine as anathema to the facts of history.  
The Charter depicts Zionism and the state of Israel as colonial racist entities; 
“Judaism is not a nationality but a religion and Jews do not constitute a single people”; 
rather they are citizens of the states where they live, as the charter states. Therefore the 
Palestinians reject any resolution to their plight short of ultimate liberation of the entire 
Palestine as defined geographically by the Mandate (Articles 20, 21, 23).  
The PNCH, at least theoretically represents the overarching document that draws 
the strategic objectives of the Palestinian national movement. From the articles presented 
above it leaves no room for improvising on the rights of the Palestinian people in terms of 
their homeland, Palestine and the exclusivity with which it perceives Zionism and the 
state of Israel. It represents the conflict as a zero-sum game where Palestinian aspirations 
are linked necessarily to abolishing the colonial presence of the adversary. Although it 
doesn’t include any religious or mythical connotations and justifications, the PNCH puts 
forth the epistemological underpinnings of the conflict in secular materialist nationalist 
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terms. Palestinian nationalism in this sense is the negation of the negation that inflicted 
upon the Palestinians. It is also inclusive and democratic in terms of the definition that it 
presents for the Palestinian as an individual and the Palestinians as a nation; all 
Palestinians are equal regardless of their religious, ethnic, gender or any other affiliations. 
This philosophy was indeed the antithesis of the Zionist/Israeli religious ethno-national 
territorial enterprise.  
However, the PNCH turned into a normative scheme that underpins the 
aspirations of the movement not the actual political blueprint of all its components. 
Taking into account the new facts in Palestine in the wake of 1976 (dubbed the Naksa or 
the catastrophe in Palestinian terminology) and the balance of power between the PLO 
and Israel, the former assumed a maximalist stance in the face of maximalist Israeli 
colonialism.  As the political program of Fateh indicated, Israel’s extreme aggression on 
the Palestinian land and rights should be met with Palestinian extreme measures; the sole 
means of resistance is armed struggle and the goal is to liberate Palestine, the whole 
Palestine (see below). The charter, in a large measure, reflected the political thinking of 
Fateh as the largest, most popular, and most influential in the PLO, and changes in PLO 
political strategy would result mainly from Fateh’s own assessments. Fateh’s hegemony 
in the movement was not friction-free and the way the PLO and its factions perceived the 
PNCH and the goals of the movement within the overarching objective of the Charter 
were crucial in shaping PLO’s politics.    
The PLO after 1969 encompassed factions of all ideological strands; secular 
nationalist (Fateh), leftist Marxist-Leninist (DFLP), leftist Marxist nationalist (PFLP), 
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organizations affiliated with Arab regimes (Sa’iqa, and the Arab Liberation Front) and 
the other smaller organizations. Each of those factions and organizations had a high 
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the PLO; the structural organization of the PLO hadn’t 
included any authoritative leverage over the decisions and actions of those entities. 
Added to the regional and geographical dispersion, the existence of many independent 
factions compromised PLO’s ability to construct a coherent organizational structure of 
command and a consistent political translation of the PNCH. Thus, in spite of the fact 
that the Charter set the broader framework for the Palestinian national movement each 
faction and organization maintained its own political program that challenged other 
programs as a tool of recruitment, mobilization and legitimacy. Ideological and personal 
rivalries especially between the three main factions –Fateh, PFLP, and DFLP- impeded 
their coordination around common goals and means of struggle. The loose organizational 
structure of the PLO that gave each faction a certain degree of autonomy forced the 
adoption of a consensus framework of decision making, which turned the PLO into a 
political system rather than a structure of national liberation movement. The leadership 
could never exercise a degree of monopoly over the national decision that characterizes 
most of the successful national movements of the modern-day, as Helena Cobban lucidly 
remarks (Cited in Pearlman 2011: 7). The PLO lacked the powers of a sovereign entity 
that would have enabled it to enforce binding rules and codes of conduct to compel the 
factions and organizations within it to act in a unified fashion. Decision making remained 
a matter of consensus Twafuq where leaders of the factions (especially largest ones) 
immersed in marathon deliberations to reach a compromise. Competition and rivalry 
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among the main factions and their political perspectives overshadowed the ultimate ends 
as articulated by the PNCH:  
Fateh focused on nationalism as the supreme arena of struggle; avoided social 
questions and class-struggle; and rejected the intervention in Arab host states’ own affairs 
and denounced international armed operations. It defined the Palestinian struggle in 
simple terms; the liberation of the whole of Palestine and the liquidation of the Zionist 
entity. This goal is not the sole responsibility of the Palestinians although they play the 
central role in it; it is also the obligation of all Arabs. Therefore the conflict is not only 
national-Palestinian but also and as much is national-Arab. Fateh also envisioned the 
creation of an independent sovereign democratic Palestinian state that preserves the rights 
of all its citizens on an equal foot, with Jerusalem as its capital
109
. PFLP by contrast, 
called for Arab unity, social revolution, and the overthrow of authoritarian Arab regimes, 
and practiced armed activities against civilians in the region and beyond.  
The political program of the PFLP calls for armed struggle in the sought of the 
right of  
return, self-determination, and the establishment of the Palestinian sovereign 
state en route of defeating the Zionist entity and the liberation of the entire 
national soil and the establishment of the democratic state of Palestine in 
which all citizens enjoy equal rights without discrimination on racial, gender, 
or religious belief, on the way to establish a democratic social society as the 
ultimate end. (italics are mine)
110
.  
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DFLP adopted the “Staged Program” in 1971 that called for the achievement of 
the right of return, self-determination, and the establishment of the Palestinian sovereign 
state on the OPT of 1967. On the long run the DFLP espoused the establishment of a 
democratic secular state in all Palestine
111
.  The DFLP agreed with the PFLP in the 
necessity to thwart ‘reactionary’ Arab regimes but it shunned the nationalistic stance of 
the PFLP and called for a strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist principle, and took the side 
of Fateh in rejecting armed struggle against civilians or international operations. The one 
can’t but notice the striking similarities of these programs as to the general goals of the 
movements and their differences on the milestones to achieve on the road. 
The paradox that PLO leadership confronted was that in order to maintain unity as 
a categorical imperative it has had to accommodate all factions and tolerate ideological 
rivalry; unity in this context hindered the achievement of a consistent national strategy, a 
political blueprint, and stable alliances. Under these organizational circumstances politics 
within the PLO became increasingly contentious especially on the two issues of the 
relationships with Arab regimes and the acceptance of diplomatic initiatives to reach a 
political settlement to the conflict. Fateh, has been able to shift the strategy of the PLO 
not by virtue of internal institutional processes of decision making deliberations; rather 
by resorting to its hegemonic political position, its popularity, and its ties with Arab 
regimes. The rule of consensus was compromised dramatically after PLO departure from 
Lebanon in 1982; Yassir Arafat opted to a majority decision making process ignoring 
criticism of other organizations in the movement. Although in the 1970s Palestinian 
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internal rivalries and disagreement created serious cleavages within the PLO, the unity of 
the movement took a supreme imperative. In the aftermath of 1982 expulsion and the 
from Lebanon factional contentious politics turned into a divisive stance that reached a 
climax in 1992-3 when the PLO signed the Oslo Accords against the will of most the 
factions within and out of the PLO. There is nothing indicative of the effects of Arafat 
and Fateh’s hegemony than changing the PNCH in 1996, which officially changed the 
underpinnings of the PLO as a national liberation movement as we discuss below.  
        
   Regional and international dynamics 
The fact that the PLO was formed and based in the exile and that the main bulk of 
its constituency lived in the refugee camps in the countries surrounding Palestine made 
the movement vulnerable to regional politics and Arab states’ rivalries. Soliciting Arab 
hosting regimes’ acceptance to operate among Palestinian refugees and using their 
territory as a base required the PLO and different factions within it to modify their 
policies and discourse in accordance with regimes’ considerations and sensitivities.  
Regional politics of the 1960s were an arena of pacts and counter-pacts in which rising 
nation-states (Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) sought a supreme status. The 
PLO was caught in the middle of these power circles without gaining a strategic and 
stable ally among those powers. Quite the opposite, PLO suffered serious strategic 
setbacks as a result of the animosities and conflicts with those powers (Said 1992: x-xiii). 
In Jordan; the first and closest base to Palestine the PLO and its factions was involved in 
an armed conflict with the ruling monarchy following PLO attempt to impose 
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revolutionary authority alongside the government. The military confrontation of 1970 
that was decisive in determining which party has the upper hand and in solving what 
came to be known as a “dual authority” ended with PLO defeat. Leftist organizations 
(PFLP and DFLP) were adamant on the necessity to overthrow the Jordanian regime 
while Fateh opposed it and called for focusing on the struggle against Israel. Although 
the PLO did not trust the regime in Jordan as competing and disputing the legitimate 
representation of the Palestinians, the lack of unity and agreement on a strategy triggered 
the military confrontation in Jordan (Pearlman 2011: 75). Fateh’s position was taken by 
the DFLP and PFLP as a verification of their earlier criticism of Fateh as abandoning the 
principle of revolutionizing the Palestinians and Arabs that is necessary for the long term 
struggle against Israel. They accused Fateh of having vested interests in allying with 
reactionary Arab regimes (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 193).  
The confrontation with the Jordanian regime resulted in major strategic loss of the 
most important, widest, closest to Palestine and most populated area of Palestinian 
refugees. The PLO had relocated in Lebanon where it was more successful in establishing 
its status as a political power in internal Lebanese politics. The weak state in Lebanon 
enabled the PLO in 1969 to strike an accord with the Lebanese government that granted 
the latter control over the refugee camps and the right to wage armed struggle against 
Israel from southern Lebanon. For the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon this was a source 
of relief after years of oppression by the Lebanese security apparatuses and 
discrimination as they were treated as “alien residents”. The PLO consolidated its 
position in Lebanon vis-à-vis the government by building a resistance coalition with 
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Lebanese progressive movements creating an atmosphere of revolutionary sentiments 
that gave boost to armed operations against Israel. However, this interference coasted the 
PLO another heavy political and strategic price when it involved in a long and bloody 
Lebanese civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1981(Younis 2000:159-161, Farsoun and 
Zacharia, 1997:184-5, and Pearlman 2011: 74-76) and resulted in complicating the 
relationship between the PLO and the Syrian regime, and the increase of mistrust and 
animosity between the Palestinian national movement and Jordan.    
Regional development in the 1970s introduced opportunities and restraints to the 
Palestinian national movement. Arab military offensive against Israel in the 1973 war 
coupled with Arab ‘oil embargo’ against Western states revived Palestinians’ hopes and 
expectation for the liberation of their homeland. The war showed Israel’s vulnerability 
but also revealed the limits of Arab military power and their political willingness to 
challenge Israel’s great power ally; the U.S.A.  Under the pressure of the American 
diplomacy Arab combatants signed cease fire agreements with Israel. The agreements as 
well as the resulted UN resolution 338
112
 sidelined the Palestinian element of the conflict 
and offered Israel a de facto recognition by Arabs who accepted the resolution as the 
basis for solving the conflict. For the first time since 1948 Egypt, Syria, and Jordan 
accepted UN invitation to participate in the Geneva peace conference alongside Israel. 
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 In response to the Ramdan War (Yum Kipor in Israeli historiography) in which Egypt, and Syria 
initiated a surprising war against Israel, the UN Security Council issues the resolution 338 of October 1973. 
The resolution  includes three articles distinguished with a strong language to stop the war and start peace 
negotiations based on resolution 242 of 1967: it called all the parties to “cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, not later than 12 hours” after the adoption of the resolution. The resolution 
also called the parties to start implementing resolution 242 in all its parts right after cease fire. The Security 
Council also “Decid[ed]  that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start 
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in 
the Middle East” (http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/288/65/IMG/NR028865.pdf?OpenElement).       
332 
 
UN resolutions 242 and 338 ignorance of the Palestinians and their rights was further 
entrenched by Israeli refusal of PLO participation in the conference. More to the 
resentment of the PLO, the USA refloated the idea that Jordan was the representative of 
the Palestinian people. Under the pressure of these critical diplomatic developments the 
PLO, to the resentment of the PFLP and other smaller organizations and under through a 
coalition between Fateh and the DFLP, supported by delegates from the West Bank and 
Gaza strip -participating for the first time in PNC meetings- took the first and major 
strategic shift of its agenda in both the objectives and the means of the struggle.  
  In the 1974 Twelfth Meeting of PNC the PLO adopted a new strategy that 
abandoned the goal of a ‘democratic’ secular state and the liberation of Palestine in favor 
of establishing a Palestinian ‘national authority’ on any liberated part of Palestine. The 
10-Point Transitional Program in Point 1 reconfirmed the PLO rejection of UN resolution 
242 and in Point 2 called for the establishment of a national authority in any Palestinian 
areas liberated from or evacuated by Israel as a ‘phased’ plan en route to total liberation. 
The new blueprint also endorsed the use of all means of struggle and thus sanctioned the 
resort to diplomatic alongside armed struggle to achieve this goal and reiterated the PLO 
commitment to achieve all Palestinian legitimate rights especially the right of return
113
.  
Arab regimes pressure and their new strategy compelled the PLO to make a profound 
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The PNC, in the introduction of the decisions taken in the meeting confirmed the drivers of the shift in 
policy as “the new political developments and circumstances emerged in 1972-3 (referring to the 1973 war). 
It is important to notice that the PLO in order to show that the new strategy does not imply capitulation 
included articles that confirm the refusal of any political initiatives that provide Israel with recognition or 
grant it secure borders or reconciliation and reaffirmed its commitment to achieving all Palestinian rights 
especially the right of self-determination (From the official website of the PNC).     
http://www.palestinepnc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=542%3A2011-06-27-09-
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transformation from a guerrilla revolutionary movement to a political and they rewarded 
this transformation by the recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people in the 1974 Arab League summit in Rabat 
(Morocco). PLO quest for recognition made another breakthrough following this shift; 
the UN granted it observer status. In a deeper level, this shift marked the beginning of a 
redefinition of the PLO as a national liberation movement.  
 
The involvement of the PLO in the diplomatic processes that aimed at a political 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the consequences of the 1967 war implied 
the de facto transformation into a national independence rather than a national liberation 
movement. This question, however, was not answered fully as Said (1992 p134) until the 
current day as the PLO is still oscillating between its inability to achieve neither objective. 
Thus in 1977 the PNC clarified the 10-Point Program of 1974 by stating that the 
‘national authority’ objective means the acceptance of a state in these borders. The PLO 
went further to show its willingness to coexist with Israel: leaders of the PLO started 
holding meetings with Israeli peace activists and initiated indirect dialogue with the 
United States (Pearlman, 2011 p86). Two major events at the turn of 1970s reinforced the 
transformation of the PLO and its explicit acceptance of the two-state solution, with the 
implicit recognition of Israel: First, The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 under the 
auspices of the U.S.A. The treaty changed significantly  the regional balance of power in 
favor of Israel the treaty ushered by depriving the Arabs, and the Palestinians in 
particular, the most militarily powerful state that could challenge Israel and deter its 
334 
 
aggression (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 203). Moreover, the provisions of the treaty on 
the Palestinian question endorsed Israel’s –particularly the Likud- vision that espoused 
creating Palestinian autonomy within populated areas in the OPT (autonomy over the 
population not the land). Second, Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 that led to the 
departure of the PLO from Lebanon and to moving its headquarter to Tunisia while the 
most of the military infrastructure of the Palestinian organizations and the PLO was 
depilated and the remnants of it were dispersed in different Arab states. Now the balance 
of power between Israel and the PLO witnessed a new level of asymmetry in favor of 
Israel. The military threat of the PLO through the Lebanese borders was curtailed to a 
large extent and the political viability of the PLO and its ability to maintain relevancy 
were significantly undermined.  
The rapid decline of the PLO contributed to the PLO unified acceptance of the 
Fez Arab League summit peace plan of 1983. The plan specified the terms for achieving 
peace in the Middle East as the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the 
WB and GS. It also confirmed the right of all states, including the proposed Palestinian 
state, to live in peace and security (Ibid p203). The Arab peace initiative virtually adopted 
the basic elements of the Saudi King Fahd’s ‘Eight-Points Plan’ of 1982
114
.  The Fez plan 
implicitly recognized the state of Israel. Development of this magnitude was welcomed 
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 The elements of the plan were familiar, and loosely based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338: Israel to 
withdraw from 1967-captured territories, including East Jerusalem (but not the whole city), dismantling of 
settlements, recognition of the PLO as the Palestinian representative, establishment of an independent 
Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital, and secure guarantees of peace. Fahd’s plan was not popular 
at home with the Saudi intelligentsia, middle class, and clergy who were strongly critical of any proposal 
that recognized Israel. http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_fahd_1981.php 
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by the United States as a breakthrough while rejected by Israel who was at the time 
battling its way on the Lebanese soil to reach Beirut. 
Israeli continuous military invasion of Lebanon undercut the Fez peace plan. However, 
the consequences of PLO departure from Lebanon were yet to be translated into more 
shifts in Palestinian political behavior in the same direction. The 16th PNC meeting in 
February 1983 accepted the Fez peace plan as the minimum requirement for Arab 
political strategy; it also noticed the positive aspects of President Regan plan for peace 
that he initiated at the wake of the Lebanese war. However, the PNC dismissed Regan 
plan as inadequate for achieving a just and durable solution for the Palestinian cause. 
Israeli and U.S.A ignorance of the Fez peace initiative and PLO new stance coupled with 
the deterioration of PLO in this period and the financial crisis it endured pushed the 
leadership, Yassir Arafat and Fateh in particular to seek a political and diplomatic revival. 
For this leadership sustaining the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people had become an end in itself and sustaining its role as an accepted 
player in the region became a priority. Ignoring internal huge opposition
115
, Arafat 
continued his diplomatic endeavor and reached an agreement with King Husain of Jordan 
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 PLO sense of threat on its own survival and political relevancy as a main actor in region’s politics can 
be noticed in the language and the substance of the 16th PNC decisions. The PNC stressed “the rejection of 
all plans that aim at undermining PLO right in representing the Palestinian people” and reiterated the 
centrality of sustaining “the independent Palestinian decision” (Official website of the PNC). 
http://www.palestinepnc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=556&Itemid=345&lang=ar 
In 1983-4 the PLO was divided as never before; the internal consequences of PLO strategic shift after 1982 
were manifested in polarizing political forces along the entire spectrum of Palestinian factions and 
organizations within and outside the PLO. The PFLP, DFLP, and other factions formed the Democratic 
Alliance that opposed Arafat’s leaning towards Jordan and advocated a policy of alliance with Syria. 
However, they maintained their position of sustaining the unity of the PLO. The PFLP-General Command 
of Ahmad Jebriel, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Fateh defectors (the Revolutionary 
Council) and the Sa`iqa (all of which Syria’s allies) formed the “National Alliance” and rejected the PLO 
under Arafat’s leadership. Arafat and Fateh remained the major block in the PLO (Pearlman 2011: 90).   
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in 1984. Amman Accord announced Jordan-PLO a comprehensive peace in exchange for 
withdrawal from the OPT. The Accord deepened the chasm within the PLO; all 
opposition organization apart from the DFLP and the West Bank-based Communist party 
(later on the Palestinian People’s Party PPP) came to form the “Palestinian National 
Salvation Front” as the alternative to the PLO. For those Arafat’s explicit acceptance of 
the two-state solution was nothing less than treason. The main opposition organizations, 
the DFLP and the PFLP boycotted the next meeting of the PNC that rectified Amman 
Accord. The PLO would remain divided and the PNC wouldn’t be assembled again until 
1987 when the Palestinian intifada in the OPT erupted; the later development was another 
turning point in the history of the PLO and the Palestinian strategic political thinking.    
The intifada: restoring ethno-territoriality 
The accumulated experiences of the national movement in the OPT and Israeli 
occupation policies created the background for the revival of Palestinian nationalism. 
One of the main consequences of Israel’s occupation is that it rekindled national 
awareness of those Palestinians who became under its direct military rule as a people 
bound to other Palestinians in Israel and the Diaspora with a distinguished connection. 
They are not any more the ‘Arabs’ Israel expelled and dispossessed, now they reemerge 
under Israeli oppression as nationalist and patriot Palestinians (Sadi 1992: 137) whose 
self-consciousness re-emerged and consolidated particularly in the face of Israeli 
negation and ignorance. This consciousness had been gradually translated to political 
actions in the OPT, as we discussed earlier, by early 1970s. Israeli policies and regional 
developments abovementioned drove people en mass to identify with the PLO and 
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different factions under its umbrella. Socio-economic transformations of the Palestinian 
society in the OPT that sprung from Israeli policies contributed significantly to the rise of 
nationalism: Robinson (1997) notices that Palestinian labor in Israeli market and 
employees’ remittances from expatriate and refugee Palestinians in the Gulf raised living 
standards for many Palestinians. Real GDP increased by 1119.5 percent in the WG and 
86.4 percent in the GS from 1967-1987.  
These changes undermined the traditional social base of affiliation; conservative 
and patron-client social structures waned and replaced with growing middle-class 
configurations. Inequality, Palestinian labor working conditions in Israel, subjugating 
Palestinians to oppression and taxes…etc created a ripe soil for political activism and 
militancy against Israel’s occupation.  The mobilization effort and success gave the 
movement more confidence and opened the eyes of the exile leadership on the crucial 
role of mass mobilization and organization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fateh, 
following the example effort of leftist organizations, had involved in the establishment of 
mass organizations for students, women, workers, artisans, teachers…etc. Mobilizing the 
masses through these politically-oriented and top-down-led organizations in the 1970s 
and 1980s had created the organizational structure within which the intifada of 1987 took 
place. The role of the “inside” (Ad-Dakhil) is not any more perceived in terms of 
steadfastness but also as crucial in resistance to occupation through direct actions and 
militancy (Pearlamn 2011: 96). Although factionalization and rivalry of the PLO were 
transferred to these popular frameworks as Younis (2000: 168) notices, the pressure and 
daily confrontation with Israeli system mitigated the effects of fragmentation. The 
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flourishing mass organizations contributed to the rise of democratic norms of leadership 
and participation that gave the movement more political relevance and strength in 
challenging Israeli domination and rule by establishing the power of people. Gaining a 
political and moral leverage over Israel’s occupation would reach its peak in 1987 with 
the onset of the Intifada.   
This pattern of national mobilization and political militancy was deepened in 
response to main two events that ignited Palestinian protest: the Israeli-Egyptian Camp 
David peace treaty and Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Camp David peace 
treaty sidelined the Palestinian question and reduced the rights of the Palestinians to mere 
“autonomy” (or self-rule) over the population. By ignoring the PLO Israel, Egypt, and the 
U.S.A stroke a deal on behalf of the Palestinians while excluding their representative. 
Thus the Palestinian question was left to Israeli own discretion. Palestinians were left to 
the Likud aggressive colonial policies were escalated as Begin now had a free hand to 
conquer his ideological precepts. Israel colonial machine, now under the supervision of 
Erik Sharon (a minister in Begins Cabinet), was unleashed to construct a network of by-
pass roads, settlements, and military bases on the purpose of confining Palestinians. 
Ultimately, this process was creating a continuous Zionist presence in the OPT and a 
discontinuous Palestinian existence. Autonomy plan coupled with Likud’s colonial 
offensive  
left in the minds of the Palestinians that the autonomy could never become 
anything more than a carefully regulated, minutely controlled reservation for 
confining them, and an authority on Palestinian nationalism…for eliminating 
their national aspirations” (Said 1997: 207).  
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It further created a sense of abandonment and neglect by the most powerful Arab 
state that was until recently the vanguard of Arab nationalism and Palestinian rights. The 
treaty triggered a wave of demonstrations that Israeli security forces curbed forcefully; 
killing protesters, imposing curfews, and mass arrests were used to silence the protest.       
Related to the Camp David treaty, as Begin felt the free hand and taking the 
opportunity of sidelining the Egyptian balancing power, Israel initiated its war on the 
PLO in Lebanon in 1982. Accompanied the war an Israeli massive and harsh oppression 
in the OPT against the GNC and the upheaval that erupted in protest of Israeli military 
assault in Lebanon. As we discussed above, the war left the PLO in a political and 
organizational debacle that was exacerbated by the divisions within its ranks. Arab 
political and financial support to the PLO also declined significantly in the years 
following the war
116
: the Arab summit of 1987 ignored the Palestinian issue altogether in 
its deliberations. It was the first time since the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 
that the Palestinian question did not dominate the Arab political agenda, which alarmed 
the Palestinians especially the PLO for the necessity to take action in order to restore its 
status as major player in the region. These developments positioned the OPT as the main 
arena for the PLO to reconstruct its political viability and to revive Palestinian ability to 
sustain the Palestinian question as a core, if not the core issue in the turbulent Arab 
region in the 1980s.    
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 The decline of Arab financial support to the PLO can be seen as a result of the economic crisis of the 
1980s that stemmed from the decline of oil prices; oil prices that plummeted from a high of $42 per barrel 
in 1982 to $8 in 1986. Arab and world exporting countries were in serious economic retrenchment and 
recession. PLO main source of financial aid was seriously decreased. Moreover, Arab regimes were 
preoccupied with Egypt’s exit from the Arab politics and Arab league following its peace treaty with Israel 
and the Iraqi-Iran war. Lebanese continuing civil war was still a main issue in Arab politics. All these 
issues contributed to the Arab position in the summit (Farsoun and Zacharia 1997: 204).   
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Palestinian vigilance and willingness to mobilize and organize in the OPT 
following the political objectives of the PLO was the last resort of the PLO leadership 
now operating from Tunisia; a decisive challenge that required restoring the movement’s 
unity and political/diplomatic relevance.  The split in the PLO following Amman Accord 
and the devastating internal armed conflict within Fateh left the whole movement in 
disarray (Younis 2000: 162). In short, the very legitimacy of the PLO was on stack. 
Under these conditions reliance on the role of the Palestinians in the OPT became 
paramount, which entailed shifting the emphasis and political and operational energies 
from the Diaspora to the interior (ad-dakhil). The shift changed the political map of the 
conflict whereby the main arena of confrontation would be inside Palestine
117
. The 18th 
meeting of the PNC in April 1987 -5 months before the eruption of the intifada- restored 
the unity of the PLO especially after dismissing Amman Accord. Retaining Palestinian 
consensus on the challenges and objectives of the struggle in this period reawakened the 
PLO and reinforced its popular support among the Palestinians especially in the OPT. 
The meeting reassured the “commitment to achieving the immutable national rights of the 
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 From my own observation of the atmosphere in the OPT in the mid 1980s as an undergrad in An-Najah 
National University in the city of Nablus and a political activist I can register the euphoria of national 
revival. The war in Lebanon, and particularly Israel’s siege of Beirut and the heroic resistance of the 
Palestinian factions and PLO and the Lebanese nationalist forces ignited the masses in the OPT. The image 
of Palestinian freedom fighters in Lebanon captured the minds and hearts of the people and provoked 
action. PLO’s debacle in Lebanon and Arab silence while Beirut was under Israeli assault especially in the 
wake of the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila had outraged people and 
created a fertile soil for mobilization and recruitment. Simultaneously, Israeli occupation authorities 
launched a massive security campaign to undercut the increasing wave of nationalism; arrests on a large 
scale, house demolishing, curfews were deployed. Collective punishment had become the norm especially 
in response to stone-throwing and cocktail bomb attacks. In 1985 Israel revived the efficacy of the British 
emergency law of 1945 that gives local military commanders wide range of jurisdiction to enact all kinds of 
procedures against the population including shutting down schools and universities. The latter were 
targeted in specific for students’ leading role in the events. Relying on the 1945 law Israel detained and 
deported 10s of activists and kept hundreds under Administrative Detention for indefinite periods of time. 
Israel’s draconian measures only increased resentment and willingness to militant confrontation among 
increasing numbers of Palestinians especially the youth.   
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Palestinian people”. It also reconfirmed that “the PLO is the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people” and the rejection of intervening in Palestinian 
own affairs and/or the attempts to create an alternative to the PLO. Alluding to the Camp 
David treaty, the PNC reiterated the rejection of UN resolution 242 and all other plans 
that aim at the liquidation of the Palestinian cause
118
. 
Thus the moment was ripened in 1987 for a mass uprising. The intifada itself 
reflected the overwhelming sense of unity and political strength generated by the 
restoration of Palestinian common goal as the achievement of national self-determination. 
The degree of organization and militancy of the intifada gave the Palestinian national 
movement the first and most important achievement since the 1948: it gained political 
leverage over Israel. Israel was not able to curb the uprising regardless of the extreme 
measures it took, which raised questions within Israeli polity and society on the  
political, moral and economic costs of upholding the occupation…It became clear 
that the existing forms of control were not producing the desired calm and that 
another strategy was needed” (Gordon 2008: 169).  
Political leverage the Palestinians gained was primarily and to a large extent the 
result of the convergence of Palestinian struggle against Israel’s occupation. Convergence 
was evident on two main levels: political and organizational. 
On the political level the intifada reaffirmed the oneness of the Palestinian people 
in Palestine and the Diaspora under the leadership of the PLO. Thus it gave credibility 
and vibrancy to the PNC resolutions few months before its onset. Slogans and periodic 
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communiqué of the National United Leadership of the Intifada (NULU) stressed the 
Palestinian people’s right in self-determination, the right of return and the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state in the OPT. The NULU also reasserted that the PLO is 
the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; this was the consensus as 
90 percent of the Palestinians in the OPT claimed the PLO as their representative 
according to polls (Pearlman 2011: 101).These objectives and proclamations echoed the 
pillars of the PLO strategy thus far. The NULU expressed the popular will of the vast 
majority of the Palestinians in the WB and GS who demanded an end to the Israel’s 
military occupation of their land. The intifada united the “inside”, the “outside”, the 
factions, the society en mass, and the political leadership behind single and clearly 
articulated demands for the first time. 
On the organizational level the intifada turned almost instantly from outrageous 
upheaval to a very well organized effort with levels of command and popular institutions 
under the NULU. The ability of NULU to establish the organizational elements of the 
uprising was not surprising taking into account the years of mobilization and organization 
of popular committees and organizations, as we discussed above. In the words of Joost 
Hilterman who was in the city of Ramallah at the time  
remarkable… that the entire population could be mobilized simultaneously, and However, 
NULU was remarkable in terms of its ability to create a vertical hierarchy that 
encompassed the main components of PLO factions in the OPT (Ftaeh, PFLP, DFLP, 
PPP) and prominent social figures.  
A horizontal structure for popular participation and organization was established 
by constructing the “Popular Committees of the Intifada” (PC) in every city, village, 
refugee camp, and in neighborhoods within these residential areas. Thus the NULU, 
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being in direct connection with PLO leadership in Tunisia, brought the “outside” with the 
“inside” in one organizational process. Moreover the NULU was not only the legitimate 
leadership and the “highest law of the land” but also it devolved decision making to 
“Popular Committees” to choose their own members and to carry activities within the 
broader political and programmatic framework of the NULU.  
Ultimately, the vigor with which the NULU and the “Popular Committees” led 
the intifada “inspired and was inspired by an invigorate sense of collective purpose in 
society. A society that participated in the intifada through the PCs in defiance campaigns, 
street demonstrations, displaying national symbols, general strikes, boycotting Israeli 
goods, social solidarity activities, civilian protection and security groups…etc, had shown 
exceptional ability to sustain and redraw the geographical politics of the conflict as a 
struggle for national-territorial self-determination on the OPT. Images of Israeli soldiers 
breaking the bones of Palestinian protesters, and youth throwing stones in confrontation 
with heavily armed Israeli troops captured media outlets all over the world and generated 
a sweeping movement of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. From the Palestinian 
perspective moment seemed ripen for a political breakthrough to take advantage of this 
unique change of the political balance of power.   
One Year through the intifada the PNC was called for an extraordinary meeting in 
Algeria mid November 1988. Resolutions taken by 18th PNC conference (The 19th in 
some sources that do count the Amman meeting of 1985) (The Session of the Intifada, 
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National Independence, and the Martyr Khalil Al Wazir
119
 ) were a landmark in terms of 
the extent to which PLO was willing to reach in the dubbed “Palestinian Peace 
Offensive”. As the name given to the conference suggests PLO transformation to an 
independence movement was the hallmark of the peace offensive. In addition to the 
“Declaration of Independence” that the meeting issued it recognized UN resolutions 242 
and 338 and the ‘Land for Peace’ formula proclaiming the state of Palestine with the 
occupied territories as its patrimony and East Jerusalem as its capital. The image of 
Yassir Arafat in the midst of a storm of applause declaring “…in the name of God and 
the name of the Arab-Palestinian people we declare the establishment of the state of 
Palestine on our Palestinian land…” conquered the headlines and Palestinian zeal in the 
OPT reached a climax. The Palestinian new position included an implicit recognition of 
Israel that is embedded in the UN resolutions 242 and 338, and called for an international 
conference under the auspices of the UN to settle the conflict in the ME. The PNC was 
clear in the demand for Israeli withdrawal from the OPT and to annul Jewish settlements 
and all other forms of annexation in the OPT (PNC official website).  
In effect the PNC also recognized the UN Partition resolution of 1947. Factions 
and organizations who opposed PNC new policy, especially the PFLP maintained their 
position for the record but abided by the majority and refrained from defecting the PLO. 
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 Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) was one of the founding leaders of Fateh and considered to be the Second 
in ranking following Yassir Arafat. Abu Jihad was known as one of the most talented military commanders 
and has led the Fateh’s most important armed brigades, AL-Qita` al-Gharbi (The Western Sector) that was 
specialized in armed attacks inside Palestine. Israeli intelligence affiliated the man with the eruption of the 
intifada. In addition to his history in armed struggle Israel assassinated al-Wazir in his mansion in Tunisia 
on April 16 1988. Israeli commandos were deployed on the Tunisian shores headed by Ihud Barak stormed 
the house and carried the killing. His assassination stirred a wave of rage and anger in the OPT where the 
intifada was already in its heyday. For the Palestinians Israel aimed at cutting off the intifada by removing 
one of its masterminds. Massive demonstrations were launched in every corner of the WB and GS and 
Israel imposed curfew on almost the entire OPT.   
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The meeting authorized the Executive Committee of the PLO and Chairman Arafat to 
pursue and exhaust diplomatic initiatives in order to give the Palestinian offensive 
international and regional efficacy and momentum. Arafat and PLO legitimacy was as 
high as never before: the PNC reunited the PLO and gave Arafat a free hand to seek 
diplomacy and the support from the OPT and the NULU galvanized his position. Soon 
thereafter, and depending on the Palestinian consensus the PLO issued a joint statement 
at the close of a meeting with U.S Jewish delegation in Stockholm. The statement further 
indicates the length to which Arafat took the PNC resolutions. It stated that the both sides  
agreed to inter into peace negotiations at an international conference under the 
auspices of the UN; establish the independent state of Palestine and the 
acceptance the existence of Israel as a state in the region; the PLO declared its 
rejection and condemnation of terrorism in all its forms including state terrorism; 
they called for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with 
international laws and practices and relevant UN resolutions (including right of 
return or compensation) (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1997 p206).  
The Palestinian “Peace Initiative” gave the PLO a new international recognition 
as more than 100 states recognized the Palestinian state, and Arafat was invited to give a 
speech to the UN General Assembly. The U.S.A Government denied Arafat a visa and 
the UN moved the session to Geneva where he addressed the UN reiterating the elements 
of the Palestinian peace initiative and stressed PLO condemnation of terror.  
However, the Palestinian imitative receded for many reasons, the most important 
among which was Israeli rejection. Israeli government under Yitzhak Shamir and the 
Likud did not reciprocate. Rather it dismissed the initiative as a mere show of deception 
by Arafat. The U.S.A followed on the Israeli path and demanded Arafat to abandon 
ambiguous language and recognize the right of Israel to exist and to renounce terror not 
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merely to condemn it. Moreover, by the turn of 1990 the intifada was in decline due to 
Israeli oppression that left its organizational structures in tatters.   These developments 
were followed by the Gulf crisis and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that led to the first Gulf 
war of 1991 in which Yassir Arafat took the Side of Iraq against U.S-led invasion. 
Arafat’s position pitted Gulf States and U.S against him. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities 
imposed the extremist security and military measures in the OPT (long term and wide 
range curfew was imposed and transportation and mobility were impeded and an 
unprecedented campaign of arrests was carried out) when Iraq was bombarding Israeli 
cities with long-range missiles. The PLO and the Palestinians found themselves in a 
precarious position as the war ended with the U.S.-led coalition triumphed at the time 
when the Soviet Union was collapsing, which marked a dramatic change in international 
and regional balance of power in favor of the U.S and its allies; Israel being among the 
those. 
The Madrid Peace conference of 1992 was one manifestation of the new power 
configurations in the region following the Gulf war and ushered the beginning of a new 
phase of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict under the Palestinian Authority that would 
become the main outcome of the Oslo peace accords signed by the PLO and Israeli 
government. This phase strikingly marked the decline of the Palestinian national 
movement and PLO backtracking even on the independence scheme. The PLO came into 
terms with Israeli conditions as it accepted to establish a nominal authority that 
accomplished merely part of the Palestinian national and political rights (as the PLO 
espoused them), for part of the Palestinian people (those who live in the main cities of the 
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OPT marked as “A” areas in Oslo agreements), on part of the Palestinian soil (the OPT 
and particularly parts of the WB and GS), to which we return in the conclusion of this 
whole part of the study. 
 
To wrap up one may say that the experience of modern Palestinian national 
movement as represented by the PLO was born within and conditioned by certain 
structures that shaped its main characteristics and crippled its ability to exert serious 
challenge to Israel’s domination. The first and most important of which is the 
consequences of Israel’s success in controlling the entire territory of Palestine in 1948 
(expulsion, fragmentation, and dispersion) and 1967 (alienation, exclusion, and 
exploitation). In the first place Zionist and Israeli exclusionism and the system of colonial 
segregation they established generated a maximalist Palestinian stance that aimed at 
abolishing Israel’s aggression and its illegitimate takeover of Palestine. This had resulted 
in a Palestinian rigid nationalism that sought total reclamation of what was lost namely, 
homeland.  
Israel’s entrenched colonial buffer that it established deprived the Palestinian 
national movement from the geographical base to engage the domination system of its 
adversary from within. The rise of a democratic national liberation struggle while the 
Palestinian community is shuttered and dispersed was hindered by these structural 
conditions. Although the PLO in the late 1960s adopted a democratic liberation agenda, 
the limited access it had to the space and geography of Palestine undermined its ability to 
unify and mobilize the Palestinians in a democratic struggle. Following the 1967 the PLO 
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suffered another strategic loss that deepened the asymmetrical power relationship 
between the Palestinians and Israeli rule in favor of the latter. The dynamics of the 
conflict have consolidated its ethno-nationalist and territorial nature. Two parallel 
trajectories were in the making: Israel’s territorial maximalist stance, and the PLO’s 
territorial minimalist demands. The prospects for a democratic struggle were sidelined 
and a struggle for independence prevailed as the two adversaries consolidated their ethno-
national ethos within spatial and territorial boundaries.  
The structures of Israeli colonialism, however, do not explain the entire Palestinian shifts 
in strategy; Palestinian national movement’s own structures and social build-up played a 
crucial role. The movement and the PLO is the youngest in the Middle East. Time has 
important implications in this respect in terms of the decision making mechanisms, 
organizational traditions, and ideological underpinnings; all of which contributed to the 
peculiar volatility and inconsistency of PLO’s political thinking and shifts of strategic 
planning. PLO is a coalition of disparate factions led by Arafat. Each of which has its 
own politics and led by the same manner Arafat led the movement; vertical hierarchy and 
personified leadership. Fraction and rivalries, the lack of structural and organizational 
center, and different agendas have undermined the movement ability to adopt a unified 
blueprint and seek it persistently. Moreover, PLO’s emphasis of the armed struggle had 
put the political arena of struggle in the second place and with it the role of the masses 
especially in the main arena of struggle, Palestine. It also postponed the rise of people’s 
political will and power to engage in a mass organization to turn Israeli occupation into a 
costly enterprise politically, morally, and economically. The main arena of struggle, 
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Palestine has not witnessed the emergence of the Palestinian challenge that would have 
turned the OPT into an ungovernable terrain for Israel until mid-1980s. Downplaying the 
role of masses and popular resistant contributed to fixating the struggle as between two 
political entities and henceforth undercut the democratic dimension that could have 
developed. Perhaps the most important outcome of PLO characteristics and political 
thinking is the failure to establish the necessary organizational constructs to elevate 
Palestinian struggle as one people that should have encompassed the Palestinian inside 
Israeli proper; the absence of this dimension gave Israel the political and legal ability to 
divorce its Palestinian citizens from the broader movement of Palestinian struggle for 
liberation. PLO style and political attributes contributed significantly to the development 
of the conflict in the ethno-territorial direction it took and reached to the point of 
capitulation for Israel’s terms and conditions in who and how to determine the territorial 
institutional boundaries of Palestinian independence.  
Israeli exceptionalism 
Systems in general collapse either by internal dynamics of decay, erosion and 
structural contradictions, or by external effects. In many occasions both effects overlap to 
lead a system decline especially social systems for the fact that they are interactive and 
dynamic. Under certain circumstances external effects play an enabling role that 
reinforces the internal dynamics of change; South African apartheid regime is an example. 
As Sisk (1995) notices, the apartheid regime collapsed primarily as a result of its own 
dynamics whereas regional developments (the rise of anti-colonial nationalist regimes in 
Southern Africa and South Africa’s military adventures) contributed significantly to the 
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salience of apartheid on international agenda. The latter waged a series of sanctions and 
boycotts against the regime that changed the decision making environment of the regime. 
More importantly, international tools of pressure on the regime were diverse and steadily 
developed to converge in one direction. Except for the United States of America who 
joined international campaign later on, a front of governmental and non-governmental 
forces all over the world pooled their effort to de-legitimize the regime in South Africa. 
In this respect world’s efforts, almost consensus, on the illegitimacy of an ethno-racial 
regime to which the sole alternative is a unitary democratic no-racial regime also 
converged with internal struggle seeking the very same objective.  
The South African case shows the crucial importance of international 
convergence on universal principles that overlapped with domestic struggle for the same 
universal norms namely, the principle and right of self-determination; the 
impermissibility of racial, ethnic, religious, or any kind of domination; and the 
prevalence of Human Rights, equality, and universal democracy as the acceptable norms 
of governance and nation-building. International de-legitimating of the South African 
regime, although took place against the background of the demise of the Cold War and 
the changes accompanied it, which created new strategic constellations of global power, 
was instrumental in the collapse of apartheid. 
Obviously, the nature of the international order has changed in post-Cold War era 
and with it the nature of conflicts and international intervention approach. The 
willingness of powerful states in the world to intervene in many conflicts has decreased, 
which has serious implications when it comes to the duration and violence of many 
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conflicts as Zartman (1997: 5) notices. Spheres of influence that characterized the Cold 
War and drove superpowers to intervene in order to maintain their respective spheres 
have changed; regions of importance in the new distribution of world power also changed. 
Ethnic and civil wars, intrastate disputes, and irredentist movements flourished. 
International reluctance to intervene poses serious questions: “How much unconstrained 
conflict and brutality will the international community allow? How widespread is the 
right of self-determination, and who may claim it?” (Zartman (1997: 5). And more 
particularly, in the ear of post-totalitarian regimes and the collapse of authoritarianism, 
how acceptable is the domination of one ethno-national group/people on another ethno-
national group/people? In this respect, the Palestinian case is unique; it is the last case 
(along with Kashmir) to which the decolonization principle of self-determination applies 
to. It is the most internationalized national liberations case (taking into account heavy 
international presence in the conflict since 1917 through all phases of the conflict). 
However, international efforts to solve the conflict only exacerbated its rigidity, and 
superpowers’ support of one party, Israel impeded the emergence of international 
consensus or convergence on the requirements to resolve the conflict.  
In post-Cold War the Palestinian-Israeli conflict cuts deep into the 
abovementioned questions. It begs answers to the question: What drives the world of 
today to legitimate a system of religious ethno-national differentiation namely, Israel’s 
ethnocracy? And how, in spite of all changes in the structures of the international system 
Israel has maintained its position as an exception of the universal understanding of 
inclusive democracy? Parallel to this Israeli source of power and impunity is an ongoing 
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Palestinian plight having to fight an exceptionally favored regime in the international 
arena. What is the main source of Israel’s ability to sustain such close ties with 
international dominating powers and generate identification with the Zionist and Israeli 
enterprise in Palestine? In spite of major changes in regional and international 
constellations of power and changes in geopolitical and security configurations Israel 
maintained its privileged status in the western countries especially in the U.S.A; what 
accounts for this phenomenon?    
First this section examines the peculiar type of relationship between a self-
sustained colony with global centers of power. Remarkably, Israel and the Zionist 
movement succeeded to continuously situate their existence and viability within 
international power dynamics in the ME as indispensable regional hegemony. The 
peculiarity of the Israeli quasi-colony is that Israel obtains a high level of autonomy and 
ability to exert leverage over its sponsors.  Among the most important consequences of 
this type of relationship is the discrepancy between the internationalized nature of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the inability of international institutions to intervene 
effectively to resolve it. Second, we entertain the relationship between the United States 
of America and Israel as one of the major obstacles to reach a political settlement to the 
conflict. US policies in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict play a major role in 
impeding the emergence of a convergent international position and policy that would 
contribute to the resolution of the conflict. American strategic relationship with Israel 
contributes significantly to crippling international institutions’ ability to fulfill its role and 
abide Israel by the resolutions of the UN and provisions of International law pertaining to 
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the conflict. Ultimately, American support to Israel and shielding it from international 
intervention put the Palestinians and the PLO in a precarious position facing a powerful 
strategic alliance that gives their adversary unprecedented impunity. The two 
considerations we discuss ultimately contributed significantly to the entrenchment of the 
ethno-national territorial character of the conflict, and consolidated Israel’s self-
identification as an ethnocracy, which stands anathema to a democratic outcome of the 
conflict.   
 
Israel and super-powers: a quasi-colony-metropolis link 
       The conceptual framework (Chapter II) discussed the peculiar nature of settler-
colonial societies as distinct from classic types of military foreign colonization. The 
former gain life of their own and gradually, usually in a long period of time, they 
transform into an ethno-national group in and for itself. In this sense their relationship 
with their metropolis changes and they achieve more independent. French colonizers of 
Algeria, for example and their adherents in France became a political and institutional 
power in French politics and succeeded to postpone French withdrawal from Algeria for 
a long time. The price was heavily bloody, though. In South Africa, the Afrikaner white 
state although was formally established by Britain, it sought independence from British 
influence ferociously. Those had been self-sustained settler societies who sought the 
metropolis political, diplomatic, and military support as autonomous colonies. Self-
sufficiency of settlers’ societies had been reinforced and solidified systematically by 
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asserting sovereignty and righteousness vis-à-vis the external world and segregation vis-
à-vis the native nations they conquered.  
The case of Israeli is peculiar in this respect. The Zionist movement was not a 
colonial settler society that belongs to the colonizing power citizens. Rather, British 
preferred the Zionist movement to colonize Palestine and the Zionist movement brought 
Jewish immigrants from all over Europe and molded them (or milted them) into one 
religious ethno-national group. Although, Zionism relied on British support and 
legitimation (recall that the Balfour Declaration was the first and most important juridical 
basis of Zionist claims in Palestine) Zionist Jews did not hesitate to turn against Britain 
once the latter showed reluctance to allow more Jewish immigration. Zionism at this 
point was turning its energy to the U.S.A, the rising global power. This reorientation of 
international strategy was consolidated following World War II and resituated Israel 
within the new world order as a western fortress in the face of the communist threat and 
nationalist sentiments.  
Zionist movement and the state of Israel have waged the struggle for their 
purposes in the international arena with the same, if not more persistent and importance, 
they gave to their efforts in Palestine. Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann is a leading 
example, realized that their objective should be raised and planted in the interests and 
moral identification in the great capitals of the western countries (Farsoun and Zacharia 
1997: 322). Zionist most prominent thinkers such as Moses Hess, Theodor Herzl, and 
Joachim Prinz (see page 27-8) submit that Zionism is to be carried out by the Jews 
themselves with the assistance and support of major European powers. They argued that 
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Zionist plans for Palestine would reinforce European powers’ position in the ME. 
Zionism, in this sense was presented as a colonial agent that would mediate between 
European civilization and the backward region by establishing Zionism as a Jewish entity. 
Thus European powers’ most crucial complicity with Zionism was nurturing the 
perspective by which Palestine, a territory outside the metropolitan Europe was declared 
empty and available to white European settlers to civilize it.  Two factors were functional 
for the ability of Zionism and Israel to fit within the western global dynamics of power, 
colonization and most recently with U.S.A. hegemony: presenting Zionism as a national 
liberation movement that conforms to the liberal ideas of Europe and the U.S.A, and 
Israel’s democratic discourse and it’s the notion of Israel’s indispensability for the 
protection and existence of the Jewish people. We turn now to each of these two factors.  
First: Zionist movement introduced itself as a national liberation and anti-colonial 
movement that was fighting the British colonial rule and a minor penniless residue of 
Arabs. The struggle against the wishes and the rights of the indigenous population was 
suppressed and concealed from western nations whereas notions of higher purpose and 
civilization were emphasized. Zionist discourse and justifications for colonizing Palestine 
conformed to European colonial precepts. We noticed earlier the European colonial 
element of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. The extension of the colonial logic relied 
particularly on argument pertaining to the idea of a “higher more worthy, more modern, 
more fitting interest, cause, or mission” (Said 1992: 15) that supersedes the indigenous 
Palestinian existence and the right of native Palestinians. The higher interest was not only 
Zionism’s but as well British. In the Words of Balfour himself promising Palestine for 
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Jewish Homeland serves interests that render indigenous rights and opinion irrelevant: 
“…in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes 
of the present inhabitants of the country” (Quoted in Said 1992:16). 
This discourse overlaps, as Tilley (2005) remarks with the history of the Jewish 
problem in Europe and the USA that is still producing some hard self-critique in these 
countries as a result of the atrocities perpetrated against the Jews in the first half of the 
Twentieth century. Western and especially European powers’ long-standing moral deficit 
vis-à-vis Jews is one of the main sources of these countries’ exceptional treatment to 
Israel. Even before the Holocaust, opposing Zionist appeal for the reconstruction of 
Palestine as a Jewish homeland would have been considered anti-Semitic especially after 
the advent of fascism. Taking into account that Zionism not only linked its objective to 
colonial justifications (claiming Palestine as a backward and uninhibited territory) but 
also as the place where Jews could reestablish their unique historical linkages with their 
promised land. In this sense Zionist ideas resonate to the Christian-ethnic and religious 
belief that Palestine is a biblical land plays an important role in the support Israel receives 
in these countries. Palestine for Millions of Christians in the West is a proto-Christian 
terrain, and the Jewish people of Israel is seen as the carriers of the Judeo-Christian 
values and therefore nullifying the indegeneity of other religious or ethnic peoples lived 
or living in Palestine.   
Zionist enterprise in Palestine fits neatly with the precepts and justifications of 
white colonialism of Northern America in particular. Clearly, Zionist propaganda 
conformed to the same mentality that motivated and drove white settler-colonial practices 
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in these areas. Indeed, Zionism and Israel “enjoyed an astonishing dominance in matters 
of scholarship, political discourse, international presence, and valorization” (Said 1992:  
xiv). However, propaganda does not create states and nations; it did not establish Zionism 
and Israel as well but it enabled diffusion the ideas on Zionist-Jewish successes as a 
pioneering movement, with exceptional institutional and moral enthusiasm that turned 
Palestine into a blossoming land. This Jewish model plays a crucial role in the 
perceptions of the western nations on Palestine, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon culture 
and mentality. American people, as a society of pioneering settlers find it easy to identify 
with the Zionist model. Suppressing Arab Palestinian existence and social, cultural, and 
laborious life in their land has been part of the diffusion of the idea of ‘higher purpose’ of 
Zionism that corresponds to the  White colonialism in Northern America that applied the 
same diffusion of ideas about Native Americans that accompanied and justified the 
destruction of native civilizations in the USA and Canada. In Northern America, as in 
Central and Southern America, white  
pioneering colonialism seeks to exclude and eliminate the native inhabitants 
rather than to occupy and exploit them…it is a form of colonialism that offers 
refuge to the disinherited, to persecuted minorities and to the surplus, 
marginals, and misfits created by industrialism and modernization in the 
metropolis” (Ahmad 2006: 303).  
The epistemology of colonial settler enterprise that negates the native Palestinians and 
seeks to suppress their existence resonates with the colonial past of the Europeans within 
Europe and in the Western hemisphere.    
The idea of higher purpose turned to be that the Jewish ought to rule in Palestine 
as a distinct, and indeed exceptional, religious ethnic-national people. In essence, British 
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and Zionist agreement on the irrelevance of the indigenous and “downplaying them as 
somehow secondary and negligible” (Said 1992) remained a core element in the Western 
world and particularly in USA policy towards the Palestinians. Supplanting the Zionist 
movement as its institutional expression, the state of Israel has become the supreme focus 
of the west and the U.S.A. Thus, western countries not only created the state of Israel but 
also pledged to its survival and strength until the current day.  
The prevalence of the Zionist discourse in the west yielded its most important 
fruits in 1948; UN recognition of the state of Israel ignored totally demographical facts 
and social and ethnic texture of Palestine. When Israel was declared a state, Jewish 
immigrants and the Zionists legally owned 6 percent of the land.  These facts seemed 
irrelevant from an Occidental point of view that distinguishes European colonial 
mentality; the natives as backward, less human, less valuable, and their rights are inferior 
to those of the European settler and to the Zionists as bearers of European civilization. In 
essence UN resolution legitimized state and nation building that was an anachronism: 
legitimating a settler-colonial society as an ethno-national sovereign state in the era of 
decolonization. This brings us to the second point, Israel. 
 Second, international position and political discourse especially in the West 
spring, at least partially, from the ability of the Zionist movement to link its legitimacy 
with the existence of the Jewish state as a prerequisite to prevent genocidal intents against 
the Jews people. Israel’s “right to exist” and Israel’s security” represent the overarching 
mantra under which Israeli exceptionalism is being justified. This linkage underlies the 
argument that criticizing Israel undermines the legitimacy of Jewish people’s right to 
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exist and defend itself, therefore “either a Jewish state will survive or Jewish annihilation 
will follow” (Tilley 2005: 133). 
Jewish history in Europe plays a major role in this connection; persecution of the 
Jews, discrimination they endured, and the Holocaust generated a paradigm within which 
Zionism was equated to Jewish survival, and Israel equated with sanctuary. Criticizing 
either Israel or Zionism can easily be considered anti-Semitic.  Israel’s legitimacy and 
exceptional status it enjoys in the western world relies heavily on the epistemological 
underpinnings we presented as they pertain to liberalism. The ability of Zionism and the 
state of Israel to conceal its racist character, its expansionist colonial endeavor, and its 
ethno-religious nationalist tenets originate primarily from Israel’s image as a democratic 
regime fighting an insurgence movement, and then a terrorist menace, rather than a 
national movement seeking national self-determination. At different turning point of the 
history of the Palestinian-Israel conflict, Israel, Zionist movement, and their adherents 
invoked the infamous mantra: “Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East”; the only 
regime that conforms and identifies with western values in the desert of Islamic and Arab 
dictatorship.  Thus, “Zionism and Israel were associated with liberalism, with freedom 
and democracy, with knowledge and light with what “we” [in the West] understand and 
fight for” (Said 1992: 29). To be sure, Israel is the only state that can claim a religious-
ethnic identity and a liberal democratic. In both accounts there is no room for non-Jews 
who cannot afford liberalism and democracy.   
The extent to which Israeli political system could be considered Western 
democracies plays a crucial role in justifying their policies towards their adversaries. As a 
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majority in domination, Israel established its political system as a liberal democracy; for 
Jews only though as we discussed earlier. The most important consequence of this 
identification has been shielding Israel against comparisons. Israeli exceptionalism, in 
this sense, becomes clearer as many Israeli and Zionist leaders supported by allies in the 
West defy the comparability of Israeli domination over the Palestinians with other 
systems of domination elsewhere where ethnically and racially based nation and state 
building was rejected and defeated. International tolerance of Israeli nationhood as 
essentially a  
permanent Jewish-national domination over state institutions and governance 
within a territorial state…ha[s] rendered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
uniquely resistant to peacemaking methods applied elsewhere” (Tilley 2005: 
134).  
In comparison to other conflicts that have settler-colonial origins; charged with rival 
discourses of idegineity; characterized with mutual ethnic or racial fears; and have similar 
structures of deep domination and discrimination, international powers accept Israeli 
ethno-religious domination over Palestinians while pushed for a democratic solution in 
other cases such as South Africa and Northern Ireland. The castigation of the South 
African apartheid by global powers targeted its fundamental underpinnings of white 
domination as an ominous extension of racism; it challenged the foundation of the state 
and its moral standing. In contrast, Zionist and Israeli system of apartheid had been 
legitimized and justified by international acceptance of the very foundation of Israel as a 




Consequences of Israeli exceptionalism 
This research assesses the implications and consequences of Israel’s 
exceptionalism in terms of its quasi-colony correspondence with western global powers 
and more particularly with American hegemony in world politics especially U.S. Middle 
East foreign policy. The linkages and privileged status of Zionism and the state of Israel 
in the west turned them by choice, and necessity into an appendage, or a quasi colony for 
the USA following the decline of Britain and especially after 1967 as we discuss below. 
Israel has turned into a major actor in strategic calculations of western superpowers 
starting with Britain, and then for a short period of time with France in the 1950s. In the 
wake of 1967 war Israel emerged as a main ally to the rising superpower; the United 
States of America. As we discuss below, American foreign policy in the ME would 
develop steadily in congruence with the development of the ally with Israel. The primary 
outcome of this development has been more marginalization of the Palestinians and their 
national movement that, within US policy, turned into a burden not an actor. Developing 
the ally with the USA, Israel has deepened its reliance on a metropolis assistant and 
support.        
However, the quasi-colony position of Israel and its increased dependent of 
American economic, financial, political, military, and diplomatic backup implied that 
Israeli policies would be constrained generally by U.S. requirements and considerations. 
However, on the Palestinian question American administrations have shown a striking 
acceptance of Israel’s conditions and terms for a settlement of the conflict. Thus the U.S. 
rebuffed all Arab and PLO peace initiatives in 1970s and 1980s and in 2000s for these 
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initiatives recognized Palestinian people’s rights; included a certain level of international 
intervention in the form of international conferences or referring to UN resolutions. The 
quasi-colony relationship that links Israel with its sponsor, the U.S is part of the system 
of power and hegemony the U.S. established in the region, which gave Israel the ability 
to practice political leverage over U.S. policies in specific issues especially the 
Palestinian question regardless of considerations of international law or international 
community political will. 
The governments of Israel have long been assertive in defying external pressure 
and international law, and have shown a great deal of insensitivity to international critics 
to their policies. This stance is congruent with domestic policies, namely treating all 
outsider parties as hostile; a policy that has proven to be domestically productive. By 
refusing to compromise and by rebuffing international castigation and demands for 
recognizing Palestinian right of national self-determination Israel produced a warrant of 
its own value:  the righteousness of Israel and Jewish people are denounced and attacked 
by the unrighteous who seek the destruction of Israel and the Jewish people. 
A major consequence of Israel’s ability to correspond its existence and strategic 
importance to superpowers hegemony in the region and thus its ability to defy 
international law, norms, and rules is that the role of international institutions in resolving 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian question in particular was reduced 
to a mere arena for demonstrating norms and ideals of international law and universal 
principles. Western, and especially U.S support of Israel’s rejectionist behavior has 
crippled UN ability to act and  granted Israel a certain degree of impunity against 
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international intervention and universal norms including UN Charter itself. In particular, 
rejecting relevant international conventions and international law provisions that apply to 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
deprived the Palestinians from a crucial source of strength facing a powerful foe.  
Thus while international community (except Israel) gave South African apartheid 
the cold shoulder and refused to recognize the Bantustans as independent political entities 
(Sisk 2010) this community took sidelines watching Israel turning the OPT into 
Bantustans and isolated enclaves . In Israel-Palestine, there is a long history of warm 
world support for the concepts of territorial partition and ethno-religious separation. The 
UN formally endorsed partition in 1947, and today every major effort to bring peace to 
Israel-Palestine or engender amity between its peoples is predicated upon the two-state 
solution that endorses the ethnic-territorial foundation of Israel.  More to the point, the 
international community  in the Oslo era including the “Quartet” of the US, the European 
Union, Russia and the UN secretariat is promoting a peace process that calls for neither a 
complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 nor the dismantlement 
of the bulk of the settlements built since then. Nor it endorses or calls for a democratic 
one state thus it has given its blessing to the idea of a non-contiguous Palestinian entity 
on parts of the OPT.  
The linkages between Israel and the existence of the Jewish people have never 
been expanded and stretched the way they became in the 1990s and 2000s where Israel’s 
security justifies apartheid. Israel’s segregation wall and Israel’s blockade on Gaza are 
two striking examples of international community’s acceptance of Israel’s expansionism 
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and aggression. The US harshly rejected the 2004 advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice against the wall in East Jerusalem and the West Bank on the grounds that 
the wall is a necessary and legitimate means of deterring Palestinian attacks on Israel, a 
defense it extends to checkpoints, restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement, home 
demolitions, extrajudicial executions and other violations of international law. Most 
dramatically, the US, with the tacit backing of European and Arab allies, has eagerly 
enforced the years-long siege on Gaza and acquiesced in several Israeli assaults upon the 
territory, including the egregious Operation Cast Lead over the winter of 2008-2009. 
Thus slicing the OPT and the amputation of Gaza doesn’t seem to the international 
community as an impediment to the establishment of “viable Palestinian state” as Julie 
Peteet contends.  These remarks bring us to the last and most important source of Israel’s 
impunity and exceptioanlism in international arena namely, Israeli-United States 
relationship. This relationship stands as a huge challenge to the Palestinians who have to 
find an answer to the question: How to succeed against a regime that has been able to 
sustain legitimacy through the pretense of democracy; the image of victim, and the 
unconditional support of the most powerful state in the world?  
U.S.-Israeli strategic ally from the perspective of Palestinian rights 
The strategic relationship between Israel and the U.S.A in terms of its 
determinants and regional and international implications is beyond the scope and 
purposes of our inquiry. Rather we focus on the underpinnings and consequences of this 
relationship in so far as it pertains to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and particularly to 
Palestinian people’s rights in self-determination, ending Israeli occupation, and 
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compelling Israel to abide by international law and international community’s will as 
presented by UN resolutions and peace initiatives. Although regional and international 
implications of the Israeli-American ally overlaps with its repercussions on the conflict, 
we focus our attention on the latter while incorporating the broader implications of 
regional considerations.  
Our main task is to show how the unprecedented American support of Israel has 
established an institution of rejectionist policy of all initiatives to realize a political 
settlement to the conflict that accommodate Palestinian rights. The U.S. has rejected any 
initiative that doesn’t meet Israel’s own conditions and terms even though such 
rejectionist policy has compromised America’s own interests in some instances. As 
Mearsheimer and Walt, (2006:1) contend  
For the past several decades, and especially since the Six Day War in 1967, the 
centerpiece of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel… 
This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the United 
States been willing to set aside its own security in order to advance the interests 
of another state?”  
By the same token, U.S. exceptional support to Israel flies in the face of international 
efforts to establish a consensus or at least a convergent position on the accepted 
requirements for a peace settlement of the conflict. The Obstructionist role the U.S. 
played to impede international and Arab convergence has resulted in Israeli increased 
intransigent position, which enabled it to sustain, maintain and consolidate its colonial 
settler grip on the OPT. Moreover, America’s unconditional support to Israel helped the 
latter to turn its demands from the Palestinians into international prerequisites and thus 
creating a convergence that subjugate the Palestinians to Israel’s terms.   Ultimately, this 
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state of affairs also obstructed the necessary conditions for the establishment of a 
sovereign Palestinian state on the OPT and simultaneously reinforced Israeli self-
identification as a Jewish, ethnocratic state which stands as a structural hindrance against 
the emergence of a democratic resolution of the conflict. 
 
United States’ presence in the region developed into a paramount priority that 
turned it into institutional presence as early as the 1956 Triad War that included Israel, 
Britain, and France allied against Egypt. The U.S.A, realizing the increased importance 
of the region in the Cold War and its natural resources especially oil had driven 
Eisenhower’s administration to exert a significant pressure of the allied states to cease 
fire and withdraw their forces (Rogan 2009: 283-285). Following the Arab-Israeli war of 
1967 American presence as Said (1992: xv) notices, was coupled with cementing the 
strategic ally with Israel as tailored by the Nixon administration and consolidated during 
Regan’s administration.  
The Nixon Administration re-supplied Israeli war machine during the October 
War and protected Israel from the threat of Soviet intervention while US deep 
involvement in the negotiations between the combatants not only ended that war but also   
led to the Disengagement agreements that  granted Israel a political victory (Mearsheimer, 
and Walt 2006: 1).  Arab military achievements in this war were circumscribed by U.S. 
pressure for a cease fire that reiterated the UN resolution 242 as the basis for resolving 
the conflict. In effect American position sidelined the Palestinian rights and shielded 
Israel from a diplomatic loss. The strategic alliance between Israel and the United States 
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was, however, conditioned by the balance of power between USA and the Soviet Union, 
which granted Israel a strategic role in U.S. containment policy. Israel’s need for U.S 
support in a hostile region and America’s reliance on Israeli role in the region especially 
in the face of nationalist movement enabled Israel to obtain monopoly over the 
Palestinian question.   
Thus Israel was able to defy international demands and resolution even when the 
US holds a different position. In early 1970s, for example, the USA position in regard to 
the interpretation of UN resolution 242 was close to the European one: 242 implied 
Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories of 1967 with minor and mutual 
adjustments. The US, as Arthur Goldberg; US ambassador to the UN clarified, asserted 
on the principle of mutual and minimal adjustments “that would not, of necessity, be 
detrimental to the Arab states” (Chomsky 1994: 208). Israel refused this principle and 
defied UN initiative for peace based on 242; Israeli government declared that no 
withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders will happen. Events and developments of 1970s show 
clear evidence that the quasi-colony link between Israel and the U.S. gave the former a 
political leverage over the latter especially on the Palestinian issue. Particularly, U.S. 
policy in the region would center on achieving Israeli’s supremacy and impunity vis-à-vis 
its Arab adversaries and especially Palestinians; American diplomats would 
unconditionally accept Israel’s own terms as U.S imperatives.        
Following the war of 1973 and under Nixon-Kissinger’s US policy in the region 
changed to accommodate Sadat’s regime to conform with US interests. Thus the US 
accepted Sadat’s peace initiative of 1977 after eliminating its call for recognition of the 
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Palestinian national rights echoing Israel’s own position. Kissinger’s strategy in the ME 
as cited by Chomsky (Chomsky 1994: 212-213) aimed to keep the soviets out of the 
diplomatic arena, “to isolate the Palestinians” so that they would not be a factor in the 
outcome, and “to break up the Arab united Arab united front” thus allowing Israel “to 
deal separately with each of its neighbors. The first major success of this policy was the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of Cam David in 1978. Although American alliance with 
Israel in the 1970s coasted U.S. a high price in terms of its relationships with Arab allies; 
Arab oil embargo during the war of 1973 was provoked primarily by US military and 
financial back-up to Israel and had triggered economic and financial crisis in the U.S and 
worldwide.  
The main achievement of Camp David peace treaty for Israel and American 
policy, as Kissinger espoused, was dividing the Arab world and containing Egyptian 
challenge to Israel. Now Israel not only has the upper hand over Arab adversaries and 
Palestinians but also neutralized the main source of power that deterred its ability to 
militarily attack its neighbors. Shortly afterwards Israel invaded Lebanon under the 
pretext of eliminating PLO threat to Israel northern borders. However, isolating the 
Palestinians and destroying their political viability was the main aim of the war: taking 
into account that the PLO was gaining increased international and regional recognition as 
a result of strategic change it adopted was a source of threat to Israel’s position. 
Moreover, PLO political position and new agenda of 1974 opened a new venue for a 
political settlement of the conflict that recognizes Palestinian people’s rights.  
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Thus in spite of these development U.S. and Israel persistently worked to annul 
international consensus on the acceptance of a Palestinian state on the OPT that 
developed in 1970s. In 1976 Arab “confrontation states” (Jordan, Egypt, and Syria) and 
the PLO proposed a political settlement base on the international consensus and presented 
to the UN. The proposal reiterated most of the provisions of resolution 242 except for 
adding the recognition of Palestinian political rights and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. Israel showed a strong rejection to the resolution and refused to attend 
the session that discussed the proposal, and the USA vetoed the proposal in the Security 
Council and eliminated a serious breakthrough to resolve the conflict. Resorting to the 
veto turned into a powerful tool to obstruct international role and granted Israel impunity 
beyond the reach of international instructions, law and conventions. Since 1972 the US 
has vetoed 71 UN Security Council resolution on the Israeli Palestinian conflict and 
Israeli policies in the OPT and the region. Those resolutions confirmed the Palestinian 
people’s right of self-determination, condemn Israel for settlement building in the OPT, 
condemn Israeli human rights record in the OPT, discuss sovereignty over natural 
resources in the OPT, concerning the right of displaced Palestinians to return to their 
homes, concerning Israel’s use of excessive force against the Palestinians, call for the end 
of Israeli 22 day attack on Gaza in 2009…etc.  
This pattern of American-Israel rejection of international initiatives to solve the 
conflict that doesn’t meet their terms aimed at depriving the Palestinian from the only 
source of leverage and a reliable reference in their legal, diplomatic, and political struggle 
against Israel. The pattern also shows a persistent policy in monopolizing diplomatic 
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arena on which the conflict being treated; Israel and the United States rebuffed all 
proposals for international conferences, annulled UN attempts to play a significant role as 
America vetoed almost each Security Council resolution that would empower the UN to 
take action, and ultimately enabled Israel itself to gain monopoly on the requisites for 
reaching peace with the Palestinians. The pattern reached a peak in the Oslo process. A 
cursory look to U.S.A policies toward the Palestinians and the PLO shows that its 
position has been, to a large extent an extensions to Israeli policy: American 
administrations rejected to recognize of the PLO at the time when the latter was changing 
its strategy and gaining regional and international recognition, as we discussed above, it 
rebuffed all peace initiatives proposed by Arab states and/or international actors, and in 
1988 US Secretary of State George Shultz denied Yassir Arafat a visa to inter the US to 
address the UN. Simultaneously, American authorities required the closing of the 
Palestinian Observation Mission at UN, which was defeated by in US District Court. 
Arafat’s speech to the UN took place in Geneva and presented PLO peace 
initiative that resulted from the new dynamism created by the Palestinian first intifada.  
Although Arafat’s initiative was dismissed by Israel and the U.S, the later with the 
consent of Israeli government accepted to open an informal dialogue with the PLO based 
on three conditions: that the PLO abandon its call for an international conference 
included in its initiative, and to stop violence i.e. the intifada as an act of terror against 
Israel, and that Arafat should not only condemn but also renouncing terror. Humiliating 
Arafat was the main aim of the policy as George Shultz asserted (Chomsky 1994: 228). 
Humiliating the PLO leader was accompanied by turning a blind eye to Israel’s brutal 
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oppression of the Palestinian intifada. Obviously, beyond humiliating Arafat Israel and 
the U.S. aimed at bringing Palestinians into terms with Israel’s conditions. U.S. 
representative to the PLO dialogue, Ambassador Robert Pelletreau presented to Arafat 
what were actually Israel’s conditions as the Israeli semi-official the Jerusalem Post daily 
stated (Chomsky 1994: 228).  
 Thus until the eve of the first Gulf war and the collapse of the Soviet Union; the 
demise of the Cold War, Israel’s quasi-colonial ties with the United States enabled Israeli 
to maintain its conditions for a political settlement with Arab states, to isolate the PLO 
and deny Palestinians political and national rights, and to sideline international 
institutions. This phenomenon among other Israeli successes in diverting U.S. foreign 
policy in the region poses a question on the immutability of Israeli importance for 
American national interests and strategy in the Middle East regardless of the international 
and regional changes. We turn now to the competing explanations of American 
unprecedented support to Israel and the development of a strategic ally between the two 
parties. Within the driving forces of this ally we emphasize the dynamics that led to U.S. 
policies in regard to the peace process between the PLO and Israel and how Israel 
succeeded to bring the U.S. to accept and defend Israel’s territorial expansionism, the 
establishment of a segregated apartheid-like system in the OPT, and to turn the OPT into 
Bantustans that executed the two-state solution.     
  Containing the PLO and reducing Palestinian rights 1992-2000s 
For many accredited scholars (E.g. Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, Christinson 2002, 
Ahmad 2006, Chomsky 1994) Israel’s strategic importance for the USA and the interests 
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of western powers is not as it had been during the Cold War and especially after the Six 
Day War of 1967. Israel’s role in the containment strategy against the Soviet Union 
extended the ability of the US to circumscribe Egypt and Syrian nationalist stance and 
their close relations with the Communist Block. At the turn of 1990s, as Mearsheimer and 
Walt (2006) contend Israel’s importance for U.S strategy and national interests has 
declined especially following its role in the Gulf crises of 1991 and 2003. While in the 
first instance Israel was a burden and needed US protection and assistance against Iraqi 
missile attacks, in the second it was told to take the sideline. In both cases Israeli-
American special relationship could have jeopardize America’s strategy by provoking 
Arab resentment and rupturing US-led coalitions against Iraq. Furthermore, Israel’s 
policies in the OPT at crucial turning points were anathema to US foreign policy, so the 
argument goes.  
After September 11 attacks in the USA American efforts were fully concentrated 
on building a wide international coalition in its declared war against terror; Arab regimes 
include. Erik Sharon’s government took the opportunity to wage a sweeping military 
attack against the PA in the main cities in the OPT. For many Arab regimes, who were 
facing increased public anti-American sentiments particularly because of Israel’s policies; 
being part of US aspired coalition could have complicated their participation. Arab 
regimes announced that “if America wanted Arab support in its fight against Bin Laden’s 
terrorism, it had first to put an end to the state terrorism of its protégé (Mansour 2002).  
Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) and Said (1992) the source of Israeli ability to 
maintain its relationship with the USA is not due to common strategic interests or moral 
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imperatives. Rather it derives strength and durability from American domestic politics 
namely, the effect of the Israeli lobby on American internal politics. As Said (1992:  xxiv) 
puts it   “Palestine was a domestic American issue, dominated since 1948, almost without 
demurral anywhere in the society, by the Israeli lobby” led by the American Israeli Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC).  Although the effect of the Israeli lobby is strikingly blunt, 
understandably, on the Palestinian question it also affects American foreign policy in the 
whole region where it  
…managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American 
national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing 
Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical” 
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2006).  
While Israel’s actual importance to America’s interests dwindled in the post-Cold War 
era it maintained an increased level of support by the U.S., which reflects to a large 
extent the power of Israeli lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt argue persuasively that the four 
justifications upon which Israeli backers establish their case for an unqualified U.S 
support to Israel are unfounded. They contend that “Viewed objectively, Israel’s past and 
present conduct offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians” and the 
explanation lies in the unprecedented ability of Israeli lobby to mobilize support. As they 
put it “Were it not for the Lobby’s ability to manipulate the American political system, 
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimate than it is 
today”.  
Furthermore and beyond the direct effect of the Israeli lobby, there exists a 
chilling atmosphere in the USA when it comes to any public debate of the American-
Israeli relationship or Israeli policies. This exceptional sensitivity of the Israeli-American 
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ties impedes public discussion and resulted in public avoidance whereby “most 
Americans have decided that it is simply safer to leave Israel out of the discourse. So, 
unconditional support continues without much review or debate (Porter  2011) which left 
American unconditional support to Israel unchallenged. Lack of public debate gave the 
Israeli lobby a bigger chance to dominate the agenda in regard to the Palestinian issue. 
Moreover, Perceptions on Palestine and the Palestinians in the USA were affected 
profoundly, more than any other western country with Zionism and Israel’s image as a 
liberal, enlightened. Zionism corresponds completely with American ideas about man and 
society and criticizing Zionism not only odd but also equally denounced as anti-Semitism. 
In her groundbreaking study Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle 
East Policy, Kathleen Christison (1999) shows the preposterous nature of the perceptions 
prevailing in U.S. among the public and decision makers alike on Palestine. She argues 
depending on detailed examination and evidence from the nineteenth century until 
George W. Bush administrations that there are two pre-existed assumptions that direct 
decision makers and the public: first, Palestinian national aspirations are mischievous, 
and second the source of the Arab and Palestinian-Israeli conflict is Arab refusal to 
recognize Israel’s right to exist. Added to a certain degree of ignorance on the history of 
the conflict American perceptions and approach to the conflict has always been perceive 
through Israeli lens. The sheer magnitude of this problem, as she concludes resulted in 





Changing the strategy and the advent of the Peace Process 
Without undermining the role of Israeli lobby and the prevailing perspectives in 
the U.S, seen from another perspective the end of the Cold War and the advent of U.S. 
uncontested influence in the Middle East Israel regained its strategic significance to 
American interests. As Chomsky (1994) argues the major shift in American foreign 
policy in the Middle East in this era has been driven by economical imperatives. In 
particular, America opted to a strategy that deploys military force to protect economically 
critical regions for its interests. The decline of the USSR made military power a useful 
foreign policy tool for the US in the region that aims ultimately to enlarge American 
sphere of influence instead of focusing on containment. Thus America must intervene 
militarily to defend this objective including the intervention in regional conflicts that may 
have consequences to the new strategy (Chomsky 1994: 31-32, 69-71). From this 
perspective, Israel has maintained its strategic importance to the US as a military power.  
One of the greatest fears of the US after World War II namely, the spillover of nationalist 
ideas and movements to the Gulf Arab states was renewed in the post Cold War era; an 
ear of democratic transitions. Democratic transition in the Arab world hadn’t been part of 
US foreign policy in the region; it hasn’t been in the 1990s and currently as well. 
Therefore, Palestinian rights, plight, and Israel’s occupation of their land and its 
discrimination against them have a very minor importance in US policy in the past and in 
the present alike. In the structure of power that US established in post World War II and 
post Cold War Palestinians had no significant whatsoever, whereas Israel remains 
significant from the point view of the American hegemony in the region. Thus the new 
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order that U.S. sought to found has reestablished the strategic importance of Israel. 
Israel’s acceptance to involve in the Madrid peace conference and Arab-Israeli talks in 
1992 fit into this strategy through which U.S attempt to rearrange the security and 
geopolitical sphere to guarantee its interests.  The role of Israel in the new strategy is 
obviously crucial and Israeli decision makers realized the change and grasped on the 
opportunity.  
Accepting a limited autonomy for the Palestinians within this context seemed a 
minor price comparing to the position Israel would gain in the region. As Shlomo Gazit 
(2006) stated  
Israel’s main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial importance. 
Its location at the center of the Arab Muslim Easy predestines Israel to be a 
devoted guardian of stability in all the countries surrounding it. Its [role] is to 
protect the existing regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of radicalization 
and to block the expansion of fundamentalist religious zealotry.  
Indeed, at the turn of the of the 1990’s, the eve of Oslo Accords, Israel has never been 
more important;  
never before had Israel had a cart blanche from Washington –to confiscate Arab 
land, build settlements, enlarge Jerusalem, terrorize the Lebanese, pauperize 
Palestinians, and sustain such transgressions with U.S. taxpayer funds, UN 
Security Council vetoes and Congressional standing ovations (Aruri 2003: 103).  
The new position Israel claimed in U.S. security strategy in the region turned it 
into a special state for the interests of America. American support to Israel has continued 
uncompromised and reached unprecedented levels in terms of financial/economic, 
diplomatic, and military aid regardless of America’s financial and economic crises or the 
burden it lays on American tax payers. Understood within American new strategy the 
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peace process between Israel and the PLO (the Oslo process) aimed at silencing the 
conflict; manage it to conform to the broader purposes of U.S. and Israel. American 
conduct and policies since the endorsement of the DOP in 1993 shows that American 
administration without exception accepted Israeli interpretations of the agreements, 
pushed toward changing international accepted requirements to reach a resolution to the 
conflict, and monopolized the role of broker; a dishonest broker though as Aruri (2003) 
contends. U.S. monopoly over the peace process only led to deploy monopoly to Israeli 
governments.  
A quick survey to the role of the U.S in the profound changes in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict shows that US administrations’ most remarkable contribution to the 
“peace process” is “preclude effective international action on the [conflict] by always 
promising but never reaching its serious discussion” (Tilley 2005: 127). American 
complicity with Israeli policies reveals the built-in hindrances they created in the process 
itself that wouldn’t allow any meaningful resolution to the conflict that accommodate 
Palestinian national and political rights. By engineering the whole process around Israel’s 
security and downplaying Palestinian rights to mere autonomy, as Aruri (2003) argues 
the process changed the requirements for a just and durable peace; it “have dealt a 
crippling blow to the foundation of the global consensus on the solution of the question 
of Palestine”, which was the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside 
Israel.    
International divergence on how to approach Israeli occupation and thus its 
inability to exert meaningful and effective pressure on Israel to adhere to international 
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law has been instrumental in the ability of Israel to manage the ethnic-religious founding 
principles of domination under the auspices of the peace process. In essence the process 
provided Israel with a cost effective and diplomatically comfortable environment to 
managing the presence of the ethno-national existence and demands of the Palestinians 
by “outsourcing the occupation”, as we discuss in the conclusion of this part. U.S role in 
this change has been substantial and instrumental especially in the wake of September 11 
terrorist attacks.  
One can’t but notice how gradually, but steadily U.S. administrations yielded to 
Israel’s terms; in the words one American participant at Camp David talks of 2000 "far 
too often, we functioned . . . as Israel’s lawyer." Thus, under Bill Clinton’s administration 
before the Camp David the U.S. changed its position on opposing any unilateral actions -
such as Israeli settlements- that are aimed at determining the final status of the OPT and 
the city of Jerusalem. Clinton was the first president to refer to the OPT as disputed 
territories and announced in March 13, 1994 that he opposes any reference to Jerusalem 
as an occupied territory (Aruri 2003: 139). Clinton administration for the first time ceded 
to Israel (by then under Netanyahu in 1996) in writing, the sole right to determine the 
extent of any further Israeli redeployments in the OPT which came to assure Israel the 
acceptance of its own interpretation of the resolution 242.  
The failure of the Oslo process became clear as the Palestinian intifada of 2000 
irrupted, which triggered an international debate in the UN to seek mechanisms that 
would out the process on the track especially with the increased Israeli oppression and 
killing in the OPT. Thus the UN Security Council convened to consider a resolution to 
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deploy unarmed international observers to the OPT. The resolution was strongly rejected 
by Israel and vetoed by the U.S. Under the pressure of increased violence on the ground 
and international disaffection with U.S. position, Clinton administration formed the 
Mitchell Committee and the resulted Road Map that was sidelined by Israel’s increased 
military oppression.  
The most dramatic change in U.S. policy in this respect came after September 11 
where George W. Bush administration ceded to Erik Sharon’s government the final say in 
the progress of the peace process and accepted Israeli military assault on the Palestinians 
as a self-defense act. More importantly, the U.S. US administration accepted Sharon’s 
definition of violence and cease fire. Sharon conditioned the cease fire upon the PA 
ability to maintain a series of security conditions, the least of which is to sustain a total 
tranquility in the areas under PA jurisdiction and the detention of Palestinians whose 
name would be provided by Israeli security forces. The two administrations maintained a 
low level of direct involvement and conceded to the Israeli government the decision 
whether the PA has abided by Sharon’s conditions of cease fire or not. Bush 
administration’s main concern was not about bringing the Palestinians and Israelis back 
to the track of negotiations. Rather it aimed at appeasing the confrontation and preventing 
its spillover effects in the region (Mansour, 2002).  
The primary effect of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on the United States 
reinforced the view, already prevalent in the US, Israel, and the western countries, that 
lumps all international terrorist groups with local terrorist actions, national liberation 
struggle with terrorism, opposition movements, political Islam, Palestinian nationalism, 
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Turkish Kurds, and so on in one category. This view contributed significantly to the all-
out war against terror. It played in the hands of Erik Sharon as “carte blanche to set the 
rules of the game in the Israeli-Palestinian sphere and that the red lines no longer 
applied”; within two days after September 11 Israeli troops launched a massive attack on 
most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip cities and Sharon declared Arafat as Israel’s Ben-
Ladin.  US position supporting Israel’s military measures against the Palestinians gave 
Sharon the needed green light to go and change the rules of the game with the PA. 
Sharon’s assault on the PA and the main cities under its jurisdiction following two 
suicide-bomb attacks in Israel sidelined American new initiative to bring both sides back 
to the negotiating table.  President Bush announced from the podium of the UN General 
Assembly that he favors a two-state solution. Ten days later His Secretary of State Colin 
Powell added other elements to this declaration, speaking of the “Israeli occupation” and 
the need to end it on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242, the importance of 
a just and realistic solution to the refugee problem, and a solution for Jerusalem that takes 
into account the religious and political concerns of the two sides (Aruri 2003: 142). 
However, American new imitative faced adamant Israeli qualifications that culminated in 
G.W. Bush acceptance of Sharon’s own definition of an acceptable solution to the 
conflict; in their meeting in April 2004 Bush introduced a new unprecedented American 
position assuring Israel that the borders of 1967 are not the reference for achieving peace 





The Palestinian interregnum 
 
On the morning of March 3, 2012 Palestinians in the big cities of the West Bank 
(Nablus, Jineen, Tulkarm, and Ramallah) were surprised with an advertisement on 
billboards at main city entrances; huge signs calling for a one state solution. “One 
Democratic state for 5 million Arabs and 6 million Jews”, the advertisement stated, and 
signed by an anonymous called “a-Ttakamul (integration) for the one-state solution”. The 
same night and the following morning groups of Palestinian activists, self-identified as 
Fateh members and/or ‘youth for Palestine’, brought them down, torn them apart and 
stepped on them. The angry youngsters chanted slogans against what they depicted as 
“normalization” with Israel and denounced those stand behind the stickers. The party/s 
responsible for the advertisement remained unknown until the moment. Without reading 
too much into such an event, the fact that no official statement was made by the PLO or 
the PA on the slogan, and that Fateh Youth Organization (Al-Shabibah) took the initiative 
to remove the stickers indicates the dilemma that the Palestinian polity endure. After 
almost two decades of negotiations and countless rounds of talks and several agreements 
the Palestinians gained nothing but geographically fractured zones of nominal autonomy; 
engineered enclaves that have no viability. Furthermore, the reaction to the advertisement, 
hints to a profound chasm between two distinct ethno-national identities, the Palestinian 
and the Israeli Jewish: for the Palestinians, Israeli domination and its geographical, 
territorial and spatial aggrandizement is seen as an existential threat. The dynamics of 
territorial-national politics for a threatened and subjugated majority (Palestinians in the 
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OPT) generated a rigid national identity that seeks separation and ultimate national 
expression; national self-determination.  
The reaction abovementioned  is a snapshot of the new structure of domination 
Israel established during the last twenty years. Israel’s type of apartheid in the OPT raised 
Palestinian public fears of a future similar to that of Native Americans. The Palestinians 
are facing an impending reality of a one Jewish state where they constitute a minority 
subordinated and oppressed by a powerful regime of segregation and enclavization. 
Indeed, Israel’s settlement grid in the OPT and other methods and means of strangulation 
is similar to the “American ‘winning’ of the Native American territory across North 
America, as indigenous populations were surrounded, boxed in and in effect suffocated 
and subjugated” (Falah 2007). Turning Palestinian main cities into isolated and 
suffocated enclaves ala South African apartheid Bantustans while expanding the spatial 
and territorial control of the Jewish settler existence almost shattered the spatial and 
territorial base for the Palestinian state and any attempt to escape this logic by invoking 
the idea of one-state solution would be considered as sell-out and a formula for perpetual 
subjugation. The answer to Israel’s ethno-territorial hegemony in the OPT wouldn’t be 
less exclusive and self-protecting than asserting Palestinian national-territorial 
distinctiveness. Clearly the dynamics of Israeli ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ 
shaped the properties of the conflict once and again and climaxed in the 2000. 
‘Regimes of territorial legitimation’ examined     
In essence, the conditions prevailed during the peace process show the plausibility 
of the theoretical accounts we presented in our conceptual framework: Murphy (2002) 
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notices that the outcome of ethno-national territorial conflicts depends on state “forces 
against which minority and stateless movements are struggling”, namely, the national 
territorial ideologies of the state in power. The means through which they articulate the 
linkages between their senses of people-hood and their senses of territoriality is a 
decisive element. Israel ‘regimes of territorial legitimation’ (institutions, practices, and 
discourses that discussed in chapter II) especially in the after the first intifada of 1987 and 
more intensely after 2000  invoke the three ideological arguments that Murphy identifies 
as the framework of territorial-ideology that designed to give legitimacy to territorial 
aggrandizement and spatial control of the OPT: that the Land of Israel (Eritz Israel) is a 
manifestation of the historic homeland  of the Jewish people as an ethno-cultural group; 
and the Land of Israel is a distinctive physical-environmental unit that is indivisible; and 
that Israel, as the Jewish state that embody these ideologies is the modern incarnation of a 
long standing political territorial entity.  Indeed, once more as we discussed in the 
conceptual framework, at the moment Israel joined the modern state-nation system it was 
defined and indentified with ethno-territorial exclusivism ideologically and legally. Its 
longstanding territorial legitimating regimes ever since it was established invoke and 
construct the Jewish ethno-territoriality as a state system of a peculiar apartheid regime. 
As the following statement made by Shulamit Aloni, former Israeli Knesset member 
depicts, Israel has established its own type of apartheid in the OPT 
“On one occasion I witnessed such an encounter between a driver and a 
soldier who was taking down the details before confiscating the vehicle and 
sending its owner away. ‘Why?’ I asked the soldier. ‘It’s an order—this is a 
Jews-only road,’ he replied. I inquired as to where was the sign indicating this 
fact and instructing [other] drivers not to use it. His answer was nothing short of 
amazing. ‘It is his responsibility to know it, and besides, what do you want us to 
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do, put up a sign here and let some anti-Semitic reporter or journalist take a 
photo so that can show the world apartheid exists here?”  
Theory of ‘state contraction’ provides us with a very useful tool to understand the 
territorial imperatives of Israel’s domination system in the OPT. Although Lustick, 
writing at the early 1990s, accounts for Israeli redeployment in limited areas in the OPT 
as an action of state contraction, the years that followed show that this action was a tactic 
to gain hold on most of the OPT. The set of institutions, practices, and discourse Israel 
established granted the OPT a meaning that goes beyond the ‘ideological threshold’ at 
which state contraction turns devastating to state’s own political coherency. Israeli state, 
as an institution has become defined and determined by its presence in the entire territory 
of Palestine, the Jewish homeland. Israel’s imagined and institutionalized correspondence 
to the OPT stands as the major obstacle to Israel’s withdrawal and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. Indeed, Israel’s limited territorial contraction is best captured by the 
concept of ‘outsourcing the occupation’: a redeployment of military forces and allowing 
for a certain level of autonomy can only be understood as a component of a broader 
strategy of state expansion rather than contraction.  Not less significant is the challenging 
group’s capabilities and chance to control the territory and its belief in the legitimacy of 
its cause.   
Palestinian nationalism as the counter forces to domination and power 
asymmetries emerged and challenged the state of Israel on the grounds that the latter 
created: as an ethno-territorial national movement seeking national self-determination in 
a well-defined space and geography namely, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) 
and Gaza Strip. These dynamics were structurally determined by Israeli systematic 
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destruction of the Palestinian territorial and spatial spheres twice: in 1948 and in 1967, 
which impedes the realization of both the two-state and the one-state solutions by 
entrenching the ethno-territorial rigidity of the conflict and by metamorphosing the 
Jewish existence in the OPT into a matter of existence for the Jewish entity as a whole. 
For the Palestinians, Israeli policies mean political and national annihilation, an utter 
politicide.  
 
Major patterns of Israel’s apartheid  
As noticed in the last section (Israel’s Exceptionalism), Israeli government 
reluctantly accepted to involve in the peace process. For Israeli ruling class, political 
parties and the military institution, the broader strategic gain Israel would accrue justified 
the minor cost it had to incur namely, accepting the creation of a Palestinian limited 
autonomy: limited particularly in terms of its territorial and spatial boundaries, and its 
political and juridical scope. The terms and conditions in which Israeli consecutive 
governments carried Israel’s territorial and spatial policies under the auspices of the 
peace process show three major patterns that were developed and consolidated since the 
endorsement of the Oslo Accords (DOP) in 1993: asymmetrical power relations, 
separation within colonial control and occupation, and the systematic destruction of 
Palestinian spatial and territorial spheres (segregation). We turn to these patterns and 
their implications one by one:   
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First: The peace process reflects, by and large the dynamics of domination 
relations. As Sisk (1999) argues asymmetry of power relations is a high risk to productive 
conflict resolution whatever the nature and goals of this process. While Israel is under 
less pressure than the Palestinians to make concessions and benefits much more than 
them from the status quo, the Palestinians find themselves under the pressure to try and 
reduce the power asymmetry by any means in their disposal, including violence and 
coercion. However, this endeavor puts Palestinians in a destructive stalemate vis-à-vis the 
Israelis. The latter has the power and resources to deepen the structures of domination 
taking advantage of the stagnant peace process. The asymmetry is evident in the formula 
of “land for peace”; while holding the land by Israel is tangible, peace is just a promise.  
Israel has been negotiating with the PA/PLO in 2000s with the aim of annexing more 
than half of the OPT. Negotiating while eating up Palestinian land reflects to a large 
extent the dynamics of asymmetrical power relations that enables Israel to act unilaterally 
to change the facts on the ground in an irreversible way. In effect Israel’s unilateralism 
especially in the 2000s has been deployed to implement a dual strategy: unilateral 
separation from the Palestinian population, and territorial dismemberment and alienation 
(segregation). First Israel intensified and extended the regimes of segregation and 
separation within the OPT in a way that red Israel from direct rule of the population, the 
second it systematically destroyed the spatial and territorial spheres of the Palestinian 
entity leaving it unfit for the establishment of a functioning sovereign state.  
Second: the dynamics of Israel’s methods of domination during the peace process 
namely, separation and territorial control have entrenched the ethno-territorial core of the 
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conflict; “original causes of the conflict persist and are exacerbated by new grievances 
sparked by the peace process” (Darby and MacGinty 2003: 3).  Indeed, the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process has changed the macro features of domination and 
subordination into a deeper and more invisible type. The peace process has contributed to 
an Israeli strategy of making occupation invisible: by suppressing the distinction between 
the occupied and the occupier, the powerful and the powerless the Oslo process created 
an unusual situation whereby the abnormal (foreign military occupation) is being 
normalized. The fundamental change Israel introduced to its domination system since 
1993 is transforming its relationship with the Palestinians from direct military occupation 
into a separation system. Separating the main body of the population from Israeli Jewish 
settler community and from Israeli administrative control gives a sense of normalcy to 
the presence of military occupation outside highly populated Palestinian areas. 
Simultaneously, Palestinian population became dealt with on pure security basis 
including those who live in Palestinian enclaves called area ‘A’ under PA jurisdiction.  
Gordon’s (2008: 169) concept of ‘outsourcing the occupation’ captures this pattern. 
‘Outsourcing’ depicts a “technique employed by power to conceal its own mechanisms” 
and it shows Israel’s “unwavering effort to endure and remain in control”. Thus Israeli 
strategy espoused to rearrange its power and domination through segregation as the 
sovereign power methods Israel deployed in the second before and during the first 
intifada failed to suppress Palestinian national aspirations or to turn the OPT into an 
extension of Israeli-Jewish sovereignty.    
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As the South African apartheid regime “sought to perpetuate a belief system 
based on the view that ‘good secured fences make good’ neighbors.” (Knox and Quirk 
2000: 163), Israeli political ruling class invoked the motto: ‘they are there and we are her’ 
to mark the new strategy of unilateral disengagement from the population not from the 
territory. This strategy in effect implies that indeed the Palestinians ‘are there’ and Israeli 
Jewish ‘are here’, and there as well.  Segregation in this sense doesn’t imply the 
withdrawal of Israeli power and domination from the OPT. Rather it means that Israel 
rearranged this power and domination in a way to preserve its colonization and control 
over the land while ceasing the management of the population except as security threat. 
Colonization and segregation have not excluded one another. Changing the strategy 
towards separation went hand in hand with intensive colonization of the land and 
resources that created Palestinian pauperized, deprived and clustered enclaves on the one 
hand and Jewish Israel expanding and prosperous colonies on the other. Antecedently, 
Israel never entertained the incorporation of the Palestinian population of the OPT into its 
political, social, and economic system.  
The colonial buffer it established was created wide and institutionalized and 
designed primarily to exclude Palestinians. We have discussed how Israel authorities 
since 1976 sought to constitute the Palestinians as non-nationals and subject to its power 
through oppression, alienation, divisions and homogenization. Jewish colonial 
settlements “created a new spatial reality for the dispossessed Palestinians whose living 
space was dramatically circumscribed” (Gordon 2008:  34) by indiscriminate land 
confiscation and expropriation that turned increasing numbers of the population into 
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dispossesses and displaced cohorts. The process showed that Israel’s occupation was not 
temporary but ubiquitous and indiscriminate, which widened and deepened Palestinian 
national sentiments and willingness to fight; a national fight that has been focused on 
land protection and resistant to Israel’s colonialism and reached a peak in the Palestinian 
intifada of 1987. Following the intifada, as we have shown Israel introduced the 
separation method as means of control. Separation has been entrenched and 
institutionally consolidated during the long years of the peace process; the principle: “we 
are her and they are there” is being carried on the imperative of not going back to the pre-
1967 borders.  
The Oslo process was based on the logic of separation and control; outsourcings 
the responsibility over the population for the PA while controlling and colonizing the 
land and space. Dividing the OPT in the Oslo agreement into A, B, and C areas in the 
WB; H1 and H2 in the city of Hebron; and Yellow and White areas in Gaza strip created 
internal borders of domination and control that institutionalized separation. Separation in 
this sense embodies a creeping apartheid system under which Israel has established a 
legal and institutional hierarchy of rights and obligations based on ethnic affiliation and 
location. A Palestinian whether lives in the OPT or in the Israeli proper is being confined 
and dealt with on the bases of his ethno-nationality and the place where she lives; the set 
of discriminatory and racial laws and legislation enacted by the Israeli Knesset against 
Israel’s Palestinian citizens withstanding especially after the those took to the streets in 
solidarity with their brethren in the OPT during the second intifada. 
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One might argue that during the 2000s Israel was not merely separating 
Palestinians and segregating them. Rather, Erik Sharon’s unilateral ‘disengagement’ from 
Gaza Strip and the evacuation of two small and geographically isolated colonies in the 
Northern part of the WB is a step towards contraction and partition. Reading Sharon’s 
plans from the perspective of ‘regime of territorial legitimation’ and ethno-territorial 
control, the plan is a package that includes the entrenchment of Israel’s colonization of 
most the West Bank. Primarily, the plan aimed at cutting off all discussion on the 
Palestinian state that was the currency of diplomatic efforts at the time including U.S.A. 
It aimed at extending the stalemate under which it is much easier to strengthen Israel’s 
hold on the WB. As Dov Wiesglass, Sharon’s senior advisor puts it 
the significant of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace 
process…to prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders, and Jerusalem. 
Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it 
entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda…All with U.S 
permission [president and congress] (Quoted in Yiftachel 2005:128).  
American administration’s endorsement to Sharon’s plan was an explicit 
legitimation of Israel’s unilateralism and indeed permission for Israel to preserve its 
colonial control over most of the West Bank.  
Sharon took the American endorsement to its extreme logical extent by asserting 
that Israel will never go back to pre-1967 borders and that Israel will hold in perpetuity 
over “territory which is essential to our [Israeli] existence…if we do not want to be 
pushed back to the 1967 lines, the territory should be divided”, as Sharon stated in the 
Knesset. In another speech he gave later he clarified: “Israel will strengthen its control 
over those same areas in the Land of Israel which will constitute an inseparable part of 
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the state of Israel in any future agreement” (Quoted in Falah, 2007:1348). As a matter of 
fact the ‘disengagement’ plan turned Gaza Strip into an officially demarcated Bantustan 
formally sealing a process of dismemberment of the Strip that started in early 1990s. The 
implications of Sharon’s plan in particular and Israel’s separation strategy and apartheid 
become more striking when looked upon from the perspective of the systematic 
destruction of the Palestinian space and territorial terrain.                       
Third: The years of the peace process have given Israel the opportunity to 
consolidate its control over the Palestinians territory while culminating a long process of 
territorial and spatial fragmentation of the Palestinian terrain. The strategy of separation 
and colonization is coupled with dynamics of strangulation and dismemberment that 
destroyed the base of the two-state solution. Spatial and territorial engineering that Israel 
launched since early 1970s has turned the OPT into segregated enclaves and reserves that 
are dependent economically on Israel and subjugated politically to Israel’s power. The 
Bantustanization of the OPT has been in the making since 1976 as Israeli authorities 
sought to ‘manage’ the inevitable; the Palestinian demographic dominance in the OPT. 
Thus the foundation of the structural territorial and spatial fragmentation was found in 
1977; instead of segregating Palestinians at this early stage Israel sought to annul 
Palestinian existence as an ethno-national group through the establishment of colonies, 
land confiscation, and other means of domination that we discussed earlier. Israel’s main 
goal was the integration of Palestinian territory to the Israeli proper while excluding the 
population and exploiting the resources and economy of the OPT through military orders. 
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The first Palestinian intifada, as we noticed, had change the geopolitics of the 
conflict by focusing the struggle on the green line as the ethno-territorial divide, which 
Israel realized as threat to its efforts to control and extend its ethnocratic regime to the 
OPT. Israel’s strategy in the 1990s focused on answering the dilemma of colonizing a 
populated territory. The question for Israel became: if Israel recognizes ‘pragmatically’ 
that at the present Jews will not be able to settle throughout the OPT territory for 
demographical and geographical reasons and therefore the full redemption of the Jewish 
land cannot be achieved, then what would be the most prudent and expedient strategy that 
would preserve Jewish sovereignty over the largest portion of the Land of Israel while 
sustaining the core Zionist belief of Greater Land of Israel? Confining the Palestinians to 
enclaves segregated from each other and depriving these enclaves form spatial, territorial, 
social, and economic correspondence is the answer. Enclavization and Bantunization in 
this respect refer to the process of institutionalization of  
cutting off spatial interflow and heightening [territorial] control. It also has 
the effect of sundering enclaved space from other spatial areas, thus 
confining and drastically weakening the population economically, politically 
and socially-in effect ‘neutralizing its challenge as a potential opponent” 
(Falah 2007: 1344).  
This process was intensified and extended in the 1980s and entered a phase of 
consolidation n 1990s mainly through settlement expansion, bypass roads, territorial 
zoning and gerrymandering. Ultimately it aimed at consolidating territorial and spatial 
dismemberment in order to expand a state with undetermined territorial boundaries. The 
fragmentation of the OPT has been the mechanism through which Israel can tame the 
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sources of Palestinian opposition to its regimes of territorial legitmation based on 
expansionism.  
Oslo agreements paved the way for the Bantustanization and enclavization of the 
OPT; in effect it provided the answer for the Israeli dilemma above-mentioned by 
bridging the contradictory between Israel’s territorial integration of the OPT and its social 
and political separation (Farsakh, 2005: 238). Indeed the Oslo process founded the legal 
and structural bases for fragmenting the OPT and giving Israel the final say on the future 
of most of the OPT: First, the agreements failed to include any provisions that guarantee 
Israeli withdrawal from the OPT and ending the occupation; second by dividing the OPT 
into separate areas each of which subject to different territorial-legal treatment; and third 
by not affirming the supremacy of international law and conventions pertaining to the 
conflict. Thus the Oslo process has institutionalized the already established demarcations 
between Palestinian reserves.   
In 2000s Israel took advantage of the violence and open confrontation with the 
Palestinians to entrench its ethno-territorial control over land, resources, and space of the 
Palestinians. This dynamism applies to the Palestinians in the West Bank as well in the 
state of Israel. As Yiftachel (2011) remarks, Israeli governments since the eruption of the 
Palestinian Intifada –taking advantage of the increased anti-Arab sentiments that 
accompanied violence- have been involved in a massive ethnic-territorial alteration of the 
Palestinian space in Israel and in the OPT.  As we noticed earlier Palestinian Citizens of 
the state of Israel are facing unprecedented discrimination as an ethno-national group 
including, and especially, in terms of land possession and access to resources, and 
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citizenship rights. Palestinian citizens of Israel, particularly in the Negev region are 
facing a silent deportation from their lands. Israeli governments resorted to all means to 
expel the Arab Bedouins of this area from the region including spraying their corps with 
poisonous chemicals. The Israeli official explanation to this extreme measure as aiming 
at preventing non-Jewish threat to the Jewish land leaves no room for speculation on the 
racially driven policies of Israel that have been increased in the last two decades. 
The interregnum persists   
The manipulation of ethnic geography and space with the goal of Judaizing Arab 
areas in the OPT has gathered unprecedented levels during 1990-2000s by imposing an 
overwhelming set of military, administrative, and “legal” measures. The core character of 
these measures is the control of the land, while dispensing with its (non-Jewish) 
population. There is no case for a viable nation-state that can function as segregated 
enclaves controlled militarily, territorially and spatially by a powerful infiltrating foreign 
state. Under the circumstances of spatial and territorial fragmentation no viable 
circulation system will be possible. With regard to social, economic, and political flows, 
the system of circulation is an important element in the functioning of a state (Falah 
2007:1346). Palestinian state would not be more than a mockery of state unless the 
settlement grid and all other aspects of territorial control and systems of privileges 
attached to it are dismantled. This can’t be achieved until the colonial and ideological 
underpinnings that create this project being transformed. A cursory look at the current 
structural facts in the OPT makes clear that the talk about the establishment of a 
Palestinian state is unfounded:     
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• Israel is almost done with construction of the separation wall that extends to more 
than 700 Km (85 percent of the wall runs deep in the OPT) while intensifying Jewish 
settlement on both sides adjacent to the 1967 borders on both sides. For many 
Palestinians, including citizens of Israel, Netanyahu’s government policy in this respect 
de facto erases the green line and aims to prevent the geographical contiguity of 
Palestinian life and future state. The wall and the settlements with network of bypass 
roads are drawing the boundaries of the Jewish state; boundaries that are otherwise 
undetermined and anchored to Jewish colonial capacity in the entirety of Palestine. The 
power asymmetry we discussed grants Israel the capability to determine the extent of 
territorial and spatial expansion. Thus the green line and other boundaries established 
within the OPT even by the peace process are provisional from Israeli perspective and 
subject to the Israeli capacity to Judize and colonize territory;   
• Israeli military measures (segregating and separating the OPT) are systematically 
destroying Palestinian economy. In the most recent estimations presented by the 
Palestinian Minister of Planning and Administrative Development, Ali Jirbawi Israeli 
restrictions have coasted the Palestinians $ 7 billion in 2010 alone, which comes close to 
the Palestinian GNP. The minister asserted that Israel is looting Palestinian natural 
resources systematically which rules out the viability of a Palestinian state; 
• While Palestinians in the OPT can only use 40 per cent of their land Israeli 
authorities continued the policy of deportation against Palestinian communities in the 
Southern plains of the West Bank and the Palestinian side of the Jordan Valley. 
According to the Coordinator of the UN Humanitarian Mission in the OPT, Maxwell 
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Jilard Israeli house demolishing policy turned more than 1100 (after demolishing their 
266) houses Palestinians homeless in the year 2011 alone. In the Jordan Valley Israel 
demolished 76 houses in 2011 displacing 113 people. Israeli depopulation of the Jordan 
Valley since 1976 by means of land confiscation, settlement expansion, and military 
measures caused a decrease of the Palestinians live in this area from over 300,000 in 
1967 to little more than 50,000 in 2011(UCHA 2012)
120
 . In a broader and more profound 
sense, these policies enabled Israel to create empty buffers along its borders with the OPT 
that are being occupied by Israeli Jewish settlers and became subject to Israel’s future 
claims in any final status negotiations.   
• Depriving the Palestinians from their own natural resources is coupled with Israeli 
illegal overuse and extraction of these resources. In February 2012 the Israeli Higher 
Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s extraction and domination over the Palestinian stone 
quarries in the OPT is legal. The Palestinian Land Research indicates that this policy 
violated the Geneva Fourth Convention and deprives Palestinians from their legal rights 
in national resources on and under their lands. The Israeli Court ruled that these sites will 
keep working until the achievement of a peace agreement. The report clarified that 94 per 
cent of the product from these sites goes to Israeli market to cover 25 per cent of its 
annual demand. In his remarks responding to the Higher Court decision, Maher Ghunaim, 
the Palestinian Minister for Settlement Issues remarks that Israel has been illegally 
looting all Palestinian resources especially water. Israeli authorities extract an annual 7 
million tons of gravel and stones and 800 cubic square of water (Ghunaim 2012). In a 
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recent and unique report, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French parliament 
released a report in the first week of January 2012 that firmly accused Israel of 
implementing apartheid policies in the OPT in regard to water extraction and 
consumption. The report noticed that Israel is using water as a weapon in the serves of 
the “new apartheid” whereby Israeli military authorities deny Palestinians access to water 
resources.    
These conditions withstanding the ethnocratic logic of Israel’s domination system 
prevails and with it unattainable neither Palestinian national self-determination nor a 
democratic solution in a single civic state. Taking into account Palestinians inability to 
practice a serious challenge to Israeli power coupled with their assertion of their own 
ethno-national territorial claim to the OPT and independence the status quo remains more 
likely. The status quo has actually turned into an interregnum that is fraught with 
dangerous dynamics, the least of which that the circumstances abovementioned would 
lead to one form or another of transfer (the euphemism of ethnic cleansing) of a 
significant portion of the Palestinians from the OPT. The existence of a great numbers of 
the Palestinians in the OPT, although being rounded up and weakened, is still the most 
adamant challenge to the achievement of Israel’s expansionist strategy. By neither 
annexing them as Israeli citizens, nor recognizing their right of national self-
determination Israel’s policies minimize the options remained, transfer is a serious option.  
The conditions for the emergence of a civic-democratic state as the final outcome 
of the conflict are being continuously obstructed by Israel’s self-identification as an 
ethno-territorial entity preoccupied with exclusion and colonial expansionism. Under the 
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conditions discussed here forging a common national identity necessary for a unitary 
nation-building process is dim. As a religious ethno-nationality Israeli polity is a coherent 
group established and crystallized around an ethnic core that diminished internal 
differentiations through ethnocratic nation-building based on religion, language, history 
and most importantly ethnic-territoriality. Thus territorial and spatial separation and 
exclusion was not sought as an instrumental tool for political manipulation and 
exploitation. Rather it is an end that is inextricably linked to close the circle of Jewish 
identification as a distinct people. Following 1967 the ethnic-territorial imperative of 
Israeli Jewish domination was reinforced and entrenched not only by deploying the 
structures and methods of territorial and spatial control and fragmentation but not less 
importantly by politically and strategically defeating its adversary; the Palestinian 
national movement. The latter couldn’t maintain a consistent strategy of liberation, 
democratization, or independence and actually is enduring a precarious position to 
prevent more losses. The Palestinian interregnum of the current day carries within it the 
dynamics of apartheid that may culminate in a struggle for civic self-determination. 
However, that implies defeating Israel’s colonial project politically, morally and 
diplomatically, which starts necessary in compelling Israel to withdraw from the OPT 
and recognize the Palestinians as nationals.  
Meanwhile the inability of the Palestinians to shift the balance of power in their 
favor, and the increased strangulation of Palestinian space coupled with Israeli polity and 
society drift to the right the discourse of transfer is becoming increasingly prevalence; 
“Several Knesset members and ministers have adopted the idea, often with feeble 
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qualifications such as "if the need arises," or "only as a voluntary plan." (Yiftachel, 2011) 
The racist transfer idea is now echoing aloud, gaining growing legitimacy among the 
Jewish public as well.  
Yiftachel (2011) provides a panoramic survey of the extent to which transfer cheerleaders 
within the Israeli polity are gaining credibility. They are not any more marginal voice; 
rather they gain popular and electoral gains and reach the Israeli cabinet.  Avigdor 
Lieberman; Israeli foreign minister expressed the idea most bluntly 
There is nothing undemocratic about transfer. Even in Europe millions were 
transferred from one place to another and it helped to bring peace... [T]he 
separation, like surgery, helps healing. When I see Arabs going to blow 
themselves up in Haifa or Nahariyya, or Arabs who donate to terrorists' 
families -- if it were up to me, they wouldn't have stayed here one minute, 
them and their families.  
Cabinet member Efraim Eitam echoed the transfer discourse in a different capacity 
stating that “Jordan and Sinai are, in the final analysis, the territorial address for meeting 
the national aspirations of the Palestinians. Israel should control forever the entire 
territory between Jordan and sea. We should offer the Palestinians a choice between 
enlightened residency (with no voting rights) in Israel, or primitive Arab citizenship. The 
Arabs in Israel are a ticking time bomb... [T]hey resemble a cancerous growth. We shall 
have to consider the ability of the Israeli democracy to continue the Arabs' participation. 
Both positions quoted here fall within the accepted political and ideological debates in 
Israel today not an odd and marginal precept. More striking is that they refer not only to 
the Palestinians in the OPT but as well to those live inside and hold Israeli citizenship. 
Transfer calls also come from the Labor political camp. In March 2002 the minister of 
transportation, Labor's Efraim Sneh proposed a plan to resolve the conflict according to 
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which the future Palestinian state annexes “Arab localities” close to the Green Line in the 
Israeli proper [Israeli citizens]  in return for the annexation of West Bank settlement blocs 
by Israel. The plan was described by its initiator as democratic and human 
No Arab will have to move from his/her home. We are offering them 
annexation to the Palestinian nation, with which they openly identify. All we 
say is: the 1967 borders are not sacred... [L]et's modify them to create a better 
ethnic political geography: Jews in the West Bank will be part of the Jewish 
state, and Arabs (who declare day and night that they are Palestinians) will 
become part of the Palestinian state, staying on their own lands. What is more 
simple?”  
 
Moreover, the idea also penetrated ‘liberal’ Zionist circles and intellectual and 
academic discourse. Thus Ruth Gavison, former head of the Israeli Association of Human 
Rights, authors A.B. Yehoshua and Amos Oz and geographer Arnon Soffer all are 
leading voices express the "need" to reshape Israel's borders according to "ethnic 
principles." Recent surveys show that this idea is gaining popularity, reaching approval 









Comparative analysis and findings 
 
 
From case analysis to theory 
 
This dissertation approached the two conflicts in South Africa and Palestine from 
the perspective of settler-colonial domination systems. Analyses provided aimed to 
achieve two interrelated objectives: First, to show the complexity and the degree of 
discipline of settler-colonial domination systems in terms of the dynamics and conditions 
that lead to transforming a settler-colonial society into an ethno-national entity in its 
specificity and peculiarity. This represents one way to explain the phenomenon whereby 
similar domination systems in a settler-colonial setting take different paths and obtain 
divergent ends.  Second, to uncover similarities and shared as well as differences 
properties of these systems in order to establish a useful comparison between the two 
cases. This endeavor, however, focused on the differences between the Palestinian-Israeli 
and the Southern African conflicts to isolate the conditions (factors and forces) that 
account for the divergence of outcome in the two contexts.  
This approach suggests that historical contexts and major structures of settler-
colonialism matter and offer plausible explanations. It also recognizes the importance of 
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uniqueness and the role of interactions and events in the developments of each case. 
Contingency, in this sense represents the dialectical relationship between structures on 
the one hand and events and human agency on the other. Thus comparative conclusions 
and derivatives provided below are generalizations bound to the two contexts and 
contingent in so far as the broad phenomenon of ethno-national conflicts is concerned.  
However, it is plausible to conclude that settler-colonial societies in general and 
the two cases concerned in this research in particular face three major vulnerabilities. 
These weak nods are inherited in the edifice of all settler-colonial ethno-national entities 
as externally imposed societies facing the other indigenous. Overcoming each of these 
weaknesses is a necessary condition for settler-colonial ethno-nationalist peoples to 
survive and endure. As suggested in the conceptual framework of this research linkages 
between “regimes of territorial legitimation” and the national-territorial nexus in the one 
hand and systems of domination and the responses to them on the other determine, to a 
large extent, the trajectory and transformation of the conflict. The three vulnerabilities 
illustrated below uncover the saliency of these linkages as they are dialectically linked to 
questions of territory, space, minority-majority dynamics, and external effects. Having 
achieved significant accomplishments in any of those vulnerability is a necessary but not 
sufficient in itself for the dominant group to overcome the uncertainties embedded in the 
conflict and its internal and external environments:  
(A) To find a permanent solution to the problem of the existence of the 
indigenous people on the same territory: The solution is determined on the one hand by 
the nature and imperatives of the settler-colonial society: the regimes of territorial 
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letgitimation upon which it is established,  levels and degrees of exclusion it practices, 
and on the other hand by indigenous national movement responses: its characteristics, its 
understanding and reaction to systems of territorial separation, and the ability it shows to 
preserve a consistent political strategy for either liberation and democratization or ethno-
territorial self-determination;  
In South Africa, Black Africans remained a majority that is structurally integrated 
in the economic system of the white economy. Segregation and territorial separation 
(apartheid) could not overcome this structural reality. Nor the white society was able to 
find a source of immigration to compensate for its minority status. As a minority, the 
Afrikaners relied heavily on police and oppressive methods to keep the African 
nationalist sentiments and actions circumscribed. The minority status of the white society 
allowed neither to accommodate the indigenous in the political system fearing the 
tyranny of the majority nor to totally expel them as they were indispensable for the 
economy.  While white society’s weak national-territorial nexus, the divisions it endured, 
and its minority status weakened its hegemony and domination systems,  African 
nationalist movement consistency in pursuing self-determination within a democratic 
South Africa undercut regimes ability to provide a permanent solution to the indigenous 
question. Thus the domination system remained starkly one of partial inclusion and 
exploitation before apartheid and separation and exploitation under apartheid.  
By contrast, the founding principles of Zionism impeded inclusion of the 
indigenous at any level of social, economic, and political life. The establishment of the 
state of Israel was premised upon total exclusion. To overcome the dilemmas of majority-
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minority dynamics Zionism and Israel resorted to ethnic cleansing that rendered the 
Palestinians a manageable minority inside the state. At this stage Israel overcame the 
question of indigenous within its territorial boundaries of 1948. After 1967, the problem 
of the indigenous became strikingly prevalent. The same principles and factors that 
enabled Zionism and Israel to maintain hegemony in 1948 were sustained in post-1967: 
the consolidation of the Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel and to control the 
territorial and spatial terrains of the Palestinians.  
Now a majority in the entire land of Palestine Israel deployed a diverse and multi-
layered system of dual domination against the indigenous amongst its own citizenry and 
those in the OPT. The majority status of the Israeli Jews provided for the diversity with 
which Israel dominated its adversary by deploying the three strands of power 
(disciplinary, bio, and sovereign) rather than relying mainly on oppression. The 
introduction of legal, administrative, military, institutional methods of domination within 
a claimed democratic system enabled Israel to conceal its peculiar apartheid within its 
own borders and in the OPT.  
Domination systems Israel established in its proper and in the OPT remained 
ethno-territorially-based: controlling the land and space and managing the population. In 
the OPT, Israel partially succeeded in confining, enclavizing, and segregating the 
Palestinians, which fragmented their ability to challenge Israeli hegemony. This partial 
success encourages Israel to enact more measures to further push the Palestinians into a 
creeping apartheid system. Palestinian national movement ethno-territoriality contributed 
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to the persistent of the political-geography of the conflict as one over separated ethno-
nationally based entities.           
(B) To achieve hegemony over the surrounding region or alternatively to realize 
normal relationships with neighboring states: white South African and Israeli regimes 
show a significant level of regional hegemonic propensity especially in tandem of their 
respective attempts to permanently resolve the question of the indigenous: after 1948 for 
South Africa, and starting 1967 in the Israeli case. Both regimes resorted to military 
aggression against their neighbors each for particularistic reasons but primarily for 
maintaining an edge that allow for a free hand in domestic issues. While South Africa 
achieved military hegemony in the region of Southern Africa and at some point deployed 
its military power to eliminate African nationalist threats in its surrounding, Israel 
resorted to a dual strategy of military aggression and diplomatic engagement. The role of 
the USA was pivotal in both endeavors. Thus, Israel has partially normalized its 
relationships with the region by reaching peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, while 
partially tamed threats stemming from Lebanese borders, Syria, and beyond from Iran. 
Within this strategic, oversimplified depiction, the question of the Palestinian population 
and indeed the conflict as a whole has become less urgent for Israel to engage.  
(C) To gain a certain degree of independence from a superpower or a 
metropolitan. Until finding answers to the first two vulnerabilities settler-colonial 
societies remain dependent on a metropolitan support. Both settler-colonial societies were 
in their rise and consolidation European in the essence of their economic system as 
advanced industrial societies. They possessed numerous financial resources and equipped 
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with technologies and expertise that the indigenous populations lacked. Depending on its 
own resources South Africa gained economic and military capabilities from any super 
power which enabled her to stand on strong grounds to bargain its interests. Even under 
overwhelming international sanctions and boycott campaigns the regime in South Africa 
established its military might and managed to survive.  
South Africa’s less internationalized conflict and the high degree of independence 
of the regime on international support have a contradictory effect that facilitated 
significant international pressure on the regime on the one hand, and encouraged African 
national movement to sustain its political and moral high ground vis-à-vis the regime. 
The international community did not have any normative commitments towards the 
regime in South Africa, and the support it gained from western states was contingent 
upon the circumstances of the Cold War and the particular regional developments. Thus 
changes in these circumstances facilitated western countries’ change of policy toward 
South Africa whereby the regime was treated as a pariah state: a repressive-aggressive 
state that should be castigated and disciplined. The nature of the ties and relationships 
between the white South African regime and the international community facilitated 
categorizing the regime as a rogue state as its internal repressive and external aggressive 
conduct attested.   
Israel, by contrast, gained one of main factors of success in creating and 
sustaining a relationship of interrelated interests and influence with an imperial or 
superpower sponsor. As we illustrate below, at their foundation and formation the two 
regimes differ significantly in regard of international involvement in conferring 
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legitimacy on their respective regimes of territorial legitimation. Israel has a peculiar 
relationship of dependence with the USA and other western countries. But at the same 
time Israel has developed certain mechanisms of influence on these actors’ decision-
making processes, which makes it partially independent from the metropolis. This unique 
position enabled Israel to isolate its adversary on the international arena and to gain 
legitimacy for its ethno-national territorial foundations.   
 
The persistent Palestinian-Israeli impasse 
 
The abovementioned vulnerabilities withstanding, the ability of the South African 
regime to endure was primarily compromised by its internal structural contradictions that 
rendered regional achievements and independence vis-à-vis international superpowers 
insufficient for the survival of the regime. Rather, regional and international effects 
conversely worked against regimes intentions as internal contradictions turned violent 
and explicitly violated major international norms and principles. International pressure 
converged with internal developments towards the recreation of South Africa as a 
democratic state. In contrast, the durability of Israeli regime is primarily refers to its 
internal coherency and ability to form and transform the conflict according to its 
“regimes of territorial legitimation”. Thus Israel’s partial achievements on the three fronts 
(vulnerabilities) especially reducing the challenge of the Palestinian national movement 
comparing to the failure of the white regime in South Africa indicates the vitality of its 
ethno-national territorial system of domination, its ability to manage the demographic 
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aspects of the conflict, and its exceptional stand vis-à-vis the international community. In 
the follow I draw the comparative findings in congruent fashion with the conceptual 
framework of the research : (1) the complexity of settler –colonial systems in terms of 
their national-territorial nexus and the regimes of territorial legitimation that underlies 
them; (2) the nature and properties of systems of domination derived from the national-
territorial imperatives and the responses they face by the challenging national movement; 
and  (3) External effects that pertain to the acceptance or rejection of the dominant 
regime. The table below summarizes the findings of the research     


















































First: The complexity of settler-colonial systems in South Africa and Palestine 
and their respective regimes of territorial legetimiation have been decisive in determining 
the trajectory of each conflict and creating the conditions conducive to democratization in 
South Africa. The magnitude we grant to ethno-territorial nexus is justified theoretically 
as the defining factor that determines ‘regimes of territorial ideology’ and the spatial 
aspects of ethno-national conflicts. As such it also determines levels of exclusion and 
inclusion, and the nature of domination systems that aim at sustaining a certain ethno-
territorial system of differentiation and subordination.  
The foundation of the modern state in South Africa did not espouse any ethno-
territorial underpinnings as we noticed and the legitimation of the state was derived from 
the system of social differentiation it created. For segregation before apartheid was not 
territorially determined and the regime sought the exploitation of the indigenous 
exclusion was partial. Nor the Afrikaners attempted to ethnically cleanse the Black 
Africans as the latter role in the economic processes was structurally intertwined with 
their confinement and subordination.   
By contrast, exclusion of the indigenous people that characterized the Zionist 
movement Palestine was absolute and represented a pre-condition for the implantation of 
Jewish immigrants in the place of the indigenous; the expulsion of more than 700,000 
Palestinians in 1947-8 outside the border of the state of Israel as it was designated by the 
UN Resolution 181 turned the Jewish community into a majority overnight. Zionism 
gained international and institutional recognition and legitimacy on the grounds of ethno-
territorial definition of the state. Again, at the moment it was established the regimes of 
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territorial legitimation of the state of Israel embodied three interrelated ideologies: (a) 
that the Land of Israel (Eritz Israel) is the historical and cultural expression of the Jewish 
people; (b) this land is a single indivisible and distinct space; and (c) Israel is the 
incarnation of this unity.  Israel as modern state came to carry on the objectives and goals 
of a movement that finds its justification within a rigid ethno-territorial ideology uplifted 
by religious convictions. As such Zionism and Israel succeeded in reconstructing Jewish 
immigrants in a single religious ethno-nationality bound to determined territorial and 
spatial boundaries whereas the settler-colonial state in South Africa fill short of bridging 
the structural chasm between two white dominant and rival groups.  
The dynamics of the conflicts in both cases diverge on this condition: religious 
ethno-territoriality of the Zionist movement and Israel resulted in total exclusion. In 
effect this impeded all aspects of interpenetration of the settler and indigenous economies 
and societies which meant that the two remained significantly separated on physical, 
legal, institutional, and psychological levels.  In South Africa, the economic inclusion of 
the indigenous Africans and the limited political accommodation of Coloureds and at 
some stage certain segments of Africans created structural conditions that gave the 
Africans a significant political leverage on the white community from within the 
structures of domination it established. Thus, Israel today appears committed to the 
territorial boundaries of its initial legetimation within the borders of 1948. On many other 
aspects, however, it practices virtual administrative, institutional, and sovereign powers 
in the whole of mandatory Palestine, which in effect reestablished Palestine as a single 
unit under a single hegemony: the political-geography of the conflict in this sense has 
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been reversed to its original boundaries whereas political. Legal, and territorial/spatial 
properties of the conflict where transformed.  
The transformation of the two conflicts at two major turning points has profound 
effects on the conditions that led to democratization in South Africa and the persistent of 
separation in the Palestinian-Israel conflicts: in the former introducing apartheid and the 
Bantustan policy against the reality of partial integration and the dynamics of weak 
ethno-territorial identification riggered a chain of events that allowed a staged decline and 
eclipse of the regime. In Palestine, Israel’s occupation of the OPT led to the consolidation 
of the religious ethno-territorial identification of the state and the Israeli Hewish society: 
social, economic, legal, and legislative resources have been dedicated to turn the Jewish 
colonial settlements in the OPT into a semi-state. This state of affairs prevents not only 
the establishment of a meaningful Palestinian state but it also     impedes partitioning ala 
the ‘homeland’ policy of the South African apartheid: the ‘homeland’ or Bantustanization 
policy aimed at partitioning the country and the creation of pseudo-sovereign entities on 
the periphery of the white state. While South African apartheid sought to solve the 
problem of the indigenous by dismembering them with their territory from the state, 
Israeli apartheid is dismembering the population apart from the land, absorbing territory 
and occupying space while suffocating the population and eliminating the fruition of its 
political and national aspirations. Thus, the correspondence between geography, 
demographic attributes, and the ethno-national nexus of the conflict (on both sides of the 
divide) increases Israeli intransigence position against Palestinian rights, and it 
galvanizes Palestinian persistent struggle for national self-determination; a situation that 
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would prolong the interregnum and with it the propensity for violence and extreme 
measures.      
Second: political consistency, convergence of purpose and reaction to ethno-
national and regimes of territorial ideology constitute a crucial factor in shaping the 
properties of the conflict. I argued that these aspects develop within a dialectical 
relationship between the dominant state and the challenger national movement. The two 
cases of South Africa and Palestine show the validity of this argument: in the first place 
the organizational coherency and clarity of purpose play a decisive role in movement’s 
ability to represent a profound political challenge to the regime. Indeed, the most crucial 
periods of the two conflicts in 1980s show striking similarities in the organization of 
political militancy and mobilization that characterized the two movements in terms of 
their highly popular and well democratically organized uprisings. However, the counter-
hegemonic social-political project of the South African national movement that embodied 
the convergence of a wide range of social elements within a single political front against 
apartheid, as we discussed in Chapter Three was not paralleled in the Palestinian case. 
The independent-driven Palestinian national movement was able to converge and 
mobilize one portion of its constituency; the Palestinians in the OPT. Objectively, this 
resulted from the factors of geographical fragmentation, properties of Israel’s settler-
colonial enterprise after 1967 and the regional circumstances. Indeed, the nature of 
regime domination systems and their ethno-territorial underpinnings enabled the ANC 
and anti-apartheid movement to challenge the regime from within its own structures. This 
structural condition offered the African national movement a genuine opportunity to gain 
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political leverage over the regime as a democratization force. The Palestinian national 
movement, and the vast majority of the Palestinians were excluded from the structures of 
power within the state of Israel and have had to challenge it from without; the 
identification with a total liberation and democratization was initially stripped of its 
geographical and institutional base.    
Eventually, the PLO, contrary of the ANC, failed to negotiate the end of Israeli 
occupation and rather involved in negotiating the establishment of limited autonomy 
under the auspices of Israeli rule. The Oslo Accords have lead to the metamorphosis of 
the occupation and then the increased difficulty to realize Palestinian national self-
determination. Oslo agreements amounted to a political defeat for the PLO as it couldn’t 
maintain a consistent political strategy or sustain a well organized and mass mobilized 
momentum for its declared goals.  By contrast, the South African National movement has 
shown a remarkable degree of consistency and persistence on its goals to overthrow 
apartheid.  The ANC rejected and fought the Bantustan policy and mobilized to thwart it 
whereas the PLO was transformed from a national liberation movement into a kind of 
subordinate client to Israel, delivering gendarme services in segregated and isolated areas 
of the OPT. In comparison to ANC, initiatives to achieve peace had not changed the 
nature, goals, and role of the national liberation movements. 
Third: international legitimation or castigation of ethno-territorial underpinnings 
of domination is a crucial factor that may categorize a settler-colonial system as a pariah 
or a rouge state based on its oppressive and aggressive essence. The effects are profound 
in delegitimizing the regime and to give rise to national movement’s democratic 
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orientation. Conversely legitimizing the regime contributes to the persistence of ethno-
territoriality as an acceptable basis for political organization and rule, which cripples the 
democratic dynamics of the struggle for self-determination. As I discussed in the last 
section of Chapter Eight, in contrast to Israel, the international community did not give a 
soft shoulder to the South African regime while Israel enjoys unprecedented levels of 
support and protection from western regimes. While apartheid in South Africa was 
condemned as a rogue state Israel has gained the recognition of the U.S.A as a Jewish 
state although the definition of rogue states applies to both regimes as regimes of 
apartheid. The recognition of Israel as Jewish state further entrenched its exclusiveist 
regimes of territorial legitimation and encouraged it to extend this ideology well into the 
OPT.       
In this respect it is important to notice that Afrikaners’ regime did not have the 
advantage of a supportive Diaspora that Israel and the Zionist movement have especially 
in North America. The support of Jewish communities Western countries has been 
crucial in driving the policies of these countries in regard to the conflict, as I showed. 
Diaspora Zionist organizations represent an important actor in Israeli domestic and 
international politics not just for their instrumentality in generating political, financial, 
and diplomatic support for Israel, but also for the state of Israel is seen as their supra-
territorial homeland. “Diaspora Jews” participate in nurturing the Zionist dream of 
“return” and share the Israeli Jewish the same aspirations by cultural, political, and 
organizational efforts within their communities. Although Israeli policies in the occupied 
territories, and particularly settlement policy, do not have a blanket support of all Jewish 
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communities, a significant part does. Furthermore, the vast majority of those, even the 
most liberal, oppose the democratic one-state as a solution for it implies the demise of 
Israel as a Jewish state.  
 
One can conclude that none of the conditions prevailed in South Africa and led to 
democratization are available in the Palestinian context. However, the developments of 
the last twenty years show that those conditions are in the making especially in the sense 
that Israeli policies in the OPT and discrimination against its Palestinian citizens are 
creating similar conditions that would culminate in conditions that trigger dynamics of 
democratization. Meanwhile, having circumscribed its adversary, Israel accelerated and 
intensified the patterns of its territorial control and the domination over the population.  
The three major patterns of Israel’s domination system show the unfounded 
grounds for the two-state diplomacy: (a) the deepening of the asymmetrical power 
relationships; (b) transforming the occupation into a form of segregation and exclusive 
system within the OPT itself. In this sense the Palestinian threat as a strategic challenge 
was minimized. While ecnlaving the Palestinians in the OPT only strengthened their 
identification with their ethno-territorial aspirations their struggle is aiming the 
redemption of  a territory and space that have been already Judized; (c) Israeli answer to 
the Palestinian demography turned the Palestinians into fractions of minimally connected 
collectivities, and narrowly linked territorially. These patterns are the structures that 
render any attempt to establish a Palestinian state unfounded. In fact, Israel has 
constructed a system of ethnic hierarchy in the entire mandatory Palestine; a system of 
416 
 
apartheid that works in different capacities inside Israel and in the OPT. It is based on 
legal, institutional and legislative measures that assign rights and obligations to people 
according to their ethnicity and according to their geographical location.          
The persistent colonial-settler enterprise of Zionism and Israel that transformed 
more than 80 per cent of Palestine into a Jewish space and territorially controlled Israeli 
proper; the exceptional organizational and institutional capacities it deploys to achieve 
this end and cultivate international legitimacy for its practices; its ability to isolate and 
castigate the Palestinians; and the unconditional support it receives for the U.S.A and 
other western powers, implies that Israel is not in a position to give any significant 
consideration to withdraw from the OPT and allow the Palestinians to practice their right 
of national self-determination. Nor it allow for the emergence of unitary democratic 
entity. It is only in this sense that the one-state solution addresses aggressively the heart 
of the conflict: Israeli and Zionist politics, rather than avoiding it by separation themes. 
Israel’s occupation of the OPT is a manifestation of Zionist and Israel territorial ideology 
and therefore even the struggle for Israel’s withdrawal from these territories requires, by 
necessity this confrontation if we seek to have a better understanding and to realize a 
democratic solution to the conflict or an Israel acceptance of Palestinians national and 
political rights.  
Israel’s settler-colonial underpinning and policies is the core of the conflict. 
Israel’s deeply-established links between the Jewishness of the state of Israel and the 
preservation of the settlement grid in the OPT renders Israeli ability to abandon the OPT 
or to accept the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state unconceivable for any Israeli 
417 
 
leadership. In other words, state contraction under these circumstances can be costly 
more than the ability of any government to afford. Israel has crossed the ideological 
threshold in its ties with the OPT, which implies that disengagement is less likely and 
confronting Israel as an apartheid regime in the entire Palestine is inevitable. Challenging 
central Zionist doctrine of Jewish ethnic statehood; the kernel of Israeli sense of 
nationhood by a coherent and well organized Palestinian effort seems the only answer for 
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